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Australian Army History Unit
16 July 2014

0120001261



AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



No. 43 DECEMBER, 1952

Notified in AAO's for 31st December, 1952

MILITARY BOARD

Army Headquarters,
Melbourne.

1/12/52

Issued by Command of the Military Board



Secretary to the Board

Distribution:

One per Officer and Cadet Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 43

December, 1952


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ARMY HEADQUARTERS
MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

Editor:

COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, ED (RL).

Staff Artist:

MR. CYRIL ROSS.

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Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps, and Reserve of Officers.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY

1952

Major C. L. Thompson,
58/32 Battalion (The Melbourne Rifles).

Major Thompson joined the CMF as a cadet in 1933, and served with the Melbourne University Regiment until 1938, when he was commissioned in the 58th Battalion. During World War II he served with the 7/14th Battalion in the Middle East and New Guinea, and was mentioned in despatches. After graduating from the Staff School in 1942, he held various staff appointments until the end of the war.

On the re-establishment of the CMF in 1948, Major Thompson became second-in-command of the Melbourne University Regiment, and in June, 1952, was transferred to the appointment of second-in-command of the 58/32nd Battalion. He graduated from the Melbourne University as a Bachelor of Commerce.

"Leadership is an art that can be successfully practised by anyone qualified to be a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. In the ultimate sense, leadership is not inherent; it depends upon traits which can be developed, and upon the application of techniques which can be learned. It is an art which can be acquired, cultivated and practised by anyone who possesses the mental and physical ability and the moral and ethical integrity expected of a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Developing this art is a continuing process which involves the practice of leadership traits and the understanding and application

of sound leadership principles and techniques."

—Extract from "Command and Military Leadership," US Army.

Bearing the above statement in mind, discuss the elements of military leadership, and suggest practical methods by which the leadership qualities of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Australian Army may be fully developed.

Introduction.

Much has been written on leadership. Almost every biography about the last war refers in some way to qualities of commanders,

their influences for good or otherwise, inspiration and decision. But any study of such work is of no value other than historic, unless we can learn from the experiences portrayed and implement their teachings in current training.

It is agreed that leadership is an art that can be successfully practised by anyone qualified to be a commissioned or non-commissioned officer, but it is considered that not everyone is qualified to rise to equal heights of command. Rather, it is opportunities for the development of those with potentialities of leadership that is the crux of the problem so that the fullest dividend is obtained from each member of the Service. At various steps up the ladder of success, commanders will eventually reach the platform from which they climb no further.

There is no easy way to learn leadership. This paper can be only a guide; one more drop in the ocean of literature on the subject. Leadership is an art, not a science. It is experience and maturity of outlook that provide the best tutors. However, there are certain elements upon which leadership is moulded. It is the purpose of this essay to discuss the rudiments, and then outline positive steps which could be taken by the Army to help develop those personnel with potentialities of leadership.

Leadership is something that is intensely individual. Each commander will determine his own technique, but in whatever degree he blends the ingredients he must portray his leadership through his personality.

What is Leadership?

What is leadership? It is the art of leading. Why then are some

people chosen to lead and others to follow? Because the individual selected has certain qualities about his personality that will enable him to be followed and, at the same time, inspire confidence. As an invariable rule, the one main element is character. From a Service point of view, it is essential that leaders have qualities to inspire those under them to the highest performance of duty under all conditions.

At the outset let one point be made clear. Leadership is not simply the art of making someone carry out a task which he does not want to perform. True leadership means inspiration and teamwork; qualities which are mental in origin. The true leader is one who can frame an attitude of mind in his subordinates so that in return he obtains one hundred per cent. co-operation. The easiest part of leadership is to give orders. The supreme test is whether subordinates can, and are willing, to continue with their duties without constant supervision and at the same time always give of their best.

Leadership is developed by thought, by training, and by practice. Once the individual can be awakened with aspirations for leadership it is possible for the Army to help.

The Art of Command.

No paper on leadership would be complete without some reference to the art of command. To accept the principle that command is an art, one must be prepared to recognise that it is something far more fundamental than the giving of orders. Military authority is the right of exercising command in the manner prescribed by Military Law. But

the success of a commander in exercising his authority will depend upon the tact with which he guides his authority. The aim is to obtain a cheerful and willing obedience, not a slavish and servile following. It is as well for any commander who finds that he has been misunderstood to look first for the fault in himself. Sir Ian Hamilton's formula for commanders was as follows:—

"Firstly, by being better up in your subject than your men, this is intellectual superiority. Secondly, by being ready to undergo greater physical discomforts or danger. Thirdly, by realising that obedience paid to you, if not earned by your own individual ability, accrues from the rank you hold."

There is the false type of leader who thinks that the true aspect of leadership consists in driving others. He makes a fuss about leading, creates a disturbance and exerts sudden pressure and adopts drastic measures. Often this type of leader succeeds, but the cost is usually very high. Eventually it will be found that this man is difficult to understand; has no settled policy, his orders are inconsistent and confused, he tries to bluff his way through when his methods are questioned and always looks for a scapegoat. Drive in an impersonal manner and the response will be impersonal.

Elements of Leadership.

The elements of leadership are just the same whether commanding a section or an army. The difference is one of degree and, in the case of larger responsibilities, a reserve of some supplementary elements which are referred to later in this essay.

One of the best and most incisive articles on leadership is that written by Field Marshal Slim and published in the Australian Army Journal for February, 1951. He defines leadership as a mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion. As a starting point, Field Marshal Slim maintains that leadership requires personality, and in that personality there must be the following qualities:—

- (a) Courage
- (b) Will-power
- (c) Initiative
- (d) Knowledge.

It is now convenient to discuss these qualities.

Courage. All other authorities agree that courage is a fundamental of leadership; not only the possession of physical courage on the battlefield, but also moral courage.

Physical courage is something that usually comes to light only in battle or in times of accident, but it can wisely be assumed that if a commander has a supply of moral courage, his physical courage will not be found wanting. Moral courage will usually be discernible in times of peace. It is the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and to strive to do the right thing even though it means conflict with others who hold different views. A person who has a liberal supply of moral courage is usually referred to as having both feet on the ground.

Moral courage is closely related to morale, and as moral courage is so important it is advisable to pause now and refer briefly to morale.

Good morale means that the individual finds satisfaction in doing a

particular job. Good morale is easy to find when things are going well, but it is in times of stress and tension that the true test is made. To stand the stress of test it is usually accepted that good morale has certain foundations, namely:—

Spiritual—that is, a faith in a cause, whether that faith be religious, ethical, or both.

Mental—that is, a belief that the object of the job now being done is really attainable.

Material—a belief in that progress or a sincere attempt is being made to improve the existing situation.

It is the courageous example that inspires, and men will follow a man who accepts personal risk in the line of duty. That is why, in practice, moral courage is a force that drives men to do certain things which may not be popular, but in the end turn out to be correct. Moral courage requires practice and tact, especially in the handling of awkward situations.

The quality of courage may excuse the absence of some of the other elements of leadership yet to be discussed in this essay.

Will-power. Field Marshal Slim tersely states that it is often easy to know what to do: the test is to get it done. This surely is a test of leadership. Will-power does not simply mean a bull-like attitude to all jobs so that, come what may, the job is done. Rather, it is the judicious blending of professional skill with determination and drive. It means that a person must be big enough to keep a flexible approach to his problem if a changed plan is necessary, but whatever opposition

is encountered, the individual continues to strive to see the job through to successful completion.

It is well to offer a word of warning in that, when it is wise and prudent to make a change in a method of approach to reach a desirable goal, plumb obstinacy is a liability. The test of the true leader is to have such a firm grip of the mind that he can balance the need of flexibility with that of determination.

Initiative. Initiative is the power to act independently when the situation calls for independent action. It is usually a question of judgment and common sense. Initiative can only be exercised when the soldier has that degree of professional knowledge about his job that he can accurately appreciate what has to be done.

Both in peace and war, it is usually a matter of thinking ahead. More often than not it is a matter of foresight. Initiative is usually based on that quality of courage that exerts a leader to grapple with situations which have never occurred in his previous training.

Often the quality of common sense is mistaken for initiative.

Knowledge. A good leader knows his command down to the smallest detail. He acquires the knowledge by constant and enthusiastic study. The first essential in acquiring knowledge of one's job is to have a sincere desire to want to learn. It is not simply a matter of study, but of learning by mistakes, accepting responsibility, and at all times being on the look-out to widen one's military professional skill.

Knowledge is not confined to knowing how to handle weapons,

mastering tactics or carrying out large scale operations. It also implies a knowledge of the art of handling men. A thorough knowledge of military duties is not sufficient if a potential leader cannot handle men. It is this ability which quickly marks people out as leaders.

Up to the present, this paper has discussed four outstanding elements of leadership. It is now advisable to supplement the list with qualities which are, at times, no less important. The elements of leadership, like the principles of war, are a guide to conduct. In some cases one of the elements may be so predominant in a personality that the others are dwarfed into insignificance, but generally speaking the true leader has that skill of being able to highlight a particular element according to the demands of the situation.

Additional Qualities.

The foregoing has attempted to confine the elements of leadership under four headings, but there are some basic influences which give the polish to first-class leadership. They are:—

Enthusiasm. Sincere enthusiasm which is tempered with determination is contagious. It is an excellent stimulus for loyalty to one's superiors if leaders are able to create that happy atmosphere of spontaneous enthusiasm.

Ability to Pick Subordinates. The quality of being able to pick subordinates who can be integrated into the team and in whom one can channel one's personality is a "must" for all leaders. It is not simply the task of picking good subordinates but rather of selecting subordinates who will be suited for the particular task you have in hand. Common

sense and judgment are necessary, also a degree of clairvoyance because every junior selected should also be considered from the point of view of his subsequent promotion to more senior rank. Subordinates must have their leader's trust.

Man-Management. Human understanding is the way to successful man-management and a complete selflessness in oneself.

Man-management is something much more than observing the rules for "March Discipline" and allocating fatigues. It means being on the alert to better the lot of your men but without pampering them. The welfare of subordinates means that you should know and understand their personal problems and that they, in turn, can count on your help. Above all, sound man-management means that the leader does not "mess his men around" unnecessarily. In all things a commander must treat his men as kinsmen and they will readily respond to follow him through thick and thin.

Knowing What to Say. Good humour and cheerfulness in spite of fatigue is a precious aid to leadership. The right remark at the right time can do more to dispel gloom than most other aids. Knowing how to be firm though tactful, how to encourage without overdoing it; all are valuable adjuncts in a leader's personality.

Some Examples of Leaders.

At this stage it is of interest to consider some practical and intimate sketches of leadership.

Field Marshal Earl Wavell was a keen and skilful critic of leadership. He believed that some of the main

principles that governed the relationship of successful commanders with their men were as follows:—

“A commander must have character, which simply means that he knows what he wants and has the courage and determination to get it. He should have a genuine interest in, and a real knowledge of, humanity. He must have a spirit of adventure, a touch of the gambler in him. A commander must keep strict, though not necessarily stern, discipline. He should give praise where praise is due. He should never indulge in sarcasm and always tell his soldiers the truth except when necessary to conceal plans.”

Wavell's study of General Allenby is of vital concern to all students of military leadership. Allenby was a commander of great perception. He had an unusual range of interests and knowledge outside of his profession. Allenby possessed absolute courage, both physical and moral, and was able to act quickly and coolly in danger. His loyalty to his superiors went beyond deeds and he trusted his subordinates. But he lacked a measure of self-control, a little humanity, and the power to communicate enthusiasm and inspire his disciples. According to Wavell, Allenby never quite realised that men are governed through the emotions rather than through the intelligence.

Take the case of David Beatty, Admiral of the British Fleet. It is reported of him that his magnetic personality had the uncanny quality of getting through to all those whom he commanded, and drawing from each one confidence and admiration. He had the rare facility of combining decision with vision in a flash,

yet he was neither impetuous nor rash. Above all he possessed dauntless courage, both moral and physical. At all times he was ever mindful of the welfare of those he commanded. No one could live in continual touch with him without being affected by his force of character and fearlessness, nor fail to feel his own confidence and determination strengthened by his contact.

As a contrast to the foregoing observations of successful leaders, it is well to examine the type of man we find as a leader at the other end of the ladder. Here is a picture of the junior officer, Captain Treacy, M.C., of the 2/14 Battalion, who was killed at Gona, as seen through the eyes of that Unit's Official Historian:—

“He was all that a man could wish to be: kind, brave, sincere, rich in common sense and sublimely unselfish. Completely efficient on duty, he enjoyed life to the full at other times. He understood and loved his men and they understood and worshipped him.”

Another random example of leadership is found in the same history in a study of two section leaders:—

“He was a quiet, serious minded dairy farmer, churchman, teetotaler and non-smoker. His steadiness, courage and quiet determination were invaluable to the Unit.”

and

“Rough in speech and lacking the radiance of education, he had a force of character that combined judgment with courage. He understood his men and his men respected him for he was always consistent. When he was given

an order to carry out he would accept fully the responsibility and see it through till the job was completed. A recalcitrant member of his section was liable for private punishment rather than a charge sheet."

Whilst the above examples have been along academic lines, a natural corollary to the elements of leadership, it is interesting to note the thumbnail comparison that Wavell makes of two outstanding leaders; T. E. Lawrence of World War I and Orde Wingate of the last War:—

"Both had high powered minds which drove to the heart of the problem, cutting through conventional practice. Both were widely read and had retentive memories and both had the gift of clear and forcible expression in speech or in the written word. Both had consuming energy in action. Lawrence was more resourceful than Wingate and had a keen sense of humour."

Another approach to an example of a great soldier is found in the observations made by Major General De Guingand on Field Marshal Montgomery. He writes of Montgomery as:—

"... imperturbable temperament with an ability to get himself across. This coupled with his profound knowledge of soldiering made him an inspiration to all who had contact with him. He radiated supreme confidence. Some of the other qualifications of his character which all leaders of high rank must especially possess are:—

Clarity of mind and expression.
Dogged persistence in those things that matter.

Physically brave and able to avoid oscillation in reaching a plan.
Be a good psychologist."

Training in Leadership.

Without a doubt the training of leaders in peacetime for command in war is the greatest single task that confronts an army. It is easy enough to dismiss the problem, for it is truly a problem, by simply saying that it only requires imagination and judicious training. At this stage it is well to remind ourselves that the purpose of the essay is to outline the positive steps and detail a purposeful policy which our Army might use.

In peacetime we train for war, and to succeed in that task training should be as near to war conditions as possible. But that is not usually practicable because, for one thing, the mental approach is different; and secondly, because a man acts one way in make-believe training, there is no guarantee that he will measure up in times of battle. Nevertheless, there is no gainsaying that whenever possible, training must be as realistic as possible, and perhaps, even more severe.

The answer to our problem, I believe, will not be found in any one single approach. Rather, by a series of events and reactions it is possible to gauge the trend of a person's ability to command. In a nutshell, the problem of training for leadership in peace is fundamentally the training or development of character, and, secondly, being placed in a job where a soldier's abilities can be utilised.

If the problem of leadership could be resolved in a code, then leadership would be an exact science. It is the very nature of leadership as

an art that makes it impossible to lay down a set of rules. The art of leadership is in knowing what ingredients to use.

It is believed that there may be certain specific instances when Regular personnel may require treatment different from the Citizen soldier. Obviously, some of the suggestions made therein may suit the professional soldier more often than his CMF counterpart, but to admit a different set of "do's and don't's" for each class of person is to admit two different kinds of leadership. On the contrary, the development of leadership is likely to fail if we do not accept the fact that each candidate for leadership is an individual. Training for leadership is distinctly an individual problem bound up with character and ability.

Perhaps it is indicative of our times that we automatically expect someone else to do the things which we ourselves should do. The help that the Army can give in developing leadership is only limited. The Army can set the stage and assist, but the main stimulus must come from within the individual himself. Jointly, much can be done to reach the desired goal.

It is not proposed to discuss the elementary training in leadership as given in the normal training of recruits, nor the cultivation of leaders by the usual routine methods. Rather, this paper attempts to highlight additional aids which the Army itself, and in some cases the soldier himself, can adopt.

The writer assumes that the conditions of pay, service and welfare which exist in the Army are satisfactory to its members and that in

all respects the potential leader's attitude of mind to army life is pleasant and stimulated.

The age of romance may be dead, but the age of hero-worship still lives. If the Army is seeking leaders, it is presumed that its existing leaders are able to inspire a following, and that junior personnel especially can have direct access to immediate seniors. In no way should "The Staff" be permitted to come between the soldier and the commander. It is believed, therefore, that in these days of ever increasing administrative problems and the issue of orders and instructions by means of the duplicating machine, the art of the personal touch should not be lost. Command in the Army is such a personal matter that every leader or would-be leader must be alerted to the advantages of the personal touch.

Every leader should be aware of the need to keep the Army going as a living organism, and to do this leaders must be constantly on the watch to bring on promising juniors. In other words, the young soldier of whatever rank must be encouraged and brought on. In fact, when he is singled out, he virtually should be treated as an individual and given as near to personal tuition as possible. The intimate training of leaders begins at the platoon level. This is the lowest level at which officer and man has direct contact. It is precisely the relationship of form-master and pupil.

"Training for War," Chapter X, is devoted to the main theme of this essay, therefore, the ideas put forward in the following paragraphs are supplementary and complimentary to the suggestions made in the Manual.

Development of Character.

Character is a term given to the qualities which show our reactions to life. A strong character shows his strength by his reactions to both favourable and unfavourable circumstances, and by maintaining his own poise, his own individuality, and by gaining increased strength. A weak character shows his weakness in succumbing to unfavourable conditions, or giving way to unusually favourable circumstances. A weak character cannot withstand either success or failure.

Training in character can be aided by such activities that develop self-control, judgment and co-operation. Suggestions made in the following pages of this essay have been designed to this end. However scientific the approach to the problem of leadership development may be, the candidate for command must never lose sight of the one cardinal factor that leadership is a quality of character and human understanding. Compassion is the measure of command. As the leader develops he will find himself shrinking in his personal identity and taking on a quality of selflessness. Through the warmth of the respectful demeanour of subordinates will come the unspoken message that his men believe in him and look to him as their leader.

The Army can do much to aid a potential leader in developing character. One of the best ways to help is to give potential leaders responsibility and set reasonable tasks which require them to exercise their initiative. The moral side of a person's character is probably moulded before he joins the Army but, by example, its own leaders can do much to guide and improve the

younger man. Ability to trust subordinates is a gem of leadership which in turn does much to bring out the best in the junior.

In short, the Army makes its contribution to character by developing a soldier's self-reliance, confidence in himself, and dignity of his purpose; by setting a high standard of conduct, just discipline, pride in turnout, and in an honest code of living.

Professional Approach.

Every leader should be encouraged to regard his work as something more than a job. It is the duty of the Army to inspire its members with the desire to regard their jobs as a career and a calling that will require consummate skill. Opportunities for practising the art of command do not exist in peace time to the same degree as in war. The British Army, particularly over the last 100 years, has had the opportunity of sending its members overseas for duty in frontier wars, and to take part in garrison duties. This has given a realistic approach to soldiering with the result that many young men have had the opportunity of getting first-hand experience in the art of command. It is suggested, therefore, that the Australian Army should endeavour to arrange a liberal programme of overseas exchange service with United Nations' Armies, so that our representatives can obtain the feel of working under strange conditions. Service in Korea is certainly providing the Australian Army with an opportunity for management which would be very hard to replace, but when this war concludes the need for exchange service, and the benefits of travelling into new lands, will be very necessary.

In Australia, especially for Regular soldiers, there should be an extensive programme of inter-Services exchange duty so that Army personnel can meet their counterpart in the Navy and Air Force. Selected personnel should also be exchanged for duty in the other Units of the Army so that they too could gain an extra knowledge and a contact with new personalities.

Beginning of a Leader .

As soon as practicable a young soldier should be interrogated by his Commanding Officer for assessment of his qualities of leadership. It may not be possible to determine there and then the worth of the soldier, but the most important thing is that contact has been made. As such personal contacts would place a big burden on a Commanding Officer, it is suggested he appoint an officer in his Unit as a Guidance Officer. Whatever detailed method is adopted by a Unit to follow-up leadership ability, the first requirement is for the young soldier to realise that someone is taking an interest in his advancement.

The day has arrived when the time-honoured methods of promotion by means of waiting for vacancies has gone. Modern war requires the Army to select, train and promote in the shortest of time. From the Army's side, it must have a clear idea of what it is after. The essential basis of good selection and placement is a knowledge of the requirements of the various jobs. Many mistakes will be made, but these will be small in comparison with the success achieved. Provisional promotion should be encouraged for the up-grading of junior officers and temporary rank for

worthwhile non-commissioned officers. It is only by giving people the job to do that their capabilities can be ascertained, and if they are doing the job they should be entitled to receive the pay which it carries.

Especially is the need great for bold advancement in the step from Corporal to Sergeant and from Lieutenant to Captain and Captain to Major. It is not suggested, however, that the existing system of examinations should be altered. The preparation for examination is an interesting challenge and a necessary assurance that candidates learn their work. But, there is no reason why a suitable potential leader should not carry out the duties of the next rank, with the distinction of that grading, whilst studying for his examinations.

To carry out a programme of rapid advancement by the means suggested above, the Army should be prepared to stand by the judgment of Unit Commanders, and it will have to reduce the statutory period of time for which officers must serve in a particular rank before sitting for the next examination. For example, a Lieutenant must wait three years before advancing to Captain.

All Units should be permitted to carry a surplus of up to twenty per cent. of its officer and N.C.O. strength. It may mean that some leaders will not have troops to command, but this will be only a temporary phase and other interesting work could be found for them by their Commanding Officer.

In the "Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay," 1949, Lieutenant-Colonel Gittings stated that modern war placed certain requirements on the selection of leaders, namely:—

- (a) Modern war is global. This calls for a broadness of outlook and a knowledge of world affairs.
- (b) War is a "combined operation". Leaders must, therefore, appreciate and understand the other Services.
- (c) War inflicts a strain, both physical and mental. Some form of escape should be enjoyed.

It will be agreed that training in leadership is something that goes beyond the barrack square and the training field. Its ramifications are so wide that each leader is required to have a sound background of knowledge and be an expert in his own branch of the Service. This requires an education in fields of training beyond military subjects. It should be the responsibility of the Army to provide this extra learning if the potential leader is not equipped with the desired background. It is, however, more a problem of Army education for the Regular Army non-commissioned leader, since the CMF soldier will have little time for such a project. It is suggested, therefore, that sufficient Army Education personnel be appointed to Regular Army units to provide informative and interesting instruction in non-military subjects.

Non-Military Activities.

No mention will be made in this paper of the importance of the sporting side of army life, and how qualities of leadership are developed on the playing field and the benefits which accrue to all members from taking part in games. However, it is suggested that the Army could encourage extra activity in those

sports with a certain element of risk.

Formerly, to live dangerously seemed to be an essential prerequisite for a potential leader, but the days when such a state of society existed have ceased. For example, fifty years ago most British Regular officers participated in such sports as pig-sticking, fox hunting, and wild game hunting. The cost of participation in such "sports" limited the number who could participate, and in any case, the modern youth no longer has the same yearning for the sports that our grandfathers enjoyed.

Therefore, it is suggested that in its place, the Army should try to stimulate as a spare time hobby, interest in ski-ing, yachting, gliding and motor-bike riding. These sports are ideal in that they require judgment, concentration, power of organisation and a certain degree of technical skill. Area Commanders could perhaps be the initiating body for such a policy. Units in their turn, would form "clubs" to carry on the necessary sporting activity.

Obviously, any sporting programme encouraged by the Army should be that in which all ranks could take part. Naturally, it will cost money, but if the community is aroused to the importance of these sports, then the necessary funds should be forthcoming, and if the cost is too extensive, the Army could perhaps subsidise part of the expense, and the personnel participating, the remainder.

Debating on all topics, within and beyond Army groups, is also an important activity that will help members to develop powers of self-expression, bring them in contact

with new ideas, and generally develop freshness of outlook that a truly fertile mind commands.

Tactical Exercises.

At the earliest opportunity potential leaders should be singled out to participate in the preparation of tactical exercises. Not everyone will excel at the formal presentation of the staff duties side of the subject, but it is the fact that the potential leader is thinking about the staging and conduct of an exercise that is important. Whether it be a section exercise or a brigade project, it is of the utmost value to the potential leader to be encouraged to bring forward "bright ideas" for inclusion. The value of the proposal to encourage the preparation of exercises, as an aid to help potential leadership, will depend on the amount of help given by the tutor. In most cases the tutor will be none other than the potential leader's immediate superior. It means, therefore, that not only does the subordinate receive tuition, but the tutor himself gets practice in instructing and analysing his pupil's ideas.

As soon as an officer or NCO has become proficient in his own rank, he should be trained in the duties of his next senior. Chapter X in "Training for War" specially refers to the need to train understudies, and to bring on the "second eleven". The best method is to give the junior the opportunity of doing his senior's job in selected exercises, whilst the senior practises the art of "umpiring".

But the use of field exercises to develop the potential leader does not finish in preparation, umpiring, and conducting of the exercise. The other main avenue available is to

fit into the exercise a number of situations that call for initiative and re-organisation. This will test the leader's powers to overcome the unexpected, and at the same time provide the opportunity of exercising powers of command.

It is well to remember that a unit fights as it is trained, and field exercises provide a mirror of the standard of training. Besides giving leaders an opportunity to test their powers of man-management, exercises provide a thorough test of one's ability to put oneself across, and concurrently keep all men in the command fully informed of what is happening. In other words, keep up the interest so that the maximum benefit is obtained.

Cloth model exercises and TEWTS are also valuable aids in testing a potential leader. If time is available, a keen tutor could gather his subordinates to the cloth model or sand table as often as practicable and set problems that require quick decision. If ten minutes a day were devoted, over a short period of time, to the solutions of quick decision exercises, seniors would be surprised at the progress made by the juniors.

Some Practical Suggestions.

The ideas mentioned under this heading, are suggestions that may help the potential leader.

Excel at one particular aspect; develop another. Whilst it is the duty of every soldier to be proficient in all sides of his training, it will be found that each has a particular aptitude for one particular line of training. For example, an NCO might have a special flair for drill, the Bren or Camouflage. It should be the intention of that soldier to

expend his spare energies in attempting to perfect himself in one other military aptitude, for example, Map Reading, Patrolling, Vehicle Maintenance.

Should a soldier set about with resolution to develop some other subject of the military art for which he is not so proficient, it will not only test his degree of perseverance, but will mean a test of willpower. These qualities help materially to give depth of character to the soldier concerned. Commanders of whatever level should encourage subordinates to study, as a side-line, some aspects of soldiering for which they may have a latent ability.

New Ideas. Seniors should be on the alert to examine new ideas of subordinates as to ways of carrying out normal day-to-day activity, or ideas on tactics or weapons, etc. It should not be any disadvantage to military discipline to have a "Suggestion Box" and to discuss ideas in an open forum.

Unrehearsed Competitions. To get away from the stereotyped competition, it is suggested that units conduct programmes of spontaneous competitions. One day a week or month could be set aside and only a few hours previously would units, companies, platoons or sections be told the nature of the competition. It could be that a certain platoon in each company is asked to report to take part in preparing a company position, to carry out a patrol or undertake some kind of field firing. Or it may be that the transport group, cooking groups or even Q staff are called at short notice to perform some feat. In some cases troops will not know what is required until a few minutes beforehand. The whole nature of this

suggestion is to get away from the usual plan of competitions when a unit's best team is put into the competition after intensive training. If sub-units, etc., did not know who might be called and when, everyone would be on his toes, and it would be fairer in that the competition would test a random cross-section and not a specially selected group. Often one unit has enough personnel to make a first-class guard but has trained no others, whilst another unit, not capable of finding a winning guard, has many personnel trained up to an equally high standard. Thus platoon and junior leaders would ever be on the alert for keeping their commands up to the highest standard of training that is reasonably possible. It means also that units would be tested on their general standard of training and not on their "window dressing."

Of course, the merits of the published competition which requires a team to train and calls on sub-units to take part in elimination contests beforehand has much to commend it. It is contended that there is room for both types of competition.

Practice in Verbal Orders and Instructing. The use of the "Wire-Recorder" would provide an excellent opportunity for practice in giving operational orders and delivery of lectures. Faults could be pointed out and by practice the potential leader could improve his technique. In fact, practice in the delivery of verbal orders is an essential requirement for the development of all leaders.

Domestic Economy. Better attention should be paid to methods of feeding, repair of clothing and sanitation. The Army could provide teams of instructors who would visit

centres to impart their views and teachings on this subject. The question of domestic economy is a side of life in which young men do not have a great experience. "Living" in the Army can always be improved upon and if the potential leader is to care for his section or platoon to the fullest extent, the Army would be well advised to take steps to provide practical instruction in this subject. The scope for improvisation under this heading is an excellent test to develop initiative.

Correspondence Courses. It is suggested that the Army should set up a "Secretariat" to provide correspondence instruction in Military History, Tactics and other subjects. This instruction would not take away the existing arrangements for the conducting of promotion classes, etc., but rather to provide a source from which additional knowledge could be channelled for those who so wished and had the time to avail themselves of the facility. The "Correspondence Secretariat" would be of more significance to CMF personnel rather than perhaps Regular members who have a full programme of military study already mapped out.

Research Topics. An interesting way to develop freshness of thought is to set programmes of study of such a nature that they stimulate fertile research into better ways of doing accepted practices. Successful research may lead to improved ways of instruction and new methods of writing text books.

The aim of my thoughts under this heading is really to stimulate an infectious keenness so that those seriously imbued with the desire to get on in the Army can develop a

skilled approach towards their problems, with a wide and sound knowledge.

Clear Expression. Unit Commanders should be alert to the need to develop clear expression in writing and speech. To encourage this side of training, potential leaders should be encouraged to prepare their work well in advance and rehearse lessons whenever it is practicable.

Conclusion.

It will be seen, therefore, that there is nothing revolutionary in the suggestions discussed in this essay. The Army can make its best contribution in the search for leaders by, firstly, trying to encourage and bring on the young soldier as early as possible in his unit training, and secondly, by being willing to promote liberally. But, it also means that the Army should be well aware of the type of person it wants as a leader and that, once the limit of a subordinate's prowess as a commander is reached, it will not hesitate to supercede him.

The Army must be prepared to rely on the judgment of Unit Commanders once it has agreed on this policy. In fact, from a practical viewpoint, the whole responsibility of leadership development must rest with a Commanding Officer. It is for the Army to provide the assistance necessary so that the inestimable relationship of tutor and pupil can be established in units. In short, the Army's policy and practice must be complemented to assure that men with the greatest possibilities are given the greatest responsibilities.

The other main theme advanced in this essay is that aids to encourage leadership should all be pointed

to character development. This is initiated in the first instance by an existing leader inspiring a junior with a spirit of keenness and professional skill in his work. It has been suggested that the Army could help in the development of background by providing the potential leader with opportunities of exchange service, opportunities to take part in certain sports; to carry out research into the improvement of current training; to carry out the job of his senior and to use his initiative.

It should not be lost sight of that the main aid for development comes from within the junior himself. It is all a question of two-way traffic.

The up and coming junior will win through in the end, but from the Army's side, it wants to advance as many as possible in the quickest time. The Army realises that not all of its candidates for leadership will rise to equal heights, but it does contend there is a place for everyone according to his ability. It is, therefore, true to say that "many will be called; few chosen," but if the spirit of the "many" is right, opportunities to serve the Army and their fellow-men will be readily available.

To whichever rank the potential leader rises as a commander, the only real failure occurs when he gives up trying to do his best.

Lockhart did not die . . . he had spent most of the dark hours in the water alongside Number Two Carley, of which he was in charge: only towards morning, when there was room and to spare, did he climb on to it . . . He made them sing, he made them move their arms and legs, he made them talk, he made them keep awake . . . The men on his raft loathed him, and the sound of his voice, and his appalling optimism; they cursed him openly and he answered them back in the same language. For all this he drew on an unknown reserve of strength and energy which now came to his rescue . . . They were saved.

Nicholas Monsarrat in "The Cruel Sea."

Mobile Defence

Translated and condensed by the "Military Review"
from an article in "Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift,"
Switzerland.

During the last year and a half of World War II, there was a great deal of talk in the German press, on the German radio, and in the communiques of the OKW concerning a new concept of combat—mobile defence—in the German Army. At first, this concept was received with interest, then with doubt, and, finally, with a smile. The term "mobile defence," from the German standpoint, was a contradiction in itself, for, according to the tactical principles of the German Army, there was only one kind of defence—that which received the attack of an enemy in a particular area, and held that area to the end.

Therefore, strictly speaking, there was no such thing as a mobile defence.

Trading Space for Time.

In a mobile defence, the possession of terrain, or its seizure, played a secondary role, except in such cases where that terrain was a basic requirement for the retention of one's own, or the destruction of the enemy's, combat capacity.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the concept of mobile defence came into being during the fighting on the Eastern front, at a time when two of the

conditions which are typical of this method of fighting first appeared, namely, a great deal of space and very few forces.

False Conclusions.

Out of the successes which were won by using the concept of a mobile defence, many persons had drawn the false conclusion that the recipe for victory for the numerically inferior force was through the use of this type of fighting. The ancient saying that "God is with the strongest battalion" seemed, finally, to have lost its value.

However, as a matter of fact, the mobile defence that was being discussed at that time was only a last resort for the numerically inferior force. It lacked the essential characteristic of Clausewitz's idea of defence; the capability for launching a powerful counter-attack, which, in his opinion, made the defence the "strongest form of warfare."

A Temporary Condition.

Mobile defence is not an operation. It can never be anything but a temporary condition which must, as quickly as possible, be replaced by the classical form of defensive action. This point has been illustrated many times in the history of warfare.

Although, even after the catastrophe of Stalingrad, many German victories were won within the framework of the so-called mobile defence, such successes were due only to the outstanding qualities of the German soldier and his commanders.

Mobile defence is a method of fighting with small resources and improvisations. Its aim is to delay or prevent a disadvantageous decision, but it is incapable of forcing a decision of its own. Action designed to force a decision requires forces — namely reserves.

Operational Characteristics.

Let us now take a look at the fighting during the winter of 1942-43 and note the characteristics of the operations which were included in the concept of mobile defence. These were:—

1. Attacks by a numerically superior enemy.
2. Break-through by the enemy.
3. Interception of the enemy's attack in the depths of the position and the blocking of the attack on its flanks.
4. Destruction of the enemy forces which had broken into or through the defence positions.
5. Counter-attacks to stop an enemy attack directed toward, or to drive him from, a decisive terrain feature.
6. Enforcement of the enemy withdrawal.

Requirements for Mobile Defence.

However, mobile defence is possible only when:—

1. Space can be surrendered without decisive results.
2. Conditions permit the movement of the defence forces; that is,

when weather, roads, and enemy air power do not restrict or influence the movement of the defence forces.

3. The defence forces are equipped for mobile action; namely, by the use of motorized or mechanized forces.

4. The defence force commander is able to act, improvise, and command at lightning speed, unhampered by interference from higher authorities.

5. The counter-actions of the defence force—either through a choice of time, place, or conditions, or a combination of those factors — are able to obtain a temporary superiority over the attacking force. For example, when the defence force is able to catch the attacking force off guard so that there is no chance for counter-action from the attack forces, or when the defence force is able to engage the attacking force when it has few reserves to influence the battle.

"Capsule Accounts."

In the following paragraphs, two examples are given from the fighting on the Eastern front during the winter of 1942-43. They are capsule accounts, which, when lifted out of the major actions, fit into the general pattern of defensive warfare. However, they have this feature in common, namely, that a numerically inferior force was able to beat a numerically superior enemy force, and that the fate of the major formations depended on the success of the smaller units, because in all cases additional large reserves and resources were not available to influence the battles.

First Example:

On the morning of 16 February, 1943, the German 384th Infantry

Division, after weeks of retreat fighting, finally reached the Mius River and started to prepare defensive positions. The division, with a strength of approximately 2,500 men, had a front of 12½ miles to defend. The main defence line — the west bank of the Mius — was weakly occupied and had practically no depth. The division reserve, which consisted of only two companies, had to be moved that night to the left of the line, because the enemy had crossed the Mius at that point with tanks.

Early on the morning of 18 February, while the division was still preparing its defence positions, two Soviet companies attacked across the frozen Mius in the division's defence sector and threatened to seize an important observation point about a mile behind the lines.

While the battle for the observation point was still in progress, the sector reserve — a force of only eight men — worked its way forward and counter-attacked the enemy force. The sector reserve opened up with its machine gun and machine pistols from the right and rear and caught the enemy force by surprise, killing 61 of the attackers and forcing the remainder of the force to flee across the Mius. In this action, the sector reserve had only one man wounded, and the total casualties for the division included two killed, three wounded, and five men taken prisoner.

Second Example:

On 17 February, 1943, the German 79th Infantry Division (the unit on the right flank of the 384th Division, which was discussed in the previous example) was attacked by a Soviet force just as it was completing its defence positions. The

Soviets, with the aid of tanks, opened up a breach 5 miles wide through the 79th Division's line, into which poured a Soviet armoured corps. Although the 79th Division was unable to halt the penetration, it was able to prevent a further widening of the breach. During the night of 18-19 February, a weak combat team from the German 23rd Armoured Division, which was engaged farther south, attacked the rear areas of the Soviet column, setting the corps' fuel convoy on fire during the action. On 19 February, the 79th Division was able to close the breach in its lines, thereby cutting off the retreat route of the Soviet corps. The Soviet armoured corps, immobilized because of a lack of fuel, eventually was annihilated by the Germans.

In the two examples discussed above, a numerically inferior force won a victory over a numerically more powerful enemy; and in each of the examples, the fate of the major formations depended on the success of the smaller units.

Conclusions.

If we must draw conclusions from these operations, it may be said that the application of the concept of the mobile defence belongs to the lower levels of command. The higher command cannot attempt to determine solutions beforehand, by means of previous directives and orders. The primary role of the higher command in such a situation is to provide mobile reserves for the actions. In this regard, the high command must make sure that such reserves are not committed where they will become involved in frontal fighting, but it must not hinder the freedom of action of the reserves.

THE PLACE OF DRILL IN TRAINING

General Günther Blumentritt,
German Army.

THE question of an acceptable modern form of military training continues to cause many headaches in most countries. Important people, both civilians and soldiers, have devoted much time to it and it may well be that the problem will become acute again in the near future.

Criticism of military training follows familiar lines. Again and again "this nasty drill" obtrudes as the main bugbear. Dull, unimaginative drill fills many with a sense of foreboding when they recall the long hours spent marching in single file at a five-pace interval or when, they think of the endless rifle practice, and so on. This is not to be wondered at.

Let us just see why exactly this "drill" developed from the earliest

times in all countries and all armies. The Greek mercenaries of Xenophon and the disciplined and fearsome Praetorian guard and legions of the Roman Empire were just as pitilessly drilled as the various armies of later times. A severe form of drill and a very rigid parade ceremonial is still to be found in many armies today. Its original purpose was to influence the mind and an attempt was made, by external and mechanical forms of drill, to produce the desired state of mind in the soldier.

It has always been realised that not all soldiers are heroes. Everyone on the battlefield experiences a natural fear for one's life. It is not true that a soldier of any rank can go through one or two world wars without experiencing any fear whatsoever. **Every one** of us, even the bravest, has inwardly faltered at

—From "Irish Defence Journal."

some time or other. Only the sense of duty, the example of others and, perhaps, the discipline drilled into us have borne us through the ordeal. Thus, from the earliest times it was thought to spare the soldier this strain by depriving him of his own will—indeed even by eliminating his power of judgment. Consequently, resort was had to various means of influencing the combatant. There was the intoxicating effect of march music on those about to attack, designed to intensify courage and obscure the unpleasant aspects of combat. There was the cavalry or infantry officer riding ahead or leading the advance with drawn sword. We recognise in all armies the symbolism of flags, eagles and banners which were borne in front of the combatants. Every army had some kind of battle-cry, even if it was only "Hurrah."

All these devices were intended to act like a drug on the men and make them forget their fear. Drill was regarded as another suitable means to this end.

When I became a soldier in 1911 drill still played an important part in training. We, however, were told by our then superiors that the practice of drill had formerly been much more intensive. After the First World War there was a considerable reduction in drill, by comparison with the pre-war period, and the drill forms were numerically decreased and were simplified in their execution. Subsequently, things became even more simple. Contemporary opinions regarding the amount of drill to be done are, therefore, very varied, depending on the experiences one has had during the years. There was, however, another reason why drill was necessary in former times.

Up to 100 years ago almost all fighting was done in closed formations, as dictated by the primitive, short-range weapons then in use. Open combat with lines of infantrymen in extended order had not yet been accepted as generally advisable. Most of the shooting was in the form of volleys and thus, in combat as in firing, the greatest accuracy was required in all movements and in the handling of weapons. For this reason combat in former times really consisted of "drill" and all movements followed on sharp commands. The armies of the past were, therefore, all compelled to drill rigorously. The army which was best drilled had great advantages.

The army of Frederick the Great differed from the French, Austrian, Russian and Swedish armies of the time only in that it was still more severely drilled. The English forces in particular were then in no way inferior to the Prussian. Thus drill was a very wise measure since combat, as already stated, was based largely on it.

During the nineteenth century weapons became increasingly effective and had greater range. This led, of necessity, to more open combat and greater exploitation of the terrain. With this development the old method of drill gradually lost its meaning and had to be replaced by something else, namely, education, independence and a sense of responsibility and initiative.

This open order in combat had extended extraordinarily even before 1914 for it had become apparent that close order would no longer be possible under intense fire. The World War saw a great advance in technique and it is only today that we can properly recognise the com-

pletely open order method of combat based on the individual action of the soldier and the utmost exploitation of the terrain. In addition, in recent times there has been a considerable increase in popular education in comparison with the widespread illiteracy of former days. The internal development of the State has also produced different aims to those of 150 years ago. All these circumstances have, to a great extent, deprived the old form of drill of its importance. If one wishes to use every means possible to create the independent, responsible individual combatant, acting according to reason, one must not jeopardise the success of one's efforts by any undue emphasis on dull, spiritless drill.

Modern war involves the combination of all weapons. Many weapons require "collective" handling. The machine-gun, the artillery piece, the tank and the bomber aircraft must be operated by a team. Combined effort is essential, as in a football game. In addition to this, modern combat consists, in a tactical sense, in the skilful co-operation of the individual combat teams, sections, companies, etc., and all this in turn requires understanding and judgment. Moreover, grand tactics are, in the long run, nothing more than the co-operation of larger units in achieving a certain objective. Thus "rifle practice" and "individual drill march" are no longer of any value under modern conditions.

One should not, however, reject the good with the bad. During the period of basic training a moderate amount of drill is indispensable. This is exactly what happens in other armies. But the time spent on drill must remain restricted and the few drill forms which are left must

be as simple as possible in execution. Moreover, only such forms should be preserved as are indispensable even in peacetime. To a great extent, the old form of drill must be replaced by an intensive type of military service in which sport and combat are closely identified.

Modern youth shows great enthusiasm for sport and it would regard military service in a very different light if it were voluntary. A really good football match requires just as much discipline, combination, purposefulness, energy, endurance, skill, and so on as does modern combat.

The collective handling of weapons can be conducted on the lines of a sport provided there is a quite brief preliminary period of practice in the essentials. The same is true of the co-operation required in minor tactics by lower formations in combat. It also applies to musketry which, after a short period of formative instruction on the same basis as if it were a sport, shows much better results than the musketry training drilled into the men at the battle-school.

The barrack-square and the old-style drill-ground have long since been replaced by the training area with natural terrain as the main scene of action of the modern military force in training. It is there that preparation for combat is really carried out and not on the parade ground.


Basic training can also be modernised. It would be best if, following his introductory statement of fundamentals and aims, the instructor were to let the pupil do most of the talking. One has only to try out this experiment by talking over an interesting combat situation with one's men. You will be astonished

by the number who display excellent judgment and develop new ideas. A further advantage of such "free" instruction is that the timid are encouraged to express themselves and a teacher, applying psychological methods, can convert such "Cinderellas" into self-confident soldiers. Instruction can only be of practical value if it is perceptive and employs all possible aids—above all, the film. **Sport** in the army made great progress after the First World War. It only needs to be adapted to the present time and should, in particular, embrace such games and sporting activities as serve the purpose of military training under active conditions. Most games are based on the "collective principle" and this, as already pointed out, is an essential requisite for the modern fighting force.

Finally, in a modern army conditions should not always be a "secret." The more the garrison commanders permit all sections of the population to take part in the soldier's life the better. A large part

of the distrust we encounter is often due to the fact that a large part of the nation does not know what the soldier actually does inside the barrack walls. There is no need for any anxiety regarding the preservation of secrecy in his everyday life and normal service as there are practically no secrets involved. The latter are to be found at entirely different levels. In Germany, conditions in the old "Reichswehr" from 1919 to 1935 were much more modernised than in other armies of the time. After 1935 a certain deterioration crept in, due solely to the much-too-rapid increase of the army and the dilution of the officer and N.C.O. body. No army can stand up to the internal strain when it is increased fivefold in three to four years.

Likewise in the case of training success depends not so much on external forms and the application of the law to the letter as on the **spirit**—as in every other department of human activity.



PARACHUTISTS
are
ORDINARY MEN

Major M. B. Simkin, Royal Australian Infantry
Senior Army Instructor of the Parachute Training Wing,
School of Land/Air Warfare.

SINCE we started Parachute Training again in Australia I have been continually confronted with people who consider all aspiring parachutists to be either quite mad or else something akin to a superman. This is a fallacy which I hope to correct in this short article. Any normal soldier can become an efficient parachutist.

As the art of parachuting is a comparatively new one, and one that is perhaps rather spectacular to watch, many bogies have been built up by the uninitiated. These have been seized upon by the sensational element in the popular press and enlarged to something that is quite ridiculous. To refute them, let us look at a few cold, hard facts.

- (a) Since 1944, when the present parachuting equipment and techniques came into use in Great Britain, over one million parachute descents have been made without a fatality due to the failure of the parachute!
- (b) In the same period the few fatalities and serious injuries that have occurred have been caused entirely by individual error, and even then only amount to one in every 280,000 descents made. One in every 40,000 people who cross streets in Sydney is killed!
- (c) Minor injuries (mainly muscular strains) caused during ground training and parachuting itself only amount to an average of one in every 50 who undergo


training—a much lower figure than that experienced by people who take the rugger field!

These figures surely speak for themselves.

Now let us consider the type of individual we can train. During the 1939-45 war an aircrew medical standard was required of all who wished to begin training. This has since been proved unnecessary and today we will accept any soldier who is A1 without a bad medical history of certain bone fractures, is not over 6 ft. 1 in. in height and 13 stone in weight, and is under 35 years of age. Actually, people out-

side these limits can be accepted if they are normally agile and satisfy one of the officer instructors of the Parachute Training Wing accordingly. It will be noticed that vision and dental fitness are not normally considerations, although we cannot train men who are colour blind in the sense that they are not able to recognise red and green.

In addition to the above physical standards we require a student to have a good conduct record, be trained to DP1 standard and be well disciplined. In short, he must be a good soldier. Exact details of these conditions may be found in MB1 145/51.



Parachuting in Wet Conditions at the Salt Ash Dropping Zone Near Williamstown.

In Russia today parachuting youth clubs have been formed in which teenagers spend their week-ends making descents, the whole subject being treated purely as a sport.

To complete the case, it should not be necessary to mention that in England, Canada and the United States, nursing sisters and female medical orderlies have flocked to parachute courses, where they have performed very creditably, and are regularly carrying out parachute descents.

In the above paragraph I do not wish to detract one iota from the individuals who have volunteered for, and have qualified at, a para-

chute course. They are good soldiers who have volunteered in the face of the rather frightening reputation that parachuting has so wrongly been given. All do credit to the Australian Army and if given the chance are capable of establishing traditions that are at least the equal of those now held by the British Airborne Forces.

It is to be hoped that we shall see no end to the long list that already exists of volunteers waiting to attend the Basic Parachute Course—a very interesting and comparatively easy course for normal men.

Far more people have been imprisoned for Liberty, degraded and humiliated for the sake of Equality, and tortured and murdered in the name of Fraternity during the last thirty years than in the previous thousand under less hypocritical forms of despotism.

Roy Campbell in "Light on a Dark Horse."

YUGO-SLAVIA



Its Future Under Tito

Colonel Sam J. Rasor,
Command and General Staff College, U.S.A.

THE first crack in the Iron Curtain was revealed by the open break between Tito and the Soviet Union. "Pravda," an official Soviet news organ, stated that Tito had joined the Imperialist camp. The Soviets played upon the theme that Tito had become a tool in the hands of the United States and England, who were struggling against the mighty democratic group and its guiding forces—the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government officially designated this camp as "the enemy of the Soviet Union."

—From "Military Review," USA.

When Mr. Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, was asked if Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union was not a little like David fighting Goliath, he replied, "In history the Davids have always won."

The Chetnik Way.

Immediately after the German attack on Yugoslavia in April, 1941, a resistance movement started. This resistance movement was led by Draza Mihajlovic, a staff colonel in the Yugoslav Army, who refused to obey General Kalafatovich's order to surrender. He (Mihajlovic) told

his commanding-general, "You may lay down your arms and surrender, but I am going to continue the struggle in the Chetnik way, together with those who wish to follow me." Thus, the Chetnik movement was started.

Mihajlovic represented the Royal Government inside Yugoslavia and wanted to maintain the authority and strength of that government. He was violently opposed to communism.

Tito's Rise to Power.

In 1941, following the German attack on Russia, an active Communist Party member, Josip Broz, better known as Tito, made his way into Serbia and there began to organise a partisan army to fight the Germans who had invaded Yugoslavia. Tito established himself as head of this partisan force, with Communist members forming the nucleus of the force.

Josip Broz adopted the Party name of Tito, and, by his own admission, the nickname goes back to 1924, when he was doing illegal work in Yugoslavia after the Communist Party had been outlawed there. Tito was born on 25th May, 1892, the son of a blacksmith, and was christened in the Catholic Church. In 1915, Tito was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army and sent to the Russian front, where he deserted or was captured. The Czarist Government sent him to Siberia as a prisoner of war. Following the October Revolution, he fought in the Red Army during the Civil War.

Tito returned to Yugoslavia with a Russian wife in 1924, as a labour organiser. He continued these acti-

vities until he was arrested in 1929, and was sentenced to five years in gaol.

In late 1941, the Chetniks (Mihajlovic) and the Partisans (Tito) began to quarrel. Attempts at reconciliation failed, and by 1942 their differences broke into an open fight. The Germans regarded Tito as a Russian agent and Mihajlovic as an agent of the Allies. In fact, in July, 1943, the German authorities simultaneously announced a reward of 100,000 gold marks each for the heads of Tito and Mihajlovic.

Since Tito was a trained Party member, the Soviet Union was to endorse him at the first opportunity as the true representative of the Yugoslav people. This occasion was not long in coming for, in July, 1943, the Soviet Government charged that Mihajlovic was collaborating with the Germans and fighting the Partisans. The Communist Parties all over the world immediately launched a press programme against Mihajlovic and the Chetnik movement, claiming to the world that the Chetniks were monarchists, and were, therefore, reactionaries; the Partisans were anti-monarchists, and were, therefore, progressives.

Originally, Mihajlovic had at least the moral support of the United States and Britain. The United States furnished the Chetniks, among other supplies, four Liberator bombers early in 1943, and, on 7th May, 1943, the British Government informed Mihajlovic that they hoped soon to be able to furnish material on a greater scale than in the past. However, on 8th December, 1943, the Right Honourable Richard Kidston Law, then the British Minister of State, informed the House of Commons that henceforth

Tito was to be favoured "for the simple reason that the Partisans' resistance to the Germans is very much greater." This was the beginning of the end so far as support for the Chetniks was concerned. Early in 1944, Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed to support the Partisans.

Soviet Endorsement.

In March, 1944, a Soviet military mission was sent to Tito which greatly strengthened his hand, and, on 28th September, 1944, the Soviet Army reached the Yugoslav border. They asked Tito for permission to enter Yugoslavia, promising to leave civilian administration entirely in Partisan hands. Tito, to no one's surprise, granted their request. The purpose of the mission's strategy was political rather than military and their goal was the capture of Belgrade and the establishment of Tito in power as chief of state by the Soviet Army.

Tito entered Belgrade in the wake of Russian tanks, and Mr. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, stated in the House of Commons that "Tito's government has now installed itself in Belgrade with Russian assistance." Russia and Yugoslavia signed a mutual assistance agreement soon thereafter.

Russo-Yugoslav Postwar Relations.

Mihajlovic was captured by Tito's forces in March, 1946, and was tried by a Communist court and executed on 16th July, 1946. Thus, Tito eliminated his chief rival and one who was beloved by many Yugoslavs.

World War II gave the Soviets the opportunity to attain their long-awaited control of Yugoslavia. Tito and the Communist Party had been

prepared long beforehand as an instrument for that control. Once Tito was installed in Belgrade, he openly adopted a hostile attitude toward America and Britain. Two days after VE-day, Tito asked the military missions of the two countries to leave Yugoslavia. The deliberate shooting down of unarmed American airmen while flying over Yugoslavia, in August, 1946, was also a part of a determined policy to strengthen the tie between Tito and Stalin.

After Tito's installation at Belgrade, the Tito-Stalin horizon seemed cloudless. The Soviets flattered the boundless ambition of the Yugoslav dictator and encouraged his well-known desire for luxury.

Tito forced communism on Yugoslavia. The methods used later in the communisation of satellite countries were first tested in Yugoslavia. Suppression of political parties, curtailment of freedom of the press, elections from a single hand-picked list of candidates, and the merciless liquidation of the middle classes were methods first practised in Yugoslavia before being applied in other satellite countries.

Tito's prospects were bright: with a recent trade agreement and friendship pact with the USSR; and a government and parliament which appeared legitimate in the new Communist world. Yugoslavia was an independent member of the Communist family of nations. Tito was head of a powerful Yugoslav army and was accepted as *secundus inter pares*. In the United Nations and on the diplomatic front, the Soviets supported Tito's claim for Trieste, even though they had demanded Yugoslav evacuation of that ter-

ritory in 1945 as the use of force in this instance would have disrupted their programmes for Eastern Europe as a whole. After the claim for Trieste was denied and Trieste was declared a free territory, Tito placed an iron curtain around that portion of the free territory bordering on Yugoslavia and under its administration.

The Blast Heard Around the World.

On 28th June, 1948, the Soviets' vitriolic condemnation of Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia revealed the first important breach in the USSR's leadership in Central Europe. The open break between the Kremlin and her principal satellite emphasised the importance of Yugoslavia in European affairs.

The conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was to provoke much comment in editorials and over the radio, as well as in high government offices throughout the world. Overnight, "experts" expounded their theories as to why the break had occurred and forecast its impact upon the world. There were many who doubted seriously that Tito had many more days to live.

The Cause.

What was the cause of this break in the relations of these two Communist countries? This question is difficult to answer because of the many people involved, the petty jealousies among leaders in the Communist Party who were attempting to gain favour with Stalin, and because of the restrictions imposed by the Iron Curtain that enclosed the communistic states from the rest of the world. It may be of interest, however, to examine some of the theories, or possible causes, of the split. One popular

theory was that success had gone to Tito's head, and that he had begun to see himself as the rival or potential successor to Stalin as the leader of the Communist cause. One must remember that Tito had come a long way in a short time—from a very obscure person in 1940 to the absolute dictator of Yugoslavia by 1945.

Another theory was that Tito had been entrusted with certain tasks by Moscow and had not been willing to undertake them. A third theory suggested that Tito had visualised ambitious plans for a Balkan federation, with Yugoslavia as the controlling state. There were those who considered it such a fantastic situation that they thought it had been created intentionally.

Although the Tito-Stalin split broke suddenly upon the world, it had been developing for some time. Tito was determined to run his own show, despite Stalin's plan to make Yugoslavia another pillar of the Soviet empire. Unlike other rulers which Moscow had placed over other satellite states, Tito and his associates were not mere puppets; they had successfully fought the Axis armies and their political enemies inside Yugoslavia.

The Problem.

Tito was determined to bring industrialisation and its many blessings to Yugoslavia. He had promised the Yugoslav people after the war that, under his programme of industrialisation, nationalisation and collectivisation, factories and hydro-electric plants would be developed, irrigation systems would be constructed to bring water to arid regions, oil resources would be tapped, and modern highways would be built throughout the country.

Tito had hoped to obtain financial assistance and heavy equipment from the Soviet Union to accomplish these things. Tito was coming to realise that Yugoslavia's place in the over-all Soviet economic plan was to remain what she had always been—poor, backward, and weak. Raw materials which would have supplied native industry would be shipped instead to the Soviet Union or to other satellite states. The Soviet Union set prices on Tito's exports, according to a ratio that would cost the Yugoslavs £9,400 for every Soviet tractor. By this Soviet arrangement, Yugoslavia's labour and natural resources were to be exploited for the benefit of the Soviet Union. Tito, of course, would have none of this.

The Kremlin was not satisfied with the progress Tito was making in the collective ownership of the land and it complained bitterly that the land was still in private ownership, that it was bought and sold, that considerable portions of land were concentrated in the hands of rich peasants, and that hired labour was used. The peasants still hold a key position in the Yugoslav system; they still constitute almost 70 per cent. of the entire population of the country, and more than 90 per cent. of the land they hold is still privately owned. Tito realised that critical decisions concerning the successive steps and tempo of the class struggle in Yugoslavia might soon pass out of his hands if methods used in the collectivisation of the land in the Soviet Union were transferred integrally to the Yugoslav scene. He also realised that pitched battles between the peasants and the government agents and police were certain if this policy were established.

Tito, confronted with realities, soon realised that he could not overcome the opposition of the peasants, especially of the Serbs. As Mr. Sumner Wells said, "In his dual rôle as head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and as Moscow's proconsul, Tito found himself up against one of the toughest specimens of the human race—the Serbs."

The Soviets had made an offer to Tito to rearm and reorganise the Yugoslav Army. Tito did not relish the idea, since he felt that under the plan the Army would lose its national character and become, in effect, an auxiliary of the Red Army. He was unwilling to permit Soviet intelligence agencies to operate in the Yugoslav Army. In the Soviet plan, Yugoslavia was to train conscripts in yearly batches but not maintain any considerable standing army, and neither was she to build a national armament industry. Tito felt the Soviets wished to obliterate their characteristic nationalism and self-reliance.

Tito was beginning to grow restless, and rumours of his discontent reached Moscow. Further, the Kremlin heard that unkind things were said in Belgrade about the demands of the Soviet trade delegates, the salaries and behaviour of the Red Army officers, and the way the Soviet intelligence was recruiting Yugoslav citizens.

Stalin, at this point, seemed to realise that the time was ripe to bring Tito, the "realist," into line with the thinking of the Cominform. The final goal was complete "Sovietisation." The collectivisation of the land was to be complete, since the most dangerous seeds of capitalism still lived on in the peasantry.

Tito tried to convince Moscow that a certain autonomy of action must be permitted if he were to bring communism into a non-Soviet country; however, to the Soviet leaders, Tito's attitude of temporisation seemed careless, and they insisted upon complete communisation without compromise. Tito, having failed to meet the Soviets' expectations, the Cominform was set in motion to demote the man who had lost the confidence of the Kremlin and to replace him with someone who would carry out the policies it dictated.

The Split.

On 18th March, 1948, formal notification reached Belgrade that the Soviet Government had decided to withdraw all military advisers on the ground that they were "surrounded by hostility"; the next day Tito was informed by the Soviets that all civilian missions would be withdrawn because of "lack of hospitality and lack of confidence" shown them.

Tito and Yugoslavia's fate had been decided. After several exchanges of communiques between Belgrade and Moscow, the Information Bureau (Soviet-Communist controlled) made the following statement on 28th June, 1948: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the United Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau."

Thus came the open break between Tito and Stalin on 28th June, 1948.

The Kremlin unsuccessfully at-

tempted to incite the Yugoslav Communist Party against Tito for the obvious purpose of replacing him with a Moscow-controlled puppet. Tito reacted vigorously and gaoled two leading members of his party and cracked down on everybody suspected of plotting against his regime.

Economic Situation.

Yugoslavia began her five-year plan early in 1947. The plan envisaged the transformation of Yugoslavia from a backward, war-destroyed Balkan country into a highly developed, modern country with an economy balanced between agriculture and newly developed modernised industries. The plan, however, was dependent upon a network of bilateral trade treaties with the Soviet Union and other satellite states and, to a lesser extent, on some Western countries. Yugoslavia could not succeed in her ambitious plans if she were to become a single unit isolated from the West and ostracised by the East (the Soviet Union and her satellites).

When the Soviet leaders realised that their hegemony had met with resistance on the part of Yugoslavia's people, the USSR and her satellites applied economic blockade tactics against Yugoslavia. Hungary cancelled treaties. Czechoslovakia withheld deliveries of goods already completed and for which Yugoslavia had already paid in materials and credits. Rumania carried the blockade so far as to refuse payment of a debt of honour resulting from a loan of Yugoslav wheat during the Rumanian famine. Bulgaria refused to carry out her treaty obligations to Yugoslavia.

The economic blockade imposed

by the Soviet Union caused Yugoslavia to lose overnight more than 45 per cent. of her markets. The Soviet Union's aim was to ruin Yugoslavia's five-year plan and thus cause a great upheaval among the people of Yugoslavia against Tito, and his party.

Yugoslavia's economic problems today stem from three sources:

1. A grandiose industrialisation programme that is bogging down for lack of capital and materials.

2. The economic dislocation inherent in the re-orientation of Yugoslavia's trade toward the West.

3. The results of a disastrous drought during 1950.

In considering the seriousness of the economic problems, one must bear in mind that Yugoslavia is dependent upon imports for about 75 per cent. of the raw materials for her manufactured goods.

Tito Faces West.

Let us consider the steps Yugoslavia has taken to overcome some of her economic problems. Tito realised his dilemma, caused by the break with Stalin, and he further recognised the necessity for finding trade elsewhere after the Soviet Union and her satellites applied the economic blockade against his country. Tito, being the realist that he is, began to put out feelers to the West for assistance. His main political preoccupation, of course, was that regardless of whatever credits or loans he might get from the West, the independence and integrity of his country should not be jeopardised. He had already risked everything to preserve these against Soviet encroachment.

The policy of the Western powers

was to help Tito without making heavy demands in return.

Early in 1949, the National Security Council broadened American commercial policy so as to permit American concerns to sell Yugoslavia materials required in order to maintain a "peacetime economy."

In the closing days of 1949, Great Britain signed a trade agreement providing Yugoslavia with a credit of 8 million pounds sterling (repayable in five years) to facilitate purchases in Great Britain. The British also granted commercial credit of 5 million pounds sterling to the Yugoslavs. Tito negotiated additional loans from the Export-Import Bank. The total amount of loans and credit made available to Tito by the Western democracies by mid-1950 was 89 million dollars with no strings attached to the loans or trade agreements that could be considered as interfering with the independence of the Yugoslav Government.

As a result of the severe drought in the summer of 1950, Yugoslavia was threatened with famine. The food shortage, together with the shortage of consumer goods, added to Tito's problem and provided fertile ground for the subversive activities of the Kremlin and seriously reduced the capacity of the Yugoslav people to resist aggression, either internally or externally.

On 20th October, 1950, the Yugoslav Government formally requested United States assistance in averting the worst effects of the disastrous crop failure. This request came only after the Yugoslav Government had exhausted all means of meeting the situation through its own efforts.

After having received assurances from the Yugoslav Government that all assistance furnished by the United States would be given full and continuous publicity, that the aid would be distributed equitably and fairly among the Yugoslav people, and that the distribution would be under the observation of persons designated by the United States, the United States Government, in December, 1950, made available to Yugoslavia nearly 28 million dollars in stop-gap aid from the Economic Co-operation Administration stock pile in Europe. Then, later the same month, the United States Congress voted an additional 38 million dollars for Yugoslavia in emergency food shipments. The Yugoslav Government informed the United States and British Governments in the spring of 1951 that, because of the drought, Yugoslavia was unable to exchange foodstuffs for raw materials on the world market, that her stocks of essential industrial raw materials were almost depleted, and that many of her factories might have to be closed in the near future, which would cause widespread unemployment and would further lower Yugoslavia's living standard. At the present time, the Yugoslav Government's principal shortages include cotton, wool, gasoline, and lubricating oils. The continuing shortages of raw materials for light industries are acute, and it is in these industries that shutdowns may cause serious unemployment.

The possibility of national economic stagnation in Yugoslavia is as potentially dangerous today as is external military aggression. The Yugoslav economy must be re-primed with outside aid or it will gradually come apart at the seams.

Washington and the Western powers have let it be known that they are willing to continue aid to Yugoslavia, and Tito is sure that he can keep his country on an even keel as long as there is aid to ease the food problem and assistance in securing raw materials.

Political and Military Pressure.

Since the break between Stalin and Tito, the Soviet pressure against Yugoslavia, like the development of Soviet foreign policy as a whole, has evolved through various stages. In the first period, Soviet propaganda against Yugoslavia utilised the medium of radio to call openly on Yugoslav citizens to resist and overthrow the legal government of Yugoslavia, while the Cominform apparatus tried to inveigle Yugoslav citizens into working against their own country. This, without question, was gross interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

The rules of diplomatic immunity were violated. Diplomatic mail bags were opened and the personal freedom of diplomatic personnel was violated; Yugoslav diplomatic representation was severely harassed by all Soviet bloc countries. An intelligence network of foreigners was organised within Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union and her satellite states saw to it that subversive leaflets were distributed throughout the country. The Cominform, through broadcasts from satellite states, encouraged its followers in Yugoslavia to engage in sabotage activities. "Incidents are being organised and provoked," accused Foreign Minister Kardelj, of Yugoslavia, "almost every day along our frontiers." In two years, he charged, 896 frontier incidents have

been staged by the Kremlin against Yugoslavia. Yugoslav citizens have been murdered in their homeland by Cominform agents.

Soviet Propaganda.

At every opportunity, the Soviet Union and her satellite states would tell the world, and especially the people of Yugoslavia, that Tito had sold out to the West and that he was a mere pawn in the hands of the "Imperialists." On 9th April, 1949, Tito announced to the Third Peoples' Front Congress that "no intimidation from the West or East can divert us from our principles as determined followers of Marxist-Leninism or from our own road to socialism." And he added defiantly that Yugoslavia would trade with the West on a *quid pro quo* basis, Yugoslav goods for Western machines and money. Anything else would be "a crime against our Socialist country."

Another line that the Soviets have taken against Yugoslavia is that they are doing a thorough job of war-of-nerve propaganda. The Cominform radio constantly charges Tito with the persecution of her bordering states' minority groups within Yugoslavia. Frontier incidents of all kinds are provoked constantly. Cominform propaganda accuses Yugoslavia of preparing to attack her Cominform neighbours, and of mounting espionage and sabotage operations for the Americans.

The "White Paper."

On 9th March, 1951, Tito's government officially protested against the movement of Soviet arms and troops around Yugoslavia's borders. The protest came in the form of a 481-page "white paper" on the aggressive activities of the Soviet Union

and her satellites against Yugoslavia. Copies were delivered to the Western nations and to United Nations Secretary, General Trygve Lie.

The "white paper" accused the Soviet Union of applying forceful means in an attempt to overthrow Tito's independent Communist regime. It further charged that Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria are carrying on a "permanent little war" along Yugoslavia's borders; they are erecting barbed-wire fences, planting mine fields, digging trenches, constructing machine-gun nests and emplacements for mortars and artillery, and building observation posts along the frontier.

Tito further accuses the bordering satellite states of getting bombers and tanks from Moscow in direct violation of peace treaties; shifting civilian populations from border regions and sheltering Soviet troops.

Thus, one can readily see that the USSR and her satellite states have used every possible course of action short of open warfare against Tito and his party. The aim of the Soviet Union has been clear since the open break with Yugoslavia occurred—to dispose of Tito and his party and to replace him with a Soviet-sponsored "puppet."

Will Tito Return to the Soviet Orbit?

In the foregoing discussion we have shown that Tito is an individualist and a realist. Further, it has been pointed out that Tito came to power by his cunning ability; that he has taken advantage of war supplies furnished him by the United States and Britain, and by the Soviets. Then, when he felt he could benefit more by aligning him-

self with the Soviet Union, he lost no time in doing so.

After a few years of Soviet sponsorship, Tito realised that Yugoslavia was playing second fiddle to the Soviet Union. Stalin attempted to tell Tito how to run his country—politically, militarily, and economically—but Tito would not permit this. Finally, when the break came between Tito and the Soviet Union, the USSR used every trick known to Stalin and his henchmen, short of war, to destroy Tito and his party. The objective of the Soviet Union now is to eliminate Tito and his government and replace them with a regime subservient to Moscow.

Recently, when Tito was asked whether, looking back, he would act differently if he had it all to do again, he paused as if recounting in his mind the steps by which he had earned Stalin's hostility. "No," he said deliberately, "no compromise was possible, and none is now."

Tito has burned his bridges behind him; there can be no turning back. The only way he could return to the Soviet family would be in chains. Stalin's method of doing business does not include giving a dissenter a second chance.

Tito and the West.

Since it is highly improbable that Tito could or would return to the Soviet orbit, what is next for Tito? As has been pointed out, for Tito to remain solvent at home he must carry on trade with the outside world. Stalin has made trading with the Soviet Union and her satellite states impossible. Therefore, Tito must seek aid from the United States and the West, for without outside aid Yugoslavia

might decay from within and Tito might be forced out by Soviet pressure through her agents inside Yugoslavia. Under present circumstances, Yugoslavia can remain independent only under Tito, and since Tito can retain his position as chief of state only by the maintenance of Yugoslavia's economic health, the future of Yugoslavia as an independent state depends upon Tito's obtaining that aid.

Yugoslavia's Future.

Yugoslavia's future, then, depends upon our answer to the question, "Should the United States and the West continue to aid Tito?" From a practical point of view, considering the world situation today, the only answer is "Yes!" The argument for aiding Tito is not based on our love for communism. Tito is a Communist. He is the dictator of a police state. However, Tito knows the source of danger to himself and his party, and, by aiding Tito, Yugoslavia will at least remain an independent state.

Of what advantage is it to the Western democracies to have Tito and Yugoslavia remain an independent state outside the Iron Curtain? Some of the advantages are:

1. It is a crack in the Iron Curtain and shows the world that Stalin and his followers are not invincible.
2. If the Soviets regain control over Yugoslavia, it is expected that they will not stop with the elimination of Tito. The Soviet bloc would be in a position to take over Trieste and pose an immediate threat to Italy and Greece.
3. Tito has under arms today almost a half million soldiers. These men are physically fit, highly trained fighters whose morale is

good. Some observers rate Tito's army one of the best in Europe—with the exception of the Soviet Army. Recently, in a speech in Belgrade, Tito warned the Soviet Union and her satellites of the consequences should they attack Yugoslavia. Tito said, "Every inch of our land has been soaked in blood in the past, and, if necessary, it will be soaked in blood again, but it will remain ours." He further stated, "We are always ready to defend ourselves from anyone who wishes to deprive us of our freedom and independence."

4. If a conflict is forced upon the West by the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia would constitute a military factor which the Soviet Union could not overlook, and Tito's army could provide flank protection for a counter-blow launched from another area.

We have listed some of the advantages that the Western democracies would enjoy if Tito and Yugoslavia remain outside the Soviet orbit. What are the advantages for Tito in his leaning toward the West?

1. Economic aid from the West, without which Tito would not be able to survive. This aid has been furnished Tito and his government without any interference from the donor as to how Tito conducts his internal policies.

2. Military aid from the West, as well as the implied promise of United Nations help for Tito if his country is invaded by the Soviets or her satellites. The statement by President Truman, in which he said, "An attack against Yugoslavia might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace,"

gives the implication that the United States would support any United Nations action to assist Yugoslavia in maintaining her independence. Military assistance for Tito was further implied when Aneurin Bevan, then British Minister of Labor, told the House of Commons, on 15th February, 1951, that "any threat to Yugoslavia is naturally of concern to His Majesty's Government."

Conclusions.

Four conclusions may be drawn from this discussion:

1. Tito is a realist and will take advantage of any situation to improve his position within his country. He is a dictator and will remain so, allowing no outside influence in the conduct of his state's internal affairs.

2. Under present circumstances, it is in the interest of the West to keep Yugoslavia an independent state and out of the Soviet orbit, and the United States and Western democracies will probably continue assistance to Tito and his regime.

3. Barring some drastic changes in the situation, Tito will be able to maintain his position as supreme ruler of his country. Further, Tito and his people will continue to resist any aggressive move, either political or military, by the Soviet Union or her satellites against their homeland.

4. If the Soviet Union should decide to go to war with the West, though not necessarily closely allied with the West, Tito, with his large army, would stand like a dagger pointing directly at the heart of the Soviet homeland and her satellites.

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