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
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
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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE.

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"RICE-ISM"

Major A. W. John,
Director of Army Education.



IN these days of the blatant, the spectacular and the super-colossal, it is easy to lose sight of fundamentally important things in the affairs of nations. One of these things is rice. President Eisenhower gave recognition to this recently when he said that the peace which the U.S. seeks could be "fortified not by weapons of war, but by wheat and cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat, by timber and by rice." Point Four of the Colombo Plan has also recognized this principle.


A Japanese proverb likens a grain of rice to Mount Fuji. Perhaps it would be less of a fantasy to liken a grain to an atomic bomb!

Normal world production of rice is around five hundred billion pounds of rough rice, but, unlike wheat, it is mostly consumed by its own growers and only 4 per cent. of the total production enters international trade. Most areas of Asia are producing as much rice as they are able, though more scientific methods of cultivation, particularly fertilization, may mean greater yields. Practically all these areas

are over-populated and the relationship between food supply and population is of special importance because of its bearing on the causes of war.

A significant feature of the northern coastal strip of the Australian continent is that it is nearer the swarming millions of South-East Asia than the populated centres of its own South-East corner. It may some day be recognized as an international crime for a nation to breed more people than its territory can support, but in the meantime none can blame hungry Asians for making rough estimates of how much rice can be grown north of the 15th parallel(S) on areas as big as Borneo.

If a majority of Westerners see rice as something to throw at weddings or argue with the grocer about, a majority of Easterners see it as something to cultivate with meticulous care and to handle with reverence. There is no forgiveness in the East for anybody who willfully throws away a handful of rice. Men live on it more exclusively than any other food. It is the foun-



Terraced rice fields in Java.

dation of the existence of whole nations—Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Indians, Burmese, Thais, Malayans, Indonesians, the peoples of the kingdoms and colonies of Indo-China and additional millions in Africa and the South Sea Islands. It should also be noted that some of the peoples of Southern Europe (the Italians and Spaniards) are rice-eaters, and that it is now cultivated extensively in parts of North and South America.

However, the great mass of rice-eating peoples live in Asia. There are areas in China where rice cultivation has gone on steadily for four thousand years. It is no accident that the rice regions of China have the greatest population density, for one acre under rice will

produce more food than one acre under most other crops and as much as four to six acres under livestock.

It should not be supposed that all rice is made into puddings. A Japanese has claimed that: "If rice is eaten, the people will become physically strong, live longer, have warmth in the body and avoid starvation, and if the grain is made into sake, it gives vigour to the body, when made into vinegar it stimulates the blood and when made into sweet soup it nourishes the kidneys, and when made into paste it will stick for a thousand years." A Buddhist sect has made rice synonymous with religion, whilst other sects and the native theology, Shin-

toism, place great emphasis on the cult of rice, the Emperor of Japan himself performing rites of harvest thanksgiving.

But for the simple peasant of Japan, or any other part of Asia, rice is life, and he cultivates it with the devotion to detail of the fine craftsman. Every foot of ground is prepared with loving care, every individual plant is inserted by hand to the accompaniment of elaborate ceremonies. Throughout the hot growing months the paddy fields receive constant attention. To guard the ripening grain from insects and birds ingenious traps and scarecrows are used. At harvest there are again elaborate ceremonies, thanksgiving and general rejoicing. One thing is constant throughout the

year, and that is hard back-breaking toil for both sexes, young and old.

Of the rice producing nations, several consume all they produce. By intensive cultivation, the Japanese make their fields yield twice as much as most Asian rice-fields, but production is falling behind in the race against population increase. Formerly Korea supplied Japan with 5 per cent. of her requirements, and other imports came from California and Saigon. India, Ceylon, Malaya and Indonesia must import, but the Philippines produce about enough for home requirements.

The nations which normally produce a surplus are Burma, Indo-China and Thailand, a contiguous land mass, as everybody has been



Burmese peasants cultivating rice.

made aware in recent months. Not the least important feature at any time is its rice output.

Like the rest of mankind, the life of the Asian is conditioned by his environment, and the most important factor in his environment is rice. Libraries full of wisdom on democratic freedom versus ideological slavery are empty platitudes alongside a single bowl of rice. If the Asian is to be politically swayed there must be the conviction that the party he is asked to follow will provide rice, more rice, better rice, or a more just distribution of rice. To the untutored Asian, the side which offers rice and more rigid political control could be more acceptable than the side which offers jellied petrol and the right to vote.

The devastation in Korea is more in the minds of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, Thailand and Burma these days than any bogey conjured up by the term "communistic aggression." Korea will have no exportable surplus of rice for some time to come and must be supplied from outside. Who is to have control of the areas of surplus production?

The Viet-Minh probe into Laos fo-

cussed public attention on the problem for a moment, but nothing very coherent appeared in the press. Does the Laotian or Cambodian think in terms of supporting capitalism or communism or of supporting the power which comprehends and controls his rice economy? The weakness of the French position in Indo-China is its restriction to strong points which do not administer the wider resources of people and products.

While the probe into Laos was in progress, one clue as to the importance of rice appeared in the press. It stated that a General Giap, commanding large Viet-Minh forces operating in Laos, paid his soldiers 20 to 40 lb. of rice a month. There seems to be a principle here—that of putting first things first in Asian terms. It is probably recognition of this principle more than all the sins of the Kuo-min-tang which brought Mao-tse-tung's regime to power in China. The Land Reform Programme introduced into Japan under the Occupation will make a firmer contribution to the cause of democracy than all the less tangible measures of "democratization" put together. "Ism" without rice is not much use to the Asian.

KOREA

Decisive Battle of the World

Lieutenant Colonel Leon B. Cheek, Jr., Artillery
Instructor, Command and General Staff College, USA.

THE Korean conflict is now in its third year. Since 25 June, 1950, much has been said and written regarding the fighting there. Many soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen of the United States have participated in the Korean conflict.

This battle has been referred to as the "unnecessary war" and in other terms that are unprintable and unfair. Many of the statements made have been biased or coloured by the political affiliations of the individual or group disseminating their views. What one faction has labelled as success, the other has called failure. The reasons given by one person or clique for a continuation of the struggle have been countered by the others as a basis for its termination. The only point of agreement has been on the actual necessity for our intervention in the conflict. However, the methods employed have been subjected to a barrage of criticism.

In general, two courses of action have been advocated:—

1. Get to the source of the trouble, and thereby broaden the conflict to the extent necessary to win it.

—From *Military Review*, USA.

2. Continue to strive for a peaceful settlement while confining the conflict to the Korean Peninsula.

Advocates of the first plan disagree on just how the conflict should be won and, with few exceptions, do not have the courage to speak up without the advantage of hindsight.

Although we have been showered with a vast amount of verbalization concerning the Korean conflict, few authors, armchair strategists, or statesmen have attempted to analyze the *true* significance of the military campaign.

What is the significance of Korea? Future historians may claim Korea as a decisive event in the history of the world—the bulwark needed by the non-Communist peoples to reach a decision and enable them to stem effectively the tide of Communism.

Of the many battles fought throughout the ages, a very few have been selected by noted historians as decisively affecting the future course of world events. Most of these battles have been of short duration—ranging from a few hours to a few weeks. In modern

war it is doubtful that any one battle of a prolonged campaign can be selected as decisive or as influencing the outcome of a war to the extent that it can further be stated that the battle "essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes." We have such a battle in Korea and its significance cannot be disregarded. However, before pursuing this matter further let us look into the past at a military engagement which has been considered a decisive battle and examine the reasons for its importance.

The Battle of Marathon.

In 490 BC, a council of Athenians was faced by the invading forces of King Darius of Persia. This mighty force, which was arrayed on the plain of Marathon, intended to impose upon the Athenians a special reprisal for the part the Athenians had played in the aiding of rebels and for the burning of the capital of one of the provinces of Darius.

Before the battle of Marathon was fought, the prestige of success and of supposed superiority of race was on the side of the Asian against the European. The Persians had succeeded in subjugating the fairest portions of the then known world, while the Greeks, from their geographical position, formed the natural vanguard of European liberty against Persian ambition. The nations around and near the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea were the first to receive the rudiments of art and literature and the germs of political and social organization from the East.

The Greeks were among these nations, but imparted a new and wholly original stamp on all they

received. Long before the Persian invasion, the kingly form of government had given way in almost all the Greek states to republican institutions. In literature and science, the Greek intellect followed no beaten track, and acknowledged no limitary rules.

Compare all this with the tendency of Eastern rulers to claim supreme control of education, to stereotype the lines in which literature and science could move, and to limit the extent to which it was lawful for the human mind to inquire. We can thus appreciate the repulse which Greece gave to the arms of the East, and to judge the probable consequences to human civilization, if the Persians had succeeded in bringing Europe under their yoke.

Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy, in his book, "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," sums up the decisiveness of the battle of Marathon as follows:—

"The day of Marathon broke forever the spell of Persian invincibility, which had paralyzed men's minds. It generated among the Greeks the spirit which beat back Xerxes and afterwards led on Xenophon, Agesilaus, and Alexander in terrible retaliation through their Asiatic campaigns. It secured for mankind the intellectual treasures of Athens, the growth of free institutions, the liberal enlightenment of the Western world, and the gradual ascendancy for many ages of the great principles of European civilization."

Similarity of Aggressors.

It would be difficult to support a claim that conditions in the world

today parallel those at Marathon some 2400 years ago. The struggle today is between the Soviet brand of Communism and the democratic principles practised by the peoples of the free world, and not necessarily a struggle between the East and the West, as is so often stated. The tyranny practised by the Persians is, however, exemplified by the Soviet masters today, in that they, too, control education (and religion), stereotype the lines in which literature and science must move, and limit the extent to which it shall be lawful for the human mind to prosecute its inquiries.

The tidal wave of Communist tyranny, seeking to engulf the world, was met by the first forceful military opposition by Republic of Korea and United States armed forces, and it is this initial action in Korea that is worthy of careful analysis in order to evaluate properly the true effect of this action upon current and future trends.

Decisive battles of the world which have occurred down through the centuries have been decided by land forces, sea forces, or both. During the past 40 years, no battles have met the rule for decisiveness laid down by Henry Hallam, the English historian. Therefore, a potent air arm has played no part in deciding a battle of the world, because the ascension of air power to the realm of military operations has occurred since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Air power is still in its infancy, but we may be entering the age when air power alone will determine the outcome of military operations; however, this is not in the foreseeable future.

World War II.

In recent years we have fought many battles. However, it is doubtful that any of these battles—at least since the turn of the century—have “essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes.” One or two battles probably decided the turning point and final victory in World War I, but the outcome was not a decisive battle of the world.

Was there a decisive battle in World War II? It is doubtful that one or even two or three battles can be claimed as decisive battles of the war and they were not decisive in the world sense. It is not intended here to minimize the importance of World War I or World War II, because there can be no doubt that both wars reduced the threat of tyranny and upheld the cause of freedom, and, therefore, had a pronounced effect on future world events. However, even so soon after the end of World War II, the following conclusion can be drawn: The crushing of fascism, which the war accomplished, resulted in the creating of a void to be filled rapidly by the threat of Communism.

This Communist threat continued to spread as the Soviet Union infiltrated the Governments of border nations and seized power by political chicanery or by other means expeditious to the Soviet cause. Concurrently, every effort was made to thwart any or all constructive action attempted by the United Nations Assembly.

By the beginning of 1950 the United States had reduced its military establishment and embarked upon a programme of military austerity which threatened to reduce

us to a position of impotency. The Soviet Union, in the meantime, continued to build up her own armed forces, particularly air power, with no deterrent to Communist aggression, other than the threat of a United States stock pile of atom bombs.

The Big Test.

The year 1950 was obviously the year for the Soviet's big test. The opportunity was there to wreck the United Nations as a potential peace enforcing agency of the world; defy the United States to fulfil foreign obligations and commitments; and test the feasibility of employing satellite forces for further aggression, while retaining the Soviet military strength intact, to be committed only if necessary to force a decision.

On 25 June, 1950, when the North Korean Communists moved south of the 38th Parallel, the United States took the initiative in answering the call and acted with decisive determination.

By October, 1950, the objectives placed for test by the Soviet Union had resulted in failure and the Communist forces committed were being decisively defeated. A major change in Communist-dictated policy was necessitated by the military reversal suffered.

The United States was neither mentally nor physically prepared to fight a battle in Korea or elsewhere. Our available military equipment was largely that which had been left over from World War II. Our active units were under strength. Our men were not instilled with the will or the desire to fight, and no incentive existed to create this will.

This was substantiated by the fact that 72 hours prior to the time they were involved in a shooting war in Korea the major concern of many of our soldiers was the quality of food in the mess hall.

Some ten days after the initial elements of the United States 24th Infantry Division were committed in Korea, the remainder of that under-strength division was engaged with the enemy, and every battalion was attempting to defend a front greater than that normally allocated to a full-strength division. Artillery was spread so thinly that it frequently could reach the flanks of its supported unit with only one or two pieces. Engineers were employed as infantrymen, in addition to their other duties. This inadequate force suffered many defeats, but still managed to regroup, pull together, and fight again over the long road from Osan to Taejon.

The initial shock of battle was great when American troops first encountered the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the North Korean Communists, and it is here that the American soldier's strong will and great determination made his indelible impression on the pages of history. A few soldiers were able to do only that which was necessary for self preservation, while others no longer seemed to care. On the faces of many one could see nothing but the blank expression of lost hope. Fortunately, a majority appeared to be invincible, and some of these possessed a certain courage and tenacity that enabled them to go on even when reduced to fighting with rocks or bare fists.

The Decisive Phase.

When the 24th Infantry Division

withdrew from Taejon on 21 July, contact had been established with elements of the United States 25th Infantry Division. The next day these two divisions were reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry) in the vicinity of Yong Dong. Although it did not appear so to the forces actually engaged with the enemy, this period was a major turning point in the early days of the Korean campaign and assured the Republic of Korea and United States forces of adequate physical means to retain a beachhead on the small peninsula.

True, the fighting was extremely severe from that time until October, 1950. However, the enemy had missed his opportunity to occupy the whole of the Korean Peninsula by failing to exploit his early successes. Although some of the most severe fighting in the history of warfare occurred during the winter of 1950-51, the battle which most influenced the course of world events was fought during the first three weeks of July, 1950, by greatly outnumbered and out-powered United States and Republic of Korea forces.

United Nations Action.

Korea in itself may or may not be important. It is what has happened there and the service that has been provided the freedom-loving nations of the world that bear the significance of importance. Here, too, during those weeks in July, the die was cast and the incentive developed to which members of the United Nations responded. The Republic of Korea forces, which had been badly hurt by the initial North Korean attack, developed into an army of importance. The United States once again rose from the status of a military weakling to that

of a potent military force, and, along with other non-Communist nations, awoke to the necessity for armed opposition to Soviet-sponsored aggression. Thus, in a few short weeks, determined opposition by a few provided the necessary motivation for the forces opposed to Communism.

Members of the United Nations were called upon to stand up and be counted, to assure the effectiveness of the United Nations concept, or lose it forever. This can be better expressed with the words of the late Reverend Peter Marshall, former Chaplain of the United States Senate, when he prayed, "Dear God, our Father, deliver us from patience, which is akin to cowardice; let us be either hot or cold, let us stand for something, lest we fall for anything." The United Nations force finally reached a total of 22 nations, working together as an effective fighting machine. While considerably smaller than those of the United States and the Republic of Korea, the contingents of other United Nations members have contributed to the common United Nations effort, and they have distinguished themselves in courage and fighting ability.

The Soviets learned, early in the Korean campaign, that they had not only failed to destroy the United Nations, but had strengthened it. They learned that the United States could not be forced into submission and that the scheme of employing satellites to further the cause of Communist domination placed a far greater strain on the tentacles of control than they had anticipated. Had any doubt existed in the minds of free people as to the designs of the Soviet masters before, certainly none can exist now.

It is not the purpose of this article to determine whether we could have avoided the Korean conflict by the retention of troops in Korea. Neither is it the purpose of this article to conjecture on whether we would have ended the conflict by retaliation in Manchuria and the Chinese mainland after the Chinese Communists intervened in November, 1950.

There are many and varied opinions as to the future courses of action to be taken in Korea: continue the peace talks, discontinue the peace talks, launch an all-out offensive, or withdraw from Korea entirely. If we accept Korea as a check upon Communist aggression, then the sacrifices which have been made there have not been in vain. The United States and other free nations are today in a better position to retard the growth of Communism than at any time since the end of World War II.

We would lose face if we were to withdraw or be forced from Korea now; however, it would have been far worse had we failed to take action or been defeated earlier. Korea may be the turning point in the stemming of Soviet aggression and the initiative may soon be on

the side of democracy. Therefore, Korea justly deserves to be considered among the decisive battles which have "essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes."

Members of the military establishment can profit from a study of the military and political implications of the Korean campaign. Should we have used the means at our disposal to attempt to gain a quick and decisive victory? Are the truce talks leading us in the right direction? Should we continue them? Is it possible to negotiate with communism? Should we refrain from interfering militarily anywhere unless we are confronted with aggression upon our own shores or possessions? Is there a time when it is not desirable nor advantageous to gain a decisive victory in war?

Future Koreas.

What has happened in Korea might have happened in Iran or Greece or any other place. Officers serving in what they may consider rather insignificant positions today may be studying the facts bearing on another Korea tomorrow. It would be profitable to draw sound conclusions regarding the successes and failures of today.

SPOKEN ENGLISH

Warrant Officer N. F. Clarke, L.A.S.A.,
Australian Army Educational Corps.

THE value of spoken language in the Army can scarcely be over-estimated if the number of man-hours occupied by lecturing, instructing and listening were equated with, what might be called, non-vocal and non-auditory man-hours. At the highest level the ability of a speaker to convey his ideas or wishes effectively and impressively may have profoundly important and far-reaching consequences. At a lower level a lecturer's capacity to hold the attention and gain the respect of his audience may make all the difference between a pass and a failure for candidates at a given examination. Even in the informal atmosphere of a Mess a speaker may produce pleasant or unpleasant impressions upon a guest which have, apparently, no connection with the actual words spoken. Bearing these points in mind it should be clear that the ability to manipulate speech as an instrument or a tool is an extremely useful accomplishment.

In this connection it may be argued that anyone with sufficient intelligence and sincerity should have no difficulty in expressing either thoughts or feelings to his fellows. But, because the normal child begins to speak at the age of three and continues to do so for the rest of his life without any special training, it cannot be assumed that speech is a natural gift requiring no


cultivation. In point of fact many people of high intellectual attainments and possessed of vital interests are poor speakers and ineffective exponents of their own special concerns. Speech is a skill no less than the ability to solve a simultaneous quadratic equation. Intelligibility, delivery and the conscious adjustment of force, time, pitch and tone of voice are technical achievements acquired only by training.

A moment's consideration will show the importance of conveying meaning merely by the rise and fall of the voice and the still more subtle shades of meaning which intonation may have in conveying the attitude of the speaker to the listener. The harassed housewife who says: "This is a *fine* Government we have in power today," means something very different from the politician who says (assuming his party holds office): "This is a fine Government we have in power today." Intonation is particularly significant in the English language for a wealth of meaning can be conveyed by a mere flick of the voice.

Many speakers would be surprised, if not indignant, to hear that their speech is often unintelligible due, say, to the slipshod pronunciation of consonants. It is a popular fallacy that indistinct speech is caused by faulty vowel pronuncia-

tion. On the other hand an un-naturally careful utterance of consonants, syllables and words give rise to wooden and unintelligent speech. People get into the way of thinking that because two words are spelt differently they must be pronounced differently. The pronunciation of "new," "gnu" and "knew" is identical. The person who thinks himself superior because he pronounces the "e" of "English" like the "e" in the word "men" is merely being ridiculous. He is the sort of person Shakespeare had in mind when Mercutio says: "who stand so much on the new form that they cannot sit at ease on the old bench." Speech habits are taken so much for granted that it is commonly believed speakers of good English will never drop an "aitch": supporters of this opinion would find themselves in as many difficulties as the man who swore to speak the blunt truth for twenty-four hours simply by considering their own utterance of the sentence: "He had his hat in his hand." The assumption that the "h" of "his" is actually spoken arises from the fallacious idea that because there is a symbol in the spelling there must be something in the speaking to correspond with it.

The Professor of Phonetics in the University of London, Daniel Jones, while affirming that the main criterion of good speech is intelligibility, nevertheless, allows the importance of aesthetic values. With regard to the more particular aspect of pronunciation he states: "I have no intention of becoming either a reformer of pronunciation or a judge who decides what pronunciations are 'good' and what are 'bad.' I take the view that people should be allowed to speak as they like." While agreeing in essence with Jones, Professor A. G. Mitchell, of the Department of English, at the University of Sydney, states in his standard textbook, "The Pronunciation of English in Australia": "We should not speak of 'good speech' and 'bad speech,' we should rather take the types of speech that do exist and consider whether they are adequate or inadequate for certain uses. The uses range from ordinary conversation with its very moderate requirements to those in which speech becomes an art." Obviously the manner of speech used by the instructor of a physical training squad at Puckapunyal will differ widely from that used by a lecturer in English at Duntroon.



THE PROBLEMS of INDONESIA

Captain A. M. N. Rodulfo,
Australian Intelligence Corps.

SINCE Indonesia gained her independence in December, 1949, she has been faced with recurrent crises which show no signs of abating with the passage of time. This state of affairs is inseparable from the conditions which governed the creation of an independent state of Indonesia.

Neutral in the Ideological War, a stable Indonesia is a first requirement of Western policy, since only the Communists could gain from a disintegration of governmental authority in the islands. The position of Indonesia is also of importance because it is an area in which Great Britain, the United States, Holland and Australia have a direct interest. Strategically it is the hinge of two defence areas, the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As the history of the last war only too clearly showed, this area could be the cause of disagreement between

Great Britain and the United States. Political developments in Indonesia could therefore have a direct bearing on Western defence policy in South-East Asia.

Geopolitical Factors.

Indonesia is a convenient geographical expression coined in the first place by eminent philologists and anthropologists to denote the vast congeries of islands, numbering over 2,000, which lie between Asia and Australia. Parts of the archipelago belong to foreign powers—Britain, Holland, Australia, Portugal and the Philippines. By adopting the style of Indonesia this new Republic implies that it has a legal claim to the whole of Indonesia. At present only the colony of Dutch New Guinea is so claimed, although individuals are already striving to stir up irredentist feeling over British Borneo, Portuguese Timor and the Philippines. Claims


to these territories are liable to become more vociferous as internal conditions deteriorate and public attention needs to be diverted. Such clamour also serves to conceal the fundamental disunity of the Indonesian islands.

The revolutionary fervour of the Independence War has of necessity faded with time and with it that sense of unity engendered by the rebellion against the Dutch.

The original federal republic, while seemingly the obvious form of government to be chosen, only served to underline the essential disunity of the country.

The Javanese and Sundanese, with two-thirds of the population, and who are by far the richest and most numerous section of the community, set about the destruction of regional autonomy as soon as the Dutch had withdrawn. They had at their disposal the bulk of the population, wealth, and armed forces of the nation, and the imposition of a unitary state was thus only a matter of time.

The unitary state of Indonesia now exists, but it possesses few of the attributes making for strength and permanence. Unity has been imposed by persuasion in some cases, by guile and force in others, over a population of 75 millions, speaking no less than two hundred distinct languages. The population includes Papuan, Mongoloid and Caucasoid racial stocks spread over a chain of islands stretching longitudinally for nearly 3,000 miles. Moslems, Hindus, Christians and Pagans have in common only one factor—former subjection to the Dutch. Differences in race, religion and language are matched by cultural differences. Although it would be vehemently denied by all Asians, the relationship between the Javanese and Sundanese on one side and the Toradja and Toala of Celebes on the other is precisely that between the European rulers in North Africa, or until recently in India, and the native populations of those countries, but without any sense of responsibility for their welfare or preservation.



Three factors in the past have made for unification—revolutionary fervour personified in President Sukarno, Dutch shipping facilities, and the Army. Of these the first is a well-nigh spent force and the second an alien and therefore unacceptable factor. This leaves only the Army.

The Army Crisis.

The Army is ill-equipped and ill-disciplined, having its origin in the guerrilla and quasi-bandit mobs which terrorised the countryside after the war while fighting under the banner of freedom. It is far too large for the resources of Indonesia and reorganization is badly needed. This has been recognised by Army Headquarters. Such a reorganization would, however, entail wide demobilization. This is probably unacceptable to the main political parties, who look to the Army for support, and is doubtless unacceptable to the rank and file. The demobilization of several thousand men would almost certainly swell the ranks of rebel and bandit gangs such as Dar ul Islam and the Bamboo Spears.

This threat of reorganization therefore precipitated a crisis of the first order last October, when a motion was accepted in Parliament demanding changes in the management of the Defence Ministry and Armed Forces. It is widely believed that the President was responsible for this motion since he is a leader of the Nationalist Party and the wholesale retirement of his followers in the Army could have undermined his political position. It should be remembered that neither President nor Parliament has been elected. Both are self-nominated.

On the morning after the motion



Dr. Sukarno addressing a political rally. Note the number of Communist salutes.

was accepted some two to three thousand demonstrators paraded outside Parliament demanding its dissolution, the holding of elections and proclaiming support of the Army against the parliamentary motion. The demonstrators then went to the Palace and made known their demands to President Sukarno, who refused to submit beyond promising early elections.

There is no doubt that the demonstrators were organized from Army Headquarters, the majority having been given Army transport from nearby villages. These demonstrators treated the whole occasion as an outing in town, for which in return they had to make noises as directed.

A conference of the seven Territorial Commanders was then held, which announced full support for the Military leaders in their action

on 17 October. A few days later, however, it was learned that the Territorial Commander of East Java had been "dismissed" by his officers and one of his brigade commanders appointed in his place. This mutiny was followed by similar action in East Indonesia and South Sumatra, so that three out of seven commanders openly opposed Army Headquarters, while declaring their loyalty to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile the Cabinet vacillated and was unable to exercise its authority when the new commander in East Indonesia refused to permit a visit by the Minister for Defence—The Sultan of Jogjakarta.

President Sukarno consolidated his control of the situation by refusing to act with vigour in support of his Cabinet by checking this insubordination in the Army. As a result the position of the Sultan and his military advisers became untenable and they were forced to resign.

On the face of it the Presidential faction has won a complete victory. But this has probably been achieved only because all parties to the dispute were anxious to preserve outward appearances of legality and no one wished to see yet another change in government. Nevertheless, the split in the Army remains unhealed beneath the surface, as do the original causes. The loss of Army discipline and integrity will certainly cause a further deterioration in internal security from which only Dar ul Islam and the Communists can benefit. In addition the tendency for local commanders to act independently, a heritage of the guerrilla days, is a potential source of wider troubles.

Dar ul Islam.

This is a fanatical movement in Central and West Java seeking to establish a Moslem Theocratic State. The Dar ul Islam bands are well armed and organized and have associated in the past with such adventurers as Westerling. But the real danger of Dar ul Islam lies in the extent to which it has been penetrated by the Communist Party and the cloak of religious orthodoxy and respectability it affords to both Communist and other more criminal bands. Stern action by the Government is extremely difficult because of the storm of protest it arouses among devout Moslems. There is a further danger in the religious appeal it makes to the soldiery, resulting in constant mutinies.

It is also natural that the Moslem Masjumi party, probably the strongest in Indonesia, should give only half-hearted support to any attempts to suppress Dar ul Islam.

Communism.

At present the Communist Party is remaining in the background and consolidating its position as probably the third largest party in the country and controller of the Trade Union Movement. It has been considerably helped by the Chinese minority of 2½ millions.

Chinese Communist penetration has been achieved by the appointment of teachers in Chinese schools, some direct from China, financial aid to Chinese and Indonesian labour unions, Chinese associations and secret societies, and through economic and business channels.

East Indonesia.

While the Government and Army is faced with a growing deterioration in the security situation in

West Java through the depredations of Dar ul Islam, it is also faced with a long-standing insurrection in Celebes, and a minor revolt, now largely suppressed, in the South Moluccas.

It is unfortunate that the October mutinies included the Territory of East Indonesia. The effect of this mutiny has been to enable the local commander to set himself up as a semi-independent war lord, owing allegiance to the President, but not necessarily to the Government. There is even a distinct danger that he may come to terms with the rebels so that together they can

oppose the "Javanese," thereby reviving old secessionist tendencies.

Conclusions.

Discipline must be restored in the Army if separatist tendencies in East Indonesia are to be overcome and the Dar ul Islam menace in West Java is to be contained. Should efforts in this direction fail the Communists may well gain sufficient support in the ensuing economic and political chaos to gain control of part of the Army. Such control, together with present Communist control of the major trade unions, might well be decisive.

While the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peacefulness, secure and prosperous. Unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part still awaiting exploration and understanding.

—Liddell Hart.



THE BATTLE OF MILNE BAY

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JAPAN launched her attempt to conquer an empire in South-East Asia and the Pacific on 7 December, 1941. By the end of March, 1942, her forces were in possession of Hong Kong, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, all the important places on the north-eastern coast of New Guinea, and the islands of Guam and Wake. Towards the west one of her armies was well on the way to the conquest of Burma (See AAJ, No. 45, February, 1953).

Japan had won possession of this immensely wealthy territory at trifling cost. Her naval losses in particular had been insignificant, whereas those of her opponents had been heavy. With ten carriers in commission she had good prospects of retaining control of the Western Pacific indefinitely, and, by suitable dispositions, of making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Allies to stage a counter offensive. At any rate, that appears to be the way in which the Japanese viewed the situation.

Strategic Background.

In April, 1942, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters appreciated that the Allies would attempt to base their main counter offensive on Australia. The main support area for such an offensive, both in re-

spect of personnel and material, would be the United States. With command of the sea in their hands, it was apparent to the Japanese that the anticipated counter offensive could be delayed indefinitely if they cut the Allies' lines of communication between America and Australia, or alternatively, if the lines of communication could be forced so far to the south that they would be lengthened to an uneconomic degree. It appeared to the Japanese that this object could be achieved by the seizure of a number of key points athwart or on the flanks of the direct line of communication.

In accordance with this appreciation, Japanese Imperial Headquarters ordered the seizure of Port Moresby, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. Port Moresby was to be taken first, operations against the other objectives would follow immediately.

The Japanese began amphibious operations against Port Moresby in May. These operations led to the Battle of the Coral Sea, in which an Allied naval task force forced the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet with the loss of one of its carriers.

The Japanese now changed their plan. Two new objectives—Midway Island and the Aleutians—were introduced and were to be taken first.

Then would follow the capture of Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia, and, lastly, Port Moresby.

The attempt to execute this ambitious plan ended in a disastrous naval defeat at the Battle of Midway, where the Japanese lost all four of their carriers engaged. This loss, in addition to the carrier lost earlier in the Coral Sea, jeopardized the Japanese control of the sea and led to a modification of their plans.

They then began an infiltration of the Solomons with the intention of establishing themselves firmly on Guadalcanal, the key island of the group. From there they intended to strike at Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia at a later date. They considered that they could safely postpone the capture of these points on the Allies' communications, but Port Moresby was a different matter. Moresby lay on their flank, and its possession by the Allies jeopardized their operations in the Solomons and their proposed subsequent operations further to the south-east. Accordingly they decided to take Port Moresby at once. However, they were afraid to risk any more carriers in an amphibious operation, and resolved to attempt the capture of Moresby by an overland attack from the north-east coast of New Guinea.


In accordance with these plans they landed a large reconnaissance force at Buna on 22 July with orders to report on the feasibility of the terrain. The small Australian detachment at Buna was driven back into the Owen Stanley Range, and the Japanese commander, without any real knowledge of the difficulties which would be encountered in crossing the Owen Stanleys, reported favourably on the project.

Japanese Headquarters at Rabaul passed on the information with a recommendation that the operation be undertaken immediately.

Imperial General Headquarters accepted Rabaul's recommendation, and issued orders not only for the capture of Port Moresby, but also of the Allies' base at Milne Bay, of whose existence the Japanese had learned soon after its establishment in June.

The plan drawn up by Rabaul in accordance with these orders directed the South Seas Detachment, then at Rabaul, and the 41st Infantry, then at Davao, to land at Buna under the command of Major-General Horii in mid-August. From positions prepared by the reconnaissance force, Horii was to cross the Owen Stanleys via Kokoda and move on Port Moresby. Meanwhile the 8th Fleet and the Kawaguchi Detachment, then at Palau, would capture Milne Bay. After Milne Bay was taken the Kawaguchi Detachment, supported by the 8th Fleet, would make an amphibious attack on Port Moresby. Horii's operations and the attack on Milne Bay were to be co-ordinated so as to bring the two points in the Allies' defences under attack simultaneously. Subsequently, the amphibious attack on Moresby would take place at the moment when Horii was launching his final assault from the landward side.

Before the operations could be mounted, however, American troops had landed to oppose the Japanese on Guadalcanal. This unexpected development caused the Japanese to switch the Kawaguchi Detachment to the Solomons and to substitute the Aoba Detachment, then in reserve at Rabaul, for the attack on Milne Bay.



Map 1.

Milne Bay.

In May, 1942, the Allied Supreme Commander in the South-West Pacific had ordered the establishment of a base at Milne Bay to:—

- Provide flank protection for Port Moresby.
- Provide airfields from which Allied aircraft could strike at Rabaul and the northern Solomons without having to cross the 13,000 feet high Owen Stanleys.
- Provide an advanced base for projected operations on the north-east coast of New Guinea.

Milne Bay is some 20 miles long and from 8 to 10 miles wide, with deep water close inshore. On its northern and southern arms the

Stirling Ranges rise to heights of 3,000 to 4,000 feet. The mountains are covered with thick scrub or kunai grass. The narrow flats between the mountains and the sea consist mainly of dense jungle or deep sago swamps, intersected with creeks liable to heavy flooding after rain. In wet weather the flats become virtually impassable quagmires of glutinous mud. The climate is hot, humid and extremely enervating.

At the head of the bay a large coconut plantation provided a fair area of relatively firm ground. More correctly, perhaps, it was the only area not more or less permanent bog. Consequently most of the base installations and the airfields had to be concentrated in the plantation area.

Although work started at Milne Bay in June, lack of engineer resources, the extreme scarcity of suitable materials and the adverse weather conditions retarded construction of the Base. By the middle of August the roads were still in a shocking condition, while the dock at Gili Gili consisted of two barges moored side by side with a ramp leading to a small and inadequate jetty. No. 1 Airstrip, the only one in operation, consisted simply of steel matting laid on a soft base. Mud seeping through the matting made the surface slippery and dangerous for aircraft. No. 2 and No. 3 Airstrips were under construction by American engineers.

No reliable maps of the area existed at this time. Towards the end of July the 24th Field Company, RAE, produced a very rough sketch map based on compass traversing and distance pacing.

In July the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade arrived and its com-

mander, Brigadier J. Field, became operational commander of all troops at Milne Bay. However, in view of intelligence reports which indicated Japanese action in this area, it was considered that the garrison required reinforcements. Accordingly the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier G. F. Wootten), an AIF formation with battle experience in the Middle East, together with some division units, were despatched, and disembarked between 12 and 21 August.

On 22 August Major-General C. A. Clowes, with a nucleus staff, took over command at Milne Bay.

The general organization of the command structure in the SWPA, and the command organization as it affected the allied land forces in New Guinea, are shown in Figure 1. It will be seen that Milne Force was under direct command of HQ New Guinea Force.

Milne Force.

On 22 August Milne Force com-




Fig. 1.

prised the undermentioned Australian formations and major units:

- 7 Infantry Brigade (9, 25 and 61 Battalions).
- 18 Infantry Brigade (2/9, 2/10 and 2/12 Battalions).
- 9 Battery, 2/5 Field Regiment
- 4 Battery, 101 A Tk Regiment.
- 2/6 Heavy AA Battery.
- 2/9 Light AA Battery.
- Two Heavy AA Gun Stations.
- 2/4 and 24 Field Companies.

These units were supported by the usual Signal and service troops.

In addition to the Australian units, Milne Force included the following United States units:—

- 43 Engineer Regiment.
- Company E, 46 Engineer Regiment.
- 709 Air Borne AA Battery.
- "C" Battery, 104 CA (AA) Battalion.
- Some small service units.

The allied air force units stationed at Milne Bay comprised 75 and 76 Squadrons, Royal Australian Air Force, equipped with Kittyhawks, and part of an RAAF Squadron equipped with Hudsons.

Climate and Terrain.

To fully appreciate the achievement of the Allied Force at Milne Bay it is essential to really understand the conditions under which the battle was fought.

In the first place none of the troops had had any experience of tropical warfare, while about half the fighting force had no operational experience at all. Force Headquarters consisted of staff officers, most of them without operational experience, drawn from various formations on the mainland. Insufficient time elapsed between their

arrival and the beginning of the battle to enable these officers to be welded into an efficient staff machine, or even to get to know each other properly.

The only relatively firm ground was in the plantation area at the head of the Bay. Even this area consisted largely of little ridges and hillocks of coral formation with waterlogged ground in between. Everywhere else the ground was so soft that all movement, even movement on foot, was extremely difficult. The "roads" were boggy, waterlogged tracks along which transport could move only with the greatest difficulty. Before the battle the slender engineer resources available had made little impression on the improvement of communications.

The weather before and during the battle was appalling. Low cloud and practically continuous heavy rain reduced visibility more or less permanently to zero, while the hot, steamy atmosphere imposed a great strain on the troops.

The lack of a proper map made it extremely difficult to direct and control the battle, especially from Force or even Brigade Headquarters. It was not possible to record and assess information, or to plan operations except in a very general sense. The problem of the Artillery can easily be imagined, and the lack of an accurate map or anything in the nature of an OP greatly reduced their potential effectiveness. Signal communications also left much to be desired, as it was virtually impossible to get cables down in time, while the RT was unsatisfactory. Had these conditions been even partially understood in Brisbane the Head-

quarters situated in that area remote from the battle zone might have saved themselves much unnecessary excitement and the despatch of numerous unrealistic orders to New Guinea.

Plans for Defence.

Taking into consideration the appalling communications and the soggy ground, which combined to make all movement slow and difficult, the task facing Milne Force Commander was not an easy one. In general, terms this task was:—

- (a) To protect and facilitate the operations of the Allied Air Forces operating from and through Milne Bay.
- (b) In conjunction with the Allied Air Force, to deny to the enemy the area occupied by

Milne Force and vital outlying sea, land and island areas.

The vital ground for the successful execution of this general task was the area at the head of the Bay occupied by the base installations and the three air strips. While this area was held the battle was not necessarily lost. But if the enemy succeeded in occupying the area Milne Force would be decisively defeated, and the whole Milne Bay area would fall into enemy hands.

Four courses were open to the enemy. He could:—

- (a) Attempt a direct amphibious assault on the Gili Gili area.
- (b) Land on either of the inside shores of the Bay, and establish a firm base from which to strike at the head of the bay.



An Australian patrol on the North Shore.

- (c) Land on the outside shores of the Bay—Wedau or Dogura on the north-west coast; Mullin's Harbour on the south-west coast—and advance overland on Gili Gili.
- (d) Stage a combination of two or three of the above courses, one or more of which might be merely a feint.

At 2015 hours on 21 August Milne Force Headquarters issued Operation Instruction No. 6. In this Instruction General Clowes clearly indicated that he had no intention of engaging in a purely static defence. On the contrary he stated specifically that: "The basis of the defence will be the maintenance of the offensive spirit and offensive action." The disposition of the infantry brigades and the roles allotted to them show that Clowes intended to launch a strong counter stroke as soon as he was sure about the real direction of attack. Broadly, the less experienced 7th Brigade was given the task of holding the enemy


assault from whichever direction or directions it might come, while the more experienced 18th Brigade was held in reserve to deliver the counter stroke at the right time and place.

Operation Instruction No. 6 laid down the following tasks for the brigades:—

7 Brigade.—Defence against enemy operations from seaward, including approaches along south and north shores of Milne Bay; protection of No. 3 Strip against airborne or other form of attack.

18 Brigade.—Counter attack in any direction, especially against landings effected in Milne Bay; protection against incursions into the rear of the defended area from Mullin's Harbour and Wedau; protection of Nos. 1 and 2 Strips; provision of detachments for special operations as may be required.

The Operation Instruction directed that every allied unit and



Map 2.

sub-unit, including Air Force ground staffs, would be organized in defended localities for all-round defence, and that such localities would be wired and provision made for storing food, water and ammunition sufficient for seven days.

The general outline of the dispositions made in accordance with the Operation Instruction, as they existed at 1800 hours on 25 August, are shown on Map 2. 7 Brigade had two battalions forward—61 Battalion around No. 3 Strip with its B Company on the north shore of the Bay at KB Mission and D Company further east at Ahiona; 9 Battalion on the south shore about Gaba-Gabuna; 25 Battalion in reserve. 18 Brigade had 2/12 Battalion at Waigani; 2/9 Battalion in the Hagita-No. 1 Strip area; 2/10 Battalion in rear of 61 Battalion to cover the latter's flank and to launch a counter attack should anything go wrong at the tactically important No. 3 Strip.

The Landing.

Japanese 8th Fleet Headquarters decided to proceed with the Milne Bay operation with the reserves they had available at Kavieng — Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF), 10th Naval Pioneer Unit, and a detachment of Sasebo 5th SNLF. The commander of this force was ordered to land on the north shore of Milne Bay and occupy the Allied position around Gili Gili. A detachment of Sasebo 5th SNLF was to come from Buna, land at Taupoto on the north-east coast, and march overland on Gili Gili.

The detachment of Sasebo 5th left Buna for Taupoto in six or seven large motor barges on the morning of 24 August. During a rare break in the overcast these barges were



Major-General C. A. Clowes.

spotted by an Allied reconnaissance aircraft during the afternoon, but the weather closed in again almost immediately. They were picked up again next morning nearing Goodenough Island. About noon the weather cleared sufficiently for 12 RAAF fighters to take off from Milne Bay. Early in the afternoon they found the barges drawn up on the beach of Goodenough, where the occupants had gone ashore to stretch their legs. All the barges were destroyed in a series of low level attacks, and the Japanese detachment was left stranded on the island.

The main body of the Japanese assault force, heavily escorted by cruisers and destroyers, was first sighted off Kiriwina Island early on 25 August. GHQ ordered the Allied Air Force to destroy the convoy, and every available bomber in the

Moresby, Townsville and Cape York areas took off immediately. Unfortunately the weather, which had been bad all the morning, got progressively worse, and by mid-afternoon visibility was down to zero. Only sheer luck would have enabled the Allied bombers to find the convoy, and luck was against them.

During the evening the Japanese entered the Bay, and, after heavily shelling the beaches, began landing shortly after midnight at Lekwind, which they mistook for Rabi, and at Waga Waga and Wandula. Before morning, headquarters and supply dumps were established at Waga Waga.

Although they had much difficult country between their base and their objective, the Japanese enjoyed the advantage of secure flanks. Their right could not be turned because of the mountains. Not only did local command of the sea secure their left flank, but it also enabled them to move men and materials forward by water at night despite their lack of air support.

First Contact.

Reports reaching Milne Force during the 25th established the probable composition of the Japanese convoy as three cruisers, two transports, each of about 8,000 tons, two vessels of about 6,000 tons, resembling tankers, and two mine sweepers. In face of this strong naval force the destroyer HMAS Arunta and freighter Tasman left the Bay. General Clowes arranged for an RAAF tender to patrol the Bay to give warning of the enemy's approach.

At 0015 hours on 26 August the RAAF tender reported the presence of the enemy convoy 11 miles east of Gili Gili. Two hours later, and

again at 0530 hours, heavy naval gunfire was heard at Force HQ, but no shells fell in the Gili Gili area.

During the evening 25/26 August "D" Company, 61 Battalion, whose withdrawal from Akioma had been delayed by lack of small craft, embarked in two ketches. The two vessels ran straight into the Japanese landing barges. One was sunk; the other was beached and its occupants eventually reached Gili Gili via a circuitous route through the hills.

Shortly after the landings, elements of the Japanese detachment from Lekwind, including a tank, ran into "B" Company, 61 Battalion at KB Mission. Although it was unable to cope with the tank, "B" Company beat off the attack. During the day an additional company of 61 Battalion reached the Mission. The two companies, supported by artillery and RAAF fighters, launched a counter-attack, but made little progress.

During the day 7 Brigade brought 25 Battalion forward to support the troops in the vicinity of No. 3 Strip. Despite extremely poor visibility RAAF fighters made many strafing attacks on the beaches and on the tracks between the enemy base and our forward troops. Some 10 or 12 Japanese landing barges were destroyed. In the evening, under cover of a heavy fog, a second enemy convoy entered the Bay, fired many shells harmlessly into the jungle and a few into the Australian lines, and landed reinforcements and stores.

The Fight at the Mission.

During the 26th, Milne Force received numerous messages from New Guinea Force and Allied Air Forces

reporting sightings of Japanese convoys apparently approaching Milne Bay. In addition there were persistent reports of enemy shipping in the vicinity of Mullin's Harbour. These reports strongly suggested that the enemy was about to renew his effort, either by additional landings or by reinforcing the troops already ashore. Having regard to the several courses open to the enemy, and the lack of mobility imposed on his own troops by the

weather and the terrain, General Clowes was bound to follow a cautious policy until the Japanese intentions became clearer. However, during the afternoon he decided to place 2/10 Battalion under command of 7 Brigade with a view to passing it through 25 and 61 Battalions along the north shore as far as Ahioima.


The Japanese spent the day re-organizing their forces and reconnoitering the Australian position at KB Mission. During the night they attacked strongly and persistently and pushed the defenders back to the Rabi area. At 0400 hours they broke off the fight and withdrew east of the Mission.

2/10 Battalion reached KG Mission very late in the afternoon of the 27th and organized a perimeter defence for the night in the plantation. For some reason, possibly because they had little faith in this weapon, they had left their anti-tank rifles behind, and they did not have enough shovels to dig-in properly.

About 2000 hours the Japanese launched a heavy attack supported by two tanks. Fitted with brilliant headlights, the tanks cruised around on the firm ground of the plantation area, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the defence. Many attempts to destroy the tanks with sticky grenades failed because the grenades had deteriorated in the damp, humid climate. After about two hours fighting the battalion was split in two. Battalion HQ and two companies were forced off the track into the jungle, and reached the Gili Gili area after a difficult march through the foothills around the enemy's flank. The remainder of the Battalion tried to reform on the Gama River, but were forced back



Brigadier J. Field.



Map 3.

through 61 and 25 Battalions, which were in position on No. 3 Strip.

The Fight on No. 3 Strip.

No. 3 Strip, 2,000 yards long and 100 yards wide, afforded the defenders a clear field of fire. At its eastern end near the Rabi track a glutinous bog provided an effective tank block.

The commander of 7th Brigade, Brigadier J. Field, had deployed his troops to extract every possible advantage from the terrain and the clear field of fire, the only clear ground in the whole area. Unless he attempted a difficult enveloping movement, and thereby exposed his own communications, the enemy could do one thing only — attack more or less frontally across the clearing.

The Japanese reached the strip just before dawn, and launched a series of heavy attacks supported by mortars and some light field guns. The 25th and 61st, together with the American 709 Airborne AA Battery, which had been brought forward with its .5 in. machine guns,

met each attack with such a steady volume of fire that it is doubtful if a single Jap crossed the strip, though many died in the attempt. The tanks bogged down and were destroyed by the 25 pounders. Finally the attacks died down, and for the rest of the day the enemy confined his activities to steady sniping.

During the day the elements of 2/10 Battalion were withdrawn to reorganize, and 2/12 Battalion was brought forward from Wungani in preparation for a counter-offensive along the north shore by 18 Brigade. The dispositions of the Allied Forces at 1800 hours on 28 August are shown on Map 3.

Situation 28/29 August.

The freedom of action enjoyed by the Japanese naval forces in the vicinity of Milne Bay constituted a continuous menace of further landings. This factor necessarily had a marked influence on plans to deal with the enemy on the north shore. On several occasions these plans were slowed down or suffered varia-

tion through the delay involved in ensuring that the south shore was clear, and that the reports of enemy landings at Mullin's Harbour were not correct. Apparently neither this factor nor the slow rate of movement actually possible on the ground were properly appreciated at GHQ in Brisbane, which, late on the 28th, despatched a peremptory order to General Clowes to clear the north shore forthwith.

On the 29th 18 Brigade, less 2/10 Battalion, was ordered to recapture KB Mission with a view to continuing the advance along the north shore. At 1630 hours, however, air reconnaissance reported a Japanese convoy of one cruiser and nine destroyers apparently making for Milne Bay. Since it seemed not at all unlikely that the enemy would use

his freedom of manoeuvre by sea to land another force on the south shore or in the Gili Gili area, 18 Brigade was ordered to stand fast for the time being.


On 30 August patrols of 61 Battalion reached KB Mission, and it seemed as though the enemy might be withdrawing. That night, however, another attack was made on No. 3 Strip, but again the enemy was unable to cross the cleared space and suffered heavy loss.

Counter Attack.

2/12 Battalion began the advance along the north shore on 31 August. Considerable opposition was encountered during the day, and there was much close fighting. However, the opposition was methodically overcome and by nightfall the



Japanese tanks knocked out near No. 3 Strip.



Map 4.

Battalion had reached the following positions:—

Bn HQ, A and D Coys: KB Mission.

B and C Coys: Gama River.

2/9 Battalion had been moved up to the Gili Gili area, as shown on Map 4.

During the night the Gama River garrison, which had been strengthened by two platoons of 9 Battalion, was heavily attacked, but maintained its position and inflicted severe loss on the enemy.

On 1 September the companies of 2/12 Battalion at Gama River moved forward to KB Mission and the Battalion prepared to continue the advance. Towards evening, however, the following signal was received from GHQ:—

"Expect attack Jap ground forces on Milne aerodrome from west and north-west, supported by destroyer fire from Bay. Take immediate stations."

As a result of this signal all units were ordered to stand-to throughout

the night, and 18 Brigade Commander was informed that 2/9 Battalion would not be available for operations on the north shore the next day. However, apart from sniping in the Mission area there was no enemy activity during the night.

At first light on 2 September 2/12 Battalion resumed its advance, and later in the day 2/9 Battalion was moved to KB Mission by water. The next day they passed through the 2/12 and maintained a steady rate of advance against tenacious opposition, their forward companies reaching Lilohoa on 6 September.

During this period signals were received from HQ Allied Land Forces indicating that the remnants of the Japanese force would be withdrawn on the night 5/6 September and that another landing would be made by two battalions on 10 September. These signals, in conjunction with enemy naval activity in the Bay each night, imposed caution on Milne Force Commander.


On 6 September the motor vessel "Anshun" arrived with stores and personnel and began to unload at the jetty. Later the hospital ship "Manunda" arrived and anchored off Gili Gili. During the night enemy naval craft sank the "Anshun" at the jetty and shelled the Waga Waga and Gili Gili areas. Searchlights were played on the "Manunda," but she was not molested. A similar visitation occurred the following night. We know now, but Milne Force did not know at the time, that these activities covered the withdrawal of the remnants of the Japanese force, the main body of which embarked on the night of 5 September, only one jump ahead of the forward elements of 18 Brigade.

The dispositions of the Allied troops on 7 September are shown on Map 5. From then on it was only a matter of mopping up scattered parties of Japs who had been left behind, though a number of sharp encounters took place.

Discussion.

Any attempt to make a just assessment of the conduct of the battle of Milne Bay will arrive at incorrect conclusions unless the following facts are kept steadily in mind:

- For months the Japanese had enjoyed an almost unbroken run of victories. On land their troops had not suffered a single serious defeat.
- The lack of maps, inadequate signal communications and poor visibility made it extremely difficult to control the battle or even to get a clear picture of what was happening at the front.
- The freedom of action enjoyed by the enemy. So far as Milne Force knew, or anyone else on our side for that matter, he could have used his local command of the sea to reinforce his original landing, or to land at any other point or points in the Bay.



Map 5.

- The numerous messages reporting sightings of enemy shipping which flowed into Milne Force HQ from various sources. Only a few have been referred to in this article; the War Diary is full of them.

Bearing these facts in mind it is clear that General Clowes fought a sound battle from first to last. Furthermore, if the description of what actually took place is compared with the outline of Operation Instruction No. 6 given above, it will be seen that Clowes fought his battle as he planned to fight it. In extremely trying circumstances he refused to be hustled either by the enemy or by the urgings of Headquarters on the mainland, where, presumably, no real knowledge of events or con-

ditions existed. There was no panic at Milne Bay, though there appears to have been some in Brisbane.

From the peremptory order despatched on 23 August ordering General Clowes to clear the north shore forthwith it would appear that GHQ considered that he was not acting with sufficient energy. Viewed from another angle the order implies that GHQ, hundreds of miles away and more or less completely out of touch with events and conditions in the battle area, had concluded that the moment for the counter stroke had arrived and that the opportunity was in danger of being lost.

The time to pass to the counter offensive is one of the most difficult things to assess, and only the com-



An Australian patrol on the North Shore "Road."

mander actually fighting the battle is in a position to judge when that time has arrived. Quite apart from the "feel" of the battle on the north shore, Clowes had to take into account the possibility of further enemy landings. His primary role was to hold the airstrips, and this role could easily have been defeated by a too rapid commitment of 18 Brigade. Clowes had no means of finding out what the enemy was doing in the Bay each night, and the numerous reports of sightings suggested that they were increasing their efforts. The attack on the north shore could easily have been a feint. Had he committed his reserves too soon, and had the enemy then landed elsewhere there would have been little to prevent them taking the airstrips. In this case the battle would have been lost, and Clowes would have been criticized for permitting the enemy to draw in his reserves before they delivered their main blow.

Naturally, GHQ was anxious about the battle because Milne Bay was strategically most important. It would seem that the proper thing to have done was to have sent up a senior officer to go thoroughly into the situation on the spot. In fact one senior officer did go, but he stayed at Milne Force HQ for only about an hour before returning to Brisbane. Apart from this GHQ could have taken more care in sifting and authenticating the information forwarded to Milne Force, and they could, perhaps, have exerted more pressure on the signals organization to improve the meagre communications.

On the other hand, the Commander of New Guinea Force followed a course which was professionally



Brigadier G. F. Wootten.

and logically correct. During the battle he visited Milne Force and satisfied himself that appropriate measures were being taken to deal with the situation, and from first to last he kept closely in touch by means of liaison officers. He could do nothing to help General Clowes. He did nothing to harass or hinder him, and he held up several unrealistic signals routed to Milne Force through his Headquarters.

At the lower level the outstanding features were:—

- (a) **The imperturbable steadiness of Brigadier Field (7 Brigade). Unable to stop the jungle-experienced enemy in the dense bush, he conducted a steady withdrawal to the only ground on which his troops could meet the Japs on an equal footing. On that ground, through suitable dispositions,**

fine leadership and the unbroken fighting spirit of his troops, he thoroughly defeated them.

- (b) The methodical and tactically sound advance of 18 Brigade (Brigadier Wootten). These troops had been trained and experienced in the desert conditions of the Middle East. At short notice, and without any practice, they successfully adapted their training and experience to jungle conditions. They demonstrated that basic tactical principles are sound anywhere, and need only to be intelligently adapted to any conditions which present themselves.

Another outstanding feature of the battle was the splendid work of 75 and 76 Squadrons, RAAF. Operating from a dangerous, slippery strip,

the squadrons, both in reconnaissance and direct support, gave invaluable assistance to the ground forces. It is doubtful if anywhere else in the Pacific war were airmen called upon to fly so frequently in such adverse weather conditions. No call from the Army went unanswered.

Conclusion.


Milne Bay was the first decisive defeat suffered by the Japanese on land since they began the war nine months before. It was suffered at a time and place of their own choosing, under conditions which gave them the initiative and complete freedom of manoeuvre. That this defeat was inflicted almost exclusively by Australian arms should be a source of perpetual pride and inspiration for the fighting services of this country.

If you love and serve men, you cannot by any hiding or stratagem escape the remuneration.

—Emerson.

ALL MEN ARE BROTHERS

— EVEN IN WAR —



Captain J. G. Sloman,
Royal Australian Infantry.

SINCE the earliest times war has been a familiar phenomenon in the history of the world. In fact, of the 3,400 years of recorded history a war of some sort has been in progress for a total of 3,150 years.¹ Yet, during these thousands of years the idea of alleviating the horrors of war had made scarcely any progress. The champions of the idea have been so few that some of them are cited as memorable exceptions.

The Laws of Mano forbade the Hindu warrior to kill his disarmed, sleeping or wounded opponent, and prohibited the use of poisoned missiles and barbed arrows.

In 550 BC Cyrus, king of the Persians, ordered the physicians of his army to nurse all the wounded on the field, friend and foe alike.

During medieval times knights and nobles solemnly promised not to attack churches, unarmed monks or peaceful traders, nor to fight on certain days of the week. This chivalry did not last, and by the end of the 19th Century modern war, as we know it today, was evolved on Europe's battlefields.

In 1859 at Solferino was fought one of the most bloody battles of the coming era. The French and Austrians left on the field some 40,000 wounded to die without hope of assistance. By chance a young Genevese banker, Jean Henry Dunant, arrived on the scene soon after the battle. He was so profoundly moved by the sufferings of the abandoned wounded that he organized the local population and some fellow travellers to give what aid they could to the stricken men. Working day and night, they saved many who otherwise would certainly have died.

1. Since 1914 there has not been a single day on which an armed conflict of some sort has not been in progress in some part of the world.

Dunant was so affected by this experience that he resolved to do all in his power to arouse the conscience of mankind. In 1862, he published a book, "A Memory of Solferino," in which he described in powerful and moving language the aftermath of Solferino. In Geneva he formed a committee of five under the chairmanship of one of the most venerated men in Swiss history, General Guillaume Dufour, the victorious leader of the Swiss federal troops in the civil war of 1847. The other members comprised two doctors, a lawyer and Dunant himself. This original "Committee of Five" was the forerunner of the present International Committee of the Red Cross.

At its inception the principal task of the Red Cross was to alleviate the sufferings of sick and wounded soldiers who could no longer take an active part in the fighting. In the course of time the field of action has been greatly extended to include activities not connected with war, such as the general improvement of health, the fight against disease and relief after catastrophes of all kinds. Nevertheless, the principal task of the Red Cross remains the provision of assistance in time of war to those who have ceased to be combatants because they are sick, wounded or have been taken prisoner.

Each national Red Cross acts in part as "an auxiliary to the army medical service of its country." In addition it has special tasks to be carried out in time of war, as outlined in the "International Humanitarian Conventions of the Red Cross," generally known as the "Geneva Conventions." With this general understanding of the basic

purposes of the Red Cross organizations we can now consider their two main functions more fully.

Medical Services.

In 1859 when Henry Dunant conceived the idea of helping the sick and wounded the medical services of European armies were unorganized and inefficient. Public opinion was aroused by the appealing language of "A Memory of Solferino" and the activities of the National Red Cross Societies established in several countries. The army medical services were reorganized and, for a start, staffed largely by Red Cross personnel. Gradually, however, European military authorities accepted the idea that the provision of an efficient medical service was their direct responsibility. In April, 1952, an International Red Cross survey noted that in only six countries did their Societies undertake the management of service hospitals and the provision of trained medical personnel. In the other countries help was given mainly as a supplement to the medical service provided by the military authorities. In these countries social assistance and moral comfort to help war victims overcome their disabilities had become a main task for the Red Cross.

However, not all army medical services have reached a satisfactory standard of efficiency. In some cases Red Cross assistance in the form of trained staff and technical advice is still required. Guidance is given to all countries, with particular emphasis on standardization. Some current problems are:—

1. The apparatus and equipment to be used for blood (and blood substitute) transfusions.

2. Various types of medical accessories to be carried in the field for the use of the sick and wounded, including the soldier's individual field dressing.

3. Medical transport equipment, including various forms of field stretchers and their adaptation to motor vehicles, helicopters, etc.

4. Recent advances in mobile medical equipment for setting up operating theatres and field dressing stations close to the scene of battle.

5. Important discussions are regularly taking place on standardization of health and medical means of defence against new weapons — biological, chemical and mechanical.

Thus it can be seen that although the original function has been somewhat modified, there is still a requirement for an active National Red Cross to act as an auxiliary to the army medical services, both by standardization and preparation in peace and by active assistance in war.

The Geneva Conventions.

In war certain rules of conduct should be observed towards enemy nationals as well as towards one's own. The principles of these rules are expressed in the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, which nearly all countries have now pledged themselves to observe.

These Conventions govern the individual soldier's behaviour both towards enemy soldiers in the field and civilians who become involved in military operations. Without going into details of the Conventions it may be said that certain principles of conduct expressed therein are binding on the nationals of all countries which have signed them.

Persons not actually taking an active part in hostilities must in all cases be treated humanely. This is a cornerstone of the Conventions. Thus, sick and wounded soldiers, prisoners of war and civilians, are all entitled to be treated humanely in accordance with the Conventions.

The four Conventions contain a series of Prohibitions specifically stated. The following acts are prohibited at all times and places in respect of persons protected by the Conventions:—

- Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.
- The taking of hostages.
- Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
- The passing of sentence and the execution of sentence without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.

Certain grave breaches of the Conventions are mentioned specifically and the individual committing them is liable to suitable punishment. These include wilful murder, torture and inhumane treatment, including biological experiments. Under the Conventions the individuals committing a prohibited act are held to be equally responsible with the State. The excuse that he was only obeying orders does not absolve the individual from responsibility for his actions.

The Conventions now apply equally to civil and international wars. The obligation for the mili-

tary authorities to treat protected persons humanely, the absolute prohibition of the acts mentioned above, the obligation to collect and care for the sick and wounded whether friend or foe, henceforth apply to any form of conflict, whether it is a civil war or a war between two or more states, and whether war has been declared officially or not. The Conventions also apply to cases of occupation of foreign territory.

In war the interests of the citizens of the belligerent states may be safeguarded by neutral states, known in the Conventions as Protecting

Powers. The provisions of the Conventions will be applied with their co-operation and under their supervision. Their delegates will be empowered to visit prisoners of war and civilian internees, and to observe whether the belligerent states are carrying out their obligations under the conventions.

While it is at present impossible to eliminate all the horrors of war, the application of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions will go a long way to save millions of human beings and to mitigate their sufferings.

It is much easier to meet with error than to find truth; error is on the surface and is more easily met with; truth is hid in great depths. The way to seek does not appear to all the world.

—Goethe.

PEOPLES' WAR



Lieutenant-Colonel Edward A. Raymond.

MARX and Lenin called guerilla warfare "peoples' underground war"; Stalin has called it "Stalin warfare," "underground envelopment," and "the fourth dimension of war." Guerilla warfare is defined by many authorities as operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting his military operations. The potential of guerilla warfare is infinitely greater than that.

At the end of 1949, China, the most populous nation in the world, had been seized from within by overgrown guerilla warfare. On the Eastern Front, in the last two years of World War II, Soviet and Polish partisans engaged more Nazi divisions on the German lines of communication than were deployed on the so-called front. Guerilla forces under Tito freed Yugoslavia from Axis occupation. In Greece in 1947-1949, Communist guerilla forces threatened the existence of the central government. In Indo-China guerilla forces threaten to seize the state. In each of these cases, guerilla warfare played a major role, far beyond "harassing and delaying," and more far-reaching than the term "disrupting" implies.

One important characteristic is found in each case: the margin of victory was provided by a powerful, outside supporting power. Chinese forces first received American aid, then our Soviet ally transferred to the Communists captured Japanese arms. Partisan forces behind German lines on the Eastern Front in World War II used munitions left behind by retreating Red Army forces, or, exceptionally, flown in from unoccupied regions. British and American seaborne and airborne logistical support turned the tide of battle in Yugoslavia. The Soviet satellites supported Greek Communist guerillas and Communist China supports the forces of Ho Chi-minh in Indo-China.

The harassing, delaying and disrupting mission may be appropriate for guerilla forces in a secondary situation, but does not measure the full potential of this form of warfare under optimum conditions. The ultimate aim of guerilla warfare, as of all warfare, is to defeat the enemy. In its truest form, guerilla warfare is civil war—insurrection against a regime—with participating units growing in size and evolving into full-scale conventional armies and forcing the existing government or occupying power to withdraw.

friendly power is required if the potential of guerilla warfare is to be fully exploited. Missions of a particular guerilla force, both strategic and tactical, must be based on the objectives of the outside supporting power.

The pages of history are red with the blood of unsuccessful revolts. Guerillas can see all too plainly how few arms they have, how little ammunition. Food and transport are constant problems, and much of the energies of fighting units must be expended in staying alive. Shortages of medical supplies and the difficulty or impossibility of evacuating and hospitalizing casualties are a severe drain upon morale.

To fight on for years against overwhelming odds requires a form of fanaticism. As a drowning man clutches at a straw, guerillas seize upon outside assistance. The idea of outside support is immensely enheartening. There is a danger that it may cause too much enthusiasm, give rise to too ambitious a programme and outstrip the possible. A greater danger lies in not realising the price which must be paid for outside support. There may be too little national feeling; regional loyalties, the personal ambitions of leaders, political differences or religious schisms may obstruct the purposes of the outside power or powers. The royalist Mikhailovitch and the Communist Tito fought each other in Yugoslavia. More tragic was the effort of the Polish Home Army to free Warsaw from German occupation as the Soviet Army approached from the east in 1944. The Soviets delayed their attack and an estimated 100,000 lives were sacrificed, most of them needlessly. In World War II in Greece, there was

bitter political competition among the partisans of ELAS, EDES and EAM.

The mission of guerillas in a strongly occupied country must be wedded to the mission of the outside supporting power. If the supporting power plans an early invasion, the guerillas must conduct their operations so as to attract a minimum of attention. Bands of guerillas should not lay a paper-chase trail of leaflets, posters or publications, although such activity may be conducted by static non-combatant formations, dissociated from the field forces. Widespread sabotage, nuisance raids and terrorism attract too much attention, like a dog with firecrackers tied to his tail. This may seem obvious, but certain Allied headquarters in the Second World War, charged with the co-ordination of behind-the-lines activity, had a number of interested staff sections. Each section tried to keep its particular ball in the air all the time.

A secondary guerilla mission in the situation of a friendly invasion impending may be a co-ordinated military effort for tactical advantage in landing areas or drop zones.

From February to May, 1944, the French Resistance placed top priority on preparing for the Normandy landings. In this situation there were sufficiently large French forces in the area to permit preliminary sabotage. Just before the landings and during their execution, a full-scale campaign was conducted on communications and isolated troop units. These operations (plus the aerial campaign) prevented six German divisions from reaching the battlefields of Normandy during the critical period of 6 June to 26 July, 1944. German heavy armoured units,

forced to move by road instead of rail, arrived in the battle area too late and too disorganized to fight. General Eisenhower estimated the value of the French guerilla forces to be equivalent to fifteen Allied divisions.

The early Communist theorists, Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, paid particular attention to the struggles of the Spanish population against Napoleon, the Austrian campaigns in Italy and also to the Franco-German War. They popularized the concept of the Peoples' Underground War.

In their studies they tried to find out how an organized popular movement, without proper arms, can be led to fight with any hope of success against highly organized and well-equipped armies. F. O. Miksche, in his interesting study, "Secret Forces," points out that the Franco-Spanish War was exceptionally enlightening. French forces of considerable size for their time — some 670,000 men and 520 guns — crossed the Pyrenees between 1807 and 1813 to conquer Spain. Only 250,000 men and 250 guns returned to France. Allied victory in the Middle East, in Mesopotamia and Palestine in the First World War, was won with the help of the Arab free rangers, under the semi-legendary Colonel T. E. Lawrence.

Lawrence's significance is that he largely destroyed the Turkish forces and gave us new concepts of guerilla strategy. While the Arabs were more mobile, but less able to bear casualties than orthodox armies, the Turks were almost uninterested in loss of men, though not in loss of material, of which they were short. Superb at sitting tight in a trench or firing at a directly oncoming tar-

get, they could neither adapt themselves to, nor endure, the strain of fluid operations. Lawrence seized on that weakness by destroying railroad equipment, thus paralyzing the Turks.

When invasion by an outside supporting power is not imminent, the strategic mission of the guerillas is served by distinctly different tactical means.

The primary tactical mission in this situation may be psychological warfare, with the objective of maintaining hope of eventual liberation and overcoming unreasoned fear of the occupying power. Acts which will foster widespread reprisals on the part of the enemy are to be avoided. Under the cloak of apparent collaboration, slowdowns are encouraged, not only to hamper the enemy, but to show people that they are not helpless; that united they are strong. All appropriate methods of communication are utilized, but in most situations, leaflets or the clandestine press will be the most effective. "Ideas," writes Brigadier McLean of the British Army, "are more important to guerillas than bullets."

Outside headquarters should be aware of the risks run by guerillas, not only in obtaining information, but in transmitting it as well. Requirements should be limited to data which actually will be used, and not merely ornament files and grow obsolete before they are needed. For example, if biographical information on minor, routine figures in the occupying forces is woven into broadcasts, it can be considered to have been used; but a further screening of requirements is needed to ensure that the effect attained justifies the collection effort.

Resistance in the Balkans led to classic examples of guerilla warfare in the high mountains. Very primitive and poorly equipped at the start, the resistance organization improved to such an extent that towards the end of the war it had almost attained the standard of a regular army. Whereas in the spring of 1941 the Germans required only twenty divisions to destroy the Yugoslav and Greek armies within a few days, the subsequent occupation and policing of the countries required fifteen German and thirty Italian, Bulgarian and Croatian divisions. Territories the size of Belgium were governed by Yugoslav partisans. Documents found in the possession of the Chief of the Press Bureau of the Supreme Command of the German Army reveal that the German losses in killed in the Balkans amounted to 24,000, as compared with only 12,000 in Africa.

When the supporting power does not envisage an invasion, but wishes guerillas to contain the maximum number of occupying troops and deny the enemy logistical support, appropriate tactical missions alter. Here they can be described adequately as harassing, delaying and disrupting.

In view of the indefinite protraction of guerilla activity in this situation, psychological warfare again plays a foremost part. When armed action is imminent a sense of accomplishment and progress maintains enthusiasm. When there is no liberation in sight, when the battle against tremendous odds goes on indefinitely, the climate for non-co-operation and sabotage is hard to maintain.

It is in this situation that widely scattered acts of terrorism are ap-

propriate, from the guerilla point of view. The Communist-inspired Hukbalahaps have greatly retarded the post-war development of the Philippines and have tied up large government forces. Communist Chinese guerillas in Malaya have interfered with the economic rehabilitation of the country and forced Great Britain to use large military and police forces in Malaya.

Conflict between the government and communist-led and communist-supported guerillas broke out shortly after the liberation of Greece and for four years threatened to dislocate completely the economic and political life of the country. The communists gained complete control of the northern border areas of Greece and were supplied by the communist nations of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which in turn were supported by the USSR. Within these areas, regular communist military forces were organized. Additional forces waged guerilla warfare in other sectors of Greece. Only after large-scale economic and military assistance from the United States was the Greek Government able to overcome the communist forces.

The Indonesians, who had never accepted Dutch control, openly resisted Dutch efforts to re-occupy the country at the end of the war and effectively denied a large part of the country to the Dutch military forces. As a result, the Netherlands government granted virtual independence to the area.

Today Indo-China is in danger, and at least 150,000 good French troops are tied down there.

Resistance movements are of a predominantly political character, and political factors must be con-

sidered with great care by an outside supporting power. There is a high premium on picking a winner among rival resistance factions. Allied strategy in Yugoslavia, though fraught with controversy then and now, provides an excellent illustration of this type of difficulty. The support given to Tito's followers in Yugoslavia was a factor in causing the Catholic Croatian Ustachi to support the Nazis. Another extremely serious political consideration is the post-war effect of guerilla warfare.

Normal warfare has for its object the destruction of the opposing army in battle; aerial attacks demolish the adversary's industrial centres and cities. But the "Peoples' Underground War" destroys the soul of a nation, systematically leading it into disobedience and disrespect of law and order. As in all revolutions, the "Peoples' War" means complete chaos, a savage struggle in which the end justifies the means, and vengeance, trickery, and even treachery, play a great part. Each action provokes a reaction, and the consequent reprisals engender hatred.

The question of political commitments is a major one. Normally, firm political commitments are made in advance. Lawrence of Arabia promised the Arabs their independence. When it did not materialize, resentment festered in Arabian bosoms.

External propaganda efforts may have some political effect. These should fight xenophobic tendencies in the guerilla forces. German attitudes towards the Italians were so arrogant and overbearing that many Italian soldiers joined the partigiani in their successful resistance movement in northern Italy in 1944-45.

Native leaders who have been trained outside the resisting country are of great value in ensuring harmony of viewpoint after the conclusion of a campaign. The Lenin Institute in Moscow trained Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Peter Dimitrov, Ana Pauker, Josip Broz (Tito), and others.

Continuous external support is of great importance, and should include tactical and technical liaison, delivery of arms, ammunition, explosives and supplies demanded by the tactical situation.

In 1937 Mao Tse-tung wrote a remarkable treatise on guerilla warfare. Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, has made an English translation of this little-known, but important volume. Mao concludes his treatise in the following manner:—

"Historical experience is written in blood and iron. We must point out that the guerilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China, but will be world wide."

When Mao Tse-tung wrote these words, observes Colonel Griffith, "he commanded a communist guerilla army which the Japanese considered as an essentially unimportant collection of tattered bandits. Mao now rules a nation of 460 million people. He is the chief architect of a strategy designed to repeat the communist triumph in China all over Asia."

Mao likens guerillas to fish. "The people are the water in which the fish swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will multiply and flourish," he said. Military raids into enemy territory, like those of Morgan and Early in our Civil War, did not have the benefit of support

from the local population—the “temperature was not right.” Anti-communist powers controlled the water in which the communist fish were swimming in Greece and Indonesia. Can it be done in time of war in communist-held territory? In the Soviet Union, the German invaders were greeted as liberators in 1941 and two million Red Army men deserted. This does not prove that any such number would desert to a conventional invasion force today, but it does indicate their true feelings about Stalin. There are other indications. When forced repatriation of displaced persons from Germany was suspended after World War II, very few of the hundreds of thousands remaining were willing to go back to the USSR. Many citizens of the Soviet Union have risked their lives to escape from despotism and reach the West.

Discontent in the satellite states is hard to measure; although the num-

ber of defections to the West is many times as high, opportunities to escape are greater than for Soviet citizens. Chou En-lai himself is the authority for a 1950 estimate that there are no fewer than 250,000 “bandits” in Communist China.

“Mao Tse-tung,” writes Colonel Griffith, “has basically revised the theory of ‘The People’s War,’ sired so long ago by Karl Marx. All students of guerilla war, including at one time Mao Tse-tung himself, have believed in the past that guerillas by themselves can never win through to final victory; they can never be but a complement to regular forces fighting at the front. But Mao Tse-tung proved in China that guerillas, given the support of a great power, and given modern techniques of communications and supply, can themselves be transformed into regular forces. They may then win total victory.”
