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
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ARMY HEADQUARTERS
MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The Company Officer and — His Men

Relations between the army officer and the men under his command are so personal that no regulations or directives on the subject ever completely express their meaning. For this reason, the younger and inexperienced officer usually spends considerable time striving to get the feel of what our army expects these relations to be. The more experienced officer can help guide his younger colleagues in this vital aspect of leadership.

Because this is a subject on which there is no "last word," no precise rules that apply in all cases, it is particularly fitted for consideration by both junior and senior officers.

This article is reprinted from Officers' Call (U.S.), and while it is, of course, directed to U.S. Army officers, the information it contains should be of considerable value to Australian Army officers.—Editor.

* * *

In a sense, you and every soldier under your command are partners bound together by a common contract to perform the common task of defending the Nation. Under the "terms" of this contract, you and your men have definite responsibilities toward each other. As an officer, you have the obligation to take care of your men; you have the right to demand certain standards of performance from them. At the same time, your men have the obligation to maintain these standards.

From Canadian Army Journal.

The ultimate goal you both seek is effectiveness in combat. Few things will influence your unit's success in battle more than the relationships you've built up between you and the men you command. This is true whether you command a rifle company or a quartermaster company. If a rifle company commander has trained his doughboys, if they trust and have confidence in him, they'll do their utmost when they meet the enemy on the battlefield. A quartermaster company will continue to support the fighting units despite fatigue, danger, and hardships—if the men know they have a commander who is looking out for them, but who expects their best efforts.

For some of you, the men you now command will be the troops you lead in combat. Therefore you have a compelling interest in building strong relationships that will weather the common tests in the future. Others of you may never have this opportunity. But your job today is equally important. For it is you, as an individual officer and as a representative of what all officers are like, that your men are learning to know. The impression you make as an officer can make it easier or harder on the commander who will follow you.

There is another more personal reason why you should take advantage of your present opportunity to practise the art of managing men. There are few assignments in the

Army that do not require officers to supervise and direct the efforts of others—subordinate officers and civilian employees as well as soldiers. The ability to build and maintain good relations with subordinates will help you throughout your entire service.

No one can tell you in exact detail what the relationships between you and your men ought to be. It depends on what sort of man you are, and on the particular soldiers you command. It is affected by circumstances—your station, your varying missions, the requirements of your superiors—things you cannot always control. You can, however, get the “feel” of the **principles** underlying sound relations by discussing them with other officers and then practising them in your day-to-day efforts under the guidance of more experienced commanders.

It will also help you to study how other commanders operate. With this in mind, let's take a look at three company commanders in an infantry battalion and see how they handled their men.

Three Captains and Their Companies.

Company A

Soldiers in Company A, Captain White commanding, boasted that they had the “best deal” in the regiment. And so it appeared. Certainly the captain had the interests of his men at heart. Nobody could deny that, not even the battalion commander who sometimes grew impatient with the captain.

Captain White spent a lot of time in the mess hall supervising the mess sergeant and the cooks. “I want this company to eat better than

any in the regiment,” he said. And most of the time Company A did eat fairly well. But there were times when the cooks overslept in the morning, and turned out a breakfast that was below standard. Occasionally KP's would fail to clean the mess hall properly. But Captain White made up for some of these deficiencies by the conscientious attention he personally gave the mess.

It was the same thing in the supply room and orderly room. Things went well, but mainly because the captain personally concerned himself with almost every detail of the work. Rather than discipline soldiers who fell down on their jobs, he would often do their work himself.

In training Company A performed as you'd expect. Captain White worked hard himself, but seemed to fear he'd overtax his soldiers. As a result, Company A approached the confidence course with all the enthusiasm of a soldier returning from leave. Company A was usually the last to arrive on its objective during battalion exercises. Company A set a range record—in bolos. “Company A,” said the battalion commander, “is being slowly mothered to death.”

Company B

Company B, Captain Black commanding, was an outfit of entirely different stamp. Captain Black was a perfectionist of a kind—but not in the things that really matter.

A systematic man, he made regular inspections of his company. But in the mess hall he was more interested in the appearance of the cooks and KP's than in the food. In the barracks he emphasized cleanliness and arrangement of equip-

ment—but paid little attention to whether the men were getting adequate hot water. To the company supply sergeant, it seemed that Captain Black was more interested in well-shined than in well-fitting shoes.

Perhaps it only seemed this way to the supply sergeant. Actually none of his soldiers really knew Captain Black. For the captain remained aloof from his men and their problems. Because the company commander wanted it that way, the 1st sergeant's office became an insurmountable barrier between each soldier and his commander.

On the surface, Company B was an efficient and disciplined unit. It performed its duties in garrison and in the field with a certain mechanical thoroughness, but it lacked the spirit of Company C.

Company C

Company C, Captain Brown commanding, was the pride of the battalion. It was a spirited, disciplined unit which tackled every assignment with zest and confidence.

Captain Brown was a humane and approachable commander. Rarely was he too busy to see one of his soldiers who wanted to talk to him—whether on personal or official business. When he was busy, he made sure the soldier received an appointment to see him later.

Captain Brown conducted his inspections differently from Captain Black. He checked his mess to see that it was neat and clean, but he also paid particular attention to the food. He ate often with the troops. His barracks were as orderly as Captain Black's—and they

also had plenty of hot water and good ventilation.

Unlike Captain White, Captain Brown made certain that everyone in the company knew his duties and responsibilities. When something went wrong, the soldier responsible was promptly informed, and Captain Brown did not hesitate to deal out punishment when necessary. He also made it a point to commend soldiers for work well done.

Training, for the soldiers of Company C, was always tough. But they responded to achieve the standards Captain Brown set for them. They boasted that they shot better, marched faster, manoeuvred more skilfully than the rest of the battalion. There were no "refusals" on the infiltration course when Company C went through.

Captain Brown had found the right balance between the extremes demonstrated by Captains White and Black. In effect, he had entered into a bargain with his men, and both parties adhered to it scrupulously. This commander knew his men and looked after them; the men knew and performed for their commander. As a **member** of Company C, Captain Brown was careful to do all that was expected of him. As **commander** of the company, he demanded that every soldier in the outfit (including himself) pull his weight on the team.

How Do Soldiers Regard Officers?

Today Captain Brown is described by many of his colleagues and superiors as a "natural leader." But it took a few years of service to acquire that reputation. Today he approaches his job with the confi-

dence and poise of a commander who knows his men and knows that he knows them. But when he was a second lieutenant—well, let him tell how he felt.

"I'll never forget the day (Brown reminisces) when I put on my gold bars and stood before a platoon for the first time. I was a youngster then, fresh out of college, and my main trouble was I didn't feel like an officer. In fact, I didn't even feel like a soldier.

"I looked at the men in my platoon and I noticed that some were older than I. Never in civilian life had I been required to give orders to older men, and the idea made me feel uncomfortable. Some of the privates looked almost as green as I felt. But there were others, especially the noncoms, who looked and carried themselves like seasoned soldiers. They were lean, tough men, tanned by the wind and sun. In the manual of arms they handled their weapons like a star halfback handles a football.

"Sure, I'd been trained in ROTC. But that was part-time soldiering. These soldiers had been living in the Army, doing full-time duty for years. I wondered how they felt about this Army system which put me in command over them."

As a matter of fact, how do soldiers regard their officers?

We received a recent answer to this question as a result of studies made after World War II. As the officers and men of our wartime Army returned to civilian life, it was perfectly natural for some of them to blow off steam. The disciplined military society in which these men had served had not provided all the "safety valves" for public expression available in civilian society. Now the lid was off. Phrases such as "officer caste system", "abuse of authority by the brass", "discrimination against enlisted men" were thrown about with reckless abandon.

It's absurd to claim that in an Army of thousands of officers, all performed as they should have. But the overwhelming majority did. It was therefore equally absurd to regard these complaints—as some observers did—as proof that the entire officer-troop relationship established by the Army should be discarded.

Use of Authority

In the midst of a public furore, careful and thorough studies were made of the attitudes and opinions of present and former soldiers. Neither experienced officers nor experienced soldiers were surprised by the findings.

It was established, for instance, that young Americans as a whole do not, as is sometimes charged, question the need for authority. On the contrary, they submit willingly to direction by competent leaders. They recognize that there must be a system of ranks and grades in an Army, and they agree that commensurate privileges should go with increased responsibility. What our wartime soldiers said they resented most was **arbitrary or selfish** use of authority by a leader. They resented any superior—whether officer or non-commissioned officer—who abused the authority of his rank.

Captain Brown had learned these same facts by personal experience. Had he known them when he took over his first platoon, he probably would have been more confident.

For even as an inexperienced second lieutenant, Brown's men saw that he had the makings of a competent officer. In the first place, he knew more than he thought he did. And, more important, he learned fast—thereby winning the re-

spect and admiration of his men. True, he made mistakes, but abuse of authority was not one of them. His innate respect for his men, combined with respect for the Army and Nation whose authority he represented, protected him from errors of this kind.

The Company as a Community.

Brown was a first lieutenant when he received his first company. Shortly afterward, his division went on manoeuvres. During this training, Lieutenant Brown came to look upon his command in a new light.

He began to realize that his company was, in effect, a small community. Although remarkably self-sufficient as a unit, its members depended more on each other than people in any other community he had known.

Take the problem of food, for instance. Unlike civilians, the soldiers of Lieutenant Brown's company could not stroll into a restaurant at meal time—there were no restaurants in the manoeuvre area. They depended on their own mess sergeant and cooks to feed them. If the mess sergeant failed to draw rations on time, the meal was late. If he didn't draw enough food, some men went hungry. If the cooks turned out a meal unfit for human consumption, that was just too bad—there was nothing else to eat.

It was the same with clothing. If a soldier's shoes needed repair, if torn clothing or damaged equipment needed to be replaced, he depended on the supply sergeant to take care of him.

Everyone Contributes

The supply of food, clothing and equipment depended, to a great extent, on the company's transporta-

tion. If the jeeps broke down, supplies were delayed or didn't arrive at all. It was up to the company's transportation officer and drivers to keep the jeeps rolling.

In this military society, the individual soldier's health was more than his own personal problem. It was the responsibility of Lieutenant Brown, the platoon leaders, and non-coms to see that all soldiers obeyed the simple rules of field sanitation. If a soldier's feet became blistered, a company aid man was available to treat him. If a soldier became ill, the company commander made sure he got to the dispensary.

During manoeuvres there were few sources of entertainment outside the company itself. Some nights, the company comics performed about company camp fires. The 3d Platoon had a guitar player and a quartet that everyone agreed were better than many professional entertainers.

Even in the manoeuvre area, Lieutenant Brown was constantly reminded that his men had obligations and responsibilities beyond those they owed the Army. He arranged an emergency furlough for one soldier whose mother had died. (He also remembered to send a letter of condolence to the soldier's family.) Another man became involved in a law suit. Lieutenant Brown sent him to the division judge advocate to get legal advice. A letter came through channels from a soldier's wife who complained he was not sending her enough money to support her and the children. Brown discussed the matter with the soldier to get his side of the story and to offer advice. Two soldiers of Company C received word, during manoeuvres, that they had become

fathers. Lieutenant Brown congratulated them and made it clear that he appreciated the importance of this news.

The Job Never Ends

These are random examples of what Lieutenant Brown referred to as the "administrative" part of his job as company commander. He was careful not to neglect any of them because he recognized their vital influence on the way his men would tackle their primary mission—training.

Lieutenant Brown discovered that the job of training never ends. Even when his superiors complimented him on the performance of his company, he kept thinking about all the things he still had to teach his men. When some of the men in his rifle platoon seemed to grow "stale" from their training, he arranged for men in his Weapons Platoon to swap places with them for a while. To develop leadership in depth throughout his company, he frequently gave the junior noncoms a try at the jobs of senior noncoms.

By the time manoeuvres were over, Lieutenant Brown himself had grown in maturity and experience. He had become more aware of the responsibilities he shouldered as an officer. True, he received help from both inside and outside the company in training his men, feeding them, clothing them, keeping them in good health and in good spirits. But he realized that he alone had the ultimate responsibility to see that these things were done. This final responsibility of command, he saw, could never be delegated. For this was **his** company, these were **his** men. Every man depended finally on him, and he in turn depended on them.

Managing Men.

If you were to ask a dozen successful commanders to list the most important personal qualities of a leader, you'd get a wide variety of answers. Ask the same group to describe the techniques they employ to manage the men in their commands and you'll also find divergence of opinion.

The reason, of course, is that the whole personality of a man affects the way he performs as an officer. That is why men of greatly differing personalities can become equally outstanding troop leaders.

That is also why we won't attempt here to isolate specific traits and assert that all officers should strive to develop them, nor discuss techniques of command as if all officers should copy them exactly. Rather, we'll describe how one outstanding commander, Captain Brown, managed his men.

He Listens to His Men

When he was an inexperienced platoon leader, Brown had looked often to his noncoms—as well as to his company commanders—for advice and counsel. With increased service and experience, he grew less dependent on them for help. But he never outgrew the habit of listening to the advice of his subordinates—privates as well as noncoms and junior officers. He has never believed his own ideas to be infallible. As a commander, he has learned to select the best solution to a problem regardless of its source.

Captain Brown feels strongly about this. He points out that there are brains and experience among his men. Some of the older soldiers held responsible jobs in civilian life. A few are trained in various pro-

fessions, some are skilled craftsmen, many were students of above-average ability. Brown boasts that in his outfit are men who can design bridges, build houses, repair watches, run locomotives, butcher cattle, or write novels.

"Who am I," Brown asks, "to ignore all this talent and experience?"

According to Brown, his attitude has proved helpful both to the men and to himself. The soldier who knows he can approach his company commander and offer recommendations feels that he has a part in helping to run the company. Even if the commander decides against a suggestion, the soldier has the satisfaction of knowing that his idea has been heard and considered. When the commander is able to act on a soldier's suggestion, and the company performs more efficiently because of it, the soldier gets a much deeper satisfaction. His sense of personal responsibility for the success and good name of his company is greatly strengthened.

He Develops His Men.

Captain Brown says he sometimes feels like a football coach, because he spends almost as much time thinking about his "second" or "third" teams as he does about his "first" team. Here's what he means:

A company commander must be realistic when he trains his unit for combat. He knows he'll lose men in battle, and through accidents or sickness. Some of these casualties will be key men. Others must be ready to take their places. "If you don't have a second team you can depend on," says Brown, "you'd better start training one now."

Here again, Brown points out, the morale of the individual soldier is

involved. Most men have a deep-seated desire to improve themselves, to assume jobs of greater responsibility. The wise commander encourages this ambition in his soldiers. He develops his men by giving them added responsibility commensurate with their ability and experience.

When an untrained civilian first enters the Army, he usually has his hands full taking care of himself and learning the fundamentals of soldiering. Some are quicker than others in mastering the basic tools of the military trade and their duties on the combat team. The company commander should watch these men especially. He should study all his men in the search for potential leaders. Superior soldiers of normal ambition become frustrated by long assignment to minor routine jobs. It's up to the commander, says Brown, to give these soldiers their head, to develop them. If there is no position vacant for them in the company's important slots, they should be trained as replacements for those jobs until vacancies occur.

He Makes Decisions.

A good company, says Captain Brown, is like a team of spirited horses. You rarely have to prod it into action. You have only to guide it in the right direction.

But to do this you have to make decisions. The company commander daily faces situations calling for dozens of decisions. Some are so minor they can be made on the spot with only a moment's thought. Others demand determination and more careful study of the factors involved. Many require consultation with superiors and subordinates. In any event, Brown emphasizes,

the commander should make all decisions as rapidly as possible. If he dawdles and procrastinates he weakens, and may even destroy, the desire for action that he has been trying to develop in his men.

This does not mean that the commander should go off "half cocked" merely for the sake of making a rapid decision. Troops have special dislike for false starts caused by ill-considered and hasty decisions. There are occasions when the best decision is to take no action, at least for a time. When this is the case, says Brown, don't forget to let your men know why no action is being taken.

Captain Brown habitually makes rapid decisions. He says it's because he has consciously developed this habit. His superiors say it's because he knows his job. Both are probably right.

Building the Unit

It's the easiest thing in the world, says Captain Brown, for a company commander to get bogged down in the maze of details that form the bulk of his daily work. When this happens, it means he has forgotten that his organization exists to take care of these details, and that he can operate most efficiently by working through his men.

Therefore, Brown contends, the company commander should spend a good part of his time building his organization. This includes close study of his men to find the right soldier for the right job. It also includes development of a unit *esprit* that welds the individual soldiers together as a team.

Your goal, says Brown, is to reach the point where the individual soldier thinks more of the unit's wel-

fare than he does of his own personal desires. This theme should usually be emphasized by a company commander when he finds it necessary to punish a man. Says Brown, "The soldier being punished should realize that he has wronged the company, not the company commander or an impersonal code of military law. Moreover, every man in the outfit—including the soldier punished—should feel that the offender is getting his just deserts."

Once you create a sound organization, Brown contends, the rest of your job is easy. All you have to do thereafter is to keep the organization in good working condition.

These are just a few of the random thoughts that Captain Brown left with us before he and his unit departed for Korea. They are some, but hardly all, of the most important things for a commander to consider in managing his men. We're not even sure that Captain Brown has included everything he thinks is most important. We are sure that he does not claim to know all the answers. He would be the first to admit that he still has much to learn about the art of leadership.

His ideas on the subject came from his personal experience and training. They are what one commander thinks.

A Letter from Korea

The other day we received a long letter from Korea. It was from Captain Brown, and here's how part of it read:

"You ask me what I've learned after six months of combat. Well, I've learned a lot of things. But the most important lesson that war has taught me is something I knew before I left the States. My combat

experience has just given it more emphasis.

"The lesson is this: Take care of your men and they'll take care of you. Sure, I know you've heard this a thousand times before. But it's true! Let me give you some examples:

"It was rough over here when we first arrived. The Reds were attacking all along the front and we were rushed to defensive positions the minute we got off the boat. My company was given a front of **two miles** to defend. (You know what the field manuals say.)

"I put the platoons in and then I climbed up and down the hills to inspect their positions. We'd been told to expect an attack any minute, and I figured my men would be nervous about the wide open spaces between platoons. They weren't. In fact they were a lot more confident than I felt. 'Don't worry, Captain,' said one of my squad leaders, 'we can handle anything that comes this way.' I couldn't help smiling at the remark—his telling **me** not to worry!

"The Reds hit us soon after that and it was really something. You can't imagine how helpless a company commander can feel during a fight like that. Sure I could talk to my men—at least to some of them. But wire lines went out, radios were jammed or destroyed and I could gain contact with only one of my platoons. I helped out some by getting artillery fire and by telling my Weapons Platoon where to place mortar and machine gun fire.

"But the real brunt of the fighting was squarely on my men. If the platoons, the squads, the individual soldiers held, everything would be okay. If not—Never in my life have I felt so dependent on others.

"My men did hold. Not only that but they later counter-attacked and I think some of those commies are running still . . .

"If you think you can forget all those 'administrative details' when you get in combat, you're wrong. I looked through my pocket notebook the other day. There were a few pages of battle orders. But . . . about 90 per cent. of your time is spent taking care of your men. The big difference is that over here they depend on you a lot more than they did in the States. During stateside duty, a lot of things are done automatically for your command by somebody else. And over here the supply people do a good job getting the things we need up to the company. But you're the one responsible for getting the food, ammunition, clean socks, and all the rest of it to the men who need them. You're the one who keeps an eye open for an opportunity for them to take a bath, to get writing paper or newspapers or the hundreds of things they want . . .

"Over here you get closer to your men than ever before. Remember, you live with them 24 hours a day. And there is nothing I know of that brings men closer together than sharing the dangers of combat. I thought I knew the soldiers in my company pretty well when we were in the States, but now I know many of them better than people at home I've known all my life.

"In combat, it's highly important that you know your men. You've got to know what each man can do and what he can't do. Let me give you an example:

"About a month ago I visited my 3d Platoon and got to talking with the platoon sergeant. This man is

one of the best I've got, a whiz on leading patrols. This day, however, he was acting strangely. Ordinarily, a talkative and confident man, he was quiet, morose, and jittery. He looked worn out. I talked to his platoon leader but this officer had joined us recently and couldn't help me much. Then I questioned one of the other noncoms who spoke quite frankly. 'The trouble with Sergeant Jackson,' he said, 'is that he's been on too many patrols. He's just shot his boot, Cap'n.'

"Of course! Jackson was so good on patrols I'd fallen into the habit of using him nearly every time I had a patrol mission. Without realizing it, I'd given him more than his share of dirty, dangerous assignments. No wonder the man was exhausted.

"We'd had a call from regiment to send a good noncom to Division to help handle incoming replacements. So I sent Jackson back for this job. He was gone about a month on a detail that was supposed to last two months. The other day he reported into the company CP looking rested and fit. 'Back for duty, Captain,' he said. 'I got lonesome for the outfit.' Jackson's with his platoon now and he's doing better than ever

"Don't get the idea that your company is always a self-starting machine. Sometimes you have to crank it up to get it going. Not so long ago, we made an attack which was exceptionally tough—straight up the side of a steep hill against the commies who were dug in up to their eyebrows. My men were tired—we'd

taken a lot of hills and here was another. It was way below zero and it seemed an effort just to stay alive, much less fight. You know how I feel about my men—they're tops. But in this attack I could sense their reluctance, their desire to hold back.

"Well, I kicked them out and we got going. My 1st and 2d Platoons got half-way up the hill and got pinned down. They clung to the side of that icy slope like flies on a ceiling. I told my 3d Platoon to go in on a flank and go in fast.

"They went in all right—like men walking in their sleep. At least they did until I chased after them and woke them up with a few words not ordinarily repeated in unit histories . . . They took the hill.

"So that's the way it goes over here. You and your men are a tight little group doing a tough and important job thousands of miles from home. You're cold, dirty, hungry and frightened together. For the commander, it's especially tough, and the weight of command is something I can feel like a physical burden.

"Do I sound discouraged? Perhaps that's because I'm describing the responsibilities of my job. But as far as I'm concerned, I wouldn't trade my command for the plushiest job you've got in the States.

"Let's put it this way: I get my reward for what I'm doing every time a soldier in my company speaks to me. For I can tell the way he looks and the way he acts that he thinks I'm a good company commander."

FIELD CENSORSHIP

1939-1945

Captain H. B. Anderson,
1 Field Censorship Company.

TO appreciate the achievements of Field Censorship in the last war it is necessary that we consider the censorship-security problem as it existed when Field Censorship, as distinct from unit censorship, became active early in 1942.

At this time inward mail from service personnel presented Post and Telegraph Censors with a major problem. Their staff was fully occupied with the large amount of overseas mail, which required thorough examination to prevent matter which might be of use to the enemy from leaving Australia. Consequently, service mail, particularly that of units moving or preparing for movement, reached a stage where normal procedure (examination, any necessary treatment, release) became impossible. Privilege envelopes, i.e., Green Envelopes in the case of Army and RAAF, Black Envelopes in the case of RAN, which are not censored in units or ships and sometimes contain up to five letters, received first priority for examination, and a spot check was made of unit-censored mail. It soon became apparent, however, that the large number of security breaches detected in this mail demanded more complete examination.

As staff limitations precluded normal examination the only course

left was a systematic delay of troop mail until units either had completed their movement, or, at least, were well on their way. This treatment, whilst delaying the passage of positive information, defeated its purpose by arousing speculation, which inevitably gave birth to rumours and generally advertised the fact that "something was happening."

That was the situation when Field Censorship sections, each comprising one officer and nine other ranks, were formed and attached to Post and Telegraph Censorship offices in capital cities for initial censorship training and duty.

After a short training period Field Censorship sections were moved to Port Moresby, Townsville, and the Northern Territory. Mail was requisitioned from Army Postal Service, before reaching PMG channels, and liaison was established with GS (Int) formations in the sections' respective areas. O's C Sections were appointed Post and Telegraph Censorship authorities thus allowing mail to be requisitioned from PMG channels and enabling Field Censors to obtain letters posted by service personnel in PMG post boxes with intent to evade unit censorship. It should be noted that this latter function obtained only in "de-

clared areas" or with the specific approval of a District or Sub-District Censor controlling a particular area.

Security breaches detected were referred back to unit through GS (Int), offenders were penalised, franking officers who consistently allowed censorable matter to pass were denied the privilege of franking their own letters, and the situation improved considerably.

It will be understood that at this time Field Censorship was primarily concerned with security, the stoppage of information which could be of use to an enemy, either directly or indirectly, e.g., information which might disturb public morale, arouse antipathy to allied troops or in any other way affect the war effort. Censorship was directed and conducted with that one aim.

It soon became apparent that an unduly harsh or restrictive censorship aroused resentment, that troops were devising codes to convey information, and, despite severe penalties, were still attempting to evade censorship by posting in PMG boxes.

Field censors in conjunction with Field Security personnel commenced a drive to educate troops in the urgent need for security in their correspondence, their actions and their conversation. Lectures were given to units explaining the reasons for censorship, officers were taught how to treat mail, and a further improvement was noted.

Field censors then began to explore and exploit the informative aspect of censorship. Examination of troop mail had revealed a wealth of matter of interest to the Army.

Pointers to the morale of individual units and the factors contributing to or against morale, comment on every phase of army life.

Field censorship reports progressed from a recital of security to an accurate record of morale, troop reaction to security measures, censorship, training, comment on rations, quarters, and a variety of subjects. Mail was requisitioned from individual units and checked over a given period. Subsequent reports to GS (Int) gave a fairly comprehensive picture of security and morale in these units, also a cross-section of troop comment on various matters. To quote GS (Int) First Aust Army, "... Your reports convey more information of value than all other sources combined. ..."

In 1943 field censorship sections were absorbed by the newly-formed 1 Field Censorship Company, commanded by GSI (c) Adv LHQ. Standing Orders were revised, up-to-date field censorship instructions were issued, a comprehensive report pro forma was drawn up, and work of detachments was co-ordinated.

As operations proceeded in New Guinea, so were field censorship detachments moved forward and attached to division and base sub-area headquarters. This enabled detachments to requisition mail as close as possible to its source, facilitated examination of mail from individual units and allowed speedy reference for any action required.

It will be understood that once outward mail reaches Base Post Office it is sorted into "locality" bundles, i.e., cities, towns, etc., and that censorship becomes a general check on mail from a large area

rather than an intensive examination of mail from a particular unit or group of units. Both types of censorship are necessary, the former to provide a general check on security and a general picture of troop morale, etc., the latter to allow a specific check of individual units and thus provide sufficient material for accurate reports on such units.

The New Guinea campaigns brought a flood of souvenirs, ranging from enemy documents and equipment to live ammunition, hand grenades, rifles and even machine guns. One enthusiast attempted to mail a fully-armed Jap mortar bomb of a new type.

The search for enemy equipment, improperly retained and sent home by members, also entailed a thorough examination of parcels handled by the Military Forwarding Organisation. This channel, available for handling parcels unacceptable to Army Postal Service because of bulk or awkward dimensions, was given special attention, and all equipment intercepted was returned to senders' units through GS (Int) formation.

Units were lectured by field censorship and field security personnel on the necessity for sending captured documents back to the rear without delay. The intelligence value of such material was stressed, particularly as it might apply to the operation then in progress.

The informative value of enemy soldiers' personal documents, identification tags on uniforms, makers' plates and serial numbers on equipment, etc., was explained, and members were encouraged to hand in these items, for examination, with a tag attached bearing the finder's

no., rank, name, unit, date and place found.

Members were informed that material not required by the army would be stamped with a "War Souvenir" stamp and then would become a legitimate souvenir, which could be sent or taken home. A new approach was made to the censorship-security problem. It was realised that members of the forces were usually sympathetic to reasonable and necessary censorship, but were resentful of harsh or inconsistent censoring.

It was stressed that, so long as his remarks did not transgress security, a soldier could write or criticise as he pleased. If his morale was to be sustained he should have a free outlet for his thoughts and opinions.

Troop reaction to this modified policy was excellent. Security breaches were reduced to a minimum and the informative value of letters increased. Field censorship lectures, by invitation of RAAF Group HQ, were extended to RAAF units in New Guinea.

Officers and crews of merchant ships also were lectured.

North Queensland, roughly north of a line drawn westward from Cardwell, was at this time a major troop concentration area. Infantry divisions were being brought up to strength and new units were constantly arriving. These activities in an area whose population contained many people of enemy alien origin presented a special security problem. Consequently, the area was "declared," civilian movement to and from the area was restricted and all mails, telephone lines and telegrams were placed under field censorship.

Trunk line calls to places outside the area could be made only with the approval of OC Field Censorship Detachment. All trunk line calls and a percentage of internal calls were monitored. Any security infringement brought an immediate warning from the monitor, repeated infringements resulted in termination of the call.

All telegrams and a percentage of letters from the area were subjected to censorship. This overall coverage of postal communications was achieved with a minimum of incon-

venience to the public and the business community.

Field censorship detachments in New Guinea, later in Morotai and Borneo, continued to lecture new units on arrival. Selective censorship of unit mail and reports arising therefrom continued to provide HQ formations with accurate information. Security breaches had been reduced to 1 per cent. of all communications examined, and were mainly of a minor nature. This low figure was maintained until the war ended.

No man was ever a greater practical administrator than Wellington; none ever more conscious of the necessity of meticulous attention to every minute detail; to what he describes as tracing a biscuit from Lisbon into a man's mouth on the frontier, and to remembering that "a soldier with a musket cannot fight without ammunition, and that in two hours he will expend all he can carry." But he was therefore all the more critical of the kind of administration — so dear to little minds — which obscures clear and simple administration by a mass of needless paper. "My Lord," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "if I attempted to answer the mass of futile correspondence that surrounds me I should be debarred from all serious business of campaigning. . . . So long as I retain an independent position I shall see no officer under my command is debarred by attending the futile drivelling of mere quill-driving from attending to his first duty, which is and always has been, so to train the private men under his command that they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field."

—Arthur Bryant in "Years of Victory."

HOME MADE AMMUNITION

This is not a plan for the production of atomic bombs or guided missiles, but a short description of how the bandits in Malaya make small arms ammunition.

Materials Required:—

- (a) Salvaged cartridge cases of any calibre. The bandits are equipped with all sizes and types of small arms.
- (b) Safety matches.
- (c) Nail polish.
- (d) The droppings of a bat colony, sulphur and charcoal.
- (e) Lead from the roofs of Chinese temples.

Method of Production:

- (a) Prize the spent cap from a cartridge case and insert in the hole the crushed heads of one or two matches. Lacquer with nail polish to hold in position and keep dry.
- (b) Place a fair quantity of bat droppings in a cauldron, with a second cauldron inverted over the first. Cook for about four hours and let stand for about twenty-four hours. Then scrape the resultant powder from the inverted cauldron and mix with sulphur and charcoal. The result is a fair propellant. Pour it into the cartridge case.
- (c) Melt the lead, set in a home-made mould, and fix in position in the cartridge case.

Tests of captured ammunition made by this process have proved that only one round in hundreds fails to function.

Range, accuracy or penetration is of little importance to the bandit, as he rarely opens fire at ranges in excess of 20 to 25 yards.

JAPAN TODAY



[With the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan again takes her place as an independent nation. This article, which is reprinted from the RAAF Reserve Magazine, discusses her future role in the East-West conflict, and indicates just what part a revived Japan may play in world affairs.]

Neither the General Staff nor RAAF Headquarters necessarily agree with the views expressed by the author.—Editor.]

IT is nearly seven years since this small archipelago—Japan—announced her surrender to the Allied Powers. From that time she has undergone an intensive course of democratic tutelage, and now she is again considered fit to take her position along with the other nations of the world. But never has a country received her independence

at such a period of world confusion and division, and never has that country been so fervently desired by both divisions.

Considered an absolutely essential ally by the Western Powers as a bulwark against the Sino-Soviet bloc's push eastward, Japan is also coveted by the Sino-Soviets themselves because of her vast industrial potential.

Disarmed so thoroughly by the Allied Powers and being particularly vulnerable to air attack, Japan appears an easy prey to possible invasion by a Sino-Soviet force.

To fully appreciate the unstable position of Japan today, it is necessary to study the external influences of both the Western and Soviet divisions upon her, and the internal effect derived from these influences.

Soviet Threat

Completion of a military agreement between U.S.A. and Japan following the ratification of the Peace Treaty and prior to the cessation of hostilities in Korea, could provide an excuse for Chinese Communist or Russian aggression. This is due to the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, which stated that should either signatory be attacked by Japan or any power allied with her, both parties of the treaty are pledged to support one another. Therefore, should Red China launch an attack on Formosa, American armed intervention to protect the Nationalists could perhaps involve Japan in another conflict. Technically speaking, Formosa is still Japanese, having been annexed from China in 1895, and, according to International Law, the Chinese Communists have no real claim to it.

Having refused to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan, Russia and China could claim that Japan's autonomy is still only valid with those countries which signed the Treaty, and, as Japan would be forced to eventually refuse demands made upon her by the Soviets and Chinese, the surrender of Japan could be repudiated, and the Soviet and Japan would be virtually in a state of war. Even if America should leave some of her forces in Japan as a protective measure until such time as Japan became self-dependent, Russia could still exercise considerable influence on Japanese policies due to the close proximity of Soviet-influenced Manchuria, China, Sakhalin, Mongolia and the Kuriles, with which areas Japan must be forced eventually to trade.

Trade and Economy.

Japan, with an area of 142,000 sq.

miles (approx.) and a population of 84 million, increasing at the rate of approximately one million every year, has always been faced with the problem of feeding her millions. This is mainly because only 16 per cent. of the total area can be classed as arable land. Therefore, Japan must have intercourse with neighbouring countries, the majority of which are, today, Communist controlled.

National resources include small mineral and ore deposits and a limited hydro-electric scheme operated by Japan's fast-flowing rivers; but Japan is forced to rely upon external sources for most of her raw materials, in particular, coking coal for her much-needed steel industry. In fact, the only thing that Japan really has an abundance of is manpower. Out of a labour force of 36 million, approximately 15 million are employed on the land. This is one section of Japan which it is virtually impossible to mechanize, due to the segmentation of the land into thousands of little farms, the majority of which are separately owned and worked. To combine these farms for greater mechanization and therefore increased crop yield would be contrary to all principles of land reform, as introduced by the Japanese Government under S.C.A.P. direction.

Mass emigration has been contemplated by Japan as a means of solving her population problems, but this has been opposed by the industrialists, who do not wish to be robbed of such a cheap and plentiful labour pool. Also, there is an acute lack of offers from other powers to accept Japanese migrants.

Regarding trade, both Conservative and Leftist quarters in Japan

state that she should scrap her hostile policy towards Red China if trade opportunities should arise with that power. However, Prime Minister Yoshida considers the trade-role of China to be grossly overrated, although industrial groups greatly favour resumption of trade relations with the Chinese mainland, especially in raw materials.

The Japanese steel industry, which has greatly assisted U.N. operations in Korea, has in the past utilized coking coal brought from Manchuria and Sakhalin. However, India has now begun to ship coal to Japan.

Realizing the advantages of trade with Japan, Red China is tempting her with an abundance of these raw materials and also a ready market for Japan's manufactured or processed articles. Negotiations have also been carried out with the U.S.S.R. for the resumption of coal imports from Sakhalin. This is truly a tempting contract for Japan, as Soviet prices are very low.

Hence it can be seen that the Soviet must have an influence and a very definite interest in this small archipelago which geographically commands the Western Pacific, both as a base for either further Eastern or Western attacks, or because Russia harbours a hidden fear that Japan could jeopardize Communist solidarity in Asia.

Russia is also endeavouring to bring her influence to bear on Japanese politics by means of the Japanese Communist Party (J.C.P.).

Communism in Japan.

Following the failure of the 1947 general strikes in Japan, the J.C.P.,

under the leadership of Kyuichi Tokuda, suffered a great setback until the reins of leadership were taken over by Sanzo Nazoka, who decided on the use of "peace front tactics" rather than continuing all-out onslaughts against the "Western Imperialists." However, on the abandonment of these popular "peace tactics" on Moscow direction a considerable drop in the numerical strength of the J.C.P. was noticed. The sweeping victory of the right-wing parties in the general elections, followed by the introduction by the Japanese Government of "unlawful labour acts" and "control of strikes," also brought about substantial losses in support for the Communists.

The retrenchment programme which was introduced by the Government as an austerity measure resulted in the dismissal of several thousand trade unionists, including many militant Communists, which further diminished Communist influence in the trade union movement.

It then became general knowledge that, due to the influence of S.C.A.P., the anti-Communist attitude of the Japanese Government and the tremendous "loss of face" that the J.C.P. had suffered, the Communist



The Dai Achi Building—HQ of SCAP in Tokyo

Party had "gone underground" with its remaining supporters. It is significant, however, that when the arrest of the J.C.P. leaders was ordered, police were unable to trace any of them, indicating that the Communists obviously had more influence and power than had been previously realized. It is also well within the bounds of possibility that the apparent decline in the numerical strength of the J.C.P. was only due to the thorough "sorting out" of party members and the retention of only the most ardent supporters and militants.


A significant fact is the non-return to Japan of repatriates from the Soviet areas. The majority of these ex-P.O.W.'s had undergone Communist indoctrination courses prior to returning to their homeland. On arrival in Japan they were immediately approached by local J.C.P. members to join the party and the greater number of them did become fervent supporters. Following several political demonstrations at repatriate collection depots, such demonstrations were banned on S.C.A.P. direction. It is interesting to note, however, that shortly after this period no further repatriates were returned to Japan by the Soviet, even though transport was made available by the Allied Powers for their conveyance. It is not at all unlikely that the Russians were disinclined to allow any more of their carefully indoctrinated Communist "ambassadors" to return to Japan until such time as the Occupation troops were removed, so that the remaining 300,000 repatriates would have some chance of being able to spread their teachings unmolested and unhampered by rigorous Occupation controls.

Many of these repatriates who

had already returned home became members of the Japan-Russian Fellowship Society, formed on the surface with the prime object of establishing and preserving peace. At meetings of this society, which had sub-branches in many of the villages in Japan, repatriates delivered talks and lectures on conditions existing in the U.S.S.R. and the advantages of Communism to the working populace. One section of these societies confined its attention to the youth of Japan, even to the small children in primary schools. Children's picnics and picture shows were organized, but all entertainments were heavily impregnated with pro-Russian and Communist propaganda.

Forming themselves into the Japanese Repatriates League, with a membership of approximately 80,000, they were a powerful addition and a booster to the J.C.P., but frequently the aims and policies of this league were inclined to be pro-repatriate rather than pro-J.C.P. Friction was also caused by the repatriates' tendency to "look down" on J.C.P. members, due to the formers' superior education in Soviet doctrine.

Another section of the community to be considered is the Korean minority in Japan, which is also predominantly Communist. Although small in number as compared to the total population of Japan, it is a very influential section in some areas and figured prominently in the strikes and demonstrations by Communists mentioned previously. Recent reports reveal the opening of Korean youth training schools in Japan where the curriculum incorporates, among other things, guerrilla tactics and small arms practice. These Communist sections finally became



Shigeru-Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, is a liberal and strongly anti-Communist.

so troublesome that the Japanese Government resorted to the use of "secret police" to investigate and curb their activities.

Thus it can be seen that although the threat of Communism internally in Japan is very definitely present, the danger of it becoming a dominating and controlling influence, to such a degree where the Government would be powerless, is rather slight if the people of Japan can be "cared for" by the Allied Powers until such time as they can fend for themselves. Not only material and financial aid, but trade assistance, is essential to Japan.

Relations with the West.

Never has an occupation and disarmament of a former enemy been carried out so peacefully as that now completed by the Allied Powers

in Japan. On the surface the whole period has been marked by co-operation — not only from the Government, but from the people themselves. But what of the subterranean feeling of the Japanese against the so-termed "Western Aggressors"?

Firstly, Japan still has its Emperor, and although he renounced all claims to divine heritage in a proclamation to the nation, this could have been interpreted to the Japanese way of thinking as a gesture by the Emperor to appease the Allied Powers. So although the Potsdam Declaration stated that "All who deceived the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, shall be removed from power," the Emperor still remains.

Also significant is that Emperor Hirohito's proclamation to the people on the cessation of hostilities made no mention of the word "surrender," but to only "effect a settlement. Later, in appealing to the Diet for the adoption of the New Constitution, Prime Minister Yoshida stated that this constitution was made necessary "due to the feelings of Allied countries"; thereby relieving himself of all responsibility for the rulings as laid down in the document. It is therefore quite possible that drastic amendment of this constitution may take place upon the Peace Treaty being ratified.

Japan was supposedly demilitarized thoroughly by the Allied Powers, but, due to the lack of Allied staff with a sufficient knowledge of Japanese affairs most of the demobilization of the armed forces was carried out by former high-ranking Japanese officers. And perhaps it would not have been unnatural for


them to have so demilitarized or demobilized their forces that they could be rapidly mobilized again if Japan was really in danger. There is also on record the many tons of Japanese arms and weapon stock-piles which were uncovered by the security forces in Japan. How many of these arsenals still remain?

Complete demilitarization of Japan was further handicapped by the language barrier between the Occupier and the Occupied. Practically all Military Government business necessitated the use of Japanese interpreters, the integrity of whom must often be doubted, due to patriotic ties or just plain cunning.

Admittedly, many Westerners, especially those who have been in Japan, agree that the Japanese as an individual, is a friendly, homely

and peace-loving person, who desires little from life but to live. However, the individual is a totally different proposition from the politically organized, fanatical "fiends" which were so much a part of war-time Japan.

Recently Prime Minister Yoshida stated that by October, 1952, Japan would have a new defence set-up, financed by American aid. This means a further drain on the already overstrained purses of the American taxpayer. Actually, the cause of the economic state of Japan today is partly self-inflicted. She previously blamed her lack of production on "uncertainties" in the reparation claims of foreign countries, but this fact did not in any way seriously curb her production in other industries.



Women silk-reelers

Pre-war Japan derived a large percentage of her export revenue from industries such as silk. This material has been largely superseded by such substitutes as nylon and rayon, which has caused Japan to concentrate on other industries, such as machine-building. These industries could be quite easily reconverted for war purposes if the occasion should arise.

Although like the armed forces the "Zaibatsu" (money group) of Japan was officially disbanded on the cessation of hostilities, nevertheless their influence on Japan, both industrially and politically, is once more gaining momentum.

In reality, it appears that the Japanese industry, and consequently the industrial potential of Japan, has not been seriously impaired by either the occupation or by the reparation claims, as the original reparation programme has been scaled down by S.C.A.P. and is now practically non-existent. The reason for this action has been stated as the inability to separate one industry without affecting another, and the obsolescence of war-time Japanese equipment. Another reason is that Japan must be permitted to develop in order to assist South East Asia, and any serious reparation demands would make this impossible, or at least delay it considerably. Hence we have Japan sitting back with the possibility of reaching her pre-war production levels in a relatively short space of time, and meanwhile receiving considerable American aid.

Armed Forces Revival.

Against vigorous protests from outside powers, Japan has announced that the N.P.R. (National

Police Reserve), in reality a bazooka-armed, rifle-carrying and organised army, will be 300,000 strong by 1953, whilst her "Navy," known as the Maritime Safety Board, will be expanded to 21,000. Together with this is the fact that during the Allied occupation Japan has had a first-class opportunity of studying and absorbing American "know-how" in hygiene, medicine and service organization generally, which should greatly assist her armed forces at a future date. We can be assured that, world "copiers" as the Japanese are, they will waste little time in applying to their own forces what they have observed and learned.

The men under arms, 321,000, may seem a negligible force as compared to the population of Japan, but it may be recalled that it was from a nucleus of 100,000 men that Germany arose to challenge the world, following World War I.

It was also announced recently that 400 ex-Staff and 400 ex-company officers of the Japanese army, previously on the purged list, had been released for training duties with the police reserve. Also significant is the fact that the N.P.R. and the Maritime Safety Board shall come under control of the Defence Ministry, following the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

Apart from this so-termed "standing army," Japan can mobilize, at extremely short notice, large volunteer forces. This was proved in July, 1949, when the Japanese Government intervened to "break" the Communist-led union strikes by organizing a 2,000,000 strong volunteer force as a demonstration of Government strength.

Future Role.

Of course, on the completion of the American occupation of Japan there is the possibility of an acute dollar shortage and the danger of inflation. America may decide to limit her financial and material assistance to a bare minimum because of her experience with post-war China in that field.

If pro-Americanism should prove

profitable to Japan by seriously affecting her economy and also her trade relations with other countries, we could expect drastic changes in her policy towards the Allied Powers. By "fence sitting" and playing off the Western Powers against the Soviet, the wily Japanese might indeed drive a hard bargain.

Such is Japan today — as unknown now as she was in 1939.

The grim struggle which occupies the entire world today is simply the latest version of the age-old conflict between freedom and tyranny. In the terms of our times, it is a battle between democracy and totalitarianism. It has accurately been described as a battle for men's minds — and we are joined desperately in that battle today. But unless we pursue the struggle unremittingly, and unless we are armed with clear, unqualified conviction as to our purposes, we can have little hope of winning, without resort to a war which no nation would really win.

—Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, USA.

IT'S THE PRINCIPLE THAT MATTERS

Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Masel,
11/44th Infantry Battalion.

IT was unfortunate for the author of "A Matter of Principle" ("Australian Army Journal," No. 34), that his attack on tactical principles should have been published in the same issue as "Operation Commando"—an admirable report, which proved that the Principles of War are being applied with full success in Korea.

The author states that he has "no quarrel with the so-called Principles of War;" but some answer is required to his use of the damaging term "so-called;" to his assertion that the principles are almost invariably rewritten after each major war; and to his claim that the major powers cannot agree as to what should or should not be included in the list.

The Principles of War are not laboratory-tested formulae for success; they are simple, commonsense precepts which have emerged from our study of centuries of warfare. David hurls a stone from a catapult; Hannibal crosses the Alps on elephants; the Seventh Australian Division makes an airborne landing in New Guinea—here are different applications of the need for flexibility. The Greeks build a wooden horse at Troy; Montgomery builds a dummy pipeline at Alamein; here are variations of the use of stratagem to gain surprise. Harold is lured from the vital ground at Hast-

ings; careless talk allows the Germans to anticipate the Dieppe raid—here are variations of the disaster that follows violation of the principle of security.

The Principles of War are in essence a summary of the lessons learned from a long series of operations; and World War 2—far from requiring us to rewrite the principles—confirmed our selection. True, "mobility" was changed to "flexibility;" but this is a change only in terminology. True, "morale" and "administration" have been officially added to the list, but they were always recognised as being of vital consequence, and their inclusion does not alter one sentence of the common tactical doctrine.

Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that each major power has its own list of principles. Admittedly the Americans include simplicity, but do we not stress that flexibility implies the need for a simple plan? Admittedly the Prussians added public opinion; but is this not in many respects synonymous with morale?

The Principles of War can be compared with the gearbox of a car. In the gearbox are a few cogs and shafts which represent the knowledge accumulated from years of study of power-ratios, road-surfaces, gradients, friction, etc. Would the author reject the principle of the

gearbox because the late Mr. Henry Ford was satisfied to give us three forward speeds, while the munificent Lord Nuffield insists on giving us four? Or has he lost faith in gears merely because some cars are fitted with fingertip control, while others have a lever set into the floor? It's the principle that matters. Whether the Americans talk of simplicity when we talk of flexibility, whether one car has a short gear-lever where another has a long gear-lever, we cannot afford to dismiss the knowledge acquired over years of painful and laborious experience.

The Phases of War.

The author moves on to safer ground when he attacks misconceptions about the "principles" of the phases of war. There is, I agree, a tendency on the part of some instructors to believe that we have one set of principles called the Principles of War and another set called the principles of defence, or the attack, or the withdrawal.

The "principles of defence" are really the application of the Principles of War to that particular phase of war. "Counter-attack to regain vital ground" is the application of the principle of maintenance of the aim; "concealment of localities" is the application of surprise; "all-round defence" is the application of security; "centralised control of artillery" is the application of flexibility; and so on. If we remember that principles are precepts and

not immutable laws, we are free to apply each principle in accordance with our appreciation of a particular situation. If we are committed to defence on an extended front (which means a reduction in mutual support, i.e., in co-operation between arms), we must place greater emphasis on reserve of firepower, i.e., on flexibility leading later to concentration of fire at the decisive time and place. The Germans are usually sound strategists; but, when supreme command passed into the hands of a man who did not understand general principles, their plans for the defence of the French coast violated this very principle of flexibility leading to concentration when and as required.

I deprecate very earnestly the thought that destructive criticism of the common tactical doctrine is to be encouraged. What we need are a clearer insight into the meaning of the Principles of War, a better understanding of how they have been applied in various situations by the great captains, and a realisation that obstinate contempt for past mistakes will result in our receiving a bloody nose.

Just as the science student who profits by past experiments is a long way ahead of the student who starts research on the basis of his own personal and unproven ideas, so the military student who thinks in terms of the established Principles of War is 5,000 years ahead of the amateur who starts from scratch.

The Campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz



A STUDY OF NAPOLEONIC STRATEGY

Part II.

LONG before Napoleon finally abandoned his project for the invasion of the British Isles he began the preparation of his alternative plan for an offensive against Austria. This plan was developed in accordance with our modern security regulations. In the early stages he confided his intentions to two men only — Prince Tallyrand, who, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, was responsible for many details of the deception plan, and Marshal Berthier, his Chief of Staff, who had to work out the administrative arrangements to enable 200,000 men to march rapidly across France and Bavaria. As the plan developed more officers had to be put to work on it, but great care was taken to ensure that each one of them was utterly trustworthy and that he was given no more information than was necessary to enable him to carry out his task.

The Deception Plan.

Prince Tallyrand produced and coordinated the deception plan and directed its execution with consum-

mate skill, deep psychological insight and knowledge of the enemy's characteristics and predilections. From his embassies in neutral countries a stream of information, some of it based on apparently careless talk and some on apparent treachery, reached Allied Headquarters in Vienna. Much of this information was confusing, some of it pointed to action in one direction, some of it to another. But when it was all collated and processed by the Allied intelligence staff it pointed unmistakably to a French offensive in northern Italy, or possibly in the Tyrol.

The information fed to Vienna through diplomatic and other civil agencies was supplemented by suitable deceptive activities in the military sphere. In Italy the French troops increased the tempo of their training, there were high-level conferences shrouded in secrecy, and much coming and going of couriers from France. Road works were undertaken and war-like stores accumulated. Medical officers unobtrusively inspected suitable buildings, apparently with a view to converting them into hospitals.

In the Tyrol officers, whose designedly thin civilian disguise a discerning eye could hardly fail to penetrate, made extensive reconnaissances of roads, bridges, and other features, while other agents enquired about the purchase of supplies. These military activities finally convinced the Allied commanders that their original appreciation of the probable line of French action was correct.

The Allies made little effort to evolve and stage any deception measures. Their counter-intelligence service was inefficient, while their ideas on the security of plans and information were primitive. Tallyrand claimed that he knew in Paris of decisions taken at the highest levels in Vienna before the orders conveying them to the Allied armies had been issued.

Allied intelligence officers worked hard and paid high prices for many of the false reports they received. They failed to cover their own intentions, and they arrived at an incorrect conclusion as to the probable line of French action, because:—

1. They gave insufficient attention to the study of enemy methods in the intelligence field.

2. Their imagination was not equal to the task of penetrating the subtle schemes of Tallyrand and his assistants.

3. Hide-bound to a degree, they failed to realize that many of their own people secretly subscribed to the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, and that some of them at least would willingly co-operate with enemy agents.

4. Their agents were neither selected with sufficient care, nor trained with sufficient skill, to enable

them to penetrate the counter-intelligence screen which Napoleon drew around the Grand Army.

5. They allowed their preconceived ideas of the probable course of French action to influence their appreciation of the information they received.

French Preparations.

Early in his preparations Napoleon sent officers, disguised as civilian contractors, to travel through Bavaria searching for and buying horses "suitable for some new regiments of light cavalry the Emperor has ordered to be raised." The raising order was actually issued, and a copy of it was permitted to fall into the hands of an Austrian agent. Other officers travelled extensively on similar business missions. There was no pretence about it, purchases in quantity were actually made. Under cover of these activities the officers reconnoitred in considerable detail the country to be traversed by the Grand Army. The points of interest about these reconnaissances are:—

1. The skill and thoroughness with which they were carried out.

2. The clarity of the instructions given to the reconnoitring officers. In nearly every case the officer was given precise details of the information he was to collect in each area. Definite questions bring definite answers.

3. The remarkably small number of people who knew that the reconnaissances were being made.

4. A study of the instructions given to the officers suggests that even at this early stage Napoleon was working out details of the manner in which he intended to develop the operations.

The information gathered by the reconnoitring officers was added to existing maps, and stocks of them held ready for issue as the columns approached the areas concerned. Supplies were accumulated at points from which they could readily be moved to meet the Grand Army, whether it moved across northern France or southward to the Alps. The troops were carefully refitted with new equipment, clothing and boots. Strict censorship was imposed throughout the country. Post Offices were occupied and the frontiers closed by reserve formations of the National Guard.

Allied Preparations.

The Allies were not so forward in their preparations as the French. Neither the Austrian nor the Russian staffs worked so hard as the French, nor did they pay the same meticulous attention to detail. It is said that in considering the time factor they made the curious mistake of omitting to allow for the 12 days' difference between the old calendar observed by Russia and the

new one observed by the rest of Europe. Thus they under-estimated by nearly a fortnight the anticipated date of junction of the Austrian and Russian armies.

In contrast to the energy and singleness of purpose brought about by the French unified command, the Allied preparations were hampered and retarded by the necessity for arriving at all major decisions through a lengthy process of discussion and compromise. The different Army Commanders competed fiercely for available resources, and the Austrian Council debated at length who was to get them. Supplies came forward slowly. The Austrian Army moved sluggishly, and not very enthusiastically, towards its war stations. With equal sluggishness the Russians began to move down from the north.

Opposing Forces.

The Order of Battle of the Austrian Army of Germany is shown in Table A, while that of the Grand Army is shown in Table B. Unfortunately, through lack of informa-

The Army of Germany.

Commander-in-Chief — The Archduke Ferdinand.

Quartermaster-General — Field Marshal Mack.

1st Corps (Kienmayer)	4 brigades	18,000 men
2nd Corps (Wernecke)	3 divisions	20,000 men
3rd Corps (Schwartzenberg)	2 divisions	15,000 men
4th Corps (Riesch)	3 divisions	13,000 men

NOTE: Although nominally under the Archduke Ferdinand, the Army was in reality commanded by Mack.

Table A

The Grand Army.

Commander-in-Chief — Napoleon.

Chief-of-Staff — Berthier.

Corps	Commander	Inf Divs	Cav Divs	Artillery
1st	Bernadotte	Drouet Rivaud	Kellermann (4 regts)	24 guns
2nd	Marmont	Boudet Grouchy Dumonceau	Lacoste (4 regts)	36 guns
3rd	Davout	Bisson Friant Gudin	Vialannes (4 regts)	48 guns
4th	Soult	St. Hilaire Vandamme Legrand	Margaron (3 regts)	36 guns
5th	Lannes	Oudinot Gazan Suchet	Treillard (4 regts)	36 guns
6th	Ney	Dupont Loison Malher	Tilly (3 regts)	30 guns


Army Troops.

Guard	Bessieres	(3 inf regts)	(3 cav regts)	24 guns
Res Cav	Murat		Beaumont Walther Klein Baraguary d' Hilliers Nansouty 4th Dragoons Div (Comdr not named) One div of dismounted dragoons (Bourcier)	28 guns

Summary.

Infantry, 180 battalions,	138,194 men	
Cavalry, 185 squadrons,	25,236 men,	24,464 horses.
Artillery and Engineers,	14,093 men,	9,109 horses
Total combatants	177,523 men	

Table B



Map 2. Theatre of Operations

tion, it has not been possible to produce the Austrian OOB in the same detail as that of the French. It should be noted that this was the first campaign in which the Austrians used the corps organization. The corps commanders were inexperienced in handling such large bodies of troops, while the army commanders had not adjusted their ideas or methods of command to the new organization.

Details of the Russian organization are not known. Two armies, each of about 54,000 and 200 guns, under Kutuzoff and Buxhowden respectively, were preparing to march through Bohemia and join the Army of Germany on the Danube.

Theatre of Operations.

During the first phase of the campaign the theatre of operations was bounded on the north by the river Main, on the south by the mountainous frontiers of Switzerland and the Tyrol, on the west by the Rhine from Basle to Mayence, and on the east by the river Inn (See Map 2).

The Danube, rising in the southern portion of the Black Forest, flowed in a north-easterly direction through the theatre of operations as far as Ratisbon, whence it made a sharp bend southward. On its right bank it was joined by numerous tributaries flowing from the Alps, at right angles to the line of advance of an enemy moving from the east into the heart of Austria. The most important of these streams were the Iller, joining the Danube at Ulm, the Lech, near Donauworth, the Isar, between Ratisbon and Passau, and the Inn.

The Black Forest was a formidable military obstacle. It was a densely wooded, mountainous dis-

trict extending northward for about a hundred miles from the frontiers of Switzerland, parallel to the Rhine. It was divided into two unequal parts by the valley of the Kenzig, a small river flowing into the Rhine at Strassburg. The southern and larger portion was by far the most mountainous and densely wooded, though both were thickly covered with forests of beech, oak and fir. The climate was wet and inclement, the roads were few and bad. The breadth of this mountainous tract was about forty miles. On the west it fell away sharply towards the Rhine, but its eastern slopes merged gently into the surrounding plain.

The Rhine and the headwaters of the Danube closely approached each other north of Schaffhausen, forming a defile through which ran the main road to Munich and Vienna, via Stockach, Memmingen and Landsberg.

North of the Danube and parallel to the river, from its source to Donauworth, were the mountains of the Suabian Jura, continuing after a gap at Nordlingen, as the Franconian Jura, until they reached the Main near Bamberg.

From Mannheim, on the Rhine, the river Neckar ran first east and then south to Stuttgart around the northern edge of the Black Forest. The valley of the Neckar was a fertile and well-developed area. North of it lay the mountainous district of the Oden Wald.

The Bavarian plateau between the Danube on the north and Switzerland and the Tyrol on the south, was a fertile, well-watered tract of country with numerous small lakes and marshes. Its inhabitants were strongly opposed to the Austrians.

Austrian Advance.

In following the operations up to the point where close contact occurred it must be remembered that in those days there were no aeroplanes, no radio and no telegraph. Consequently the information forwarded by even a well-organised strategic intelligence service travelled slowly. Great armies were marching simultaneously, but in the early stages the opposing commanders had little information of each other's movements.

Although the French Grand Army began its eastward movement from the English Channel before the Austrian Army of Germany moved from its base, it will be convenient if we first consider the movements of the latter. While the Grand Army was marching across France the Austrians completed their initial operations. They then halted to argue the point about what to do next. If we first follow their movements to that stage, and then turn to the French, we will avoid getting an impression of a pause in the operations. There was no pause on the French side; they halted only to eat and sleep.

The Austrian Army of Germany concentrated around Wels towards the end of August. In accordance with the Allies' plan, Mack, on 4th September, ordered two columns to advance to the Inn, which formed the Austrian frontier with Bavaria. The southern column crossed the river at Braunau and occupied Munich, the Bavarian capital, on the 11th. The northern column crossed at Sharding, and marched via Landshut and Freising with the object of taking the Bavarians in the rear. However, in accordance with their arrangement with Napoleon, the Bavarians offered little opposition to

the southern column, avoided the northern column, and retired to Ratisbon and thence to Bamberg. Thus the first part of the Austrian plan for trapping the Bavarians and forcing them to join the Allies ended in failure, while the populace received the invaders with hostility.

At this stage the Allies learnt that Napoleon had broken up his camps on the Channel and that at least portion of the Grand Army was marching towards the Rhine. The Russian army under Kutusoff was advancing in seven columns, but was between 250 and 300 miles away and could not be expected to concentrate in Bavaria much before October 20. The other Russian army, under Bruxhowden, had been delayed by the doubtful attitude of Prussia and was not expected to arrive until a month later.

The Archduke Ferdinand and other Austrian commanders considered that in the absence of definite information about the movements of the main body of the Grand Army any Austrian move west of the Lech would be dangerous. They argued that if Napoleon was moving towards Bavaria with the whole of the Grand Army he could arrive with probably 150,000 men long before the Russians made their appearance. Since the Army of Germany numbered only about 72,000, they considered that they should take up a strong defensive position on the Inn, or at the most on the Isar, until the Russians did arrive.

Mack disagreed with this appreciation. He considered that only one corps of the Grand Army, about 70,000 men, was marching towards Bavaria, while the remainder was moving towards Italy. Therefore, he saw no danger in moving so far

forward as the Iller. In arriving at this conclusion, Mack may have been influenced by wishful thinking brought about by administrative considerations. The Austrian Army had recently adopted the French system of living off the country, but the system had not yet been "run in." Unorganized foraging was proving wasteful of supplies and extremely distasteful to the inhabitants. By moving forward to the Iller, Mack would be able to gather supplies from rich enemy territory, by moving back behind the Inn he would have to gather them from his own people and from an area in which they were less plentiful. And even if he did have to withdraw eventually he could make things difficult for the French by denuding the country of supplies.

Mack, who had the ear of the Austrian Emperor, got his way. On 15th September he closed his army up to the Iller. He placed the preponderance of his strength in his right at Ulm, his centre was about Menimingen, while his left, stretching beyond Kempten, reached out towards the Army of the Tyrol. Forward of his left he had an advanced detachment under Jellachich near Stockach, while his cavalry watched the eastern exits of the roads through the Black Forest.

Mack attached great importance to Ulm, probably from the fact that by holding it the Austrians had checked for a considerable time the French advance on Vienna in the previous war. Certainly Ulm was admirably placed on the flank of the traditional French line of advance from the middle Rhine and through the Black Forest. But in the face of an attack from the north or north west it became little more than a trap. As a fortress it was unsatis-

factory, because it required a very large garrison to hold the dominating heights surrounding the town.

Napoleon's Plan.

When Napoleon issued orders for the march of the Grand Army he knew few details of the Austrian movements. But he knew definitely where the Russians were, and he knew what the Allies intended to do. From a study of Mack's character and past performances he appreciated that that officer would look for a French advance along the old route through the Black Forest, and that he would attempt to check it on the Iller, or at least on the Lech.

Napoleon planned to so arrange the march of his six corps that the centre and right of the army would concentrate on the middle Rhine between Strassburg and Mannheim. They would then advance north of the Black Forest and strike the Danube about Donauworth. The left wing would cross the Rhine at Mayence, and moving via Warzburg, where it would be joined by the Bavarians, strike the Danube about Ingolstadt. This plan aimed at avoiding the difficult country of the Black Forest and placing an overwhelming force of over 200,000 men and 350 guns in a position from which it could strike the enemy's communications.

For the plan to succeed it was necessary that Mack should be kept in ignorance of the true line of French advance, and that he should be induced to believe that they were coming through the Black Forest. This vitally important task was allotted to Murat, who, with the Cavalry Reserve and Lanne's 5th Corps, was to screen the march of the main body, advance through the

Black Forest, and pin Mack down in whatever position he was found.

To guard the right flank of the Grand Army against a possible attempt of the Army of the Tyrol to move against it through Switzerland, and to bring additional reserves within marching distance of the Danube, Napoleon ordered Augerau, with the newly-formed 7th Corps, to move from Brittany to the vicinity of Basle.

The plan was based on an accurate calculation of time and space. It aimed to concentrate the main body of the Grand Army on the Danube between Donauworth and Ingolstadt while the enemy remained dispersed, and in a position from which it could attack either the Austrians or the Russians with equal ease.

The French Advance.

On 25th August, Napoleon issued orders for the march of the Grand Army to the Rhine.

The Reserve Cavalry started the next morning, followed at a day's interval by two divisions of Lanne's Corps. Marching by way of Sedan, Metz and Nancy, they closed up to the Rhine at Strassburg.

On the 28th the first divisions of the corps of Davout, Soult and Ney began their march, followed on the 30th by the second divisions, and on 1st September by the third. These corps reached the Rhine between the 23rd and 25th September. Three days later the Guard arrived at Strassburg, where GHQ was established.

Marmont marched by three roads to Nimeguen and thence to Cologne and Mayence, arriving at the latter town on 23rd September. After two days' halt he marched via Frank-

furt to Wurzburg, where he arrived on the 30th.

Bernadotte, who had been in military occupation of Hanover, started on 12th September and reached the Wurzburg area on the 27th.

The march to the Rhine was accomplished in perfect order. The distance was approximately 300 miles, and Napoleon had allowed his corps, on the average, twenty-seven days to complete the journey. With an occasional day of rest the marches worked out at about 12 miles a day. The various stages had been carefully planned, and detailed administrative arrangements made in advance. Consequently the corps arrived at their destination with but little loss from sickness or straggling. Marmont, for example, lost only nine men from his whole corps in twenty consecutive days' marching. The Grand Army arrived on the Rhine and the Main in splendid condition and full of enthusiasm.



Marshal Joachim Murat
After a painting by Gerard.

The march to the Rhine is a model for this type of operation. Reference to a map of France will show that the corps were moved by different roads and in successive echelons at a distance from one another so that they would not clash upon the march, and that there would be no difficulty in supplying and billeting them. And they were directed so that the concentration on the Rhine was on a front sufficiently distant from the enemy, but sufficiently limited in extent to satisfy all possible requirements, even should the situation undergo a change.

Napoleon arrived at Strassburg on 27th September and took over command from Murat, who, as Lieutenant-General of the Empire, had been in charge of the concentration. Murat assumed direct command of the Reserve Cavalry, and Napoleon issued the following proclamation to the Grand Army:—

“Soldiers, the War of the Third

Coalition has begun. The Austrian army has crossed the Inn, violated treaties, attacked and driven our ally from his capital. You yourselves have had to hasten by forced marches for the protection of your frontiers; but you have already passed the Rhine. I shall not halt until I have ensured the independence of Germany, supported our allies, and lowered the pride of lawless aggressors. We will make no peace without this guarantee. Our generosity will no longer deceive our policy. Soldiers, your Emperor is in your midst. You are only the vanguard of a mighty people. If necessary that people will rise at my call to destroy this new league, formed by the hatred and gold of England. But, soldiers, we have forced marches to make, fatigues and privations to endure. We will vanquish all obstacles, and we will not rest until we have planted our eagles upon the territory of our foes.”


In this proclamation Napoleon clearly and concisely presented the French view of the war to his troops. It appealed to their reason, their patriotism and their love of military glory, and it raised their enthusiasm to fever pitch.

Passage of the Rhine.

On 25th September, Murat, crossing the Rhine at Kehl, pushed his cavalry through the Black Forest, and, slowly driving back the Austrian patrols, convinced Mack that his prediction as to the French line of advance had been correct. As soon as he was clear of the Forest, Murat, leaving a screen of cavalry and Bourcier's division of dismounted dragoons to impose upon



Marshal Alexandre Berthier
After a painting by Pajou Fils



Mack, moved to his left to cover the flank of the main advance.

Lanne's, who had remained at Kehl to support Murat if necessary, now marched via Pforzheim to Stuttgart. GHQ and the Guard followed Lannes to Stuttgart.

Ney, who had crossed the Rhine at Maxau on 27th September, moved southward through Stuttgart, passing in rear of the Guard, to form the pivot on which the whole army was to wheel to the right. On the same day Davout and Soult, crossing at Mannheim and Spires respectively, moved up the valley of the Neckar. On 2nd October the heads of the columns were on the line Stuttgart—Wurzburg, on a frontage of ninety miles, with the Bavarians at Bamberg, some fifty miles farther to the left.

Murat had handled his cavalry so well that the advance had been entirely unobserved by the Austrian patrols. Mack was absolutely in the dark as to his adversary's movements.

Napoleon expected that at about this stage Mack would realize that the enemy on his front consisted of cavalry only, and that his rear was threatened by a force of unknown strength moving from the north-west. Napoleon considered that Mack would immediately abandon the line of the Iller and hasten with all possible speed to defend the Nordlingen gap. In orders issued on 3rd October the Emperor pointed out that the Austrians might cross the Danube at Ulm, Donauworth or Ingolstadt, or possibly at all three places. If they occupied Nordlingen, Davout, with his own and Soult's corps, was to contain them while the other corps operated against their flanks. If they attacked

the left wing (Bernadotte and Mar-mont), Davout, followed by Soult, was to march by the shortest route against their flank. If they moved against the French right from the direction of Ulm, Napoleon, with Ney, Lannes and the Guard, would deal with them. Meanwhile the advance was to continue with the utmost speed in order that the enemy might be given no chance to recover his balance, to re-group or to bring forward reinforcements from the other fronts or the general reserve.

Mack, in fact, remained where he was. All he did was to send Kienmeyer with some 12,000 men to Ingolstadt "to observe the Bavarians," and to divert thirty battalions, originally intended for Italy, towards the Iller. The bulk of his force, some 55,000 strong, was still between Ulm and Memmingen, while Auffenberg, with 8,000 men from the Tyrol, and Jellachich, with a similar number from the Lake Constance area, were marching to join him.

The situation on 5th October is shown in Map 3.

Comments.

Reference to Map 3 shows that the Austrian Army of Germany was now in a position of extreme danger. This situation had been brought about purely by strategic manoeuvre, no more serious fighting than a few patrol actions had as yet taken place.

Mack's inactivity can be explained only by the strength of his conviction that the French would conform to their previous practice of advancing through the Black Forest. Since this conviction was not based on intelligence, which Mack made little effort to obtain, it must have

been the result of a fixed, pre-conceived idea. The unfortunate Mack is just one more example of what happens to commanders who permit their minds to work in this way.

Full credit must be given to Murat for his skilful handling of the cavalry. He claimed, and with not much exaggeration, that not even a rabbit got through his screen. Simultaneously with screening the main movement throughout its most critical stage, he convinced Mack that a large force of all arms was, in fact, advancing against his front.

The outstanding features of the French operations were the smooth-

ness and celerity with which they were carried out. Careful planning, careful administrative arrangements and meticulous attention to detail carried the Grand Army from the English Channel almost to the Danube in one clean, swift movement.

Once clear of the obstacles of the Rhine and Main and the defile between the Black Forest and the Oden Wald, Napoleon had his army so perfectly positioned and balanced that nothing the enemy could do could interfere with his immediate intentions.

(To be Continued)

Victory is won only by a proper combination of powerful weapons — primarily infantry, artillery, armour and air — properly supported by the other arms and services. It is as important to recognize the importance of the battle team as it is to recognize that much of the success of the team depends on the support it receives.

—General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army.



THE PSYCHOLOGY of the RUSSIAN SOLDIER

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Translated and condensed by the Military Review from an article by Dr. W. Kretschmer, in "Allgemeine-Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift," Switzerland.

TO measure the military power of a country, it is not enough to know the strength of its economic and technical reserves, even though they are important in terms of modern warfare. Rather, the military power of a country must be based on a careful consideration of the ideas, emotions, and interests of the individuals of that country.

This article will attempt to point out a few psychological traits of the Russian people, and their application to military problems. It should be borne in mind that we are including all Russian peoples in this discussion; the Eastern Slavic races, the Great Russians, the Ukrainians, and the White Ruthenians.

Points to Consider.

In order to make an objective

study of the present-day Russian people, two points must be taken into consideration:

1. The Russians are a gifted, adaptable, culture-loving people, open to, and capable of, every emotion, and bound to the peoples of the West by a number of ties, among which Christianity is probably the most important.

2. The Russian people must not be regarded as one because of their system of government.

If one starts his study with these points in mind, it is possible to discover many interesting facts about the Russian people.

Primarily an Agrarian Country.

In spite of her increasing industrialization, the Soviet Union is still,

to a large extent, an agricultural country. In fact, throughout the broad, sparsely settled agrarian districts, despite the decentralization of labour, the almost Middle-Ages-like way of life of the peasant class remains practically unchanged. It is only in the industrial areas and the larger cities that the new system has been able to break the majority of the people away from their family and religious traditions.

Prolific Source of Manpower.

The peasant class is the prolific source of manpower for all vocations, as well as the Soviet Army, and the latter includes officers and enlisted personnel alike. All talented and active persons are absorbed by the many professional schools and, according to their talents and political "suitability," guided into the higher positions. They occupy the more important posts of the country, both from the technical and organizational standpoint, in the educational, industrial and military fields.

Even though Soviet teachers and university authorities repeatedly assured me that students from the rural districts display great mental alertness, eagerness, and capacity for learning, their training is oversimplified by providing specialization in only one field instead of attempting to give them a well-rounded background.

Exchange of Ideas Limited.

This one-sided specialization also is furthered by the fact that a great deal of political control and bureaucratic entanglement prevent the various vocational groups from coming into contact with one

another, for contact and exchange of ideas is permitted only within the same fields. The effects of this are almost negligible in the villages, but they increase proportionately according to the importance and the technology of the particular fields of endeavour.

As we have mentioned, the Russian peasantry, when not in contact with cities, industries, or the main routes of travel, occupies an almost Middle-Ages-type of civilization. However, this is not always a disadvantage, as evidenced many times during the last war. In fact, this factor was one of the main reasons for the tenacity of the Russians and their demonstrated superiority in improvisation, fieldcraft, and adaptability to terrain and climatic conditions.

Improvisation a Common Trait.

The Russian peasant is able, on the technical basis of a knife and an axe, to build houses, wagons, sleds, and other items in a completely self-sufficient manner. It follows, then, that under more modern living conditions, he is able to devise skilful technical improvisations. For this reason, it is easy to understand why the Soviet Union has suddenly imposed a modern technical civilization on the peasant class. This strange gap between the primitive peasant culture and the highly specialized industrialization permits us to visualize the great potential of the Soviet Union.

Natural Insight of the Peasant.

There also is another factor which should be included in this discussion, and that can be called "natural insight." The Russian peasant has

a definite ability in the handling of plants and animals, in travelling over and orienting himself in various types of terrain, and in processing and turning to profit the raw products of nature. Directly connected with this factor is the Russian's intuition with regard to mankind, especially in the case of the Russians living in isolated areas. Many Western Europeans have been put to shame by the knowledge of mankind possessed by the simple Russian peasant.

Organization of the Community.

From this, we can see that the pure and simple human qualities, without reference to rank or talents, stand in the foreground. Functions in the village community follow naturally from the capabilities of the inhabitants, and require no special organization. It is a sort of natural communism which is based on the free recognition of the human individual. Obviously, it is bound up with the simple peasant social order. As soon as it begins to follow technical, industrial, political, and military aims, it becomes a fearful, compelling force.

The manner of life of the primitive peasant is strongly intuitive and, therefore, irregular. Clocks are unknown, for the plants grow without clocks. The Western European immediately evaluates this attitude negatively, as a lack of orderliness, and forgets, in so doing, that this irrational inexactness is simply the basis of the prevailing harmonious living. Thus, it is understandable how the forced adaptation to a mechanical system of labour and military service is a principal source of discontentment of the present-day Russian.

Gaps in the Military Field.

What consequences follow from these cultural bases of the Soviet's military situation? Are we to assume that the basic form of Soviet combat ability is based on a Middle-Ages-type of warfare, that is, the sword and pike and the simply organized fighting force? There is no doubt that the Russian would have no difficulty in fighting in this manner. However, the modern form of armies has obtained a footing, and prevails throughout the Soviet armed forces. Therefore, the same gap that exists between the primitive peasant civilization and extreme specialization is found also in the military field. However, we find here not only great possibilities for discovery and adaptation, but also factors of relative weakness which will be of special interest to the professional military men of the Western powers.

Skilled Labour versus Production.

We shall study the problem first from the standpoint of industry. No one has any doubts that economic and industrial potentials are decisive factors in modern warfare. The complexity of combat means, especially in the field of air and naval warfare, requires specialized industries, scientific laboratories, factories, and machine tools. However, this specialized technological setup cannot function efficiently if any factor is lacking. War production is not only a question of material reserves; it is also a question of skilled labour. The precision mechanical industry is, therefore, an important psychological problem connected with the natural talent and upbringing of the individual.

The Western peoples have solved this problem through centuries of

skilled craftsmanship. Can the Soviet Union, in about the space of a generation, catch up with this development? That is the decisive question. To what extent the lead of the Western nations in the precision mechanical industry has been cut down is unknown, because we do not have accurate data on which to base our comparison. However, it is certain that the Soviet Army was far below the other Western nations in the use of specialized weapons of war during World War II. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that this inferiority, under certain conditions, was compensated for by the fact that in many types of terrain, sleighs, horses, and other primitive means of mobility were more usable than modern vehicles. With the aeroplane one is able, in principle, to fly anywhere, but it is impossible to travel everywhere in the Soviet Union with a motorized army.

A Problem to Solve.

The serving and employment of modern combat means also are matters which involve the soldier himself and must be considered. In this connection, the Soviet Army has an interesting psychological problem to solve. As a result of his natural intuition, the Russian soldier is able to operate vehicles and weapons as long as he is in direct contact with their controls. That is, he has no difficulty in operating a motorcycle, or a small vehicle, aeroplane or motorboat. However, as soon as this contact is broken, as in the case of large aeroplanes, ships, or tanks, and he is required to fly or travel with the help of instruments, this new psychological problem comes into evidence. To overcome this problem,

the Soviets have constructed simple weapons for initial training, and then through progressive instruction have attempted to achieve a high standard of training. Incidentally, the Soviet's machine pistols and machine guns were simple but efficient weapons, and almost equal to our own more complex weapons.

Is Specialization Possible?

To what extent the Soviet Army will be able to specialize its forces cannot be stated with any degree of accuracy at this time. However, it probably will attempt to train a small number of troops and technical personnel to a degree equalling the Western nations. At the present time, it does not seem likely that the Soviet Union will be able to achieve specialization, throughout the entire Army, comparable with the Western nations, because of the cultural and social structure of the country.

Adaptability to Climate and Terrain.

On the other hand, the natural insight of the Russian soldier gives him an advantage in other ways. He is able to adapt himself to terrain and climatic conditions. Thus, the Russian soldier easily does without the comforts of civilization, and can endure many physical discomforts. His physical vigour revealed itself clearly, during the last war, in his more rapid and definite recovery from wounds, as compared with the German soldier. As regards food and clothing, his requirements are amazingly small. Thus, the Russian soldier, on the average, is affected less by the terrain and weather than is the soldier of the Western nations.

Because he has an intimate under-

standing of nature, the Russian soldier easily constructs earthworks, digs trenches, improvizes shelters, and camouflages positions. He is able to move over the terrain more skilfully and orient himself easier than the soldier of the Western nations. He has unusual ability in detecting the presence of the enemy. When we were patrolling the lonely forests, in operations against partisans, it was always the Russian volunteers accompanying us who detected the enemy first and opened fire on him.

Fighting Qualities.

How is the Russian as a fighter? To begin with, we must correct the erroneous impression that the Russian is chiefly a mass-action fighter. The Germans believed this during the last war, and any country that makes the same mistake may suffer the same fate. There is no doubt that the Russian, more than the Westerner, is able to develop fighting fervour typical of the mass-action fighter. However, more important is the value of the Russian as an individual fighter.

It is obvious that this quality is developed least in the mass army, and most in a guerrilla force. The partisan constitutes the basic type of Russian soldier. To a far greater extent than an official soldier of the Soviet Army, he is the bearer of the national political concepts, which are, usually, directed against a regime which is felt to be foreign. Thus, there were partisans not only against the Czarist regime, but also against the Bolsheviks and the Germans. As soon as the Russian soldier is able to free himself from the mechanism of the Army, he is a skilful, versatile, and intelligent

fighter. The German Army paid a heavy price for learning this too late.

Soviet Combat Methods.

The combat methods of the Soviet Army must be understood from the point of view of their political background and the command practices arising from it. Political supervision has been so pronounced that the officers (and the higher their rank the more this is true) practically become the puppets of the political forces of the Nation, have no initiative of their own, and, thus, sink to the state of blind tools of the supreme command.

During the last war, the various arms possessed a sharply vertical command structure, that is to say, they were exclusively under the orders of their own commanders and were not able, therefore, to subordinate themselves to one another. Obviously, with such a system, co-operation and co-ordination between the various arms was extremely difficult to achieve. In addition, whenever liaison between the various arms was interrupted, the command structure disintegrated, with a resultant influence on the morale of the fighting troops.

The last war brought us no end of proof that, in their hearts, the Russian people hold their Government in abhorrence. The Russian soldier fights with conviction only for the defence of his native soil against an invader, or for liberation from a political system that is strange to him.

All political and military orientation with regard to the Soviet Union must consider her greatest

weaknesses. Obviously, these do not lie in the numbers of her soldiers nor in the strength of her industries, but exclusively in the internal political and ideological concepts of communism. Therefore, it seems much more important to obtain an accurate picture of the psychological situation and base an effective policy on it, rather than to count tanks and calculate the yearly output of factories.

Conclusion.

The Russian soldier is no better and no worse than our own. His strength comes from the fact that he fights more fiercely when he is defending the fatherland. By attempting to understand the motivations of the Russian soldier, we will be in a better position to cope with him, in the event of a future war.
