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

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The BATTERY COMMANDER in DEFENCE

Major A. D. Watt,
Royal Australian Artillery.

IN defence the battery commander will be with the battalion commander at battalion HQ. Normally the battalion commander will control the battle from the battalion command post. Under these circumstances, how and where does the battery commander function? The text books give practically no guidance on this subject. This lack of information is usually explained by saying that the layout will depend on "the personality of the commander." However, the requirements are clear, and sufficient experience of defence on a static line has been gained in Korea to enable some ideas to be put forward.

Up to date two main types of layout have been used in Korea. In the first the battery commander lives and functions in a dugout in which he has his exchange and wireless communications, and a one-to-one line to the battalion commander. In the second the battery commander works in the battalion command post and sleeps in a dugout separate from his exchange.

The aim of this article is to describe another layout which has been tried out with success by 3 RAR in the June-October position.

In defence the battery commander has two principal functions:—

(a) To advise the battalion commander;
(b) To control artillery fire on the battalion front.

Advice to the battalion commander does not mean merely answering specific queries and giving advice on fire plans. It implies a close and intimate liaison, not only with the battalion commander but with the intelligence officer and adjutant. The battery commander must be thoroughly acquainted with patrol policy and with the detailed movement of patrols. He should be familiar with all operational matters affecting the battalion and must maintain a close and continuous liaison both in planning and during

an operation. The obvious place for him to function, therefore, is in the battalion command post.

To control fire effectively he must be handy to his communications and be in receipt of all available information. He will get all gunner information whether in or out of the command post, but to get up-to-date information from infantry sources he must be inside.

Therefore it can be said that to function with maximum efficiency, the battery commander should be located in the battalion command post.

In Korea at present both sides patrol aggressively at night. Raids, too, are carried out almost invariably by night. It is at night that the infantry usually requires artillery support, and this must be given quickly. If the battery commander is in the battalion command post he can take appropriate action quickly. Hence it is ideal for him to be in the battalion command post by night. However, the battery commander is usually busy by day and, if he stays up at night whilst patrols are out, he will get insufficient rest. This can be overcome by the battery commander having his stretcher in the command post. However, in a position which is likely to be static for an indefinite period he needs a place to himself. A solution is to partition off part of the command post so that the battery commander has a separate living place, but is for all operational purposes actually in the command post. This is the basis of the layout at present used by 3RAR (see Fig. 1).

The great advantage of this layout is that all information is quickly available at the place where decisions are to be made. If the battery commander repeats information coming in from his OPs the battalion commander can hear it. Similarly, the battery commander can hear information coming in from infantry sources. This enables targets to be engaged quickly by the most appropriate weapons and duplication of effort is thus avoided. In addition, the gunner information will supplement or confirm the other information received by the battalion commander, thus helping him to make the right decision quickly.

The battery commander can open a line link which includes any or all of the following:

Both OPs
Battery Command Post
Regimental Command Post
Regimental CO at brigade HQ
One or more flanking battery commanders or OPs.



Fig. 1.

LINE LAYOUT



Fig. 2.

Thus everyone concerned can get information simultaneously and the battery commander can effectively control the fire on the battalion front.

Each morning the battery commander is given a copy of the patrol detail for the night, and attends patrol commander's briefing if required. He advises on and arranges any special tasks required by patrols. He encodes patrol information and passes it to RHQ.

Having plotted the patrols, he selects the close harassing fire tasks for the night and 'phones them to the regimental intelligence officer at brigade HQ.

The battery commander works closely with the intelligence officer, has access to his air photographs and stereoscope, and is on the internal distribution list for all intelligence reports and summaries. He compares reports from his OPs with those received from snipers and infantry OPs. By constant visits to his OPs he makes himself thoroughly familiar with the front.

He arranges reliefs for his OPs and trains his junior officers in OP work.

When an operation is planned, the battalion commander will probably discuss it in general terms with the battery commander as soon as he knows about it. As soon as possible the battery commander will get from the battalion commander the infantry plan, details of where fire is required, and what it is required to achieve. He will obtain from the regimental CO details of the allotment of artillery and any other specific instructions. When he has produced a plan suitable to the battalion commander he discusses it with the regimental CO and leaves it with him for co-ordination and production.

The battery commander's day is usually spent at the battery or visiting his OPs. When he leaves battalion HQ he writes his destination on the officers' location board and, whilst in transit in his vehicle, is open on the regimental net.

If the battalion commander wishes to occupy a tactical OP during an operation, the battery commander will accompany him, taking an operator and a wireless set. If the distance is not great the remote control can be taken to the OP and the set left in the vehicle. The battery commander will operate on the regimental net. A line may be maintained to the OP from the battery commander's exchange and a 'phone connected when the OP is occupied.

By completely integrating himself into the battalion HQ, the battery commander not only serves the battalion commander better, but his own CO as well. Artillery exists solely to help the other arms, therefore the battery commander cannot stand aloof and wait for the battalion commander to come to him.

Communications.

The communications of a field regiment in Korea differ from those in the book. The principal differences are:

(a) A ten-line switchboard is provided as a battery commander's exchange.

(b) Thirty-one sets are provided in lieu of 38 sets. In defence they are used as an alternative means of communication from battery commander to OPs.

(c) More line is laid than would normally be available.

Fig. 2 is a diagrammatic layout of line used in support of 3 RAR (June-October 52 position).

For getting quick concentrations of fire the regimental net is without doubt the best means. For routine work line is best. For the passage of tactical information and control of fire during an operation line has much to commend it. It is said that, in a big battle, line will be destroyed and only wireless will be available. Experience has usually confirmed this. However, there is no doubt that if lines are properly laid over carefully reconnoitred routes and maintained continuously they will survive a considerable amount of shelling. On several occasions accompanied by moderate shelling (up to 600 rounds in one hour), lines to forward OPs over fairly long distances have remained in. The security and facility of line make it well worth the effort to try to keep it through. In a static position much can be done by burying line at points subject to repeated shelling, the use of alternate lines, proper crossings and, above all, continuous maintenance. If line can be used in the battalion command post noise is greatly reduced.

OPs should use wireless as much as possible for normal observed shooting in order to exercise operators and to ensure that regimental and battery nets function smoothly. Operators must be trained to exercise tenacity and perseverance when conditions are bad.

Conclusion.

Close liaison and good communications will enable the battery commander to exercise sound control and to give quick support.

Every now and then someone gets up and tells us what a wonderful place this country is going to be in twenty years time. In the present state of world affairs the real question is whether we are going to BE a nation in twenty years time.

ARMS
and
FIGHTING

Lieut.-Col. D. A. G. Waldock, CD,
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"Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode of fighting; there is, therefore, a reciprocity of action between the two."

The above quotation was written by Karl von Clausewitz, a Prussian General, in his treatise "On War" just after the close of the Napoleonic era more than one hundred years ago. This work, an unfinished philosophy of war, was published after Clausewitz' death in 1831 and, in succeeding years, it greatly influenced, not only German military doctrine, but that of most other nations as well.

In the past, the arrow and the sword had led to the employment of personal armour and the building of castles. The discovery of gunpowder and the invention of cannon and firearms defeated the castle and personal armour and displaced the arrow and the sword. The introduction of mobile artillery, used extensively by Napoleon, had made possible the effective concentration of artillery fire which, together with the development of improved small arms, gave rise to many of our modery tactical concepts.

It was in the light of such past events that Clausewitz had reached his conclusion on the relationship between fighting and arms. It is proposed to study his findings in the light of events since 1914 and then endeavour to forecast how fighting and equipment may influence each other in the next quarter century.

—*From "Canadian Army Journal."*

1914 TO 1952.

First World War

At the commencement of the First World War, the two dominant

weapons were the machine gun and the quick-firing field gun. The machine gun heavily favoured the defence and used in a defensive role in conjunction with barbed wire, it ruled the battlefield leading to a state of siege warfare. The resultant widespread use of trench systems and fieldworks largely reduced the effectiveness of artillery.

One of the major tactical problems of the infantry attack was that of covering the last few hundred yards in the face of enemy machine gun fire. This problem was partially solved by the use of the artillery barrage which was employed to neutralise enemy fire while infantry advanced as close as possible behind it. To obtain greater effect against a well entrenched enemy, it became necessary to use artillery of heavier calibre. The widespread use of high explosive shell in place of shrapnel was also adopted.

Against the effect of these bombardments often had to be set the price of loss of surprise. Nevertheless, the effectiveness was such that it became necessary to set up elaborate counter-bombardment systems, employing sound ranging and flash spotting techniques, to locate the positions of enemy guns. In later years, the successful use of flash spotting was to lead to a requirement for flashless powder.

Artillery having met with only partial success, a radically new weapon was required to break the stalemate of siege warfare. In April, 1915, the Germans first used poison gas. They achieved some limited success but the gases used were neutralised relatively easily and the weapon became ineffective.

The problem was eventually solved by the introduction of the tank towards the end of 1916. The tank provided weapon mobility and protection at the same time and was to revolutionise field tactics. Tanks were used as mobile screens of armoured batteries behind which infantry could advance against the strongest defensive systems of the day.

Before leaving the First World War, it is of interest to note that the state of siege warfare stalemate prevailing in the earlier years led to increased reliance on the naval blockade as a weapon and to the introduction of air attack on civil populations and industry. This form of attack was used on a vastly increased scale in the Second World War and was to lead to a demand for elaborate and costly anti-aircraft defence systems. The naval blockade gave impetus to the development and widespread use of the submarine, which in turn necessitated the adoption of the convoy system.

Second World War.

Between the First and Second World Wars, the two types of major equipment which advanced most were the aeroplane and the tank or armoured fighting vehicle, resulting in the growth of large air forces and the mechanisation of armies. At the beginning of the Second World War, these two had become dominant weapons and both were used successfully in conjunction as the core of the German offensives in Poland and Western Europe. As a result, fighting took on a much more mobile and fluid character.

Tactically, air bombardment was used in the rôle of long range artillery. Strategically, it was used as a weapon of terror and mass destruction against civilian populations

and industry. An urgent requirement arose for improved anti-aircraft ground defences which was met to some degree by the introduction of radar, improved fire control instruments and higher velocity semi-automatic guns having increased rates of fire.

Armoured divisions, built around tanks and vehicle-borne infantry supported by self-propelled guns, were used to punch holes in strong defensive systems, to encircle the enemy and to disrupt his lines of communication. To meet this form of attack, defence in greater depth became necessary. A requirement arose for effective anti-tank weapons and a race began between gun and armour which is still in progress today.

Land mines were used on a large scale as part of integrated defence systems and proved to be effective weapons against personnel and vehicles of all types. Efficient mine detection and minefield clearance soon became major problems which even today are not satisfactorily solved.

The effective use of mortars on a large scale made it necessary to expand the counter-bombardment organisation to include counter-mortar activities, radar and sound ranging being used to locate enemy mortar positions.

The increased mobility of warfare demanded improved field communications leading to the widespread use of wireless. Multi-channel and high speed line communication systems were introduced to cope with the increased volume of traffic and to conserve cable. Improved communications in turn enabled the principle of concentration of artillery fire to be developed to a very high degree and in a flexible manner. The fire of complete divisions and even corps was able to be brought down on specified targets at relatively short notice. Improved communications also had a profound effect upon tank tactics.

Another revolutionary development in land warfare arising from the advances made in aviation was the introduction of airborne units. It became possible to drop whole divisions of suitably equipped troops from the air behind enemy lines to secure strategic points and to harass the enemy rear. Thus was the mobility of warfare increased, still further emphasising the necessity for increased defence in depth. Headquarters and supply units in the rear now had to be capable of adequately defending themselves against sudden attack either from the air or from highly mobile armoured units.

Operations during the latter half of the Second World War called for an increasing number of amphibious assaults both in the European and Pacific theatres. These in turn gave rise to requirements for special amphibious assault equipment, among which might be mentioned the various types of landing craft and the amphibious jeep. Since landing craft were not always able to approach close enough to shallow beaches, it became necessary to waterproof vehicles of all types and often the equipment contained in them so that they might wade ashore. The success achieved in the development of amphibious equipment and the waterproofing of existing equipment, in turn, permitted amphibious operations to be undertaken on a more ambitious scale. This culminated in the Nor-

mandy assault, in which whole divisions, complete with their equipment, were successfully landed in the space of a few hours.

Arising from the operational need to fight in tropical theatres, equipment had to be adapted to enable it to perform satisfactorily in dry and humid tropical climates. Such fighting had previously been seriously limited by the capabilities both of the soldier and his equipment but successful campaigns such as those in Burma and the Pacific islands were made possible largely by the effective tropicalisation of Allied fighting equipment and improved tropical hygiene.

Towards the end of the Second World War, three major equipment developments made their appearance: the VT or proximity fuse, the guided missile and the atomic bomb. The former met the requirement for consistently obtaining airbursts at optimum height and appeared in time to materially influence the Battle of the Bulge and the closing stages of the Pacific campaign. The atomic bomb succeeded in bringing the Pacific campaign to an abrupt and successful conclusion by completely destroying the will to fight of the Japanese nation as a whole. The guided missile, as used in the forms of the V-1 and V-2, was not particularly effective. The influence of these three developments on the future pattern of fighting will be discussed later.

Thus it may be seen that Clausewitz' statement has been amply borne out by the experience of two recent world wars. Every weapon has been designed to meet certain operational requirements arising from the pattern of warfare obtaining at that time. No sooner is a new weapon in the hands of troops than the pattern of warfare changes, on the one hand to enhance the effect of the weapon and on the other to minimise it.

1952 TO 1975.

The future is inclined to be somewhat obscured by the recent introduction of weapons of mass destruction, namely, the atomic, bacteriological and chemical warfare weapons. Experience in the use and effect of these weapons to date is very limited indeed and points towards their being most effective when used strategically against civilian populations rather than tactically against armies in the field. Rather than risk confusing the issue by discussing these weapons at the outset, it is proposed to consider first the future influence of fighting and equipment upon each other in the more orthodox fields.

Orthodox Warfare.

The race between gun and armour may be expected to continue for some time with the tank becoming the main anti-tank weapon. Requirements may therefore arise for three major classes of tank, one for use in the tank destroyer rôle, one for use in the infantry support rôle, and the other for use in the traditional cavalry rôle. Should it be found possible to combine an effective anti-tank and H.E. performance in the same gun, the first two classes would be merged into one, as in the past. Suitably stabilised tanks will be able to fire on the move, relying on their movement for protection, thereby speeding up the attack. Heavy tanks are costly and give rise to numerous movement and main-

tenance problems in the field. It may be concluded, therefore, that they would become rapidly outmoded if a more effective method of destroying them should be discovered. Here, an analogy may be drawn with the heavy battleship. Meanwhile, the armoured division, possibly air transported as required, will continue as the main offensive component of an army.

So long as the tank continues to dominate the battlefield, infantry troops will demand an effective weapon with which to combat it at relatively close ranges. Mortars will continue to be used with improved accuracy up to minimum artillery range and their effect may be greatly increased by the use of proximity fused shell. The light machine gun and machine carbine may be expected to be combined in some degree with the rifle in the form of a fully automatic rifle so as to increase appreciably the firepower of the infantry section. Every effort will be made to reduce the load carried by the infantryman in order to increase his efficiency and endurance. Scientifically designed clothing, together with lighter and more efficient weapons, will all assist to this end. Infantry is the one arm which will never be outmoded, even in a push-button war of mass destruction, since they will always be required to occupy ground won from an enemy. Any effort devoted to improving their fighting efficiency, at a time when vast sums of money are being expended upon costly and complicated new weapons as yet unproven as to their effectiveness, is, therefore, well spent.

As development continues, airborne troops will be less and less restricted by the availability and size of aircraft or by equipment dropping limitations. It may reasonably be anticipated that armies will be increasingly transported and supplied by air, although the fuel problem may become a limiting factor.

Infantry, however they may be transported, will require intimate fire support immediately at hand. Field artillery will therefore continue to be required to meet this need. Improved accuracy of artillery fire should result in a corresponding economy in equipment and ammunition. Tactical aircraft will operate as air artillery to provide reinforcing fire support, and fire support for the initial stages of an airborne landing or a swift ground manoeuvre.

The proximity fuse may be expected to have considerable impact on tactical doctrine. Infantry can no longer expect the same degree of protection from slit trenches or from dispersal in the open. Artillery must be provided with overhead protection if it is to survive counter bombardment fire. Armour, including armoured personnel carriers, can advance directly under a continuous VT-fuzed barrage. Beach assaults will prove more costly. Proximity fuzed shell fired from mortar, rocket launcher, tank gun or field gun may well lead to the reintroduction of some form of body armour. Not without justification has the VT fuze been referred to as the second most important development of the Second World War.

The improvement of artificial aids to vision at night, such as infra-red devices, may be anticipated, leading to a radical change in the form and

scope of night operations. New and improved radar devices will assist in detecting enemy ground targets and improving artillery and tank fire control systems. Further improved communications will speed up the tempo on the battlefield.

Specially developed clothing and equipment will enable warfare to be conducted in the Arctic regions. However, the strategic requirement for flexibility in operations will demand that such equipment be also capable of operating satisfactorily in the tropics.

Unorthodox Warfare.

It is proposed now to return to the more unorthodox weapons referred to earlier and to consider their possible influence on existing tactical concepts. The atomic weapon, as known today, would appear to be limited tactically to use against large concentrations of troops, major strong points, large supply depots and key points on lines of communications such as railway centres and ports. Unless mobility, deception and ease of control are greatly increased, the concentration of appreciably superior forces will no longer be practicable. A large scale amphibious assault, such as that recently conducted on the Normandy beaches, would be inviting disaster. This will bring forth requirements for equipment to facilitate rapid concentration for battle.

Strategically, the bomb has enormous possibilities when used against industry and civilian populations. Defence against it will be mainly concerned with preventing it from being used.

The bacteriological weapon, although as yet unproven, provides a definite threat, the influence of which upon active operations seems likely to be similar to that of the atomic bomb, although its effect cannot be instantaneous due to incubation time. It possesses the additional attraction to an agressor that it will not destroy material. Its effect upon a civilian population may be comparable with that of the atomic bomb and the main defence problem will once again be to prevent its successful delivery.

The chemical warfare weapon has still not reached maturity. Its limitations in close combat are well established and it has failed to affect battle conditions fundamentally in the past. It might therefore be assumed that protective measures will be devised against future chemical agents as against past ones, and it seems reasonable to assume that battle conditions will not be fundamentally affected in the future. As a weapon of mass destruction used against civilian population, chemical warfare represents a serious threat comparable with that of atomic and bacteriological warfare.

Summarising, atomic, bacteriological and chemical warfare may all preclude concentrations of any type or magnitude in both forward areas and lines of communication in a theatre of operations. They will also limit the size of amphibious operations. They are likely to be used against large centres of civilian population and industry. It is of interest to note that these weapons may all be used by a nation on the verge of defeat, if not to secure victory, to ensure that defeat is mutual.

Finally, it is proposed to consider the new vehicles by which these

weapons may be delivered at long range: guided missiles, both in the form of pilotless aircraft and rockets. It is the supersonic rocket which offers the greatest possibilities and which can probably only be countered by another guided rocket. Although their effectiveness relative to their cost has yet to be determined, guided rockets carrying conventional high explosive warheads will be available to armies shortly for use in the rôles of long range artillery and anti-aircraft artillery. In the former rôle, they may supplant tactical support aircraft having the added advantage that they can operate in any weather or conditions of visibility. In the anti-aircraft rôle, they may render bombing by piloted aircraft impracticable only to hasten bombing by pilotless aircraft and guided rockets.

Conclusion.

It may be concluded that General Karl von Clausewitz' theory concerning the influence of fighting and equipment upon each other has been amply substantiated by the experience of two recent major conflicts. Consideration of the possible developments of the next quarter century does not indicate any likely departure from his doctrine.

Thus, each new offensive or defensive equipment and each change in tactics which is introduced into warfare brings forth in due course another equipment or change in tactics to restore the fighting balance. Major General J. F. C. Fuller has called this phenomenon the "Constant Tactical Factor." It might well be called the "Law of Conservation of the Species," for unless every type of offence can be countered, man may well annihilate himself. The hydrogen bomb is a case in point.

Warfare is no longer restricted to the battlefields as it was in Clausewitz' day, and in these days there are such things as psychological weapons and civilian "fronts." However, if his theory be broadened to cover every aspect of total warfare as practised nowadays, it will still be found to hold good.

SE ASIA SERIES —— No. 1 ——



The DILEMMA of the WEST

Captain A. M. N. Rodulfo,
Australian Intelligence Corps.

THE area generally known as South-East Asia, that is, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya and the East Indies, has played a great part in the history of European expansion. Indeed, the lure of the Indies and, by extension, Cathay, prompted the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama. It may be said, therefore, that the fate of South-East Asia is peculiarly bound to that of Western Europe.

The first Europeans arrived to find a world of warring petty states. Because in many areas the situation was one of near anarchy, conservative and cautious traders like the Dutch were compelled, in self-defence, to annex and subdue the petty states around their trading factories. Thus South-East Asia became the classic area of Commercial Imperialism. There had been little attempt at, or possibility of, assimilation between White and Brown such as took place in Latin America, but the impact of European ideas has been none the less shattering in its effects on the old civilisations of the area.

The first impact of European civilisation took place at a time when the ancient Hindu culture emanating from India was giving way to that of China. In the event the West triumphed, but not decisively. As a result the inhabitants of South-East Asia are left with the task of reconciling the three very different cultures, and it is not surprising, therefore, that confusion reigns both in the world of ideas and in the world of politics.

The sudden withdrawal of European tutelage after the war has left South-East Asia only outwardly prepared to stand on its own. In addition to the mental confusion outlined above, the peoples of this area find themselves at the mercy of forces outside their control and it is largely these forces that will be discussed in this article.

Economic Factors.

The economic attraction of the Indies for Europeans still exists. The Dutch economy is almost entirely linked with that of Indonesia, so that Holland plays an important role in the rubber, tin, tea and sugar trade of the world. The dollar balances of the British Commonwealth are largely dependent on the earnings of Malayan rubber and tin. France relies greatly on Indo-Chinese rubber production and the control of Burmese wolfram has some strategic importance for the West. The loss of Persian oil supply is largely offset in Australia by the rapid expansion of the Brunei oilfield. The richest oilfields of the Far East are in Indonesia, which also possesses considerable refining capacity.

The last war showed that the loss of the strategic materials of South-East Asia can be replaced at great cost when necessary. But this substitution can only be of a temporary nature, limited to the duration of a war. Under the present conditions of uneasy peace the denial of South-East Asian strategic resources would place an almost unbearable strain on Western European and Commonwealth economy.

We can expect, therefore, that Communist political strategy will aim at denying us the raw materials of South-East Asia.

Rice.

Burma, Siam and Indo-China are unique in Asia in that they are underpopulated and are consequently food surplus areas. Their importance in this respect places them among the key areas of the world because these three countries are the only significant exporters of rice.

Communist control of these countries would give Peking and Moscow a powerful weapon with which to threaten India, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines and Japan.

The Oriental cannot readily switch from a rice diet to a wheat diet without experiencing physical discomfort. Age-old custom and religious aversion to meat make it even more difficult to find alternatives to rice. In the Bengal Famine of 1942 peasants were known to prefer starvation rather than accept unaccustomed foods. Even should the peoples of India, Japan and Indonesia turn to a wheat diet, it is doubtful whether the West could find the shipping necessary to move several million tons of wheat from distant production centres, nor could the wheat be delivered at a cost within the reach of the poverty stricken peoples of these lands.

A failure to make available the necessary shipping would provide the Communists with excellent propaganda material against the West and, at the same time, make it impossible for India, Indonesia and possibly Japan to resist Communist pressure.

Racial Factors.

The racial composition of South-East Asia is naturally intricate as a result of migratory waves moving southwards from the Tibetan and Yunnan highlands. In historical times this movement has taken the form of Chinese penetration.

Chinese colonies have been in existence for centuries in some areas; in others, as in Malaya, Chinese immigration has followed as

a corollary to European commercial expansion. In fact, European commercial expansion would have been almost impossible without the establishment of a Chinese small trading class since most South-East Asian peoples show little aptitude for modern commerce.

In Malaya the Chinese will soon form the majority of the population, while in all other countries they are a very influential minority.

Except in Burma the rice trade is almost entirely in Chinese hands. Every Chinaman must be regarded as a potential Communist.

Political Factors.

The principal political factors to be remembered are the recent emancipation of large populations from colonial rule, and a first hand experience of modern war. The first has left a legacy of anti-Western bitterness among educated classes which the Japanese assiduously fostered during the war. The second has been incalculable in its effects upon a simple peasantry which had previously lived a self-contained existence only remotely affected by Western civilisation. It has contributed largely to a breakdown of the old village loyalties and religious influences, especially in Burma and Indo-China.

Up to date no indigenous philosophy or way of life has been evolved which can obviate the present need to choose between two alien and European systems—Democracy and Communism, neither of which is fully understood. It is this spiritual vacuum which is largely responsible for the present unreal desire for neutrality in the threatening world conflict. Sooner or later a choice must be made.

Communism and the West.

The growth of nationalism in South-East Asia, itself the product of Western education and thought, was of necessity anti-European and anti-imperialist in its expression. The Japanese war prevented a gradual and relatively peaceful transfer of power as was the case in India. The failure of the West to prevent a Japanese invasion gave the Communists, hitherto unimportant, an opportunity to pose as true patriots and nationalists. The one exception was in Siam, which had managed to preserve her independence and cultural heritage by playing on the rivalries of France and Britain. The Communists were greatly aided in their pose as nationalists by the pre-war colonial policies of France and Holland which discouraged nationalist activities. As a result, many of the more energetic nationalists were driven into the Communist camp since they could see no other means of destroying colonial rule in their countries.

Any move on the part of the Colonial Powers to promote self-government depended upon the co-operation of land owners. It was not possible, therefore, to carry out extensive land reforms without alienating the very people whose help was necessary for the modern development of these countries. The Colonial Powers have consequently come to be identified with the perpetuation of a social system based upon the inequality of wealth. It is difficult, at this late date, to convince the Asiatic that Western Democracy stands for Freedom and Equality.

The European Powers no longer govern the greater part of South-

East Asia and are therefore no longer in a position to promise land reform to a land hungry peasantry. The Communists are hampered by no such considerations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Communist offer of tangible land finds a far greater response than Western offers of intangible technical and economic aid which can be effective only over a long period.

So long as the ideological struggle is confined to political platforms and the UN the advantages are all with the Communists. It seems that only daily contact with the realities of Communist practice can convince the Oriental that our way of life may be preferable in default of a native ideology suitable to modern conditions. Fortunately for the West, the Communists are already in armed revolt in three countries. Providing the present governments of Burma and Vietnam can survive the rebellions there is a good chance that popular revulsion may turn the people away from the embraces of Mao Tse Tung.

Finally, the West has a considerable advantage in two factors. Firstly, the dislike and fear of the Chinese minorities which exist in all South-East Asian countries except possibly Burma, where Indians form the principal minority. Secondly, the three mainland states are food surplus areas and consequently more readily contented than densely populated islands like Java. This is particularly the case in Siam, where the high price of rice has brought with it an unwonted prosperity.

Defence.

The strategic importance of the South-East Asian countries is evident. They are not only important producers of raw materials and of rice, but also cover the approaches to India and Australia.

Burma, if Communist controlled, would give China and Russia access to the Indian Ocean and practicable physical contact with India, the Government of which has shown itself to be highly sensitive to frontier problems. The Assam-Burma border has never been precisely defined and China has always claimed the Northern Kachin areas of Burma.

The only practicable land route to Siam and Malaya from China runs through the Tonking Delta. It is doubtful whether any natural defence line could be found between Tonking and the Kra Isthmus. The French war in Tonking against the Communist Viet Minh rebels is, therefore, not a purely French affair. It is of vital concern to the British in Singapore, to the United States and to Australia.

Conclusions.

Free access to the rice surpluses of Burma, Siam and Indo-China is essential if Japan is to be won over to the West, or, at least, kept benevolently neutral, and India's position in the Commonwealth safeguarded.

The Tonking Delta is the gateway to South-East Asia and as such must remain in friendly hands if Singapore is to play its part as a major naval base.

The Western defenders of South-East Asia must gain the co-operation of the native populations for which a readily understood and attractive alternative to Communism must be found.

The West is faced with the dilemma of continuing its political withdrawal from South-East Asia in order to convince Asia of our sincerity, thereby weakening our defences, and of maintaining military strength in Indo-China as a defence against the threat from Communist China. We are in fact faced with a set of conditions bearing a striking resemblance to the situation in Korea.

Once the soldier is trained to his weapon, he becomes a part of a highly developed combat team of infantry, artillery, armour, and air. These battle teams are the most difficult, the most complicated of all teams to create. They must be capable of operating on unfamiliar ground, in darkness as well as in daylight, amid incredible confusion, danger, hardship, and discouragement. The leadership of such teams is of the utmost importance; it requires judgment, intelligence, courage, integrity, and resourcefulness.

General J. Lawton Collins, US Army.

THE ARMY . . .

YESTERDAY AND TODAY

Adapted from an Address by The Hon. Jos. Francis, M.P., Minister for the Army, to the Corps of Staff Cadets.

IT is my sincere belief —and I am not alone in this, for public and political opinion are also behind me—that our Army of today has reached an all-high level of efficiency.

Never before in our history have we had such a substantial base to expand from if war should come.

I know from long experience and association with the Services that the measure of our ability to raise, organize and equip a modern army is inevitably bound up with financial appropriations, but money is by no means the complete or only answer.

It is the Army's objective to prepare itself for war and, whether Parliament grants appropriations at high level or low level, it must make the very best use of the funds available and reach that goal by thorough understanding and application of the many organizational and administrative principles that surround the problem.

And, moreover, the problem itself is ever changing, so that it places a prime responsibility on us all to keep abreast of modern thought, method and development in the nature of war.

Indeed, the job of soldiering is a scientific profession and one which demands continuous and enlightened study. There can be no halting places, no retreats, but always a steady march forward to full and complete understanding of the science of war.

It was to help the officers of our Army towards this full and complete understanding that Duntroon was first founded some 40 years ago.

We placed our faith, in the years preceding World War II, in the bastions of our Empire, which sud-

den and dramatic changes in the nature of war were to render impotent and ourselves temporarily defenceless.

I mention this in no spirit of post mortemisation, but only to emphasize that we pay bitterly for mistakes in war, and our only protection against repetition is adequate measures for the expansion of our Armed Forces—Navy, Army and Air alike; and, within the ability of our economic, material and manpower resources, to achieve the maximum development of the principle of self reliance.

But it is only since the end of World War II that Duntroon has reached its traditional objective. Every responsible staff and command appointment from the Chief of the General Staff downwards is now filled by a Duntroon graduate.

We can have no better testimony to the value and work of this College than the Army today. We have never had such an efficient Army—rank and file alike—such a well trained, well equipped, scientifically organized and administered Army.

It has taken us fifty years to get where we are today, and Duntroon has played a very conspicuous, if not vital, part in that evolution.

I think it was Napoleon who said that the "Principles of war, like guns, are useless as such—their real value rests in their intelligent application".

In other words, the solution of the problems of the future will very often be aided by retrospective study of the past, and this is equally true for soldiers and Ministers alike.

Let me therefore turn back the pages of our history and view in retrospect the evolution of our Army of today—before and since Federation.

In the years preceding Federation the six Colonies were separately and individually responsible for their own local defence, and raised such forces as were then considered adequate. There was no plan or policy for the overall defence of Australia.

Of course, in those times the paramount power of the British Empire and the overwhelming supremacy of the British Navy were regarded as an adequate guarantee for the safety and security of the separate Colonies—apart from the remote possibility of attack from two or three raiding cruisers or gunboats.

But the Colonies were nevertheless earnest on the question of local defence and raised unpaid Volunteer and partially paid Militia Units. Many of these old Colonial units were initially raised and organized by ex-Imperial officers, who held very rigidly to the customs of their previous service, and as a consequence the emphasis was on individuality rather than uniformity.

Thus we find the mounted troops in each Colony were trained in the tradition of cavalry proper—as Lancers or Mounted Rifles or Mounted Infantry. The infantry, armed with the old percussion muzzle loaders of the Crimea period, trained either as skirmishers, light infantry—infantry proper or as rifle regiments — and uniformed and accoutred themselves accordingly.

On their field days or encampment periods we can imagine them busily skirmishing in the tradition

of Corunna, or manoeuvring into squares to withstand the shock of cavalry as at Quatre Bras. We can see the Lancer Regiments, too, practising squadron front and charging in the tradition of the Light Brigade.

For we must remember warfare in those days was still in the picturesque stage. Automatic weapons and quick-firing breech-loading guns were yet to come. The British Army, which provided the pattern for these old Colonial units was busy fighting little wars. Infantry squares and "thin red lines," cavalry charges—Zulus and Fuzzy Wuzzies —Afghans and Frontier Tribes—alike added to a tableau which was both inspiring and colourful.

The old artillery units, very often unpaid, spent their leisure time dragging heavy and ponderous muzzle loading ordnance around the important seaports, and siting them to repel attack from the sea.

You will see these old pieces today around vantage points on our coastline—silent sentinels of the past—testimonials to the strength and endurance of the old artillerymen. We know they never spoke in anger—we can doubt whether they ever spoke at all—for shot and powder cost money, and the burden of local defence sat heavily upon the impecunious Colonies, for the aggregate of their expenditure on defence exceeded that incurred by the Commonwealth in the early years of Federation.

It was in such humble beginnings as those that the first Commandant of this College (General Bridges) commenced his career as a member of the artillery of the Colony of New South Wales. Other distinguished soldiers like Monash and Chauvel and many others who were later to distinguish themselves in war and peace—also began their careers in the early Volunteer and Militia Units of their respective Colonies.

However heavily the burden of self-defence sat upon the individual Colonies, they were not unmindful of their Imperial obligations, for we find that in 1885 the Colony of New South Wales despatched a contingent of 500, plus a battery of Field Artillery, to the assistance of the British Army in the Soudan.

Now inconspicuous and perhaps forgotten, the departure of this contingent first set the pattern for cooperation within the British Commonwealth of Nations—a pattern which was to call us willingly to greater tasks and heavier sacrifices as the years rolled by.

In the earlier 'nineties public opinion in the six Colonies began to move strongly towards Federation, and possibly nothing gave more impetus to this desire than the question of defence and security.

In 1894, under the sponsorship of the Colony of New South Wales, the General Officers Commanding the Forces of the separate Colonies met in Sydney to consider and report upon a plan for the joint defence of Australia. This conference finally decided that the several Colonies acting conjointly should raise and maintain Volunteer or Militia Forces of 7,493 on peace establishment, expanding to 12,074 on war establishment, for the defence of Australia as a whole.

This force for the active defence of the Continent was to be a Federal Field Force available for disposition anywhere in Australia. The prob-

lem of purely local defence was to remain the individual responsibility of the separate Colonies.

However, local interests — the limited resources at disposal of each Colony—and the question of earmarking Colony funds for a Federal purpose, were sufficient to kill the scheme.

The proposition, however worthy, was one that Federation alone could solve.

Federation of the Commonwealth was achieved in 1901, and in the first flush of our nationhood we gave conspicuous assistance to the Imperial cause during the South African War by the despatch of mounted contingents totalling some 848 officers and 15,327 other ranks.

The old Militia and Volunteer units of pre-Federation days formed the backbone of these Contingents; and many of the C.M.F. units of today are proud to display South African Battle Honours on their Regimental Colours, thus symbolising the traditional association with their historical background.

Immediately following Federation the Commonwealth assumed responsibility for the defence of Australia, and Major-General Sir Edward Hutton, K.C.M.G., C.B.—who had previously commanded the State Forces of New South Wales—was appointed in January, 1902, by the Commonwealth Government as General Officer Commanding the Commonwealth's Forces.

Upon this officer fell the task of welding together into one harmonious whole the Military Forces of the six separate States.

We can imagine some of the practical difficulties he must have encountered, as each of six different States had up to his arrival six different systems of defence, each varying in character and effectiveness. Apart from this, each State had a separate Defence Act under which the troops of such States were still serving, until the Commonwealth Defence Act of 1903-1904 was passed.

Other difficulties he encountered were reduction in Defence Appropriations from £600,000 in 1902 to £560,000 in 1903 and £500,000 in 1904. For purposes of economy his Headquarters Staff (the predecessor of present day Army Headquarters) was also reduced from eight officers and 14 others to six officers and 12 others.

General Hutton's overall plan for the defence of Australia was based on the premise that the inviolability of Australian shores and the security of her commerce depended in a large measure upon the power of Great Britain to maintain her supremacy at sea.

Early in 1905 a new system of administration and control of the Defence Forces was introduced. The Council of Defence was created, a Naval Board and a Military Board were established, and General Hutton relinquished his appointment and returned to England.

Following the South African War, which disclosed weaknesses and inadequacies in the British Army organization, great changes were happening at home. There had been drastic reforms at the War Office, and Lord Haldane, as Secretary of State for War, was modernizing and reorganizing the British Army for the coming conflict with Germany.

But these events sat very lightly upon us here, for a Defence Department Report of 1909 records the total Permanent Militia and Volunteer troops in Australia amounted to 25,312 as against 29,200 at Federation, and the annual expenditure on defence fluctuated about £780,000.

The total of our artillery pieces was 92, of which 28 were in reserve. This included a total of 48 15-pr. breech loaders, which were even then obsolescent.

So far as expenditure for the Field Force was concerned, the Report adds that some £5,000 had been spent since Federation on the purchase of equipment for the Engineers Corps and £2,000 was provided in the current year's estimates for the purchase of:—

5 Double Tool Carts
4 Trestle Waggons
1 Cable Cart
1 Waggon G.S. Limbered

with stores required for each.

For the Infantry and Cavalry there was a total of 54 .303 Maxim Machine Guns and 10 1-pr. Quick Firing Pom Poms—which were also obsolescent.

There were 28,000 .303 Magazine Lee Enfield Shorts and 21,000 .303 M.L.E. Longs, and there were also 27,000 obsolete .303 in. single loaders.

In February, 1910, Lord Kitchener arrived here at the invitation of the Commonwealth Government to advise on the problem of the defence of Australia. Lord Kitchener's appreciation of the problem was based on an axiom then held by the British Government that the Empire's existence primarily depended upon the maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces.

As long as this condition was fulfilled, and as long as British superiority at sea was assured, then it was an accepted principle that no British Dominion could be successfully and permanently conquered by an organized invasion from oversea.

Considerations relating to our isolation—the problem of transportation overseas, the vast extent of the Commonwealth compared with its population, and its internal transportation systems, led Lord Kitchener to assess that the land forces required for the adequate defence of Australia should total 80,000 fighting troops. Of these, half would be required for the passive defence of our principal cities, whilst the other half would be free to operate as a mobile striking force, for use anywhere within Australia.

In the meantime the Defence Bill of 1909 had been passed and this gave effect to the principle that every citizen should be trained to defend his country.

After two years of preparation, organizing training areas and building up administrative and instructional staffs, the Universal Training Scheme for youths of 18 and over was commenced in July, 1912—for Senior and Junior Cadets a year earlier.

With the influx of "Compulsory Call Ups," the Army was again reorganized to provide a Field Force consisting of six Light Horse Brigades, five Field Artillery Brigades, 12 Infantry Brigades and six unallotted Field Batteries.

But Kitchener's proposals for

80,000 men for the defence of Australia involved an organization of:—

28 Regiments of Light Horse
21 Brigades of Infantry
49 Field Batteries
7 Howitzer Batteries
14 Field Companies,

all to be supported by an appropriate backing of administrative troops.

The reorganization of the Army under the compulsory clauses of the Defence Act dealt a death blow to the old Militia and Volunteer Units. Many of the officers and N.C.Os., of course, continued to serve with the Universal Training Units until, by the process of time, they were replaced by promotees from the Universal Training Ranks.

It will be observed that Kitchener's plan was never fully implemented. The base from which he planned the expansion of the Army under Part XII of the Defence Act was much too inadequate to support his scheme of reorganization and, of course, there was a vast insufficiency of arms and equipment in the country to provide even the most modest and meagre requirements for the forces he proposed should be raised.

We may pause here to reflect that this state of affairs, which characterised Australia's attitude towards the problem of its security and defence from Federation to World Ward II, exposed us to grave dangers and bitter experiences from which we happily emerged much wiser—and very much stronger.

With the outbreak of World War I our interests, our resources and our time were fully occupied with the organization and despatch overseas of the First A.I.F., and Kitchener's scheme was necessarily put aside, if not discarded.

Australia had pledged its support to Great Britain to the last man and the last shilling. Indeed, beyond good fighting men and our ability to pay for their equipment overseas—and their maintenance—the Army had little else to give, and our Expeditionary Forces left this country unarmed and non-equipped.

In May, 1921, a new divisional organization was introduced which was optimistically hailed as the highest development in the history of the Australian Army.

The new reorganization in the background of tradition was organically based on the A.I.F. and consisted of:—

2 Cavalry Divisions
4 Infantry Divisions
3 Mixed Brigades
Non-Divisional and L. of C. Units.

These formations were to comprise a Field Force for the defence of Australia, and up to June, 1922, reached an overall peace strength of approximately 118,000, but training appeared to be a matter of secondary importance and little, if any, was carried out.

Shortly after the new divisional organization was introduced the Washington Disarmament Conference was held and the Commonwealth Government, in step with major world powers, agreed to cut expenditure on defence, and in the following year drastic retrenchments were ordered.

By June, 1922, under a revised programme, the peace strength of the Army was cut from 118,000 to

30,000, and the scope of training was limited to six days' camp training and four days' home training each year.

So far as equipment was concerned, Great Britain returned to this country after World War I five sets of equipment complete in all detail for five divisions of infantry. This was the equipment that was to meet training and mobilization requirements of such forces as were raised in this country between World War I and up to the outbreak of World War II, supplemented by very meagre expenditure on modern and up to date requirements

By the time that World War II arrived this equipment had largely outlived its purpose. It was obsolete or fast becoming so, and belonged to an era of warfare that mechanisation and more modern and scientific changes in nature of war had relegated to the past.

Added to the financial stringencies there were also strong undercurrents of political, public and press hostility to the Universal Training Scheme, and the Army barely held its own, except for its unabating sense of responsibility and tradition of service.

In December, 1929, the Government of the day suspended Universal Training and the Army had perforce to recruit, organize and train itself again on a purely voluntary basis, and at a time when effects of a world wide economic depression were very soon to be seriously felt in Australia. These were "dog days" again for the Army, but its spirit remained unquenchable.

In the middle 'thirties events were moving swiftly on the Continent—Hitler Germany was on the march and the portents for coming conflict were many, but in Australia the peace strength of the Army from 1930 to 1936 fluctuated about 29,000, which was a bare nucleus for the organization it was carrying.

However, in 1937, under the impetus of world events, strength progressively increased from 34,000 in 1937 to 71,000 when war broke out.

Parliamentary appropriations from 1930 moved sharply downwards from approximately £1,400,000 to less than a million during the depth of the depression, then to rise again to nearly two million in the year in which World War II broke out.

If we were slow to realize it earlier, subsequent events were to show us conclusively that for wars of the nature of World War I and World War II, the peace time organization, role and training of the Australian Army provided only indifferently and most inadequately for the problems which had to be overcome, particularly those related to the organization and training of Forces for service overseas, together with the build up from scratch of the vast administrative and maintenance machinery so vital for its logistic support.

I do not propose to dwell upon the eventful years of 1939-1945, but probably the most significant lesson that guided our policy for the organization of our post war Army was that the time had gone when we could raise and train an Army only as the necessity demanded from volunteers off the street.

Today it must have the framework ready for instant expansion in

time of need, and this could only be achieved by relegating to the scrap heap outmoded appreciations of the inter-relationship of British naval supremacy and the defence and security of Australia.

So too have we come to realize that our real frontier will be wherever it is most advantageous to go forward to meet the enemy, and that the defence of this Continent cannot be undertaken by fixing geographic frontiers beyond which our forces may or may not serve.

We had, during World War II, two different Armies, the A.I.F. and the A.M.F., and thus our common purpose was broken by the dividing line which determined the operational spheres in which one should and the other should not serve.

But that is finished; there is today and shall be for the future only one Army bonded by one common purpose and one common frontier.

In the words of the Prime Minister: "Isolation is dead. The United States, Great Britain, and British Commonwealth and Western European Powers are interdependent. Not one of them can stand alone. If the evil day dawns on which the last great world struggle begins, we must all be prepared to fight wherever it is essential that the enemy be met and overcome. Unity of action at the right place and the right time is imperative. Without it we shall all go down."

Our Army of today consists of a Regular Army strength of 29,000—a Citizen Force strength of approximately 51,000, of which the Volunteer Component is 16,000 and the National Service Component is 35,000.

Added to this there will be an annual intake of 29,250 National Servicemen, so that by the end of 1953 we should have 67,000 National Servicemen in the Citizen Forces, exclusive of the Volunteer Component.

We also have a Cadet Corps of 35,000 and Women's Army Auxiliary components of the Regular Army and the C.M.F.

The Army of today is organized to provide:—

- A Field Force for operations at home or abroad as may be required.
- Garrison Forces for local defence of Australia against raids and for internal security tasks, including protection of those vulnerable points which are an Army responsibility.
- A Command, training, and maintenance organization to ensure the correct and efficient functioning of the above forces, to raise and train such Expeditionary Forces as may be required in war, and, in addition, to provide facilities for any Allied Forces which we may agree to provide from Australia.

During this financial year the Government has provided a record appropriation of £200,000,000 for Defence, of which the Army's allocation is £75m. Of this amount, nearly £25m. will be expended this year on new equipments, arms and ammunition, clothing and general maintenance stores.

The training of our Army of today is conducted on the most modern and up to date lines, to instil into our officers and men those

soldierly qualities of self-reliance, toughness, alertness and self-discipline that will fit them for battle both as individuals and as members of their sub-units, units and formations.

For the training of officers we have supplemented the output of this College by the Officer Cadet School, which will give us an annual output of 150 junior leaders.

The emphasis in the Army today being on skilled tradesmen, we have introduced our own Apprentices School, which is designed to produce approximately 100 fully qualified tradesmen each year.

Added to these innovations, we have many other schools such as the Australian Staff College—School of Tactics and Administration and Schools for all separate arms of the Services, including the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers' Training Centre. We are also training parachutists, and pilots for aerial observation, which in themselves are a very far cry indeed from the pre-war era.

It will be seen, therefore, that no effort is spared, nor expense for that matter, in keeping the Army up to date and abreast of modern and scientific developments.

But the Army, in whatever favourable circumstances we may now see it, can only fulfil its true purpose if our industrial potential is so organized in peace that instant expansion will be possible in an emergency, so that a maximum degree of self-reliance will be conferred on our Armed Forces. This, of course, is the situation today.

And it is this vital change in the conception of our responsibilities, together with the obligation for service overseas that rests upon the Army today, which has made it possible for Australia in its own sovereign right, to enter into tripartite agreements with the United States and New Zealand through the Pacific Pact, and with New Zealand and Great Britain in respect to Malaya and South-East Asia.

The Pacific Pact, far from weakening in any way the close ties of kinship which bind Australia to the other members of the British Commonwealth, will, I am quite sure, add to them an important and friendly association with our Pacific ally, the United States of America.

Our obligations to the cause of the United Nations are manifest by our contribution of two battalions of the Regular Army, which are now fighting alongside other British Commonwealth troops with the United Nations Forces in Korea.

There is no need for me to dwell upon the achievements of our troops in Korea—they have earned our warmest appreciation and gratitude for the manner in which they have brought honour and distinction to the Commonwealth.

I might add here that the facility with which these troops were specially trained and equipped for the difficult conditions of the Korean front demonstrates that we have gone a long way towards achieving our goal of self-dependability.

I would like to conclude by saying that whatever the future may hold, it is certain that Australia will be called upon to accept ever increasing responsibility for her own security and defence, for co-operation

within the British Commonwealth, and in the wider sphere of the cause of the United Nations for the preservation of world peace.

The future of our Army, therefore, will be one of increasing importance; and it may well be called to greater tasks and responsibilities than ever before in the history of our country.

I am sure it will not be found wanting.

Marx and Nietzsche imagined that by such simple expedients as the elimination of the top-dog, a desirable state of affairs could be attained. As put into practice by Lenin and Stalin, the theories of Marx have filled the world with more pitiless top-dogs, and the theories of Nietzsche, as put into practice by Hitler, produced a far greater number of piteous and miserable under-dogs than they were originally intended to eliminate.

Ray Campbell in "Light on a Dark Horse".

COMMUNISM and the AMF

The first of a series of articles prepared by the General Staff to draw the attention of the AMF to the subversive attack which is constantly being directed at the armed services of the democratic powers, and to the necessity for taking appropriate measures to counter it.

THE object of this article is to present briefly the current aims of the Australian Communist Party in relation to the AMF and to outline certain methods which may be adopted by the Party to further those aims. This information will serve as a background for officers of the AMF who, from time to time, may be consulted by the soldier about such matters.

The Theory of Communism.

The important point in the Communist theory is that man lives in a community and thus the mass of the people is the source of all right, all law and all human relationship.

According to Marx, whose teachings have been embraced by Stalin, there is no God, and all religion, whether it be Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or any other form of Divine worship, is a delusion and a fraud. Similarly, all the teachings of Christianity are wrong and our code of living, as it concerns morality, standards of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, justice and injustice, is meaningless and made only for the exploitation of others.

Communists claim their theory can be put into practice by the adoption of a system whereby—

(a) The community is the sole owner of all means of production, distribution and exchange;
(b) Private enterprise is abolished and replaced by an arrangement under which all members of the community give according

to their ability, and are remunerated according to their worth;

(c) All family life, as implied by private ownership of property, is abolished and replaced by community life under which no one individual owns anything.

Communists claim that after the introduction of this Utopia, dictatorship will vanish, class hatred will cease and all people will work together in harmony.

Is this theory workable? Let us consider some of its implications.

The members of a true Communist state would need to set aside all ambition, all self-expression and all individualism; this is contrary to human nature. Even a Communist state must have leadership, and so a community would inevitably have its dictators, but no one would have the right to question their actions, as is possible in a democracy. As there would be no religion, a Communist State leader would be interpreting a- man-made code under which all existing laws and standards are redundant and he would therefore need to possess qualities which are seldom found in human beings. Finally, the renunciation of religion by the Communist State would obviously appeal to man's baser instincts, with the result that all standards of decency as we know them, would cease to exist, because they are not part of the Communist theory.

The Aim of Communism.

For its fanatical devotees, Communism has the value of a religion for it gives life a sense of purpose. This purpose is the establishment of a better world with the creation of a world-wide community under the control of the Kremlin.

This aim is to be achieved by the projection of Communism into the Free World by means of indirect attack (world-wide propaganda methods), external attack (support of the cold war, for example in Korea, French Indo-China and Malaya) and internal attack.

Communist methods for internal attack follow more or less the same pattern in all countries. Firstly, the theory is introduced by means of books, the press, lectures and films. Secondly, an organisation is formed in the country concerned and operations to prepare the country for the ultimate overthrow of control are recommended. These operations may take the form of the promotion of strikes and the consequent slowing down of production; the discreditation of persons and governments hostile to Communism; the creation of enmity between individuals; the careful selection and indoctrination of well educated professional people of the type who are open to subversion with a view to their employment as future Party executives, or, in other words, the establishment of an espionage network for use prior to and during a war; by "inside work," the deterioration of the armed forces of the country and all institutions upholding law and order, by incorporating secret agents in their midst.

It is the last-mentioned method which is of most interest to the armed forces—the undermining of service efficiency. Let us examine this method in more detail, in particular its application to the AMF.

Communist Intentions in Relation to the AMF.

The current intentions of the Communist Party in relation to the AMF are believed to be:

- The employment of indoctrinated regular soldiers of all ranks, as agents for spreading Communism;
- The infiltration into the Army of personnel from outside sources, for sabotage duties at the right time, and to obtain classified information;
- The subversion of young soldiers, including National Service trainees;
- The disparagement of the Army and its senior officers by all possible means, through the media of propaganda, pamphlets, speakers, rumours, etc.;
- The establishing of a Communist cell in each unit, which will include officers and senior NCOs;
- The lowering of morale in units by means of encouraging discontent and the consequent lowering of unit efficiency;
- Attempts to turn officer and other rank relationships from that of leaders and men to one of pure social class distinction.

The Subversion of a Soldier to Communism.

There are four main stages in the subversion of a soldier to Communism.

Selection of the Victim. The rank of the prospective victim may vary from that of private to that of a senior officer, selection being dependent upon the victim's present or ultimate use to the ACP as a source of classified information, as an agitator, as a disseminator of propaganda or as a recruiting officer for further victims. He may be selected, too, because he has some characteristic or belief, which provides an easy starting point, for example, socialistic or pacifist leanings.

Approach to the Victim by the Cultivation of Friendship. The confidence of the victim must be gained before any attempt is made at indoctrination. Communist agents will try to gain membership in soldiers' social, sporting and mess committees with the aim of eventually gaining control and then using the influence so gained to achieve popularity and to gain the confidence of those whose opinions they hope to sway. Invitations to homes and to discussion groups will follow, or the victim may become interested in Communist infiltrated youth or peace organisations. Women Communists may be used extensively in the approach to the male victim.

Indoctrination. This is the most vital, yet perhaps the most subtle, part of the whole process. During normal conversations or during debates or group discussions, subjects are introduced by Communists. These subjects, at first meeting innocent enough in themselves, are used as a means for the introduction of Communist ideas and arguments. Once some of these ideas are firmly planted in the victim's mind, he is encouraged to talk about them as though he were their originator. This panders to his ego. To help this "seed" germinate, Communist pamphlets and circulars may be introduced into the unit in many ways and at the right time to foster discussion along the required lines.

Development from the Indoctrination Stage. Once the seeds have germinated or even once they have

been sown, the speed and intensity of the development process will be governed by the characteristics and status of the victim and by the nature of the task for which he is to be used. The usual practice is to encourage the victim to carry out some small or unimportant task on behalf of the party. Once this is achieved, it is difficult for the man to turn back and he is systematically pushed further into the mire and away from his original loyalty.

The process of subversion may be a long one, but once subverted, the victim is never let go. Soldiers who are "anti-everything" are easy meat for the Communists, but they are poor human material and the Party aspires to something better. The fantastic thing about the whole matter is that the subversion of many otherwise sound, intellectual people is achieved by harping on the so-called ultimate aims of the Communist theory—the setting up of an Utopian State.

The Counter-Attack.

It is a well-known principle that every commander is responsible for the security of his unit, but it is frequently forgotten that this includes security to attack from within. To achieve a high standard of internal security, it is necessary for the commander to ensure that all members of his unit are alert to the dangers outlined above; in other words, that the security education of all ranks is well advanced.

The Unit Security Officer must be particularly alive to the necessity for the counter-indoctrination of the members of the unit and he should receive the unstinted support of all officers of the unit. If there is a unit chaplain, he can help greatly with his advice to members of the unit, should he be approached on personal matters relevant to this subject.

As a means of self-protection against subversion, there are three things a soldier can do. He can maintain his own personal integrity and loyalty and can encourage others to do the same. If he is approached by another soldier or civilian, whom he believes to have subversive intent, or if he hears or sees anything which he considers may be subversive, he must report the matter at the first available opportunity to the Unit Security Officer or any officer of the unit. If he receives any subversive literature, he should hand it over (together with wrappings and envelopes) to the Unit Security Officer, giving particulars of time, place and method of receipt. If a soldier does these three things, then the Communist is defeated before anything is achieved.

Conclusion.

The threat is a real one, for the aim of Communism has already been achieved in many countries. Mr. Churchill writes: "Communism is not only a creed, it is a plan of campaign." Other highly respected leaders consider it a form of psychological warfare. To be forewarned should be to be forearmed!

Anti-Fighter or Anti-Bomber ?

Captain M. Harrison, Army HQ, Eire.

EXPERIENCE, and the lack of it, are the two dominant factors now determining the types of fighter aircraft needed for home defence in the future. The trends in design and performance, expressed in fighter types, differ as between the United States and Britain, because the needs of the two allies are based on different appreciations of the same problem. The problem is simply how best to defend the homeland—the most vital operation of all major wars—against vertical assault. The subjection of the homeland is now, as it always has been, the main objective in all wars, except the so-called "limited objective wars," for the homeland represents the reservoir —the means to fight. Subjugate the homeland and the fight is over.

It will immediately come to mind that the relative sizes of the two countries named, the huge mass of the United States as against the relatively small area of the British island, will constitute a major factor in considering the problem. This factor can, in fact, be greatly played down in favour of one not so obvious but more difficult to reduce to a plain statement. It revolves around British estimation of what they can expect, based on their experience of two world wars, versus American estimates of what they can expect based on no experience whatsoever except the fragmentary knowledge of what the Russians can, perhaps, do by way of attacking the American homeland.

The British know their problem in nearly all its aspects—population reaction, etc.; it will be the same as previously, only more so. The Americans do not know exactly what to expect either of the American people or of Russian aircraft.

Early in World War II, at the period of the Battle of Britain, for instance, British Fighter Command was controlled by, and so integrated with, radar-equipped ground organisation that its few fighters were enabled to cope with the great numbers of German aircraft sent over to deliver the coup-de-grace to a community which had very lately witnessed the disintegration of its land forces at Dunkirk. Initially, the German pattern of assault was by bombers closely protected by fighters in the ratio of one to three. The superior radar intelligence of the British could so dispose its fighters as to be ready when the

—*From "Irish Defence Journal."*

Luftwaffe showed up. This baffling accuracy forced on Goering a change in plan whereby one half the usual fighter escort would closely protect the bombers. The remaining fighter strength was deployed in a directly offensive role characterized by free-lance attacks against British fighters. At the same time the German bomber force was reduced by half. This tactic assured to the bombers the same ratio of close escort while freeing a large number of fighters for their attack role.

By employing this new pattern Goering succeeded in a few weeks in placing British Fighter Command in the position that losses were greater than replacements from production. The ME109's were not as good as the Hurricanes and Spitfires but there were too many—so many that the escorted bombers frequently found their targets.

British Conception.

Here then appears the key to the British viewpoint; that an air assault will come in the form of bombers heavily escorted by fighters which must first be eliminated before the bombers can be attacked. The role of British fighters must be that of anti-fighters primarily. Essential characteristics are better manoeuverability and higher service ceiling than those of the probable enemy. That the anti-fighter exists—if only in prototype—is apparent in the G A 5 (The Javelin). A two-seater, it will be radar-guided; powered by two of the world's most powerful engines, she will fly at supersonic speeds to intercept, probably well-clear of the home island—an important consideration now when one bomber can destroy so much more in one sortie than squadrons could previously achieve in weeks, and when an atom bomb loosed on almost any area of Britain could do much damage, the country being so densely populated and highly industrialized.

Nothing is known of the armament intended for the G A 5, but if the standard is to be adhered to she will mount four cannon. It is improbable that she will mount rockets for her primary role, unless these be built into the fuselage or wings. Designed to waylay fighters under any conditions, she will cope easily with fighter-bombers, be well able for the best-known jet bombers and play ducks and drakes with any piston types. Her tactics may well be conventional—the swift climb to station, higher than the enemy formations, selection of target and best route down to the kill.

Russian Limitations.

The trend in America is different, one reason being that, so far as is known, no fighter yet developed can fly from Russian bases as escort to attacking bombers. Worthwhile targets in the United States can therefore, be found only by bombers flying alone and, so far as information goes on Russian long-range types, incapable of the return journey to the home base. Since there will be no fighter screen interposed between bombers and their interceptors the problem resolves itself into producing a fighter fit to neutralize bombers—an anti-bomber. Now the Americans are very bomber-conscious. Being the victims of their own advertising, they cannot help but attribute to Russian bombers the wonderful capacity for performance and destruction which they have attributed to their own

B.36. To date, the Russians have not indicated that they have anything approaching the quality of the B.36, but they apparently have produced atom bombs before anyone thought they could. It follows then that the American anti-bomber must be capable of forestalling attacks by Russian B.36 types—very fast, high-altitude, self-defending carriers of not one only, but a cargo of atom bombs. As the Americans improve on their strategic bomber types (for instance, their B.52 all-jet prototype) they will feel, as a consequence, that Russia may be doing likewise, aided by espionage or imported genius. The result is that no effort can be spared to improve still further America's fighter types.

Complicating the problem is a further consideration—psychological this time—and that is the civilian reaction to aerial bombing.

A fundamental of the Communist creed is the tenet that the state is all, the individual nothing. Civil defence in Russia is as a consequence an instrument for the protection of industry and installations rather than a device for the reduction or elimination of casualties among citizens. An industrial area of the USSR devastated by American bombers can be roped off by the MVD, the state security army; those who panic or complain can be labelled with an appropriate crime and promptly eliminated. The structure of government is such that there is no appeal to authority, no way in which the population can express its reaction.

What the American civilian reaction to a similar calamity will be is anybody's guess. The affected area could conceivably become the ground zero of a panic wave succeeded by such reaction in government as to damage seriously the war effort. Individualism in America could produce this effect, either in whole or substantial part. Isolationism could very easily revive and win rapid support.

To sum up, then, mass hysteria is, in Russia, probable but controllable; in America probable.

Infallible Interceptor.

These two factors, their bomber consciousness and the human element, have made it incumbent on the American Air Force, to produce a fighter which will infallibly intercept and infallibly destroy enemy bombers—all of them. That the Air Force is not at all happy about this task is apparent from the various statements and articles issued recently. The kernel of these is that a very high proportion of raiders will be destroyed before damage can be done, but that inevitably, single enemy bombers will survive long enough to reach some worthwhile target.

The search for this machine is frustrating, for there is the ever-present worry that, like the better mouse-trap, it may fail to trap all the mice. Its essential characteristics can be defined in general terms. Service ceiling must be better than the B.36 or its all-jet equivalent. It must be much faster so that it can reach the bombers before they appear over populated areas. It must be so armed that it can destroy the machine at which it is aimed with the first burst, for such is the speed visualised, and such the bomber defensive armament, that no second chance may occur.

Too Much.

The question now is, just how far have the Americans gone towards producing this anti-bomber? The answer would appear to be reassuring. It is, however, posited in all seriousness that American aircraft policy is hindered by two factors, briefly expressed as too much money and too many geniuses.

One prototype with characteristics approximately adequate to the requirements is the "Starfire," or more correctly the F94C, a mid-1952 child of the early 1950 F.80 "Shooting Star," the first American operational jet. Another such prototype is the F.86D, a development of the very successful "Sabre," which is the mainstay of United States airpower in Korea at present.

A description of the "Starfire" (F94C) will cover the F86D since both are being tested with the same equipment and for the same role. (The main difference is that the F94C is a single-seater while the F86D carries both pilot and radar man. Overlooking the conventional characteristics, this 'plane is abnormal in that its electronic "brain," when switched on by the pilot, flies the 'plane to the target irrespective of darkness, fog or cloud and can keep contact despite the opposing bomber's evasion tactics. At the correct time for firing the electronics launch rockets. At present these rockets are of the conventional type, calibre 2.75 inches, fitted with proximity fuze. The number carried is twenty-four. The manner of their mounting is new as they are packed in a ring around the 'plane's nose inside the skin. A split-second before firing the apertures through which they will be released open, to close again once the rockets have been launched. The advantage of built-in rockets, as opposed to the underslung type, is that they do not make for drag with its consequent appreciable reduction in speed and manoeuvrability. These rockets are the sole armament of the F94C.

Here, then, is an attempt to bring into the air a punch which can be delivered infallibly and which, once delivered, will destroy the opponent for certain. It is presumed that while under human control the "Starfire" is taken to the most advantageous station and from there the electronic "brain" is allowed to take over. Gadgets which would guide the aircraft into the powerful defensive fire of a modern bomber would not make for economy either in aircraft or human lives. Another consideration is the limitations of the conventional rocket. Much information has been released recently on projectiles which, once in the air, will home on their targets. This homing characteristic is not a feature of the 2.75-inch air-to-air rocket. Further, they have a very low launching velocity which makes for very short effective range when used as air-to-air weapons. Electronics notwithstanding, the aircraft must come within range of the bomber's fire to ensure hits; furthermore, a bomber can weave just at the moment the rockets are launched and thus avoid being hit mortally.

The quality of the present armament would appear to be the limiting factor in this 'plane's efficiency, but the trend is obvious.

Russian Developments.

What of the Russians? Data which accrued during World War II

will give us some clues.

During that conflict the USSR had no strategic air force but they remedied the deficiency quickly and cheaply by copying some American B.29 types which had been engaged in the shuttle-bombing sorties over the Third Reich. The Russian TU.70 is, in fact, the B.29 in translation, so to speak. Before the advent of the TU.70 the most propagandized Russian machine was the "Stormovik," a hedge-hopping aircraft; little wonder, then, that the Communist authorities were impressed by American strategic bombing techniques. Very long-range, self-defending light machines, bombing from high altitudes, showed the power of the United States. It can be assumed that the Russians have shrewdly assessed the capabilities of the B.36—the standard American atom-bomber—and have oriented their fighter policy accordingly while bearing in mind the probability of more advanced bomber types.

Their problem is to develop an anti-bomber for home defence against 600 m.p.h. strato-bombers flying in formations which give complete defensive coverage. That there is a problem at all is, of course, sheer speculation. That they were backward in the air in 1946 is no guarantee that they will be equally backward in 1956; their espionage is notably excellent and their employment of German experts is acknowledged. Further, they are prone to secrecy and such pictures and data as are available are all too few. However, indications point to the existence of radar-equipped fighters in China.

If it be assumed that these more advanced types are MiG 15 developments, some deductions can be made based on knowledge of this latter aircraft. To judge from its continued appearance in large numbers in Korea and Manchuria, the MiG is the standard operational fighter, occupying the same relative position as the British Meteor and Vampire. Equipped with Rolls Royce "Nene" power unit, the Soviet machine has a service ceiling of 45,000 ft., which, in all probability, is sufficiently high in Russian estimation to combat the jet-assisted American B.36. The Russians are capable of producing better power units and, undoubtedly, are doing so in their usual mass-production fashion so that it must be conceded that their aircraft will be capable of effective interception.

Armament.

As to MiG armament, the number 15 carries one 37 mm. and two 20 or 25 mm. cannon which, in action against American "Sabres," have not distinguished themselves, due to an inadequate fire control system. It is acknowledged that the MiG should be better in performance and the best reason for its deficiency appears to be the one advanced here.

The more forward-looking MiG, then, equipped with a radar scanner and directed to its target by a ground control organization, will fail if the target be a machine, as good or better than the "Sabre"; but the B.36 is no "Sabre" for speed and manoeuvrability, its published speed being 435 m.p.h. MiG types, therefore, should be capable anti-bombers, quite conventional in all respects and typically lacking in instruments which, of their nature, do not lend themselves to mass-production.

An unconventional aspect of Soviet fighting theory, however, deserves mention since it does affect the picture of the air war. On the ground the Russians try to achieve a ratio of four to one in their favour. This concept of mass is also a feature of their artillery. Where they could choose time and place the ratio was achieved both in the air and on the ground. It can be taken for granted that, since they are perfectly well aware what the vital areas of the homeland are, they will try to compensate for what is lacking in the individual aircraft's performance by using swarms of machines: quantity to make up for quality.

The latest anti-bomber MiG massed in saturation numbers on the probable invasion airways seems to be the Soviet answer to the home defence problem.

Latest Weapon.

Even while the effort to evolve the ideal piloted aircraft for home defence continues unrelenting there comes creeping into the news information of other means to the same end. Ground-based guided missiles, the more precise and scaled-down progeny of Germany's huge offensive rocket, the V2—have been released, have homed to their targets in the air and have exploded by their own intelligence when within lethal range.

Is it here that protection should be sought against the bomber, or will the bomber, too, be rendered obsolete by some atom-powered, atom-armed robot which will have spread its destruction long before its meteor-like flight can be plotted or its approach detected?

The heavier this Napoleon trampled on the world, holding it tyrannously down, the fiercer would the world's recoil against him be, one day. Injustice pays itself with frightful compound interest.

Carlyle.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY

The AMF Gold Medal Essay Competition is held annually with the object of encouraging the study of military subjects, stimulating thought, and providing all ranks of the Australian Army with an opportunity to express their ideas in a useful and constructive way.

The subject for the 1952-53 competition is:—

The study of military history shows that, to a very considerable degree, success in war has usually gone to the side which has adapted its organisation and tactical methods to make the best use of the weapons and equipment available. Conversely, defeat can very often be traced to adherence to an organization and tactical ideas and methods which have been rendered obsolete by the development of new weapons and equipment.

At the present time the major powers are making every effort to develop new weapons and improve existing ones. For example, vast sums are being spent on the development of the atomic bomb and the means of delivering it to the target, guided missiles, aircraft, radar, and various other types of new military equipment.

Discuss the effects these developments are likely to have on the conduct of war in the next five years, and outline the organization and tactical methods which you consider necessary to make the best possible use of them.

The rules for the competition are:

The right to compete will be limited to officers and other ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

The essays should not exceed 10,000 words in length; they must be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate.

The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto, and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto written on the outside and his name and address inside.

The title and page of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

The judges may withhold award of the prize if in their opinion no essay reaches a sufficiently high standard.

The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, St. Kilda Road, Melbourne, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal Essay," and must reach him not later than 31st July, 1953.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CRITICAL YEARS. By General Baron Geyer von Schweppenburg.

From the point of view of Western civilization as a whole the supreme tragedy of World War II lies in the fact that the nett result of the struggle was to open the way to the advance of Russian Communist Imperialism. Even if few Allied statesmen foresaw this result, the fault does not rest with them. It rests squarely with Hitler and his henchmen who once again diverted German military power from its historic mission of guarding the eastern marches of Christendom.

BARON VON GEYR

In his book, General von Schweppenburg throws much light upon Anglo-German relations, and the relations between the German Army and Hitler's Government, in the years immediately prior to the war —the prologue to the tragedy—and upon events in Germany during the conflict. Anyone can be wise after the event, but von Schweppenburg was wise before the event. Those of his countrymen who held the reins of power refused to believe him; those who agreed with him were powerless to act.

General von Schweppenburg was the first German military attache to serve in London after World War I, and took up his appointment in 1933. His comments on his observations in the United Kingdom show much shrewdness, insight and knowledge. His reports were ignored by his superiors, partly because they did not want to hear the truth, partly because they were dazzled by the power they had already won.

Von Schweppenburg pointed out to his Government that despite the popular appeal of isolationism in America, the United States could not, in the final analysis, afford to see Britain conquered by Germany. In his efforts to warn his Government against the dangers of starting a war with Britain, he drew up an imaginary appreciation in which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff

presented to the British Cabinet a plan for the defeat of Germany. This appreciation demonstrated how Britain, with the aid of the Commonwealth and almost certainly of the United States, would finally succeed in a prolonged war.

Von Schweppenburg showed his appreciation to General Blomberg, the German Minister for War. Blomberg was irritated because he knew von Schweppenburg was right. He also knew that Hitler wished to hear only favourable reports, and he was unwilling to jeopardise his position by presenting an unfavourable one.

Nothing was done. The German General Staff, headed by sycophants, went along with the Nazis, and it soon became personally dangerous, as well as quite hopeless, for anyone to attempt to stop the rolling tide of ambition. Von Schweppenburg buried his appreciation in his garden, from whence it has been recovered for publication in his book. It is a remarkable forecast of the course events actually followed.

During the war von Schweppenburg commanded armoured formations in Russia and in France. Just before the Allies landed in Normandy he was Commander-in-Chief, Panzer Group West. He disagreed strongly with Rommel's intention to dribble in his armour in penny packets to defeat the Allies on the beaches, instead of holding it in reserve for a powerful blow when the main point of attack had been ascertained. Rommel had Hitler's ear, and von Schweppenburg was relieved of his command.

This book is a valuable contribution to the literature of World War II. One puts it down with regret, feeling that the author has filled in many of the gaps in the blank years in Germany after 1939.

VON RUNDSTEDT. By General Guenther Blumentritt.

Many thousands of words have been written to show that the German generals were not in favour of Hitler's invasion of Russia and that, in fact, the Fuhrer undertook the adventure despite their advice. Even if this is wholly true, one cannot help feeling that the generals, or at any rate those of them who have written biographies, acted at times like a lot of obstructionists.

For instance, according to General Blumentritt, von Rundstedt was bitterly opposed to the invasion of Russia. He was also opposed to "Operation Sea Lion"—the proposed invasion of England. Nor does he

Runstedt.

appear to have proposed any alternatives. Yet Hitler, riding the crest of a wave of almost phenomenal success, must have felt that it was no time for inaction and that his choice lay between an assault to the East or to the West. And the German General Staff cannot escape responsibility for misleading Hitler, for the intelligence they gave him on Russia's capacity to resist was very wide of the mark indeed.

General Blumentritt's book reveals that the General Staff's appreciation of the Allies' intentions for the invasion of Western Europe was equally faulty. They grossly exaggerated the strength of the Allied invasion forces, and in consequence regarded for some time the Normandy landings as a feint to draw away the German forces from the Calais area, where they expected the main effort to be made. They were, of course, assisted to this conclusion by the Allies' deception measures.

It is interesting to note that the author and von Rundstedt are convinced that Field Marshal Montgomery's plan in the autumn of 1944 for an all-out Allied offensive across the Aachen-Ruhr area on Berlin would have been the correct Allied strategy. The author considers it a miracle for the Germans that this plan was not adopted. In this he agrees with General Speidel who, in his book, "We Defended Normandy," classes the Allies' failure to follow Montgomery's plan with the "Miracle of the Marne" for the French in 1914.

"Von Rundstedt" is a useful book for the military student as it gives an informed picture of the war from the German point of view.

ALEXANDER OF TUNIS. By Norman Hillson. (W. H. Allen, London: Walter Standish and Sons, Sydney.)

For a long time it has been felt that the literature of World War II would be incomplete until someone produced a competent biography of Lord Alexander of Tunis. Even to soldiers Alexander has been a somewhat remote figure. The details of his conduct of the difficult Allied retreat through Burma are not well known to military students and his work as Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East has been overshadowed by the more spectacular Montgomery. Similarly his work as Allied Commander in Italy has been obscured by the dust and smoke of the battle in Western Europe.

One opened Mr. Hillson's book, therefore, with a keen feeling of anticipation, only to find that one's hopes were to be disappointed. If the author set out to reduce Lord Alexander to the typical likeness of

a more or less popular public figure he succeeded. But he succeeded in nothing else, for the portrait which emerges is not the portrait of a great soldier or a great statesman. Rather it is a vaguely impressionistic description of a typical example of the product of a particular segment of English society.

Nowhere does the book give a clear description of military situations, and in only one instance does it even hint at the clash of personalities and ideas which is one of the major problems with which any commander has to deal. According to the author, Alexander got on very well with General Joseph Stilwell, who was military adviser to Chiang Kai Chek and who commanded the Chinese forces in Burma during the Allied retreat. Anyone who has read Stilwell's extraordinary diary will feel that it was not so easy as Mr. Hillson makes out. If it was, then Alexander is the only man who ever achieved a hundred per cent. co-operation with Stilwell without agreeing absolutely and entirely with Stilwell's opinion. And even Mr. Hillson does not suggest that Alexander was so charming as all that.

This book is of little value to the military student. It is, however, light and entertaining reading, a good thing to take on a railway journey.