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

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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SHERLOCK OF THE SIXTH

Captain W. Sherlock

THE left wing of the Japanese offensive of 1941-42 carried them as far south as the Solomon Islands and gave them possession of all the important places on the north-eastern coast of New Guinea. (See "The Japanese War in S E Asia," AAJ, No. 45, February, 1953). To consolidate these successes and to secure suitable bases from which to launch further offensives, the Japanese attempted to capture Milne Bay by an amphibious operation and Port Moresby by an overland attack based on Buna on the north-east coast. Both attempts failed, and by 2 January, 1943, Buna was again firmly in Australian hands.

These two victories, combined with the Japanese naval defeats at Midway and the Coral Sea, relieved the pressure on the allies in the South-West Pacific.

However, before they could take advantage of these successes a thorough reorganization of their exhausted fighting formations, together with extensive development of the administrative services, was essential.

Immediately after the conquest of Buna the allies began planning their counter-offensive, which was designed initially to recapture the Japanese positions at Salamaua and Lae and on the Huon Peninsula. The general situation at this stage is shown in outline on Map 1.

A glance at the map shows that the Wau-Bulolo area was important to both sides. It was important to the enemy because its occupation would not only protect the rear of their positions at Salamaua and Lae, but would also give them an inland air base for operations against Moresby and the Torres Strait Area. It was, therefore, very important for the allies to deny the Wau air base to the enemy. Further, in their projected counter-offensive they intended to use Wau as a base for an overland advance on Salamaua with a view to drawing Japanese troops away from the Lae area.

Several tracks led to Wau from



the Japanese side, but the only way the allies could get in was by air. While the Buna operations were in progress all available transport aircraft were required to support them. A risk had to be taken with Wau until transports became available to fly in a really strong garrison. Until this could be done the existing garrison, 2/5 and 2/7 Independent Companies and a detachment of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, known as Kanga Force, would have to do its best to delay any enemy advance towards the Wau-Bulolo area.

Terrain and Approaches.

More than 3,000 feet above sea level, the valley of the Bulolo is cupped in formidable mountain ranges, from which descend many streams to feed the swiftly-flowing river. Towards its southern end, where Wau is situated, the narrow valley expands somewhat into an area of great fertility. Before the war Wau was a small mining township whose climate, for New Guinea, was fairly good. The airstrip was about 1,100 yards long, with one end considerably higher than the other. The high precipitous ridges enclosing the valley are covered with rain forests and a tangled mass of rotting vegetation.

The track from Salamaua to Wau first followed the valley of the Francisco River to Bobdubi, then turned southward to Mubo, where it branched. One branch—the Black cat track—generally followed the Bitoi River and approached Wau from the north. The other branch — the Crystal Creek track — ran along the crests of numerous ridges through Skindewai and Kaisenik and approached Wau from the south east. Nearing Wau the main track splits

into several tracks leading to the village and the airstrip.

From Lae a track ran along the Markham River, thence via the Wampit and Bulolo valleys to Wau. From the enemy's point of view this was the longest route, but it had the advantage of not being so difficult as the other two.

From the beginning Kanga Force followed a policy of aggressive patrolling along all known approaches. They twice raided the strong outposts which the Japanese had established at Mubo. However, their resources were too slender to enable them to hold any ground far from their base, or to cover adequately all the approaches to Wau.

Early in January, 1943, intelligence reports and air reconnaissance indicated that the Japanese were assembling a force to attempt the capture of Wau. Towards the middle of the month a few transport aircraft became available and a beginning was made to fly in the 17 Infantry Brigade. The brigade commander arrived with the leading elements on the 17th, and assumed command of Kanga Force.

Japanese Approach.

The Japanese regimental group—the equivalent of our brigade group—detailed to capture Wau landed at Lae early in January, and was ferried in barges to Salamaua by night. Although this movement was noted by our air reconnaissance, and its possible significance appreciated, the enemy had a surprise up his sleeve. He had become aware of a third route from Mubo to Wau. This faint native pad, which had been surveyed by a German engineer before the war, followed a route about midway between the Crystal Creek and Black Cat tracks. Its existence was either unknown to our troops, or it was so faint that it had been overlooked. It did not show on air photos. Although it was extremely difficult and he would have to cut

his way through, the enemy resolved to use it for the sake of surprise.

The date on which the Japanese began their advance is not definitely known. It would appear that they started from Salamaua between 12 and 15 January. From Mubo onwards the main body moved by the central track. In cutting their way through they were careful not to disturb the upper foliage of the forest. Thus they moved through a tunnel which effectively concealed them from air observation. In any case continuous low cloud and mist made close observation impossible in that country of jagged peaks and ridges. However, the enemy moved small columns by both the Black Cat and the Crystal Creek tracks and these were glimpsed by our air reconnaissance as the Japanese commander intended they should.

Contact.

The task facing the brigade commander was not an easy one. First the scarcity of transport planes, and then bad flying weather, seriously delayed the planned build-up of his force. With increasing intelligence reports that the Japs were advancing on Wau, he had few troops available with which to cover the possible approaches. Furthermore, in order to deny the Bulolo valley airstrips to the enemy, a strong detachment had to be stationed in the Bulwa area.

This situation imposed a considerable degree of dispersion on Kanga Force, and, pending the arrival of more troops, left only a small central reserve.

"A" Company, 2/6 Battalion, commanded by Captain W. Sherlock, was stationed near Wandumi covering several of the branches of the Crystal Creek track. Late on 27 January one of his patrols encountered an enemy patrol laying booby traps about one mile north of Wandumi. Shots were exchanged.

Knowing that all tracks were being patrolled, Sherlock realized that the enemy, who appeared to be in considerable force, must have approached by a route unknown to Kanga Force. He appreciated that:

(a) He was in a very isolated position. The tangle of ridges, creeks and deep valleys so impeded movement that, if he remained where he was, he was most unlikely to receive any help or support before the enemy attacked in force.

(b) His was the only force in position, or which could possibly get into position, to oppose the enemy advance. Once past the Wandumi area the enemy would have a fair chance of rushing the airstrip.

(c) It was all-important, therefore, to hold the Wandumi area as long as possible.

Sherlock never hesitated. He knew full well that his decision meant the almost certain destruction of himself and his company. He knew that every hour gained at Wandumi would be invaluable to the whole force. He knew that on him and his men depended the safety of the Wau airstrip, and all that that meant to the army in New Guinea.

The Assault.

The following morning the enemy attacked Sherlock with total disregard for the losses he inflicted on them. After heavy fighting they got past Sherlock's left flank and occupied Wandumi, from where they were able to enfilade his position. This forced Sherlock into open kunai country on a long spur where

the track ran down to the river. The spur decended in a series of steps 50 to 100 yards long, each being overlooked by the one above. On one of these steps Sherlock's depleted company took up another position across the enemy's line of advance.

At 1345 hours Sherlock reported that he was again being heavily attacked, and that he needed men, water and ammunition. Ten minutes later he advised that the enemy was working around his flanks and towards his rear. At 1445 he reported tersely: "Things pretty hot. One platoon overrun. Counter-attacking."

Sherlock's first counter-attack was not entirely successful. Meanwhile the enemy had got up several machine guns and had his position under heavy and continuous fire.

At 1540 hours Sherlock radioed: "No mortar bombs left and very little ammunition. Counter-attacking again."

This time Sherlock's men regained their original position on the spur. At about 1630 he reported that although he had only 40 men left he thought he could hold on for a little longer.

Meanwhile the brigade major of 17 Brigade had taken guides forward to assist an officer, who was moving to Sherlock's relief with a composite party from 2/5 Battalion.

Towards evening Sherlock signalled: "It's on again. After heavy mortar bombardment Japs pouring over ridge." A little later he came on the air again: "Won't be long now. Enemy close up in front and flank."

In the gathering darkness large numbers of Japanese slipped past Sherlocks' position and headed for the Crystal Creek track. But for a whole day he had held their main body away from that or any other track; for a whole day he had held them in the Wandumi area.

Kanga Force HQ now ordered Sherlock to withdraw if he could. Sherlock shot his way out and joined the relief party.

Next morning the party fought its way through heavy opposition, and, under the direction of the brigade major, took up another delaying position on Slippery Ridge. By this time, however, the enemy had occupied Crystal Creek and the Bulolo valley in strength, and subjected the defenders to very heavy mortar and machine gun fire, followed by a vicious, but not quite successful



attack. It soon became obvious that the enemy could no longer be held so the brigade major ordered a withdrawal. Again the defenders shot their way out and crossed the Bulolo River. There they split into several small parties, most of which eventually forced their way through the dense junge to the vicinity of the airstrip. Unfortunately the gallant Sherlock and three of his few remaining men were killed soon after crossing the river.

Reinforcements Arrive.

Meanwhile, on the aerodrome at Moresby reinforcements and transport planes were waiting to take off. But the weather was impossible. The mountains around Wau were shrouded in a dense blanket of low cloud and mist.

On the morning of the 29th the enemy was closing in hard on the Wau airstrip. Every available man had been mustered for its defence—cooks, clerks and transport personnel. At seven o'clock the whole area was blanketed with cloud. At nine the sky suddenly cleared.

The break in the weather was immediately spotted by high-flying fighters, and soon afterwards the transports began to roll in. But it was a near thing, a very near thing indeed. The 'planes landed and the troops disembarked under enemy small arms fire. Many men were hit before they got off the strip, and returned to Moresby in the same 'plane which brought them up. However, during the morning the 2/7 and the balance of the 2/5 Battalions were landed, and they gradually forced the enemy away from the strip and established a strong defence.

The next morning — 30 January — the Japanese launched a well co-ordinated attack, which was first held and then driven back with heavy loss. About 0930 hours 25 pounders of 2/1 Field Regiment were flown in and disembarked under sniper fire from the ridges above the strip. The guns were rapidly assembled and their fire played havoc with further attempted Japanese concentrations.

The battle of Wau was not yet over, but the crisis had passed. Unless it was heavily reinforced the badly mauled Japanese force now had little real chance of taking its objective.

Summary.

This article was not written to describe the Battle of Wau, nor to draw any tactical lessons therefrom. It was written simply to show the far-reaching effect that the resolute action of one junior regimental officer can have on the course of great events. It is, perhaps, too much to say with absolute certainty that had Sherlock not made his stand the Japanese would have taken Wau. But it is at least a strong probability. He delayed them for a whole day, and, in view of the weather, that day was vital. Even as it was, the defenders had been forced right back to the strip before the reinforcements arrived.

By their action at Wandumi throughout the long day on that hot, fire-swept kunai spur Sherlock and his men have bequeathed to the Australian Army a manificent example of resolution and courage, an example which the rising generation of soldiers might well take as their guide for conduct in the face of the enemy.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

R. H. S. Crossman, Esq., OBE, MP.

Of recent years considerable attention has been given to psychological warfare. Some statesmen and writers have gone so far as to suggest that it can be made the primary weapon of the West in the struggle against Communism. This lecture, given at the Royal United Service Institution, London, removes many misconceptions about psychological warfare, stresses its limitations and states the basic principles of is application.

In introducing the lecturer the Chairman, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, KCMG, said: "It is my pleasure and privilege to introduce to you Mr. Richard Crossman, who requires no introduction as Mr. Crossman to any audience. But he is going to speak to you about psychological warfare, and in that connection I think I should tell you that he has had more experience of the practical application of psychological warfare than probably anybody else in the world."—Editor.

I AM afraid that Sir Robert pitched my claim a great deal too high. I was a member of a very large staff which worked under his supreme command until I moved across into the Anglo-American unit, first at AFHQ and then at SHAEF. It was an extremely able collection of people, and I think I can claim one thing at least—that we managed in the course of six years to make almost every mistake it was possible to make! On the other hand, we learned a good deal from those mistakes.

My anxiety today is lest the costly experience that we had and the conclusions that we drew during and just after the war have been forgotten already by those who are reactivating psychological warfare in different circumstances. Therefore, I feel that the most useful thing I can do is to analyse what we built up and what we were trying to do during the war, and attempt to estimate how successful we were.

We went through three stages during the war: first, the defensive stage, when we had not much to say to the Germans except that we were not going to give in; secondly, the offensive stage, when we had sufficient military power for our words to be listened to with some respect; and thirdly, the occupation stage, when the military job was over and the political job began of winning the fruits of war, if we were competent to win them.

But before I come to those three stages, let me try to define the object of psychological warfare, the media of psychological warfare, and its relationship to other weapons of war.

—*From RUSI Journal, UK.*

Objects of Psychological Warfare.

I take it that the object of psychological warfare is to do certain things to the enemy: first, to demoralize him; secondly, if I may coin a word, to exdoctrinate him, to undermine his belief in the totalitarian doctrine which he has been given; and thirdly, to begin the process of indoctrination. Those are the three stages of a successful psychological warfare campaign against the enemy.

Of course, on the other side of the enemy lines you have not only the enemy—by which I mean someone who is spiritually resisting your attempt to defeat his government—you have also friends who are behind the enemy lines, not because they are on his side but because they are compelled to serve him. With the latter the chief job that you have to do is remoralization. You can assume that they are on your side; your job is, first to keep them on your side, and second (this may surprise you), to keep them quiet. It is not the job of psychological warfare to organize their resistance; that is the job of other subversive operations. The job of psychological warfare is to keep them quiet until such time as their activities might be useful to us and not suicidal for them.

Fallacy of "Operational" Psychological Warfare.

This brings me to another point that I want to emphasize. During the last war there was coined the term "operational propaganda," by which was meant propaganda designed to make people do certain things. In my view, this was a misnomer. There is no such thing as operational psychological warfare. Operations must be left to the Services responsible for operations. If psychological warfare gets itself mixed up with, or thinks that it is undertaking, operations, then it will get into the most grievous trouble.

I remember very vividly, for instance, that one of the early successes of British political warfare (to use the proper British expression, for "psychological warfare" is an American invention) was a catastrophe. Almost by mistake, the BBC in 1941, started the V Campaign—the V sign for victory —and this spread like wildfire over the Continent, which was hoping for a second front. So successful was the campaign that it created the impression in western Europe that the invasion of Europe was imminent. It created false hopes among our friends; it made many of them do risky things and pay the penalty.

I think that it was that V campaign, which started almost by accident, that made us understand that psychological warfare may do more harm than good unless it is strictly co-ordinated with diplomatic and military activity.

The psychological warrior must therefore regard himself as a part of the military organization, and everything that he does must be fitted carefully and meticulously into the overall strategy of the war.

Unfortunately, soldiers, sailors, and airmen usually resort to psychological warfare when they are in a fix and can think of nothing else to do. I think Sir Robert will remember that whenever the Services were in a desperate predicament, they would ring up PWE and ask, "Can you help us out?" The greatest mistake of the psychologi-

car warrior is to suggest he has a mysterious substitute for military action, a way out of military difficulties. If the psychological warrior ever "sells" himself in this way, he has destroyed his profession. For psychological warfare is not an independent arm; it is not something which can do miracles on its own. It can be successful only if it is an advanced guard of a policy which is clearly defined and if it times its activities in relation to existing operations, whether of the Foreign Office or of the Chiefs of Staff. It must therefore remain strictly subordinated to Foreign Office policy and military strategy.

So much for the object and the limitations of psychological warfare.

Media of Psychological Warfare.

I should like now to say a few words about the media of psychological warfare. Broadly speaking (I am leaving out the delicacies of the subject), there are two main media which are used today in this warfare behind the enemy lines. One is the leaflet and the other is radio. There are a good many other minor activities, but in the main one can speak of radio and leaflet activity, and one must then subdivide radio and leaflet activity into "black," "white" and various shades of "grey" activity.

"White" and "Black" Propaganda.

By "white," I mean activity which is openly sponsored by one's Government, that is, activity which purports to be British. The BBC is a "white" radio activity, and a Passierschein (a safe conduct pass) with General Eisenhower's signature on it was a "white" leaflet. There was no disguise; it came from the enemy, it spoke the voice of the enemy to the Germans and the Italians.

'Black" radio or leaflets mean leaflets and radio which purport to come from organizations inside the enemy country (for instance, from some illegal organization), or which, without claiming to come from any specific organization, are the sort of leaflets which the British Government would not be very proud to publish. If, for instance, one is trying to persuade a German that while he is abroad his wife is being seduced by a foreign worker, it may be necessary to have the leaflet so designed that no one can say that it comes from the British Government. That is a "black" leaflet.

Then there are varying shades of grey. For instance, one may run a radio station which is not a "black" station—because no German would be so foolish as to believe that a medium-wave station could be a secret station in Germany—but which certainly is not a BBC station. Certain things can be said by such a station for which no British Government could take the responsibility.

Effects of "Black" Propaganda.

Obviously in this lecture I cannot talk about "black" propaganda and not much about "grey" propaganda, because officially we never did them, but I think many people will know what I am talking about if I mention Soldatensender Calais and the leaflet newspaper for the German troops which was dropped punctually in two editions each day during the Normandy campaign. This was not an official British newspaper, because it was

desired to use it for strategic deception, and therefore it had to contain inaccuracies for which the Government would not take responsibility.

Looking back and reflecting a great deal on my job, in which my left hand knew what my right hand was doing but my right hand, the BBC, had no notion of what my left hand was doing, all I would say about the "black" (not about the "grey") is that, on the whole, although we found the left-hand activities enormous fun, although a vast amount of talent went into them, although I am sure they entertained the Gestapo, I have grave doubts whether "black" propaganda had an effect in any way commensurate with that of ordinary straightforward propaganda from the enemy to the enemy. I say that for the following reason:

Psychological warfare means imposing one's will on the enemy. If you want to impose the British will, or the Anglo-American will, or the Allied will on the enemy, then it has to be your will that you are imposing — and "black" propaganda, of course, is carefully not yours. Therefore, although it may demoralize the enemy to some extent, it does not directly assist the job of making him surrender more easily; and, after all, the main job of propaganda is to make the men at the front surrender with less reluctance than otherwise they would do.

So if I had to advise Sir Robert all over again, I would say: put your best talent on to the "white" propaganda; do not be diverted into the vastly entertaining and endless delicacies of the "black" varieties (for which, I must say, soldiers had a strange addiction when they were told anything about them!).

Strategic and Tactical Propaganda.

Propaganda can be further divided into two forms, the strategic and the tactical. By strategic propaganda I mean propaganda which is spread to the whole of the enemy nation broadcast, leaflets, for instance, which were carried by the RAF on bombing raids and were dropped over German towns. By tactical radio or leaflets, I mean propaganda addressed to a specific group, whether it happens to be a division in a predicament or an encircled garrison, or a narrow group of people at high level within, shall we say, the Gestapo.

It is fairly clear, when I make that distinction, that radio is an instrument ill adapted for tactical use, because there is no way of preventing people who are not meant to hear it from hearing it. If it is desired to tell a battalion in the front line that it is cut off when it is not, that cannot be done by radio without other people knowing what is being said. It was discovered, broadly speaking, that radio was an instrument of strategic propaganda with very few tactical applications.

Radio for Specialized Audiences.

The only tactical applications of radio were the setting up of small "black" or "grey" stations which were addressed to highly specialized audiences and were so boring to other audiences that only the specialized groups would listen to them. I will give as an example the American radio stations in California beamed on Japan. As the Japanese had no short-wave sets at all, the only people who could listen to those radio stations were the monitors who were listening for the Japanese Chiefs of Staff. This was,

therefore, a tactical operation, because it was being done for the sake of the men who were monitoring and taking down what was said. If you want to get a rumour read by important generals, admirals, and air marshals, there is nothing like putting it in a report marked "secret"! For spreading rumours, there is nothing so good as getting "high-ups" to read such things; the next day they talk to somebody else and, without giving the source, they say, "By the way, did you know so-and-so?" They will not say, "I picked it up off a monitor." In those circumstances, one can expect that the rumour will spread. It was our experience that the best people for spreading such rumours were high Service officers.

Radio of this special type has its use, especially in dealing with totalitarian countries where radio listening is forbidden and where it is a high privilege to read the monitored reports of the enemy radio. A monitored report, typed out and circulated secretly, has a great effect in spreading a particular rumour that you want to spread. It may be that this has an application today; I do not know, I leave that to you.

Strategic Leaflets.

The leaflet, on the other hand, is essentially a tactical weapon. In the last war we wasted a great deal of paper on strategic leaflets. We asked the RAF on their bombing raids to drop leaflets, although they did not like doing it. The leaflets were dropped from a great height, and drifted down in the countryside over an area of 50 square miles. It was a very wasteful way of getting information to the enemy when the radio could do it so much better. I am doubtful therefore whether, in dealing with a large country, strategic leaflet raids are a very effective form of propaganda.

It was not until we perfected the leaflet bomb, which enabled us to bomb with precision a certain target, that the leaflet became important, and even then its importance, to my mind, was much greater tactically than it was strategically. This was mainly because the German enemy was a radio-listening enemy. It may be that in countries where the number of radio sets is not as high as it is in Germany we would have to use strategic leaflet propaganda; but I consider that the real importance of the leaflet was evolved only when leaflets were dropped tactically on a particular unit to which we wanted to give a particular message.

Tactical Surrender Leaflet.

The job of persuading men to surrender is infinitely easier if there is an organization, as we had during the Normandy campaign, by which a unit command could make a request for a special tactical leaflet and have it delivered quickly. The request went from Normandy to London, the instruction went to the printing presses at Watford, and the leaflets were got back (with a special squadron of Flying Fortresses to drop them) within 48 hours. It had to be done quickly if the leaflets were to have real tactical utility. On the other hand, the request had to be sent to London because the drafting of tactical leaflets requires the greatest skill and cannot be left in the hands of the average local commander. He does not know the nuances of the enemy's psychology, and if he drafts the leaflet it will almost cer-

tainly be dismissed as propaganda. The whole art of the leaflet is to appear as a simple, honourable offer by one honourable soldier to another, saying, "You have fought very gallantly; now is the time when you have a perfectly good reason for giving in a little earlier." The job of doing that is not usually a job for the fighting soldier; he is unlikely to understand the enemy's peculiar psychology, the peculiar sense of honour which each army has and which differs in each army with which one has to deal.

Of course, the American Army had its own leaflet units which were firing leaflet shells from the front; but even there, a rigorous control from Army Group and SHAEF was necessary to ensure that the leaflets were in conformity with the requirements for successful tactical surrender propaganda.

I have dealt rapidly with the objective (demoralization, exdoctrination, and indoctrination), the media (radio and leaflet), the type of propaganda (black, white, and grey), the different ways of using it (strategic and tactical); and now I come to the heart of the problem —the substance of what is put into the leaflet or in the broadcast.

The Truth—But Not All the Truth.

Here I must say to you something which is extremely boring, but it cost the British Government many millions of pounds to discover this, so it may be worth repeating. We discovered, after many experiments in Dr. Goebbels's technique, that the truth pays. It is complete delusion to think of the brilliant propagandist as being a professional liar. The brilliant propagandist is the man who tells the truth, or that selection of the truth which is requisite for his purpose, and tells it in such a way that the recipient does not think that he is receiving any propaganda. The art of the propagandist is never to be thought a propagandist, but to seem to be a bluff, simple, honourable enemy who would never dream of descending to the level of propaganda.

Soldiers are very sensitive to these things. Lord Haw-Haw was a disaster to the Germans because he was obviously a propagandist. Anybody who listened to his tone of voice knew that he was.

I suggest that in the last war the British did better propaganda than any other nation in the world. The Russians undoubtedly did the worst propaganda. The Americans in many ways had the failings of the Russians in the propaganda field. The Germans, because they loved propaganda, could not do it. You must hate propaganda to do it well, and we British did hate it and therefore took more trouble to conceal what we were doing.

From what I am saying, there arises this conclusion: if the art of propaganda is to conceal that you are doing propaganda, then the central substance of propaganda is hard, correct information. That is what you must give—hard, correct information. If you give a man the correct information for seven years, he may believe the incorrect information on the first day of the eighth year when it is necessary, from your point of view, that he should do so. Your first job is to build the credibility and the authenticity of your propaganda, and persuade the enemy to trust you although you are his enemy.

Journalists' and Advertisers' Techniques.

One of the mistakes of most propagandists in 1940, when we started, was to believe that propaganda had something to do with exhortation. Let me assure you that exhorting an enemy to desert stiffens his morale. We know that our own troops, when they received a leaflet which exhorted them to desert, felt braver than ever before. Nor is it any good pouring out the most moving exhortations to become a democrat because the enemy knows that this comes from the enemy, and writes it off as propaganda.

Secondly, it is no good giving the enemy soldier the most soothing entertainment. There are many advertisers who say that the art of propaganda is to give people lovely music to lull them and then to slip in the propaganda. It was true that if we played very good dance music for a time and let the soldiers tune in to that dance music, not knowing that it came from an enemy station, they were more likely not to switch off the news bulletin when it was put on; there was therefore something to be said for having music to fill in the gaps in order to keep the line alive.

But do not think that you will buy the enemy with jazz. You will not. Nor will you do it with brilliant descriptions of British culture. The enemy knows enough not to be taken in by that sort of thing.

Moreover, you must remember that the enemy listener is listening under grave danger of his life. There is a risk attached to listening to foreign stations in totalitarian countries. Moreover, the listener is under appalling physical inconvenience; his head is probably under a thick blanket, and he is listening through intense jamming, which makes listening a great strain. To play him a Beethoven concerto in such conditions is to make him switch off.

We discovered that propaganda to the enemy, listening under risk and physical inconvenience, has to be as concentrated and as apparently objective, informative, and concise as possible. You must not disguise that it is coming from the enemy, that it is an enemy who is telling the truth as soldier to soldier —and if you treat a civilian as a soldier, you will not be too far wrong, either in a cold war or a hot war, because he has roughly the same feelings about you as a soldier has. What they wanted was news.

We drew our propaganda technicians from two groups, the advertising profession and the journalists. They were the most proficient people at the job, and each had grave deficiencies.

The advertiser believed that somehow you could get people to surrender by giving them sales talk. He used to say, "Do you suffer from National Socialism?—Buy British Democracy," on the same lines as, "Do you suffer from BO?—Buy Bing's Deodorant." That sort of thing does not work; it is too obvious. Sales promotion is all right to a captive audience; it is all right with you and me who cannot avoid looking at posters and who have to read the Press. But the enemy can avoid reading one's propaganda, he has every incentive to switch off the radio and not to pick up the leaflet. Therefore, the usual advertising methods are not

efficacious in propaganda and have to be drastically modified. The advertising was correct, however, in one respect: he understood that you have to go on saying the same thing, however boring it is to you.

Now I come to the journalist's failure. The journalist, of course, hated the advertiser and his slogans. The journalist said that the thing to do was to give hot news, and to make every effort to get the news as hot as possible. What he forgot was that hot news is a special fiction of Fleet Street, and that it does not matter to the enemy listening whether the news is hot or cold, so long as it is new. It can be three months old, provided that it is something that the audience has not heard.

News Creation.

When we wrote our news bulletins or our news leaflets, we had to order our journalists (it was agony to them!) to repeat the same news day after day in forms in which it did not look the same. I will give you an example. We were concerned at one stage to spread anxiety about typhus coming into Germany from Russia. This was a job for the news creation department. "News creation" does not mean invention; it means looking through all the intelligence reports, looking through all the German newspapers, and selecting true items from them—in this instance, items announcing a case of typhus. If you get all the cases nicely listed, and if you see that the fourth item in each news bulletin (not too high up, because if it is put as No. 1 item it is obviously propaganda) is about a case of typhus in a German village, if you see that over three weeks the bulletin never lacks one true item about typhus, if you see that your leaflet newspaper has a new case of typhus each day—and if they are all true cases—then you are doing good psychological warfare.

The art of propaganda, therefore, was to make the journalist form his newspaper or his news bulletin or his radio broadcast according to a strict directive which told him the kinds of news he had to use and the weight he had to give each kind. The items had to be spaced out very carefully, and the bulletin balanced precisely. The art of propaganda is not telling lies but selecting the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear. The British newspapers, of course, try to entertain us each day, and only a few of them try to do propaganda often; the Daily Worker is the only propaganda newspaper every day. But our leaflet newspapers and radio news-casts had to be designed to keep certain themes constantly to the fore, whether or not there was any news about them in the daily newspapers.

Propaganda and Education.

I have shown how the advertiser and the journalist each had his disadvantage. The only person who can do successful propaganda or psychological warfare is the person who cares about education; for the art of education surprisingly is the same as the art of propaganda, especially when dealing with totalitarian countries. The job of propaganda is not merely to enter into some arid debate with the Government of the other side; it is to stimulate in the people of the country thought for themselves, to make them begin to be, not cogs in

a machine or units of a collective organization, but individuals. Individualism is the first act of disloyalty to a totalitarian government, and every individual who begins to feel that he has a right to have a view is already committing an act of disloyalty. This is why it is much easier to demoralize a totalitarian country than it is to demoralize a democracy in which the individual possesses that right and cannot be made a traitor by claiming to be an individual.

In leaflets, we concentrated on the famous safe-conduct pass. We spent a vast amount of money on research in getting the colour right, Eisenhower's signature right, the language right; and it looked rather like an American dollar bill when it was completed. It was very "slap-up." We discovered that we could estimate the morale of the German Army by the percentage of prisoners who had put a Passierschein into their wallet, because the act of picking it up and putting it away was an act of disloyalty. The German soldier was not allowed to touch it, he was not allowed to read it; if he picked it up, then it meant that we had won a tiny battle in the demoralization and exdoctrination of the totalitarian enemy.

Let us try to see where we have got to. We have reached the conclusion that in good, effective propaganda news must take priority over views, facts over preaching, and—above all—we must avoid threats. This was true of both leaflet and radio.

1940—The Defensive Phase.

We were fortunate in that we started our psychological warfare in a period of abysmal defeat. In 1940 and 1941, the only thing we could do was tell the truth, and we got an immense amount of goodwill in Germany by admitting defeat. Let me assure you that, from the point of view of psychological warfare, a defeat is a great opportunity, especially if you are skilful and say that your defeat is worse than it really is. You must be frank about it, franker than the facts. Then you really begin to gain the enemy's confidence.

I shall never forget the first really big raid on Berlin. It was a terrible disaster owing to conditions in the air, and a great number of planes were lost. We announced the losses of the RAF before the German communique came out, and our admission of our losses was larger than the German claim. This was the greatest psychological warfare triumph of the year!

It was, therefore, singularly lucky for us that we began the job when we were being defeated and had little temptation to lie.

"Committing" the Enemy.

The second thing that you have to do when the enemy is doing well, is not only to admit all your own defeats, but to "commit" the enemy. For instance, when the Germans were advancing into Russia, we said, "If they cannot reach Kiev in 10 days, then the whole campaign will break down." We calculated that it would take 12 days for the Germans to get to Kiev, and therefore we said 10 days. When it took 12 days, that represented a defeat —or, at any rate, it took the edge off the victory by suggesting that it ought to have been much bigger. If that sort of thing is done effectively, the people in the enemy

country can be made to believe that they have done very badly in the middle of the glorious victories. But we had to do something more: we had to make the truth sound truthful to the enemy.

The Need for Accuracy.

This brings us to the real complications of the subject, because what sounded objective to the home audience sounded like propaganda to the Germans. If we had put out the BBC home bulletin in German, it would have been written off as flagrant propaganda. I think you will find that our bulletins in German were the most objective sober bulletins of all that were put out by the BBC, because we could not afford to be caught out in any inaccuracy. The French were willing to swallow one or two exaggerations, but the German listeners would not swallow anything, because they were on the look-out to prove us liars. I need only mention the agony caused to us by certain RAF communiques when we suspected that they had dropped bombs 100 miles away from the city to be bombed. Finally, we decided that we could not publish RAF communiques in German without further authentification because, although they were good enough for the home public, we had to be 101 per cent. accurate. We had to claim less than we actually did. There is nothing more effective than saying that there had been a moderately severe raid on Essen when 2,000 people have actually been killed. That sort of thing really gives the enemy cold shivers. But if you say that there has been a heavy raid when one bomb has been dropped, that does not have the tonic effect that you desire.

All this raised a great problem, because it meant that what we said to the enemy sounded totally different from what was said at home. This is the explanation of the extraordinary rule that all British leaflets were classified as "secret." Members of Parliament, if they could have discussed in Parliament what we were saying to the Germans, would have complained that the propaganda organization was "appeasing" the Germans. But it was essential to make the leaflets objective and credible to a German —not to the House of Commons!

Truth Can Be Incredible.

I should like to give you one instance of this problem of credibility. One day we got a wonderful report from Norway that there had been an invasion exercise. Many German soldiers had been drowned and the bodies had been washed up in a bay; the Norwegian mayor had gone to the German general and asked, "What shall I do with the bodies?" The German general had replied, "Break in the breast bones and sink them in the sea." I offered this item to the head of the "black" propaganda. He turned it down; he said, "It may be true, but it will not be credible; it will be regarded as a propaganda story invented in England." So I took it to the BBC. They said, "Is it true?" I replied, "I do not know; I am not quite sure." We authenticated the story, and the BBC put it out. It was a great defeat for the BBC, because Germans in Norway quoted that story as proof that the BBC lied. This only shows that it is not only necessary to say the truth; it must be the credible truth. You have to eliminate a great many

things which are true if the enemy will not believe them to be true.

Psychological Warfare Intelligence.

This means that the propagandist or political warrior has to have not sympathy, but "empathy." He must feel himself into the mind of the enemy. We had to establish a very large unit called Psychological Warfare Intelligence. This unit's job was that of studying the enemy's mind.

One ancillary task of our Psychological Warfare Intelligence was to remind our leading generals and politicians not to believe their own propaganda. For the most important thing is not to under-estimate the enemy, not to take him at the value you give him to your own people, but to know him as he really is.

Propaganda intelligence had another use. As we studied the enemy's propaganda, we were able to deduce from it the directive on which it was based. From that we could deduce the enemy's estimate of his own civilian and soldier morale. There is no disguising from the expert analyst what the Fuehrer estimates to be the morale of his own country, because totalitarian propaganda is carried out rigorously to rule. Therefore it is a perfectly simple job to reconstruct the enemy appreciation and directive week by week. It was one of my jobs to write the enemy directive in this way.

That work of psychological warfare intelligence is work which should be done in peace-time as well as in war-time, but I fear that the whole organization was disbanded as being something unnecessary to a civilized nation.

Relating Psychological Warfare to Strategic Requirements.

I have given you some idea, I hope, of the scope of the work and some idea of the way in which it was done in enemy and enemy-occupied countries. Let me now consider the task of ensuring that propaganda is related to strategic requirements.

Here is one example. For the Ardennes counter-offensive we designed four leaflets for the four stages of the advance. We did the work while the German offensive was still going on and got the leaflets dead right, because we were given the advance information as to exactly the lines on which the counter-offensive would go. This means that the propagandists must be in on the inmost secrets of Supreme Headquarters. This is the reason why political warfare was a secret department in Britain.

It is also the reason why, towards the end of the war, we found that the actual planning of the propaganda had to be done at AFHQ and SHAEF rather than in London, because that was the only point where both Government policy and the higher strategy were known. It was found that SHAEF had to work upwards to Governments and downwards to the armies, instructing them on this integrated propaganda policy, because precise timing in relation to the campaign is the vital thing to the success of this particular job.

Conclusions.

It comes to this, then: you give the news, and after years of doing nothing but telling the truth and getting no profit, you drop the instruction, "Stay Put," and it works.

It works if you have held back for six years, if you have not indulged in exuberant stunts in order to get the applause of the home public, if you have been willing to be restrained—and no one can be as restrained as that if he is under the eagle eyes of Members of Parliament and Members of Congress.

If you have an organization of that sort, then it can be of modest but substantial assistance to the soldiers in carrying out their task. I will not say more than that. When morale is breaking, it will break that much quicker because the audience has already submitted to the extent of believing what you say and listening to your instructions.

Fundamentally, surely this is the task of propaganda in the cold war. Anybody who believes that it is our job to cause trouble behind the Iron Curtain in a period of peace has learned absolutely nothing from the lessons of the war. You have no right to put your friends in danger of death when you will not rescue them in time.

This means that, in peace-time, the task is extremely limited. It is, indeed, limited to the job which the BBC and PWE learned in the defensive period of 1940—building up credibility, studying the enemy, getting the organization set up so that, if the day comes for a more positive propaganda, it can be carried out effectively.

Propaganda is a major aspect of guerrilla warfare and the creation of effective propaganda, its production and dissemination, is of critical importance.

—*Mao Tze Tung.*

SE ASIA SERIES —— **No. 6** ——



MALAYA

Major G. T. Sadlier,
Australian Intelligence Corps.

IN comparison with the operations being conducted in Korea and Indo China the campaign in Malaya can be looked upon as little more than a police action. This applies in regard to both the size of the forces engaged and the scope of the operations.

However, from the practical outlook the outcome of the campaign in Malaya is of the greatest importance, not only to the security of the British Commonwealth and to the British situation in Asia, but to the influence of the West upon the Asian peoples.

The basic reason for this lies in its geographical location.

The Importance of Malaya.

Malaya is a peninsula extending from the land mass of Asia and is a natural pivot for the operation of land, sea and air power throughout the area of Southern Asia. She is so located as to dominate the sea approaches to Asia from the Indian Ocean and to the Middle East from the South China Sea. For these reasons power centred on Malaya can exert influence on Indonesia, Borneo, Indo China, Siam, and Burma, whilst still maintaining a degree of isolation from each and all of these countries.

Since the end of hostilities in August, 1945, a wave of nationalism has swept through the countries of Asia. Native peoples who were previously governed by Britain, Holland, France, and America, have sought and attained their independence, and, although many of these peoples are lacking in the ability and experience necessary for self government and administration, their rights to independence have not been denied them.

And so, in the past seven years (the process actually took about five years) the political status of every country in Asia, with the exceptions of Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong, has been re-oriented.

Asian Communism.

Because of the strength of Communist China and the presence of large Chinese minorities in each of the countries in the area, considered together with the instability of the local governments, Communism looms as a constant menace to the peace of Asia. Any resistance to the pressure of Communism stems mainly from the British presence in Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong, and the influence which arises from their presence, and of course from the efforts of the French in Indo China.

The situation can best be appreciated by examining the prospects, if, for some reason, Britain were to relinquish Malaya.

Strategic Factors.

As we no longer have the unqualified use of India, the need for a major base for the British forces in the Far East has to be met by Singapore, and, despite the mile-wide causeway separating Singapore from Malaya, the fates of the two are bound together. Our experience in the last war has shown us clearly that the loss of the Singapore base is a natural military consequence to the loss of Malaya.

The loss of Singapore then means the surrender of control of the Straits of Malacca, which virtually seals off the short shipping route from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Even with a friendly Indonesia the bulk of naval and merchant shipping would be forced around a circuitous route to destinations in Asia. Under these circumstances the naval base at Trincomalee would lose much of its value and the pro-British states of north-west Borneo would be left in virtual isolation.

Similarly, the great bulk of inter-Commonwealth air traffic, both commercial and military, which stages through Singapore would need to be diverted to use other routes such as that through Cocos Island.

Most important of all from the strategic point of view is the fact that the British Commonwealth would lose its last firm foothold on the Asiatic mainland. This would mean the end of direct British influence in the area and without this influence the situation of the smaller countries of South-East Asia would speedily deteriorate. Without the example, the advice and direct assistance from Britain and the British Commonwealth, it is questionable whether Burma, Siam and Indonesia would be willing and able to withstand the pressure of Communism. Even today, Communist penetration in these countries is a worrying problem for the newly-established national Governments.

The importance of the French campaign in Indo China, and in particular the maintenance of the security of the Tonkin Delta area, has been emphasised on innumerable occasions. It must be realised,



however, that in their efforts the French draw a great deal of moral and material support from British-held Malaya and Singapore, and also as an outcome of British influence in the neighbouring states of Siam and Burma. It will be seen that in some regards Malaya is a backstop for Indo China. Therefore if Britain relinquished her foothold for any reason, another result would be that the French would face intensified demands for the evacuation of Indo China, not only from the rest of Asia, but from metropolitan France as well.

Economic Considerations.

Economically, Malaya is the principal source of rubber and tin available to the Western Powers. Despite terrorism and destruction the output of rubber and tin from Malaya has been maintained at a high level and these commodities are still among our greatest dollar earners. Certainly, the British Commonwealth has no comparable resources for these items, nor could we readily

replace their dollar earning capacity.

In consideration of these factors we must conclude that the security of Malaya is vital to our economy and our situation in Asia, not only from our point of view, but for those other nations of Asia who are conducting similar campaigns against, fundamentally, the same enemy.

Success in the present campaign is, therefore, essential.

Political Aspects.

It is now well established that ultimate success in this type of campaign depends to a large extent upon wholehearted public support. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the people of Malaya have not given this support.

The main reason on the lower level is that the threat of Communist reprisal is a very real deterrent. The Malayan Communist Party has established links in almost every village and town, and through these links they have been able to eliminate informers and members of their families. Originally this was successful to the extent that both information and assistance from the public depended entirely upon the degree of protection which could be guaranteed by the Security Forces.

On the higher level the lack of public support can be traced directly to the difficult political problem which arises from the mixed racial groups in the population.

On the British side it is the expressed intention that Malaya should become a self-governing component of the Commonwealth. Obviously it would be unwise to take such a step under the present circumstances, but, unfortunately, the Malay leaders do not accept this reasoning and some publicly interpret the delay as a breach of good faith by Britain. The situation is further aggravated by the recent move of the Government in granting Malayan citizenship to resident Chinese.

These Chinese represent about 45 per cent. of the total population of Malaya and Singapore, but since they are not accepted as legal "citizens" it is not unusual to find that they will not generally associate themselves with the Government forces. This is more understandable in view of the fact that about 98 per cent. of the bandit forces are also Chinese. Consequently, in addition to withholding their aid to the Government forces a large proportion of the Chinese give aid to the bandits either freely or under pressure.

In September, 1952, the Government introduced the New Citizenship Code, which automatically granted citizenship to about 1,000,000 Chinese and about 180,000 Indians resident in Malaya.

As citizens, many of these Chinese thus became eligible for National Service. Their call up greatly assisted the manpower situation and in particular made up the long-standing deficiency of linguists in the Security forces, comprising police and armed forces.

Conduct of the Emergency.

With regard to the armed forces it must be understood that this is not a strictly military campaign. It is a State of Emergency introduced by the Government to overcome the Communist campaign of terrorism aimed at the people, the economy, and the Government of Malaya. This means that the armed forces who have been called out in aid of the civil power have no legal authority

to act on their own initiative. Direction of the campaign remains with the Government and the armed forces can only undertake operations at the request of, or with the sanction of, the civil authorities.

In the Emergency each component of the Government has a specific task:—

(a) The Government Departments continue their normal functions of administration, although their task is made more difficult since they must also counter Communist propaganda and conduct a defence against Communist penetration of the administrative machine.

(b) The Police Force, as the main instrument of the Government, is responsible for law and order in the populated areas.

(c) The Army, with its forces disposed along the jungle fringes — and with one regiment carrying out deep penetration mainly by air — is harassing the bandit forces in the jungle and at the same time preventing them from breaking out into the populated areas. They have direct support from the Air Force both for attacks against bandit targets and for air supply.

(d) The Navy patrols the coast and assists in coastal operations.

Economic Aspects.

We have seen that the economic output of Malaya is of major importance and so it is understandable that economic interests are given a great deal of consideration in the conduct of the Emergency. Conversely, these same interests have received a great deal of attention from the Communist forces for obvious reasons.

There are two aspects to the problem. Firstly, the production of rubber and tin must be maintained despite the damage inflicted by terrorists. Secondly, the planters and miners must be kept on the job in the face of all the dangers and difficulties.

One of the principal aspects of Malayan rubber in relation to the world markets has been the low price at which it could be sold. But, because the well being of all those associated with the production of rubber depends upon adequate returns, the price must be held at a reasonable level. Furthermore, since the Communists were damaging up to 6,000 trees each month (and each tree takes about five years to recover) the production has diminished in quantity. A similar condition exists in the tin mines, where valuable imported plant and machinery has been destroyed.

In addition to the difficulties of production, the planters and miners (and their families) live in daily danger. They are the target of many terrorist attacks, and, although many of them are carrying the fight to the enemy with private armies, the combination of lowered production and constant danger has caused many to pack up and go home.

The Malayan Communist Party.

If we are to get a balanced view of the Emergency in Malaya we must also examine the situation of the enemy.

The Malayan Communist Party is an autonomous group, in that, although they follow the Soviet line, they are independent in their activities and receive little aid from

outside of Malaya. It consists of two main bodies:—

(a) The Malayan Races Liberation Army of about 4,500 full-time armed terrorists who carry out major incidents from their jungle bases.

(b) The Min Yuen (or People's Movement), which is an underground organization of unknown strength supplying the armed forces with finance, supplies and intelligence.

In May, 1948, these forces of the Malayan Communist Party started their campaign of violence with the aim of terrorizing the population and disrupting the economy to a stage where the existing Government could be overthrown.

For almost five years they have had considerable success in their terrorist campaign and they have certainly disturbed, if not disrupted, the economy of Malaya. However, in all of their activities they have suffered through the weaknesses inherent within their own organization.

They have no administrative organization to maintain the forces in the jungle as an entity. Nor have they the transport or signal equipment to establish speedy communications to meet the requirements of command and supply.

In effect, therefore, the Malayan Races Liberation Army is reduced by circumstances to a number of independent groups of about platoon strength. Each group must tend to their own problems of food, finance, arms and equipment, and at the same time conduct operations as best they can within the framework laid down in the broad directives of the Central Executive Committee of the Malayan Communist Party. It follows, that although they achieve a measure of success in small "hit-and-run" actions, their efforts are not co-ordinated and in fact are often misdirected.

Progress of the Emergency.

In their efforts to counter the terrorist campaign, the Government forces have exploited and aggravated these weaknesses.

All of these problems were recognized in 1948 by the late Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, who was then Director of Operations, and, despite the difficulties of that period, he instituted a long-term programme to restore the situation.

This programme—the Briggs Plan —aimed principally at:—

(a) The resettlement of almost half a million Chinese squatters from outlying areas to new villages where protection could be more effective.

(b) The deployment of police and army forces to harass the jungle based terrorists whilst still ensuring security of the populated areas and the main communications.

(c) The strict control of the sale of food, medicines and clothing to restrict the flow of these items to the terrorists.

Because they were essentially long-term projects, the success of these and other associated measures was not readily visible. However, by early 1952 it was apparent that the terrorists were feeling the effects of isolation from their supply and information sources. Furthermore, there were encouraging signs of increased public support for the Security Forces.

These tentative successes have

been exploited to the full by General Sir Gerald Templar, who, in January, 1952, assumed the dual role as High Commissioner for Malaya and Director of Operations. Under his leadership the anti-terrorist campaign has gained even greater impetus. The improved training of the Police Force, the increased scale of public co-operation and the constant harassing of the jungle-based terrorists has achieved tremendous success.

So much so that by March, 1953, the rate of terrorist incidents had fallen to less than a quarter of the 1951 rate. Consequently there is comparative freedom of movement on the main communications and the people of the villages, estates and mines are enjoying greater security in their daily life.

The improvement in the situation can be gauged by General Templar's recent action in cancelling the blanket authority for detention of suspects and by the emphasis that is now being given to the preliminaries for establishing one political entity of the mixed peoples of Malaya. As the successes continue it can be anticiapted that there will be a gradual relaxation of most of the measures introduced for the Emergency.

Future Problems.

In the meantime it is clear that the authorities are turning their attention to the other national problems which have been affected by the events of the past five years.

Most important of these is the granting of Malayan citizenship to resident Chinese. These Chinese have already been a major factor in improving the flow of information and thus increasing the efficiency of the Security Forces. They will be an equally important factor in the ultimate "national" government of Malaya because their intelligence and energy more than equals that of the native Malays. Under the circumstances it is impossible to completely discount their blood relationship with Communist China and its effect upon the future of the British Commonwealth.

Similarly, there must be some concern for the future of almost 150,000 Home Guards and Auxiliaries with the Security Forces. After five years under arms their absorption into a satisfactory "normal" life will require careful planning.

And finally there is the enemy. Subversion has long been a favourite tactic of Communists, and already there are indications of infiltration into labour and trade union groups. It would be unreal to assume that the end of the phase of terrorism means the end of the Malayan Communist Party.

Conclusion.

The Emergency in Malaya has not yet reached a successful conclusion and may not do so for a number of years to come. Even when that is completed the introduction of an independent Malaya, being part of the British Commonwealth, will be one of the major problems of the Far East. Furthermore it will remain one of the foundations upon which is built the economic and strategical security of the British Commonwealth in general and Australia in particular.

To Australia, the success of Communism in Malaya and its inevitable march through the Indonesian Archipelago would be a crucial development.

GUIDED MISSILES

What Guides Them?



Captain Robert W. Fye, US Army.

IMAGINE the advantage of the ability to correct the course of artillery projectiles after they leave the gun!

The incorporation of a guidance system in a projectile, along with a means to physically change the projectile's path, permits it to correct for errors at the target. The result is a guided projectile, or "guided missile."

The first article in this series described how and why guided missiles fly, as well as some of the efforts of supersonic flight. The second discussed the principles of jet propulsion and the operating characteristics of the jet engines used in missiles. The purpose of this final article in the series is to discuss the vital element in any guided missile that makes it a useful weapon — its guidance system.

—*From Combat Forces Journal, USA.*

Need for Guidance.

Unguided rockets have been employed in warfare in the past, but they were always outmoded by such improvements as cast gun barrels, breech loading, and rifling, which gave more accurate and longer-range fire. Since an artillery projectile reaches its maximum velocity as it leaves the gun barrel, it

is comparatively easy to predict and shape its path, which is essentially a ballistic or parabolic trajectory. On the other hand, a jet-propelled missile usually does not reach its maximum velocity until some time after it is launched, making it difficult to predict its course unless there is some form of guidance.

But, if a missile can be guided throughout its flight, its initial dispersion or inaccuracy can be corrected during the remainder of the flight. This permits the missile to use jet propulsion and thus far outdistance, in range, all conventional artillery.

The ability to change the course of a missile in flight has other advantages. For example, a free-flight, unguided projectile cannot correct for non-standard atmospheric conditions it encounters (unforeseen side winds, changes in air density, and other elements), or for non-standard conditions of manufacture (the inability, with mass-production methods, to make two items exactly alike), both of which result in deviations of the projectile from its standard trajectory. However, guided missiles can compensate for these factors, since they have the means to detect and correct for variations from their desired flight path.

Further, there has never been an anti-tank or anti-aircraft artillery projectile that could manoeuvre with its target. Thus, the accuracy of fire against such targets is dependent upon pre-fire prediction and is limited by the capability of the enemy to manoeuvre after the prediction is made. This is a serious limitation, particularly in anti-aircraft fire. Guided missiles can overcome this advantage of manoeuvre which the enemy possesses if they are designed to match their targets, manoeuvre for manoeuvre.

So the requirement for incorporating guidance systems in missiles stems from three factors. First, control is needed to make missiles accurate at long ranges that jet-propulsion power plants give them. Second, non-standard conditions of manufacture and the atmosphere must be considered and compensated for, since they can produce sizeable errors at the target. Finally, in order for missiles to be effective weapons they must be able to match the evasive action of targets.

Fundamentals.

Two problems arise in any effort to control unpiloted craft in flight. Initially, the missile must be properly aligned or oriented in space. This means that the missile can interpret up from down, left from right, and rolling from stabilized flight. Control of this type is called attitude control. However, a missile needs something besides attitude control in order to hit a target. It requires a method to keep it on the desired path or trajectory. This is called path control.

Attitude control must be effected before path control can be attempted. For example, if a missile is not roll controlled, we do not know the position of its movable control surfaces or fins which we wish to position so as to guide the missile along its desired path. It is obvious that if a missile which we presume to be roll stabilized has actually rolled over on its back, a command to the missile to go left



Figure 1. *Yaw, pitch and roll axes.*

will result in the missile's moving off to the right.

To control a missile's attitude, we are concerned with the angular motions of yaw, pitch and roll which the missile can undergo. Figure 1 shows that these motions occur about three mutually perpendicular axes through the missile. In order for the missile to have complete attitude control, it must be able to detect any of these three angular motions, which it interprets as yaw, pitch, or roll errors, and correct for them by yawing, pitching, or rolling the missile back to its proper attitude. Gyroscopes are normally employed in missiles to establish a reference from which these angular errors may be detected. Figure 2 indicates the basic components of the ordinary gyroscope, which operates on the principle that a mass (the rotor, or fly-wheel as it is sometimes termed) rotating at high speed possesses a certain degree of rigidity in space (the property a gyro has of remaining fixed in its plane of rotation as it spins around). Thus its spin axis establishes a fixed line in space regardless of motion of the rest of the gyro or the missile in which the gyro is mounted. The gimbaling system of the gyro is so arranged that one gimbal moves with the missile as it rolls, pitches, or yaws, while the other gimbal remains fixed with the rotor. This relative motion between gimbals is equal to the angular motion which the missile has undergone, and can be converted to a usable electrical error signal. The signal actuates a power system, called a servo, which positions appropriate control surfaces so as to correct the missile's attitude and reduce this error to zero.

What about these control surfaces? In most cases they are movable vanes or fins, similar to the rudders, elevators, and ailerons used by conventional aircraft. When moved from their neutral position in a high velocity air stream, they cause the missile to turn, climb or dive, or roll. Unfortunately, there are times when these surfaces are not effective, namely, when the missile is not travelling at sufficient velocity and when the missile is in the upper reaches of the atmosphere, where the air is quite thin. In both cases, the air stream will not exert a sufficient force on the control surfaces to enable them to control the direction of motion, or attitude, of the



Figure 2. *Simple gyroscope.*

missile. For control under these conditions, we must resort to other means. The Germans solved the problem of controlling their V-2 missile while at low velocity in a unique manner. The V-2 was too large to be boosted into immediate supersonic flight. It rested on its launcher until the thrust from its rocket motor exceeded the over-all weight of the missile, at which time it took off. During this period the missile was travelling slowly, picking up speed as it ascended, and yet this was a critical period in the life of the missile. If it were not stabilized early in its flight, control would never be established and the flight was almost certain to fail. Since its control surfaces were not yet effective, the Germans devised a system of carbon jet vanes, actually small control surfaces, which they placed in the exhaust stream of the rocket motor. Regardless of the velocity of the missile itself, its jet stream from the motor left the missile at about 6,730 feet per second! Hence, moving the jet vanes, when attitude errors were detected, deflected the exhaust gases and produced a force on the missile similar to that produced by the movement of conventional control surfaces in an air stream. This force caused a change in the direction of motion of the missile. Of course, these "internal" control surfaces, exposed to temperatures on the order of 3000 deg. F., burned up within a short period of time, but by then the missile was travelling at such a velocity that its control could be turned over to the missile's external control surfaces.

For control at high altitudes, the air is not dense enough to permit the use of control surfaces, and jet vanes would long since have been consumed. A solution to this problem is obtained by mounting the missile's power plant (which, in all probability, would be a rocket motor rather than an atmospheric jet engine at the altitudes we are now considering) in a series of gimbals similar to the gimbaling system used with a gyroscope. By causing attitude error signals to rotate these gimbals with respect to one another, the direction of the motor's line of thrust can be changed, resulting in a change in the missile's attitude or heading.

Regardless of the methods used to achieve it, attitude control has only one purpose — to orient or stabilize the missile in space so that it can, in turn, receive and properly respond to path control commands. Note that all of the functions performed to obtain this attitude control (detection of yaw, pitch, and roll errors and their correction through proper movement of control surfaces) are accomplished entirely within the missile, requiring no outside source of information. The problem is quite similar to the actions of the automatic pilot used in many conventional aircraft today.

Assuming the missile is aware of its attitude in space and can keep itself properly aligned, it is still faced with the problem of guiding itself or being guided along some flight path to the target. This is path control, the process of noting where the missile is, comparing its location with where it should be, and correcting for any deviations so that the missile will continue on a course that will result in a target hit. Because this is a bigger problem than attitude control, over-all



Figure 3. *PRESET.*

Programmer in missile causes it to follow predetermined path to target.

missile guidance systems usually take their name from the manner in which the path is controlled.

Guidance Systems.

The method employed to guide a missile along its path usually depends on the type of missile and the target it is to attack. Certain guidance systems lend themselves to surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), which normally are used against fixed targets, while other systems are particularly adaptable to surface-to-air missiles (SAM) or air-to-air missiles (AAM), where enemy aircraft or missiles are the targets. We will discuss the systems used principally by SSM.

Preset.—This is a system wherein a predetermined path (indicating a fixed target) is set into the missile before launching. It cannot be adjusted during flight. The missile is set to fly a given distance and any corrections for wind or other effects must also be made prior to launching. The German V-2 was a preset-guided missile, in which a programmer, or time clock, within the missile, closed various electrical contacts as the flight progressed, causing different functions to be performed, such as pitching the missile over from the vertical after launching, or cutting the missile's fuel off. Figure 3 shows a typical trajectory of this missile. Such a system is very simple, but, since all programmer adjustments and settings must be made before launching, unforeseen factors that cause the missile to deviate from its prescribed path during flight cannot be corrected. Hence the accuracy of the system is

quite poor, the V-2 had a radial probable error of about eight miles at a range of 150 miles. Nevertheless, preset guidance systems have certain values where great accuracy is not required. Also, there are times in the development of a missile where flight test data are needed on such things as the propulsion and aerodynamic performance of the missile. Rather than test the missile with its entire guidance system, it may contain only a programmer, which causes it to perform certain simple manoeuvres which are sufficient for the test being conducted.

Terrestrial Reference. — This is a more refined guidance system, in which the missile flies a predetermined path, using components or devices in the missile which react to some phenomena of the earth to keep it on the path. The phenomena which might be used are the earth's gravitational, magnetic and electric fields, and its atmosphere. The German V-1 was an example of a terrestrial reference-guided missile. It used a magnetic compass to keep it headed in the direction of the target, an altimeter to keep it at the proper altitude, and an airlog to determine distance travelled toward the target. An airlog is a wind-driven propeller carefully calibrated so that a given number of turns of the propeller, mounted in the nose of the missile, is equivalent to a specific ground distance covered. The propeller counts its revolutions and when these equal the predetermined distance to the target, the airlog initiates a signal to dive the missile into the target. Figure 4 illustrates the trajectory flown by such a missile. This sys-



Figure 4. *TERRESTRIAL REFERENCE.*

Compass, altimeter and airlog keep missile on prescribed path.

tem has generally the same advantages as preset guidance and is likewise quite limited in range due to the arbitrary preflight predictions that must be made and set into the missile's guidance components.

Radio Navigation.—This is a system of guidance for the control of a missile along the predetermined path in which the missile obtained information from one or more fixed radio transmitting stations in order to stay on the desired path. The navigation systems of SHORAN (SHOrt RAnge Navigation) and LORAN (LOng RAnge Navigation) are examples of this type of guidance. In the latter, which is the most interesting for missile applications, the missile carries a radio receiver and listens for signals sent simultaneously from two base transmitters. The missile measures the time delay between receipt of signals from the two stations (the amount of delay indicating how much nearer the missile is to one station than the other). The missile's path is calculated prior to launching so that to be on course the missile should always be listening for and measuring the same delay between received signals. To do so, the missile flies a curved, hyperbolic course. If the missile deviates from this path, it will not hear the signals with the correct time interval between them and will navigate to get back into its proper path. This scheme of guidance is illustrated in Figure 5. Such a system has the advantage of using known techniques, but, like any system which depends upon radio or radar transmissions, it is subject to interference and enemy electronic counter-measures. These can take the form of either deceiving the missile with false signals or jamming the missile so that it cannot hear the base stations' transmissions.

Celestial Navigation. — This is another system in which the mis-



Figure 5. *RADIO NAVIGATION.*

Missile navigates upon receipt of signals from synchronized ground transmitters.



Figure 6. *CELESTIAL NAVIGATION.*

Missile determines its position and navigates by observing the stars.

sile flies a predetermined path, navigating itself along the path by celestial observations. The method employed is essentially that used by navigators at sea who determine their position by observation of two or more stars. The missile must contain star-tracking telescopes, which remain locked on previously designated stars throughout the flight. They continuously "shoot" these stars, determining the missile's actual position, which is compared with where the missile should be at this time. Errors in missile position cause steering commands to be generated which bring the missile back on course. In Figure 6, this system is illustrated. Such a guidance system is entirely self-contained within the missile, and hence is not subject to enemy countermeasures. Also, its accuracy is independent of range, since star observations can be made just as accurately at the end of a flight as at its beginning. However, the missile-borne equipment for such a system is quite complicated, and weather conditions can influence its usefulness.

Inertial. — In this guidance system, the path of the missile can be adjusted after launching by devices wholly within the missile, which make use of Newton's second law of motion — force is equal to mass times acceleration ($F = ma$). These devices, called accelerometers, are sensitive to accelerations which the missile undergoes, as it flies along or deviates from its flight path, due to the missile's thrust, side winds, or other forces that may act on the missile. After detecting these accelerations, it is a simple matter to doubly integrate them (a mathe-

matical process that may be accomplished electronically or mechanically) to obtain the distance the missile has travelled due to the force. So we might call the accelerometers "distance-meters" or odometers, just as the devices in automobiles which indicate velocity are called speedometers. With this distance information the missile can tell how far it has deviated from its prescribed flight path or what distance toward the target it has covered, and what corrections must be made. Like celestial navigation, this is a completely self-contained system, requiring no commands or other signals from the ground. Complexity of missile equipment is a drawback of this system.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence that features orthodox war. The general features of reconnaisance, general deployment, and development of the attack . . . are not common to guerrilla war.

—*Mao Tze Tung.*

Irregular Warfare

Lieutenant K. S. Sheard,
1 Interrogation Company.

THE article by Lieutenant-Colonel Metcalf (Australian Army Journal, No. 40, Sept., 1952, reprinted from *Military Review*, USA) helps to point out the potentialities of offensive partisan warfare, yet it would appear that the effort to remedy in part the lack of understanding of the capabilities of such warfare has not yet been entirely successful. The general survey, made before tactical use is considered, provides an introduction to the subject and, considering its briefness, adequately comments on the problems of high level planning for such operations.

Yet such planning, if based upon lines of thought which follow the article referred to, may not be so successful as it should. The tenor of the article would indicate that more stress has been placed upon individual aspects of partisan warfare, as defined by the US Army, than has been placed upon such warfare as an integrated whole. Especially noticeable is the scant reference to field activities of a guerilla nature—this despite the fact that Lawrence is quoted most tellingly. It is suggested that the author had in mind partisan warfare in more settled areas, such as Western Europe, where communities live closely in a patchwork countryside, with good communications and wide road and rail networks, which give every advantage to opposing security forces. Here sustained activity on a large scale is almost impossible, and could be expected to occur only in immediate support of regular forces.

This tendency may result from a too-close adhesion to the given definition of partisan warfare. Lawrence called the Arab Revolt irregular warfare; and it is unfortunate that the developments of the last war (and of the Spanish Civil War) lead to the use of partisan as an adjective in this context. Lawrence's phrase seems preferable; a concept which automatically opposes itself to that of regular warfare, which, as it is known today, developed from the irregular warfare of tribal days. Irregular warfare, on this definition, includes all the factors of partisan warfare—guerilla activity based on perfect intelligence, wherein the commander must rely on psychology and propaganda to a far greater extent than the regular commander.

This matter of guerilla activity is stressed, because it would seem that the gains from partisan warfare are greatest when its other forms are accompanied by such operations. This is not to deny the strategical or tactical importance, to the regular commander, of these other activi-

ties. Rather it is an attempt to see the picture as a whole, to consider irregular, rather than partisan, warfare. Probably the two most successful irregular operations in recent times were the Arab Revolt, organised by Lawrence, at first against the opposition of the Army, and Wingate's advance into Ethiopia from the Sudan. In both cases the forces were used more extensively than would seem possible if one's forecast was based on Colonel Metcalf's list of tactical uses.

Part of the failure of this section may result from the treatment, which appears principally to be from the point of view of the regular commander faced with the necessity of co-operating with and organising partisans. It scarcely touches upon the problems of the irregular commander, although a convincing policy cannot be framed without this knowledge of how and where irregulars work best. Therefore, it is proposed to consider further tactical capabilities and limitations of irregulars (and guerillas). Further consideration of other aspects of partisan warfare is not proposed, since these are adequately covered.

Factors Affecting Irregular Operations.

Terrain.

The advantage of a comparatively unrestricted, as against a restricted, terrain is quite clear. The guerilla wars of the 'twenties serve particularly to illustrate the disadvantages of operating in an area confined either naturally or artificially (within frontiers). The Kurdish revolts against Turkey in the late 'twenties and 'thirties failed when they were cornered in the mountains. Similarly, mobility of the Jebel Druze during the revolt in 1925-6 was limited by the restricted terrain in which they operated. This was a prime factor in their defeat; another was the abandonment of the early policy of mobility, which led to their defeat in the field by General Gamelin.

The second factor is the actual terrain. Guerilla operations, like regular warfare, have been conducted in:—

A—Mountains.—Restricted, as in the Rif and the Jebel Druze, and relatively unrestricted, as in Abyssinia. In the Rif the Spanish were restricted successfully and, for example, at Anual suffered losses of nearly twenty thousand in casualties and prisoners. Eventually lack of supplies and other factors, resulting from confinement within the restricted mountain terrain, forced Abd el Krim into the open in an attempt to link with anti-French forces. He was caught between the French and Spanish armies and

Lawrence

forced to surrender. However, his breakout, conditioned also as it was by the situation in Syria and the possibility of internal crisis in France, illustrates the importance of the irregular commander timing his activities with external military and political events.

B—Desert.—Again restricted, as in Libya, or relatively unrestricted, as in Turkistan and Sinkiang. With the advent of motorized desert penetration and aircraft, the desert is no longer unrestricted; instead of being mobile, the guerilla, because of his opponent's speed and power, is reduced to the defence of vulnerable fixed bases, e.g., in Libya, the oases. With such loss of comparative mobility he must, sooner or later, fight on the terms of the more highly organized enemy. Thus, in Libya, the Italians were finally able in 1933 to subdue the Senussi, who had been conducting irregular operations against them since 1911. Similarly, it is doubtful whether Lawrence's campaign could be conducted today. This does not mean, however, that irregular operations, actively supported by regular forces, cannot be undertaken successfully.

Wingate

C—Jungle.—Jungle country, provided that the area is sufficiently large, offers considerable advantages to guerilla forces. Concealment is easy, both in operations and movement, and, with a sympathetic population, guerillas can move freely in a manner which is denied to regulars. In such country, security forces operate under disadvantages which are seldom present elsewhere and under which it is hard to achieve success. In fact, the country influences operations to such an extent that it might be said, with the exception of very large scale warfare, that all jungle fighting partakes of the nature of irregular operations.

A consideration of guerilla activities in South-East Asia provides valuable information on guerilla and irregular operations in jungle country. Both the earlier and the current campaigns in Indo-China and the present activities in Malaya illustrate the points made above. The two latter campaigns also demonstrate the importance of outside assistance to irregulars. The Vietminh, apparently getting more such aid than the Malayan terrorists, have also made greater gains. These campaigns, too, stress the importance to irregulars of timing their activities to fit in with external events; though, in this instance, "Bolshevik" gave warning some time before of forthcoming trouble in South-East Asia.

D—Towns.—Irregular operations in towns have been most successful, e.g., the Druse operations in

Damascus, but only, again as in Damascus, where mobility can be maintained. Here the French were provoked into shelling the town, thus antagonizing the people, so that this course could not be continued. But the moment the enemy can blockade and attack the town as he likes, the guerillas are lost, as in the Warsaw rising.

Material.—Irregular forces should not be so armed or equipped that their mobility is lessened, but, nonetheless, should be equipped to attack the enemy where he is weakest. For example, in Arabia the Turks were numerous, but weak in materials. The Arabs had few men, but were quite strong in explosives and light support weapons, which let them attack Turkish material without much loss of men.

Personnel.—An irregular force is unlikely to be made up of the same personnel all the time—Lawrence's force varied continuously in both personnel and numbers. In the past it has often proved hard to stop personnel from following up a victory where, if it should be followed up, the enemy will be able to dictate the terms of battle. Further, locals are not often willing to cede their own area to the enemy for tactical reasons, in which case the commander may have to fight, or else lose his personnel through desertion. Discipline is a difficult matter—it may sometimes be better to use a paid core of irregulars, who have nothing to lose by location changes, rather than the patriotic locals.

One more point must be made here. It has been proved often enough that a core of highly trained regulars will give strength, out of all proportion to their numbers, to the irregular force with whom they are operating. Particularly was this noticeable in the composition of the Berber irregulars who held out against some 35,000 French troops. They had a few time-expired native soldiers, and a few deserters from the Foreign Legion, who provided valuable technical knowledge of French weapons and tactics.

Co-operation With Regulars.

All these guerilla revolts of the 'twenties, although much stronger and more united than Lawrence's Arab forces, failed. One of the main reasons was that they were operating without any support from regulars. Wingate's Abyssinian campaign, with forces consisting of one battalion Sudan Defence Force, one battalion of locally trained Ethiopians—both fought tactically as guerillas — together with native guerilla forces, tied up 56 Italian and Native battalions in the Gojjam area; while 71 battalions were occupied by, and smashed by, the Commonwealth forces advancing from Somaliland. Neither force would have fared so well had the other not been in the field, and 56:71 is a fair division.

Conclusion.

From these factors several conclusions can be drawn.

1. The irregular's essential need is for mobility, which enables him with economy to achieve surprise and concentration, as well as being the means whereby he can avoid battle where the regular army can deploy his superior resources. Lawrence spoke of his force as "a thing intangible . . . without front or back, drifting along like a gas," whose aim

was to force the situation, which was "all flanks and no front." The irregular must fight on ground he has chosen as a result of enemy advance over ground suitable for guerilla action. The notable example of this in the history of the British Army is the defeat suffered at the hands of the Afghans at Jalalabad in 1842.

2. Irregulars must not defend a fixed position that deprives them of mobility and the choice of the scene of the action. Similarly, they should rarely attack a fixed position. For this reason Lawrence abandoned the plan to attack Medina, and began anew his war of movement.

3. Irregulars operate better in an unrestricted terrain, preferably of mountain, jungle or open desert type. The deserts of Arabia and Africa are no longer suited to such operations, if they are to be at all sustained. It may be objected that Long Range Penetration groups have operated successfully in this type of country, but, although their tactics can best be described as irregular, their constitution and operations seem unsuited to the habits of native guerillas.

4. Irregular action without the support of the regular forces, no matter how distant, so long as it may be considered part of the same campaign, as again, in Arabia and Abyssinia, will almost certainly fail in the end—if only from sheer weariness, assisted by such weapons as propaganda and skilful amnesty, as in the Turkistan revolt against the Soviets in 1923-6.

5. A small core of highly trained regulars is of great benefit to an irregular force.

6. The irregular leader always faces greater problems of command and discipline, arising from the psychology of his forces, than does the regular commander.

7. Timing of irregular action is important; the more it can be co-ordinated with outside military and political events the greater is the chance of success.

The military leader must have as full an understanding as possible of politics and economics, and of the complicated problems of history and of national aspirations that form a part of them.

—The Honourable Thomas Finletter, USA.

The STRATEGIC FUNCTION of SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Translated and condensed by the Military Review, U.S.A., from an article by Gaetano La Rosa in "L'Universo," Italy.

IT HAPPENS at times, that historical events fail to be accorded adequate appreciation by public opinion and reveal their true meaning with the passing of time and after critical examination. This is, to a certain extent, the case with the war that was fought in Southeast Europe. The diplomatic transactions recorded there, and the role played by the Danubian and Balkan countries, without question, exercised a decisive influence on the entire course of the war in Europe, but they did not always reveal their scope, their direct connection with the causes of the conflict, and their decisive weight in the conduct and outcome of operations. For many years, it had been the rule of historical narration to summarize the life and changing conditions of these regions solely in connection with their successive contacts with the civilizations of the peoples who poured from the West to the East. The different mentalities of the various peoples, their conflicting aspirations, and their antagonistic interests naturally made the Balkan Peninsula not only a bridge of ethnical, political, and economic changes, but also a field of unending battles. The history of these peoples has become fused and confused with that of the neighbouring states. It will be seen that their part of the globe, attached to the continental mass along the Danube, situated at the junction point of Europe and Asia, and bathed by the extreme eastern reaches of the Mediterranean, has become the centre of world policy. Various factors have contributed to the political education and the historical development of these peoples; the principal ones being the rebirth of nationalism, and the struggle for political equilibrium arising from

the confusion of alliances and counter-alliances.

To perceive and fix in one's mind the fact that the Balkan states have maintained a subordinate position and a fictitious unity, it suffices to examine a few typical attitudes that have been assumed toward them by the major nations.

The great democracies, in order to secure the Southeast against the invasion of ambitious nations, not being able to exercise a direct mandate over them and not wishing to increase their armies, were of the opinion that they should establish, alongside the traditional Balkan Entente, a Little Entente which would join them in a pact of reciprocal aid and security. The Third Reich saw, in the Southeast, the promised land, and war in these regions was destined to free Germany from the embarrassments which the upsupportable stability and exigencies of the European order of things opposed to her free development. The Soviet Union dreamed, in its own way, of shaping the destinies of Southeast Europe and using it as a point of issue for an overflow into the West. For Germany, the Southeast represented the point of issue for an overflow into the Orient. To both Germany and the Soviet Union, it was an amorphous region without confines, devoid of the traditional guarantees of public justice, and open to intrigue and the initiative of the strongest.

The Starting Point of World War II.

In such an order of ideas and facts, the Southeast, included in the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939, became the starting point for a new world conflagration. In negotiating this pact, both Germany and the Soviet Union were bent upon making the instrument which was to continue, in the East, the policy of occupation and usurpation already inaugurated by Germany in the West. Unleashing World War II, they aimed at changing the European order, founded on the inviolability of treaties and on international equilibrium, for a more elastic order that would correspond with their desires and their ambitions. As a result of this policy, Hitler was able to enter the war in the West with his hands free and with the certainty of fighting on a single front. He also had a previous understanding of the advantages he would obtain from the partition of Poland and with the sureness of providing a concrete basis to the ethics of Lebensraum. Similarly, the Soviet Union was able to penetrate into the Balkan states, to occupy a large part of Finland, to partition Poland, to get back her old frontiers on the north, to abandon the doctrine of Geneva, to withdraw her support to the Balkan agreement, to take Bessarabia, Bucovina, and the Danubian Isles from Rumania, and to force a change in the international control of the Danube.

Inevitable divergencies in the domain of common interests and unbridled ambitions led first to division, then to the dissolving of the non-aggression pact and then war between the two imperialists. Perhaps history will be able to confirm the fact that World War II was, in the final analysis, the struggle of the Teutons and the Slavs for supremacy in Southeast Europe. These brief notes aim to make a modest contribution to this theory.

Geography of the Treaty of Versailles.

The treaties of peace, the diplomatic agreements, and the new territorial adjustments following the defeat of the Central Powers and the victory of the allies in World War I destroyed old national unions, gave birth to new states, and changed frontiers; profoundly transforming the political map of Europe.

The greatest changes occurred in:

1. Germany, who had to cede more than 27,220 square miles of her territory and 6 million of her inhabitants. The region north of Nieman, with the city of Memel in East Prussia, passed to Lithuania; the estuary of the Vistula, with the city of Danzig in East Prussia, was constituted a free city, and the remainder passed, in large part, to Poland; Posnan was nearly all absorbed by Poland; notable portions of upper and lower Silesia were ceded to Poland and Czechoslovakia; Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France; Eupen and Malmēdy were assigned to Belgium, and northern Schleswig to Denmark; the Saar was declared independent; the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz on the right bank were zones of occupation by the victors for a period of 5 to 15 years; and the whole of the zone to the west of the Rhine and a 31-mile strip to the east were permanently demilitarized.

2. Russia, who was deprived of 161,442 square miles of territory and 27 million inhabitants. She lost Finland, Esthonia, Lettonia, and Lithuania, while considerable portions of territory passed to Poland and Turkey; Rumania was given Bessarabia.

3. Bulgaria, who lost 4,363 square miles of territory and 400,000 inhabitants through cessions to Rumania and Yugoslavia.

4. Turkey, who ceded to Greece the territory on the right bank of the Maritza between Adrianople and Dede Agach, and to Italy the island of Castelrosso; who recognized the sovereignty of England in Cyprus and the independence of Egypt; and who renounced her mandate over Hedjaz, Negd, Asir, Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq.

5. The breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which marked the birth of the new Austrian republic. The cessions made to Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania left Austria with scarcely 32,432 square miles and 6 million inhabitants. Hungary, by similar cessions, was left with 36,807 square miles of territory and 8 million inhabitants.

The greatest acquisitions were to the profit of Serbia, who gained 59,189 square miles and close to 8 million inhabitants; Rumania, who received 60,232 square miles and 9 million inhabitants; and Denmark, who acquired 1,544 square miles and 165,000 inhabitants.

This brief recapitulation of the results of the peace treaties is made to emphasize the fact that, with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, there had disappeared one of two great antagonists who had disputed the leadership in the troubled Balkan Peninsula. The other contender, Russia, had been eliminated by the revolution of 1917. Thus, the peoples of the Balkans were left to

their own destiny; but with England and France standing behind them.

The consequent creation of minor states, without a corresponding economic foundation sufficient for an independent existence, was followed by effects of such far reaching results as to condition the entire political life of Europe up to the outbreak of World War II. The new, small states, which were always in fear of coming to blows with the more powerful states, obtained favours, support, and aid of every type, however, their destiny, because of their geographic positions and their political physiognomy, was fatally sealed from the very beginning by the weight of the larger adjoining states. Yugoslavia, alone, attained the power of government in the bosom of the Little Entente.

Varying Policies.

The policy of England did not favour the fusion of the little states inasmuch as it aimed at stabilizing the equilibrium created by the treaties, and leaving open the way to conquests in case of quarrels. The policy of France, based on the debility of Germany and Russia, was aimed at preventing the formation of compact German power and, therefore, in contrast with the line followed by Great Britain, sought to create a system of small states with unified political direction. The incoherent policy of both nations encouraged Hitler to attempt every sort of adventure.

Germany and the Soviet Union profited by the situation and the ephemeral appearance of European solidarity fed by the League of Nations. Germany reassumed the rank of a great power with exceptional military preparation and amazing military dynamism. The Soviet Union escaped from its isolation and resumed its ancient designs by means of advantageous positions and the benefits of immediate profits, guaranteeing the possibility of resorting to action at the opportune moment.

The Southeast in International Policy.

During the period between 1918 and 1939, the constant objective of all ententes, coalitions, and initiatives was predominance in Southeast Europe: whether in the establishment of the Little Entente, in revising the regime of the Danube, in maintaining guard over the straits, or in protecting the Middle East; and in confirming the principle of the self-determination of nations, in the partitioning of Poland, in attacking the West, and in consolidating the conquests of Germany.

German Aggressiveness.

In these actions, one sees the aggressiveness of the Germans, the inertia of the Soviets, the insipience of the West, the inefficiency of the League of Nations, and the illusion of a collective security and an indivisible peace. Thus, a German mass of 65 million individuals, planted in the heart of Europe, in an unproductive territory of uncertain boundaries, again raised up from its catastrophic condition, rearmed, and resumed freedom of action. Germany erected the Siegfried Line, again occupied the Rhineland, freed herself economically, proclaimed her right to equal juridical recognition of rights and duties with the other nations, pro-

voked the demographic struggle, agitated the matter of Lebensraum, seized again the territories under plebiscite, and annexed Austria. Moreover, Germany proclaimed to the world her firm intention of reuniting in the Reich, all the peoples of Teutonic race who had been scattered by the defeat of 1918, and dismembering Czechoslovakia in order to make it a predominantly German protectorate.

In spite of its vigorousness, this action was a sham. Germany was only misusing the principle of nationalities and the sickness of the minorities to develop a more decisive policy of revenge; and to remake, in her own way, the map of Europe under the sign of the "new order."

The project of the liberation of the oppressed minorities was to serve as an excuse for arbitrary annexations and the consolidation of the system of gradual destruction of national unions. The incorporation of Czechoslovakia was to separate the Soviet Union from Europe and deprive her of air bases; shut off, to the West, the economic resources of one of the most powerful of European industrial centres, make available 25 German divisions for the western campaign, and gain time and means for turning these forces to the east.

Soviet Plans.

The Soviet Union, in the face of the complacence of the West and the powerlessness of the League of Nations, was led to conclude that the Western democracies had definitely renounced the idea of European solidarity. She temporarily abandoned the Southeast to Germany, and worked out secret plans to Germany's detriment. Fearful of finding herself in a precarious situation and of having to be the first to endure the German attack without being able to count on any solid friendship, the Soviet Union waited for a favourable occasion for allying herself with the enemy she feared. The Soviet Union intensified her military preparations in the hope that, in time, the coveted ally of today and the certain enemy of tomorrow would weaken in its incursions.

German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact.

Germany, on the other hand, in her irrevocable intention of attacking Europe, to cover her rear, to engage herself on a single front, and to secure for herself supplies for resisting the British blockade, sought and obtained the alliance with the Soviet Union. In this way, the gates of Europe, from the Gulf of Finland to the mouth of the Danube, were opened to the two countries who were considered the worst enemies of civilization. Thus, the German-Soviet non-aggression pact brought together two opposed ideologies and put Europe under the heel of 80 million Germans and under the threat of 180 million Russians.

The content of the pact was simple: a policy of loyalty in the respective zones of interest; a policy of partition in the zones of common interest; and a policy of alliance in all other cases. This was equivalent to having a free hand in the first case, to using discretion in the second, and acting with boldness in the rest.

Thus, Hitler plundered and burned all Europe, stopping only at England. He then turned to the

East, where he should have operated in accordance with his alliance. Thus began the double-acting policy which consented to the easy elimination of the intermediate masses which were incapable of defending themselves and which fatefully brought together the frontiers of the two false friends. To absorb the small states was a great error, because the accumulation of forces of destruction took away every possibility of collaboration and stirred up every type of misunderstanding As a result, when Germany revealed the fact that she desired to exercise exclusive domination in the Balkans, the two allies found themselves pitted against each other in the void created by the disappearance of the buffer states. To complete the measure, the Three Power Agreement was entered into by the turbulent and aggressive countries of Europe and the Far East.

A Policy of Encirclement.

In spite of all German explanations and assurances, the Soviet Union saw in this pact the resurgence, in Europe and Asia, of a policy of encirclement. The Soviet Union wondered whether the pact meant a military alliance between the Germans, Italians, and Japanese, or whether it was a prelude to the partition, among the contracting parties, of the world which was to be newly organized at the end of the war. Above all, she was afraid that the pact included her omission from the plan of partition of the British Empire after its collapse, which at that time was considered very near. The most notable aspect of the pact was that Germany, in stirring up Japan against the rear of the United States, entertained the illusion of being able to dissuade the latter from entering the conflict in Europe.

Instead, the United States intervened with decisiveness.

The German Campaign in the Balkans.

With Poland erased from the number of European nations, the West subjugated, Great Britain under a continuous threat of invasion, the Soviet Union friendly but wary, and supplies scarce, Hitler, in the fall of 1940, planned to consolidate the positions gained and to develop intense political action in the Southeast and the Mediterranean in order to bring all the Danubian and Balkan countries into his orbit.

The Balkans seemed ripe for this evolution. The instrument necessary for carrying out this project was the Three Power Agreement.

The winter season was favourable to the diplomatic proceedings. The idle armies were being reorganized and were already massing toward the Russian frontier; their movements well camouflaged and their plans of operations worked out. All that was needed was the word to advance. The planned action was to be almost entirely political, and this, in fact, was continued as long as the German troops remained on the Danube. However, scarcely was the tendency manifested of lining up the southern Slavs with the Danubian peoples than the equilibrium began to fail, involving the Soviet positions of interest. Then, between ill humour and poor understandings, political action revealed itself as inadequate for the objective, and gave place to military action in forms that will

definitely continue to be counted as belonging to the art of war.

Rumania was the first, after Hungary, to come under the sound of arms in the German Lebensraum. Then followed, to increase the ranks of the German allies, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. From this moment on, military pressures were exercised with vigour.

Greece, the last southeastern bastion of the system, bound by staunch friendship to Great Britain, was also overcome by combined Italian and German action. Crete succumbed under the first grand style attack by parachute and airborne forces. German aviation, from its bases in Greece and the Aegean, kept Crete under blockade and imposed a grave toll on sea traffic. The action was characterized by such violence and decision as to cause England to believe that Germany had designs on Syria and Cyprus.

Then the simultaneous occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia proved clearly the German will to put an end to the mistakes and settle the situation in the Balkans.

Turkey, keystone to the chessboard of the Middle East, in the difficult role of a neutral country, repelled the British and the Soviet solicitations and, after the Balkan storm had subsided, concluded a treaty of friendship with Germany.

The Middle East suddenly became aware of certain easy advantages and Iraq rebelled against England, cut vital communication routes, and bound English troops and means to putting down the rebellion. Hitler failed to see that, with little risk, he would have been able to achieve a great victory since, at that time, England was obliged to face similar engagements of forces on a large scale, among which was the action in Africa against Rommel.

Soviet Activity.

The Soviet Union, frightened by the German successes in the Balkans and encouraged by the reverses of the Axis powers in North and East Africa, considered that the hour had come for awakening from her inaction and take an active part in the movement started by Hitler in the East. She was quite conscious of her complete preparation, of the influence her logistic aid had on the efficiency of the German armies, and of the wear that the years of war had produced on Hitler's armed forces.

Unsuspected by the Three Power Agreement, and not wishing to denounce the German-Soviet pact, she was determined to govern her own conduct with regard to the successive German attitudes. The Soviet Union did not intend, any longer, to remain a spectator of the broad political readjustment, and kept herself ready to intervene in the affairs of the East. Naturally, almost overnight, the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union came to occupy the leading place in the world of policy, while their opposed ideologies increased the distance between the two powers.

In the course of events, the Southeast appeared as the rampart of the chessboard on which the storm was gathering and its strategic function as the pivotal point between the East and West revealed itself in all its clearness.

Hitler's Major Decision.

The simultaneous convergence of many political and military exigen-

cies and the incomplete solution of two great problems, the jolt England came near receiving in the West and the Soviet's operations in the East, led Hitler to make the situation a matter of attention calling for a definite decision. With the firm conviction that Great Britain had been and still was the greatest enemy of Germany, and that the other nations were either friends or enemies, the question was then to decide whether he should move suddenly against Great Britain or fight the Soviet Union first.

He had the firm conviction that the economic reserves provided by the Soviet Union were indispensable to Germany. Whatever decision Hitler was to make and in whatever direction he was to go, it was necessary to ensure the continuity of these supplies, whether for feeding the new cycle of operations or meeting the minimum requirements of all the occupied countries. Germany, in fact, was not only the war centre, but also the European logistical centre.

The solution of the dilemma was made difficult by the fact that Great Britain was no longer alone, and that more than half of the world, especially America, had a friendly attitude toward Britain and of a hostile attitude toward Germany. The increased rigidity of attitude on the part of the neutral states was a sure indication.

Prelude to Invasion.

After vacillations which threatened to compromise both solutions, Hitler moved suddenly against the Soviet Union with the aim of destroying her fighting capacity. His aim was to secure his rear, continue to obtain supplies from the East, and then turn the German Army against Great Britain; thus fighting his enemies one at a time.

There concurred, in the supreme decision, numerous factors and, principally, the error of believing that this was the final phase of the struggle. Germany believed that Great Britain, at the announcement of the first great German victories in the East, would lay down her arms. Germany assumed that the Soviet Union could be conquered in a few months, and that in fighting the Soviets and Bolshevism, the British would join with the German crusade. Hitler believed that if Germany and Great Britain had engaged in an all-out war, the extreme murderousness of the conflict would have caused both of them to succumb and thus the Bolshevists would have held in their hands the fate of the universe. However, above all, there was the logistic problem of transport, from the east to the west, of the armies which were already concentrated along the Soviet frontier—a problem which would have required time and means and which would have given to Great Britain and the Soviet Union an opportunity to ally themselves.

The Invasion of the USSR.

In May, 1941, 87 German divisions were massed along the front from Rumania to the Baltic, while 25 others were deployed in the Balkans. On 7 June, 1941, Germany, with 120 divisions, together with 6 Rumanian divisions and 26 divisions in reserve, and 2,700 planes, invaded the Soviet Union.

The war undertaken by Germany in the second world conflict was not the traditional war prepared by policy and diplomacy, directed by

the supreme administrations, and conducted by the armies and countries under the command of staffs. Rather, it was the war of an ambitious despot who, in patriotic exaltation and in the slowness of the reactions of the democracies, ignored everything and believed himself to be able, with impunity, to set aside history, geography, economy, sociology, and military art in all the manifestations of life and activity and of peace and war.

Hitler's ignorance of, and perhaps contempt for, the various factors which govern war in its preparation and in its conduct was able to triumph through surprise and lack of preparation of the other countries. Thus, he won brilliant victories in the north and west of Europe. However, scarcely had the democracies become aware of the danger, and they speeded up their preparations and made ready their means and their men. The struggle then lost its one-sided character and all those factors which, at first, had been ignored and set aside came into operation and impressed a different course on events.

Summary.

In turning eastwards, therefore, Germany did not commit an error greater than the one she had committed in turning to the West. Although, in marching against the Soviet Union, Germany not only faced the risks of an operation which, in the final analysis, would be sure to end with the victory of one belligerent and the defeat of the other, but she falsely discounted the fact that such an operation would have an adverse effect against her.

The other countries of the world, after many years of lethargy, finally were determined to put a stop to Germany's audacious idea of world domination, and formed a united effort to accomplish this task.