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
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ARMY HEADQUARTERS
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Editor:

COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, ED (RL).

Staff Artist:

MR. CYRIL ROSS.

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How Effective Is Our Artillery?

Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Evans,
Royal Australian Artillery.

THE doubts that prompt this article arise from the fact that the AMF for many years has relied almost entirely on the 25 pr for its artillery support and so has little experience of other equipments. As a result, we may tend to judge artillery on the effect of this weapon alone, rather than on the combined effect of the various equipments available in the British service.

This in turn has led to a rather timid employment of artillery on some of our recent tactical exercises. It may therefore be appropriate to re-examine the problem in the light of post-war knowledge.

A full analysis of all artillery is, of course, beyond the scope of this article, but the relationship of medium and heavy artillery to the problem is chosen as being of particular interest as such units now figure prominently in our Order of Battle. Reference is also made to pack and self-propelled field artillery as their status in the gunner family is often the subject of discussion.

As a starting point, it may be as well to review briefly just how we did employ our artillery in the last war. It is probably true to say that, in the AIF, not only was our experience limited almost exclusively to the 25 pr, but even in this

field few regiments experienced the changes that were taking place elsewhere as a result of improvements in radio communication which enabled large numbers of guns to be concentrated rapidly on to a single target. Never were we called on to fire observed concentrations of divisional, corps, or army artillery. Consequently it came as a surprise to many to learn subsequently of the important changes which had taken place in this respect.

Our enemy in the SWPA was a most unenterprising gunner. Most of our targets were either troops in the open or in defensive positions. Few tanks or guns were used against us. Thus the errors of using the 25 pr as a maid of all work were seldom exposed. Its shell was not designed for use against bunkers and other prepared positions — that was properly the task of the mediums and heavies. However, as the time factor was relatively unimportant, and long periods of neutralisation were seldom required, targets beyond the capacity of the 25 pr to destroy, were dealt with by aircraft once air superiority was achieved.

This arrangement provided continuous support so long as roads existed. While we had the initiative these were usually available. How-

ever, in 1942, the enemy had the initiative, as may well be the case at the beginning of another war, and we had to fight in the Owen Stanleys. Because there were no roads and the RAA had only the 25 pr, the infantry fought unsupported. It is interesting to speculate on the effect 75 mm pack hows may have had—both materially and morally.

Most operations in SWPA were predominantly infantry, except perhaps in Borneo, when the balance had again been restored. However, the war finished before the AIF appreciated the value of large concentrations of observed fire. In other theatres, however, these advantages were quickly appreciated, and the demand for artillery fire increased until the present scale of two medium regiments per division and one heavy regiment per corps, held on AGsRA was provided.

A comparison of British and Russian scales of artillery within Infantry and Rifle Divisions respectively may be of assistance here.

Soviet.	
SP	Fd.
34 x 76.2 mm.	24 x 76.2 mm.
Med.	Hy. Mortars
36 x 120 mm.	30 x 120 mm.
British.	
SP	Fd.
Nil	72 x 25 pr.
Med.	Hy. Mortars
Nil	30 x 4.2 in.

In addition, the Russians, who regard artillery as the "God of War," have Breakthrough Artillery Divisions.

If we now consider the probable theatres of operations and relate them to the types of targets to be

expected, a measure of the support likely to be required is possible. If we operate in tropical countries again, it is hardly likely that our enemy would be as poor a gunner as was the Japanese. If this is accepted, then we shall need more artillery than we used in previous operations. Also we must have available a greater variety of equipment. It would be disappointing to say the least to be again caught without a pack how and to have to take on prepared defences and hostile guns with only the 25-pr.

If we fight in open country, then our targets, in addition to field works and personnel, will include armoured vehicles, hostile artillery and other heavy equipment. Obviously 25-prs alone will not be sufficient. Furthermore, as much of the enemy's equipment is highly mobile, it must be possible to concentrate large numbers of guns quickly on to such targets. It may not be possible to call up aircraft in time, nor would aircraft be able to neutralize targets for long periods—even if we did have air superiority. Medium and heavy artillery in addition to 25-prs provide the most effective solution. The combination of 25, 80 and 95 lb shells will cause material and moral damage sufficient to disorganise armoured attacks or highly organised defences.

To achieve the large concentrations required and at the same time be economical in manpower, guns, and road space, we must have equipment with ranges long enough to be able to cover without moving, the whole of the corps front. Usually this will be beyond the capabilities of the towed 25-prs. It will be necessary to have mediums

and heavies, centralised under the highest commander possible.

Furthermore, with the Air OP we are in a position to make our harassing fire much more effective than it was—providing we have the range. So again we require mediums and heavies.

It should therefore be rarely that a Division forming part of a Corps would not have the support of at least one AGRA in any major operation. How often on our TEWTS do we employ artillery on this scale?

The answer is "seldom." And the reasons given for not doing so are:

- (a) The ammunition for artillery on this scale could not be maintained.
- (b) The road space for its movement would seldom be available.
- (c) We are not likely to be equipped with artillery on this scale on the outbreak of war so that its use on exercises is unrealistic.

In answer to the first objection, if it is agreed that our targets are likely to be field works, armoured vehicles, or guns, as well as personnel, then it will also be agreed that 25-prs alone will not be effective. If transport for ammunition supply is limited, then RAA staffs must be prepared to make estimates of the proportions in which it should be provided and the transport available allotted accordingly.

Regarding road space for the movement forward of medium artillery, opinions will differ. However, if the targets expected early in the operation require either long-range

artillery or shell heavier than the 25-pr, then some mediums must be brought forward. It might well be pointed out here that the longer the gun ranges, the fewer guns will be required to cover a front. Also fewer moves will be required necessitating fewer guns being out of action at any one time. If road space is a serious objection to the early movement of medium guns, then more consideration should be given to the development of the SP medium gun, or tractors with better cross-country performance.

The third objection pre-supposes that we shall not go to war with the laid-down scales of artillery. Attention has already been drawn to the price of being under-gunned. Any large-scale operations will almost certainly be undertaken with a properly balanced force. In any case, unless we train to use our artillery on the scales laid down we shall certainly not do so efficiently on the outbreak of war. Having learned to handle the artillery provided on the Order of Battle, anything less will be comparatively simple. Also, as the objection relates to the beginning of a war, it might be as well to relate the artillery problem to defence on a wide front. In this, the only speedy means of reacting quickly to enemy activity without committing the counter-attack force too soon, is with artillery. Furthermore, unless we employ our medium and heavy guns on the scale laid down, there seems to be little point in raising the rather expensive locating units and CB staffs. Without sufficient artillery to enable concentrations of about 20 to 1, we cannot hope for effective CB fire.

It may be of interest to consider

here whether or not there is a requirement for the Self Propelled Field Gun in the Infantry Division. With the great demand for more range, one of the few ways of getting it is to site guns further forward. Here they may be subjected to fire not only from artillery weapons, but from some small arms as well. The SP gun with its armour and its ability to move quickly to alternative positions is therefore a better weapon than the towed gun for this role. Furthermore, in attacks where deep penetration is aimed at, to maintain continuous support, some guns will be required to move quickly during the battle. The SP guns obviously can do this more efficiently than can the towed equipments. There are, therefore, advantages in having a proportion of the Divisional Artillery self-propelled in open warfare.

In conclusion it is hoped that the

picture of the 25-pr as a general purpose weapon has been supplanted by a wider appreciation of the different artillery weapons required to cope with different types of targets and different natures of terrain. As targets become more heavily armoured so must heavier guns be available for the continuous support of the forward troops. Resulting from this, medium shell have now become a vital element in our artillery fire. Not only must we have the weight of round to produce the desired effect, but we must also have the mobility to ensure that the infantry are never again expected to operate unsupported. The 75-mm pack how has therefore a strong case for inclusion as a theatre store in the Pacific. There is no more fitting analogy than that of gunners and their equipment and golfers and their clubs.

There is a vast difference between being a staff officer and being a commander. The staff officer is never totally responsible, the commander always is.

—General J. Lawton Collins, US Army.

ARMOUR IN PURSUIT

Colonel John K. Boles, Jr., Armour, US Army.

IT has been said that pursuit is the crown of victory. When a defeated enemy attempts to withdraw from the battlefield and is not pursued immediately, only half a victory has been won, but when victory on the battlefield is crowned by a successful pursuit, the enemy indeed can be destroyed. The destruction of the enemy always has been the goal of the commander in the field, but, during some periods of warfare, the ability to achieve this goal sometimes was limited.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the ability to pursue and destroy the enemy was limited greatly by the castles and walled cities in which the defeated troops were able to seek refuge. Defence and siege warfare ruled the battlefield until gunpowder reduced the effectiveness of fortresses. Because defeated forces thus were robbed of their sanctuaries, cavalry in the hands of the victor once more became the decisive element on the battlefield, the element which enabled the victor to annihilate his foe instead of merely defeating him.

About 1870, tactical mobility again began to decline, and, when World War I was being fought, the God of War found himself shackled to the battlefield by barbed wire and

imprisoned in the trenches by machine-gun fire. The glorious days of the cavalry and rapid movement, of mounted charges and pursuits, were rapidly drawing to a close. In their place, we had stabilized fronts, hundreds of miles of trenches protected by barbed wire and machine guns. If an attack was successful, the defeated soldiers merely withdrew into another line of trenches. Because of a lack of mobility, victories were not followed by pursuits, and, consequently, the defeated enemy was pushed back instead of being encircled and annihilated. Then came the tank, the answer to the barbed wire, the machine gun, and stabilized warfare. Initially, the potentialities of armour were slow in being exploited, and, during the balance of World War I, tanks were used on small-scale local attacks, primarily as an infantry support weapon.

Between World Wars I and II, some farsighted individuals saw in armour the rebirth of cavalry. Armour was not to be kept tied to the apron strings of the "Queen of Battle"—the infantry—but was to restore to warfare the mobility which it had lost when the development of longer range weapons, with greater fire power, figuratively and literally shot the horses out from under the mounted troops. Once again the victor could outdistance his fleeing foe, cut the

routes of retreat, and destroy the disorganized demoralized troops before they could recover from their initial reverses.

The same basic principles of pursuit which served Hannibal, Caesar, and Napoleon so well were to apply to armour. Armoured units are particularly well suited for pursuit missions because of their equipment, organization, and training, which

mobility, must be utilized to envelop one or both flanks of the enemy in order to block the routes of retreat, while a direct pressure force keeps the enemy fully involved. After the retreating column is halted, the enemy then is crushed between the direct pressure force and the encircling force.

The military forces of some countries teach that there are three



combine to give them armour-protected fire power with great independent mobility. This tactical and strategic mobility is the chief characteristic of armour which permits it to become the keystone around which plans for a pursuit are built.

Principles of Armoured Pursuit.

The object of armoured pursuit is the annihilation of the hostile forces. This seldom can be accomplished by a straight pushing back of the hostile forces on their lines of communications, as was attempted by the allies in World War I. It can be accomplished most effectively by combining direct pressure with an encircling manoeuvre. Armoured units, employing their

types of pursuit:—

1. Frontal pursuit by direct pressure force only.
2. Parallel pursuit engaged in by an encircling force only.
3. Combined pursuit, a combination of 1 and 2 above.

As previously indicated, our doctrine considers only one form—the combined pursuit. If the escape routes are not cut by an encircling force, the attempted pursuit may well result in the victor only nibbling at the heels of the withdrawing rear guard. The weakness of considering the frontal form of operation as a type of pursuit, instead of realizing that it is only a part of the pursuit manoeuvre, is best

illustrated in Rommel's final movement west across North Africa.

El Alamein to Tunis.

Montgomery's pursuit of Rommel, from El Alamein to Tunis, has been regarded by many as the classic example of a successful pursuit. In this action, the British Eighth Army, after winning the battle of El Alamein, made a spectacular 1,500 mile march in pursuit of more than 240,000 Germans and Italians. Frequently, it engaged the rear elements of the enemy in action and several times forced the main body out of defensive positions, but it failed to *cut off* and *destroy* the enemy. Although the manoeuvring forces six times attempted to encircle the enemy and cut the line of retreat of the main body, all efforts failed because of the difficult terrain, unfavourable weather, and the superb evasive tactics of Rommel. Instead of being the acme of pursuit, it more accurately may be considered a remarkable example of the successful evasion of a pursuing force.


Eventually, after the Eighth Army had maintained an effective direct pressure force against the rear of Rommel's columns for more than 6 months, the enemy's escape route was blocked by American, British and French forces, which had marched east from the vicinity of Casablanca. He, then, was trapped against the Mediterranean Sea, in the vicinity of Tunis, and about 240,000 prisoners were taken.

Aggressiveness.

Next to the employment of the direct pressure and encircling forces, *aggressiveness* is considered

the most important characteristic or principle of the use of armour in the pursuit. A pursuit, at its best, is not any easy matter to initiate after a battle. Some units are disorganized, the troops are exhausted, and sometimes a mental reaction sets in resulting in a lethargic attitude among the victors. Aggressiveness is inherent in all successful pursuits, as evidenced by our reading in which "victorious troops, flushed with victory, pursued the beaten enemy." A careful study of these pursuits will indicate that often the controlling factor was an aggressive leader who possessed great daring, initiative, and enthusiasm coupled with a determination to outstrip and annihilate the enemy. The leader must drive his force and use his vehicles and equipment to the utmost. He must not look back nor attempt to keep in line with adjacent units, and he must take a calculated risk as regards his exposed flanks, realizing that the enemy's demoralization greatly reduces the risk involved.

During pursuit by armour, radio is the principal means of communication. If the enemy is off balance and speed is of the essence, radio security becomes less important. The enemy cannot react in time. A German radio intercept team, captured after the 1st Armoured Division's pursuit of the enemy to Bizerte, stated that they knew every plan of the division, but did not have time to react. Any attempt by the enemy to reorganize his retreat must be frustrated by maintaining the pursuit day and night. Under no circumstances should the enemy be allowed to break contact. To do so may enable him to evade the enveloping force, slip out of the



trap, and again become an effective fighting force.

Many a campaign or victory has fallen far short of being decisive, because of indecision and lack of aggressiveness on the part of the leaders of the victorious forces. The evacuation of the British at Dunkirk is an example of this. As a result of the failure to maintain the pressure to the limit of the endurance of the German forces, the British, by sacrificing a comparatively few rearguard elements, were able to evacuate 300,000 troops. The German commander failed in his mission to destroy the British Expeditionary Forces.

Another example occurred, closer to home, during the Civil War. We have been taught that the battle of Gettysburg was a Union victory; that it was the turning point of the Civil War; a glorious battle which decided the face of the Confederacy. Meade won the battle of Gettysburg, but what a hollow victory it was! He defeated Lee on the battlefield, but fell far short of des-

trouying him. When Lee's beaten army withdrew toward Virginia, Meade failed to pursue immediately with his army. After a delay of a day, direct pressure and encircling forces were dispatched. Lee's rear guard halted the small direct pressure force in the mountains, resulting in Meade's next great error. He halted the advance of his enveloping force, his main body of six corps, for one day. He failed to maintain the momentum of the pursuit. By this time, Lee had reached his one escape bridge over the Potomac River and found that not only had Meade's cavalry destroyed the bridge, but that rains had raised the river so his troops could not make a crossing. In spite of Meade's dawdling pursuit, Lee was trapped.

The Union forces then continued their envelopment, reached the flooded Potomac beside the Confederate forces, but there the pursuit again was stopped! Lee's beaten army, short of supplies, and laden down with wounded, was trapped in enemy territory by su-

perior forces and a flooded river, but Meade failed to press his advantage and consummate the victory. One week after the Confederate troops had been trapped by the river, the Union forces decided to attack and destroy them, but the attack was launched into an empty bridgehead. Lee had constructed another bridge, and the Army of Northern Virginia had escaped, to prolong the war for three more years.

Organization and Support.

Armour in the pursuit normally advances in multiple columns on roads and trails, prepared at a moment's notice to attack from march column. Consequently, the units are arranged in the columns, as they are on any tactical march, in the order of anticipated employment. Raids by hostile aircraft and tanks always must be expected. Hence, the means of anti-aircraft and anti-tank defence must be distributed throughout the columns.

The pursuing columns are composed of tanks, armoured infantry, armoured artillery, and engineers, and are organized into combined arms teams. Following and supporting the armoured divisions will be motorized infantry divisions, which will relieve the armour on critical terrain features, will protect the lines of communications, mop-up bypassed pockets of resistance, and, after the enemy has been surrounded, will assist in his destruction.

Although the self-propelled artillery will have little trouble keeping up with the mobile forces, heavier and longer range towed artillery will have difficulty and

usually will be left behind. In place of it, additional air support, in the form of column cover, may be employed against ground targets. This air support also will give some protection against enemy air. However, protection from enemy air, furnished primarily by the air defence command, is the most important function of the air support, since pursuing forces certainly will be the prime target of hostile air.

The air forces also can be used, in conjunction with the direct pressure force, to continue a relentless attack against the retreating columns to add to their disorganization and to slow down their movement. This will enable the encircling force to cut off their retreat more easily. The use of air support must not be restricted to daylight hours. Even at night, combat aviation must cover the enemy's escape routes, and attack the enemy columns and critical points along the routes.

Reconnaissance aircraft must be used to maintain contact with the enemy and to locate any movement of hostile reinforcements. The 20 light aircraft assigned to the armoured division are especially helpful in locating enemy roadblocks, in seeking bypass routes, as well as in adjusting artillery fire.

Another critical item of support in pursuit operations is that provided by the engineers. Where a map study indicates its probable use, bridging equipment must be well forward in the columns. The enemy's demolition crews will do all in their power to impede the advance of the pursuing forces, but, because of the speed and surprise

with which the armoured columns will advance through the hostile rear areas, many bridges on secondary roads will be found to be intact.

Multiple Columns.

The pursuit is carried out by employing multiple armoured columns over a broad front. The danger of being over-extended laterally frequently is an acceptable risk during this phase of combat. The pursuing forces avoid combat and bypass any obstacles or isolated groups of the enemy. By employing multiple columns on a broad front, unobstructed routes towards the objective are found more readily, and the units which are being impeded can be diverted to these routes.

Objectives.

The objectives selected for the encircling forces must facilitate the halting and blocking of the enemy while the two forces destroy him. Suitable objectives are mountain passes, bridges, road centres, or other defiles through which the enemy is expected to pass. Consideration must be given to the fact that if the encircling force is a small, very mobile armoured column, it will require all the assistance it can get from the terrain, in order to halt and block the enemy. At times, an airborne or amphibious landing can be used in conjunction with the armoured encircling force for the initial seizure of the objectives on the route. If airborne or amphibious troops could have been made available during Montgomery's march from El Alamein to Tunis, the pursuit of Rommel might have met with more success.

Prior Plans.

Units automatically are not capable of large-scale pursuits after a victorious battle. The pursuit must be anticipated and be the subject of prior planning. A successful pursuit is a complicated operation requiring great logistic support and co-ordination between the units on, behind, and over the battlefield.

Supplies, bridging equipment, and the transportation to carry these items must be provided prior to the initiation of the pursuit. The plan for the logistical support should be as bold and aggressive as the plan of battle, and the movement of the supplies and services should correspond to the tempo and skill of the combat units. Plans for airborne supply, particularly of fuel and ammunition, should be made in advance to permit the pursuing forces to continue with their mission, even though their supply lines may be cut or so extended that sufficient supplies cannot be brought forward.

Prior plans also include a decision as to what troops are to be used for the pursuit, particularly for the encircling force. If possible, fresh troops should be utilized because their equipment and supplies are in the best possible shape.

The Ruhr Pocket.

The most fruitful and spectacular pursuit operation in history followed the crossings of the Rhine River at Remagen and Wesel. It is the outstanding illustration of the proper employment of armour in pursuit, with its prior planning and preparation, the employment of direct pressure, the encircling forces, the use of multiple columns on


broad fronts, and, above all, a valid demonstration of aggressive leadership.

The operation was planned prior to D-day, long before the allied forces even left England. It initially was planned to separate the industrial area from the remainder of Germany. After the German forces between the Roer and Rhine Rivers were defeated, they withdrew behind the Rhine River. The allied forces pursued across the Rhine using a bridge at Remagen and an airborne landing at Wesel. These two bridgeheads then were built up with troops and supplies, and the final phase of the pursuit was begun. Holding or direct pressure forces engaged the enemy on the north flank of the Remagen bridgehead, along the west bank of the

Rhine, and on the south flank of the Wesel bridgehead, while the 7 Corps and the 18 Airborne Corps broke out of the bridgeheads to start the encirclement of the German forces.

On the north, after the 18 Airborne Corps initially broke out of the Wesel bridgehead, it was then passed through by the 19 Corps, led by the 2 Armoured Division. On the south, the 7 Corps broke out of the Remagen bridgehead, spearheaded by the 3 Armoured Division.

The two armoured divisions threw caution to the winds and maintained the pursuit night and day. What rest the men received was in their moving vehicles. The divisions destroyed or bypassed the many groups of German soldiers



which attempted to slow down the armoured columns. They advanced on broad fronts, utilising the entire zone of their respective corps in order to manoeuvre around pockets of resistance or obstacles. Although the 2 Armoured Division advanced 70 miles in its 3-day operation, and the 3 Armoured Division moved 180 miles in 7 days, this should not imply that, by encircling the enemy main body, the enveloping armour engaged only in a road march, bypassing all enemy resistance. A delaying action undertaken by the enemy can be costly — the 3 Armoured Division lost 53 tanks. Therefore, the enveloping armour must be prepared to crash through the resistance it cannot bypass readily.

As an example of the reckless courage and devotion to duty required of the leaders and staff officers in maintaining an aggressive armoured pursuit, Major General Maurice Rose, Commanding General, 3 Armoured Division, was captured and killed by a German tank commander during the final phase of the encirclement. The division G3 was captured with General Rose. In two other encounters, the G1 and the division surgeon were taken prisoner.

The two armoured divisions met at Lippstadt, thereby closing a 250-mile ring of steel around 21 enemy divisions. The job of capturing or destroying these 325,000 surrounded troops was then passed over to other supporting units and the armoured divisions continued to exploit their success by advancing quickly to the Elbe River.

Summary.

Unfortunately, not all campaigns are followed by a successful pursuit as did the one culminating in the Ruhr Pocket. It is discouraging to read of the number of celebrated victories which resulted only in indecisive gains by the victor because of the lack of an effective pursuit. Too often the pursuit is considered a mere academic manoeuvre which is an automatic sequel to every successful battle. The last battle must not be considered the climax of a campaign. We must realize that the winning of that battle merely is the prelude to victory, for not until a successful pursuit is undertaken can the victors consider themselves not only the masters of the battlefield, but also the masters of all it contained. As so aptly stated by General Eisenhower, "Relentless and speedy pursuit is the most profitable action in war."

The Campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz



A STUDY OF NAPOLEONIC STRATEGY

THE campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz is one of the most remarkable in the history of warfare. In the space of three months a French army marched across Europe from the English Channel to the valley of the Danube, forced the capitulation of one army, destroyed two others in a pitched battle, and occupied the capital of the Austrian Empire. Seldom have the principles of war been so brilliantly and clearly demonstrated.

Although nearly 150 years have passed since the "Sun of Austerlitz" broke through the mist to shed its radiance on the victorious arms of Imperial France, many useful lessons, applicable to the conduct of war by modern means, can be deduced from a study of the campaign. The purpose of this series of articles is to discuss the campaign in some detail, and in relation to modern British military teaching. The author expects to find as he proceeds that the principles underlying the causes of success and failure in 1805 are similar to the principles laid down for our guidance today, although, of course, the means avail-

able for their application are very different. Indeed, it may even be found that parts of our present teaching are derived from the experience gained in the campaign we intend to examine.

To properly appreciate the political issues at stake in 1805 it is necessary to outline the sequence of events in Europe from the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. In doing so, the author has no intention of implying a personal opinion on the morality or otherwise of any person or country's actions. In describing the aims, the motives, the morale, the will to fight, of the nations involved in this struggle, and in commenting on the military operations, the author intends to be strictly objective. If his narrative seems to express approval of some and disapproval of others, it will not be because he has any personal opinion on the matter, but simply because he considers that the point needs emphasis or has a bearing on the subject. If military history is to have any value the student must at least attempt objectivity, particularly when his own people are involved.

Europe in the Eighteenth Century.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the map of Europe was very different from the map to which we are accustomed. Italy was not a united country, but comprised a number of kingdoms and republics and the Papal States. The area now included in modern Germany was occupied by a number of independent kingdoms and principalities, the chief of which were Prussia, Bavaria and Hanover. The Austrian Empire included most of central Europe, Hungary, Belgium and part of Poland, and the Emperor claimed suzerainty over all the German states except Prussia. The European domains of the Ottoman Turks were bounded on the north by the Dniester, on the north-west by the Transylvian Alps and the Danube, on the west by the Adriatic.

The islands of the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and all the countries along the north coast of Africa were dependencies of the Turks. Malta was in the possession of the Knights of St. John, while Britain was firmly established in Gibraltar.

Europe on the eve of the French Revolution is shown in Map 1.

The French Revolution.

When the French Revolution broke out in 1789 it aroused the fears and hostility of the kings and princes of Europe, who saw in it a threat to their own hereditary power. The success of the Revolution and the bloody excesses which accompanied it increased these fears, and led a coalition of Great Britain, Austria and Prussia to attempt the restoration of the French monarchy by force of arms. To this end Prussia and Austria collected a formidable army and invaded northern France,

while British naval forces operated against her Mediterranean coast. The invasion was thrown back by the French victory at Valmy in 1792, and Prussia took no further effective action in this phase of the struggle. (For details of the campaign of Valmy see AAJ No. 35 April, 1952.)

Although at that time the French Government had no expansionist ambitions, it considered that the best means of protecting itself from its enemies at home and abroad was by means of a vigorous military offensive coupled with a revolutionary appeal to the depressed classes of the Austrian possessions. Carnot, then virtually Minister for War, expressed the idea in the phrase, "The secret of all defence lies in the counter-stroke." Italy seemed the best area for a venture of this nature, and the Army of the Alps was despatched to operate in the northern part of the peninsula.

Treaty of Campo Formio.

The ragged, under-nourished, badly led Army of the Alps met with little success until General Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed to command it. His great energy and ability, coupled with his summary dismissal of incompetent officers, restored some measure of confidence amongst the troops and effected improvements in their material conditions. Nevertheless, it was not a good army with which to attack the well-trained, well-equipped Austrian forces and, had time permitted, Napoleon would have preferred to wait until he had put it into better shape. But France badly needed a military victory, and so did Napoleon for personal reasons. Consequently he began his

offensive at the earliest possible moment and, in the celebrated campaign of 1796, drove the Austrian armies out of Italy.

In the north similar success attended French arms. The Austrian province of Belgium was overrun, and Holland agreed to an arrangement which virtually made her an ally of France.

These defeats forced Austria to sue for peace and, by the Treaty of Campo Formio, she agreed to:—

Surrender Belgium to France.

Cease opposition to the advance of the French frontier to the Rhine.

Surrender Lombardy to France.

As a sop for the loss of Lombardy, France agreed to Austria establishing her suzerainty over the helpless Republic of Venice.

Thus not only had the French military victories removed all immediate danger to the republic, but they had added extensive territories



Map 1.

to her domain. Napoleon, who had dictated the terms at Campo Formio, became the national hero.

However, peace and security had not yet been won for republican France, for Britain refused to recognise the Treaty of Campo Formio. British opposition to the new order rested on two grounds. Firstly, in accordance with her traditional policy, she would not agree to the Netherlands coming into the possession of a strong Continental power. Secondly, the political party in power, naturally averse to liberalism, was greatly influenced by the writings of Edmund Burke, who thundered eloquently against the political and social principles enunciated by republican France, and denounced in the most violent terms the leaders of the French Government. Burke's followers would have nothing less than the restoration of the French monarchy and the old order. This the French people would never accept.

Despite British opposition France's continental policy prospered. Revolutions were fomented amongst the wretched peasantry of Naples and Rome, which became French dependencies, as did also the Swiss Republic.

Napoleon in Egypt.

The French Government had hoped that possession of the Dutch fleet would enable them to attack Britain at sea, and perhaps transport an army across the Channel for the conquest of the country. These hopes were dashed by the destruction of the Dutch fleet at the battle of Camperdown.

Napoleon now sought to defeat Britain by striking at her growing

trade in the East. British naval weakness in the Mediterranean enabled him to transport an army to Egypt, capturing Malta on the way.

Napoleon's success in Egypt offended the Turks and alarmed the Russians, who cherished dreams of expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. Playing on these fears, Britain organized the Second Coalition of herself, Russia, Austria and Turkey.

Napoleon attempted to strike at Turkey through Syria. Although his expedition failed it made a strong romantic appeal to Frenchmen, and considerably enhanced his reputation at home, a reputation that was not dimmed by Nelson's occupation of Malta and his destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir Bay.

In Europe, France suffered a series of defeats. Under the leadership of Suvoroff, Russian and Austrian armies regained nearly all the Austrian territories in Italy. Quarrels over the spoils, however, caused Russia to withdraw from the conflict, leaving Austria virtually mistress of Italy. After hard fighting in the north France managed to maintain her position in the Netherlands.

Napoleon Becomes First Consul.

The generally unfavourable course of the war weakened the French Government and, in a country accustomed by now to violent politics, prepared the way for drastic constitutional changes. Consequently, when Napoleon suddenly returned from Egypt in 1799 with a band of trusted officers he had no difficulty in seizing power by a *coup d'etat*. The French electorate expressed its

approval by voting for a new constitution, under which Napoleon, as First Consul, was vested with considerable power.

To the reorganization of France Napoleon brought all the gifts of skill, insight and detachment which the problem demanded. Being neither royalist nor extreme revolutionary, and standing above the strife and petty interests of political factions, he was able to see the needs of the country as a whole. To the fulfillment of these needs he brought to bear all his own great talents, and he called to his assistance the ablest men which France could produce. Under their firm guidance the country prospered, order and security were restored.

Marengo and Hohenlinden.

France needed peace to complete the work of regeneration, but she still had the war with Britain and Austria on her hands. To resolve the situation Napoleon suddenly crossed the Alps in 1800 at the head of an army whose concentration he had skilfully concealed, and inflicted a crushing defeat on Austria at the battle of Marengo. A few months later General Moreau defeated them in the north at Hohenlinden.

In the following year Austria gave up the struggle, and signed the Treaty of Luneville, which recognized the Italian republics as French dependencies and restored the French frontier to the Rhine.

The British Government flatly rejected Napoleon's overtures for peace. The First Consul retaliated by instituting the Continental System, which aimed at closing all the ports of Europe to British trade. The difficulty about this policy lay in

the fact that it had to succeed entirely or not at all, and Napoleon was not at that time in a position to enforce it in northern Europe.

The war dragged on until March, 1802, when a temporary change of government in Britain led to the differences between the two countries being patched up in the Peace of Amiens.

Napoleon Becomes Emperor.

"Napoleon restored respect for authority in France. He found chaos and left order, inherited mutiny and created discipline. For ten years the passions which rent the social fabric had raged unchecked, while those which helped to strengthen it had suffered a disastrous eclipse With all his faults, Napoleon was a man born to command and quick to discern the secrets of national strength—religion, because it was the "mystery of the social order," education, the spirit of precision and science in government It was his task to reconcile the new France with the old, to rally priest and emigre, Jew, Protestant, Atheist and Jacobin to the service of the state His government was of a form new to France, a scientific despotism based on the plebiscite. Three times, in 1800, in 1802, and in 1804, he sought and obtained authority from the people. In quick succession the popular voice made him First Consul for ten years, Consul for life, and finally Emperor. No European monarch could claim so good a title."¹

Under Napoleon the devastation wrought by the revolution was re-

1. A History of Europe.

H. A. L. Fisher, 1936

paired with extraordinary speed. Prodigies were performed in every department of administration, while science, literature and art flourished. The codification of the law presented, not only to France but to all Europe, a brilliant prospectus of a country faithful to a long tradition of family discipline and private ownership, but at the same time tenacious of the best fruits of a liberal revolution.

Resumption of Hostilities.

It was, perhaps, not to be expected that the energy, the spirit of adventure, engendered by the Napoleonic reforms could find full scope for its expression in purely domestic affairs. In London it was noted that the power of France was continually advancing. A French garrison was established in Holland, Piedmont was annexed to France, the Swiss and Italian Republics received new constitutions which clearly brought them under French influence. Expeditions of exploration raised suspicions that Napoleon harboured designs for an overseas empire, suspicions which were reinforced by signs that France planned to recover Egypt and expand her territory in India.

The British Government reasoned that if its suspicions of French designs in the East were well founded, the possession of Malta would be an important factor in any conflict which might result. Consequently they postponed, on one excuse after another, the execution of the clause in the Peace of Amiens which provided for the British evacuation of the island. Protracted negotiations led finally to a rupture of relations in March, 1803. Britain and France were again at war.

Napoleon moved swiftly. He re-

occupied Naples and increased his garrison in Holland. He occupied Hanover, which was under the British crown though not incorporated in the English state, and declared that he would keep the principality as long as Britain kept Malta.

These measures could have only an indirect effect. Napoleon resolved to settle the matter once and for all by invading England and dictating peace in London. For this purpose he concentrated a formidable army on the English Channel and in the Netherlands. Before the invasion could be mounted, however, Napoleon would have to win at least local superiority at sea. Since the French fleet was not strong enough for the purpose, Napoleon formed an alliance with Spain. He hoped that the combined fleets of France and Spain would be able to win command of the Channel for even a few days. That, he considered, was all that he required. He was convinced that if he could pass his army across that narrow strip of water he could bring Britain to her knees.

The Third Coalition.

Victory at sea eluded both sides. If Britain for the moment could not be invaded her position was perilous. Her government was well aware that an accident of chance, a misfortune at sea, could give Napoleon the opportunity he waited for. It was very doubtful indeed if the troops in the United Kingdom could throw back the mighty army which lay on the other side of the Channel. Thus, failing a decisive naval victory, it became vitally necessary for the British Government to create a diversion, to bring about a situation which would compel the movement of Napoleon's army from its menacing position on the Channel.

Besides, even if France could not defeat Britain, Britain could not defeat France without the assistance of allies.

Fortunately for Britain the situation on the continent gave ample scope for skilful diplomacy. Napoleon's election as Emperor of the French, followed by his evident intention of creating an empire of Latin and Teutonic states under the tutelage of France, challenged the Austrian Emperor's claims to the leadership of Europe. Further, Napoleon's activities in Italy suggested to the Austrians that their only remaining Italian possession—the Venetian Republic—was about to follow the others into the French basket. However, Austria was financially weakened, her army was in process of reorganization, and she had not fully recovered the confidence lost in her two previous defeats.

The new Czar of Russia was violently anti French. In addition he was intensely jealous of the steady expansion of French influence in south-eastern Europe, an area in which he hoped to extend his own power.

The Prussian Government, too, was uneasy about the rise of Napoleon's power, but was divided within itself by fear and uncertainty.

British diplomacy went to work on the fears and ambitions of Russia, Austria and Prussia. By April, 1805, Russia had agreed to join the proposed coalition and furnish a contingent of 180,000 men. Austria would have preferred to wait until she had completed the reorganization of her army, but in June yielded to British pressure and undertook to put 250,000 men in the field. In

return Britain agreed to pay a subsidy of £1,250,000—a large sum in those days—for each 100,000 regular troops furnished by Austria and Russia, to provide 35,000 men for operations in the Netherlands and Germany, and to make available any sea transport required.

Prussia could not be persuaded to join the coalition, while Bavaria declared for Napoleon.

Napoleon's intelligence service promptly and accurately reported every important move in the protracted negotiations. Appreciating that it would be some months before Austria and Russia would be ready for action, he concluded that he could wait a little longer for a chance to cross the Channel.

The Allies' Plan.

In formulating their plans the Allies encountered the difficulties which usually beset a coalition. Fundamentally they all wished to overthrow Napoleon. But the political results each hoped to achieve through a French defeat differed materially. Each of them wanted to conduct operations in a manner likely to achieve his own political aims. Britain wished to drive the French out of the Netherlands and recover Hanover. Austria was anxious to recover her lost Italian provinces. The Czar, with the extension of Russian influence in the eastern Mediterranean in mind, pressed for an Anglo-Russian expedition to southern Italy and Sicily.

These divergent aims led to a compromise. The plan eventually agreed upon provided for the formation of three main armies and several smaller forces to operate as follows:—

1. The Army of Italy under the

Archduke Charles with 100,000 men—Austria's strongest army under her best general—was to drive the French out of Lombardy.

2. The Army of Germany, 89,000 men under Field Marshal Mack, was to march swiftly into Bavaria so as to compel the Bavarians to join the coalition.

3. Two Russian armies were to join the Army of Germany. One column of 54,000 men and 200 guns under Kutuzoff was to reach the Inn by 20th October. Another column of about the same strength under Buxhowden was to reach the Danube before the end of November.

4. As soon as the Russians had joined Mack their combined forces were to march to the Rhine, enter Switzerland, and invade France.

5. The Army of the Tyrol of some 40,000 men under the Archduke John was to connect the armies of Mack and the Archduke Charles, and act as circumstances might require.

6. An Anglo-Swedish force was to operate in Hanover and, if circumstances permitted, invade Holland.

7. An Anglo-Russian force was to attack southern Italy to recover Naples and draw her into the coalition, at the same time threatening the French rear in Lombardy.

This plan reflects the difficulty of reconciling divergent political aims with the principle of concentration. In a vain effort to win the war and achieve all their aims simultaneously the Allies dispersed their forces. Nor did they take any effective steps to impose a similar measure of dispersion on their adversary. Not only did the plan leave Napoleon's main forces concentrated but it left him complete freedom of action as well.

In another respect, too, the plan was faulty. It was based on the assumption that Napoleon, if he took the offensive, would move through Switzerland and Italy, apparently for no better reason than that he had gone that way on the two previous occasions. This was a very dangerous assumption on which to base a plan of campaign when several alternative lines of operation were open to the French Emperor.

The plan also violated the principle of economy of force in that the Army of the Tyrol was not strong enough to accomplish anything on its own, and was stronger than was necessary merely to form a link between Mack and the Archduke Charles.

In the event, as we shall see, the Army of Italy was contained and forced away from both Lombardy and the main theatre by a force half its size, the Army of the Tyrol became isolated and was destroyed, while the smaller expeditionary forces had practically no effect at all. Strict attention to the principles of concentration and economy of force in all their aspects might have brought about a different result.

Napoleon's Plans.

At an early stage Napoleon decided upon the course he would pursue if his fleet failed to secure a safe passage for the Grand Army across the Channel. He resolved to:—

1. Disregard the diversionary expeditions.
2. Contain the Archduke Charles in Italy with a much smaller force until events elsewhere forced that general to withdraw.
3. Break up his cantonments on

the Channel and march rapidly with every available man and gun to the valley of the Danube, where he would destroy Mack before the Russians arrived. Having disposed of Mack he would then defeat the Russians and the remaining Austrians.

Execution of this outline plan would certainly secure Napoleon's political aim of smashing the coalition by imposing peace on Austria, eliminating Russia for the time being at any rate, securing the adherence of Bavaria, and convincing Prussia that neutrality was the best policy. From the realization of that aim would follow automatically the security of the French possessions in Italy and the Netherlands, and Napoleon's continued ascendancy on the continent of Europe.

The plan fulfilled the following Principles of War:—

The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim in that the action of all the French forces were directed towards the attainment of the ultimate object—the breaking of the enemy's will to fight.

Concentration of Force in that the main French forces were to concentrate at the decisive point before his scattered opponents—Mack and the Russians—could effect a junction in the same area. At the same time the action of secondary French forces in Italy would prevent the enemy from rectifying his initial dispersion by recalling the Archduke Charles in time.

Economy of Effort in that the French force in Italy was strong enough to contain the Archduke Charles, but not so strong as to require unnecessary withdrawals from the main army.

Surprise in that Napoleon would strike his opponents with unexpected

speed, in unexpected strength, and from an unexpected direction.

Offensive Action was obviously the keynote of the whole plan.

The Austrian Army.

It has been claimed that had Austria refrained from joining the coalition until the reorganization of her army was completed she might have fared better in the war of 1805. Close examination, however, does not support this suggestion. The real faults lay in the army's tactical thinking and in cumbersome methods of command, rather than in details of regimental organization.

In their long struggle with the extremely aggressive Turks the Austrians had nearly always been forced to stand on the defensive, partly because their higher commanders rarely succeeded in creating situations favourable to a tactical offensive. The army had undergone a similar experience in the latter stages of the Thirty Years' War. In both these struggles Austrian armies had fought many successful defensive battles, in which they had repeatedly seen the fire power of the defence break up the attack. From this experience they developed a leaning towards the defensive and tended to lose the offensive spirit. The Austrians had not grasped the tactical lessons of their two earlier campaigns against the French in Italy, campaigns which clearly demonstrated that the lighter and better muskets and more mobile artillery had restored fire power to the attack. In 1805 the Austrians did attack, but they did so with no real faith in their own offensive power and in rigid formations inappropriate to the new conditions.

In their last Italian campaign the Austrians had copied the French in organizing their artillery into a separate arm. By 1805, however, the real gunner spirit had not been developed, nor had the true battery commander emerged.

The Austrian Army had not learnt to use its cavalry for reconnaissance

or to screen the movements of its columns. Although shock action was practically its only role, cavalry training was so defective that few regiments could deliver a knee to knee charge over any distance, and more often than not arrived at the point of impact in ragged groups.

Despite the efforts of the somewhat enlightened Archduke Charles morale was still based solely on an extremely harsh disciplinary code. Drawn from practically a different world the officers had nothing in common with their men, lived entirely apart from them, and took little interest in their welfare. In addition, confidence in the senior commanders was not strong because they had nearly all been beaten by the French in the earlier campaigns.

Perhaps the greatest defect of the Austrian Army lay in the fact that it had no permanent organization higher than the regiment and the battalion. Divisions and brigades were formed as and when required, were broken up, and reformed with different units. Consequently they lacked cohesion and the team spirit essential to success.

The Austrian system of command followed rigid and extremely formal lines. Subordinates were allowed little latitude, but were usually given detailed written orders. Since these orders took time to write by hand and transmit by courier, they often bore no relation to the actual situation confronting the recipient. The system tended to kill initiative, instil extreme caution, and produce stereotyped action.

The Russian Army.

Although less intelligent than the Austrians, the Russian soldiers were



French Infantryman, 1795

more formidable troops. They were brave, physically strong, and inured to hardship. Despite the immense social gulf which separated them from the troops, the officers managed to administer discipline with sympathetic understanding. Morale was of the stolid, negative variety rather than a compelling willingness to fight.


The Russian infantry was ponderous in attack, stubborn in defence. When properly handled the cavalry was excellent both in shock action and reconnaissance. The artillery was good, but lacked the dash of the French gunners. The senior commanders were competent and enjoyed the confidence of the troops.

The worst defects in the Russian Army of that time were the immense regimental trains which accompanied all units. The officers, apparently, were determined to live in the grand manner wherever war might take them. The large number of slow cumbersome wagons thus employed impeded movement and greatly reduced the speed with which the column moved towards the concentration area on the Danube.

The French Army.

In organization, morale, training and leadership the Grand Army was probably the finest military force Europe had seen since the days of the Roman legions. It had been in camp for eighteen months undergoing continuous training, and had attained a high standard of efficiency in every respect. All the formation and regimental commanders, and many of the junior officers and other ranks, had served in one or more of the victorious campaigns fought by the French Army in the preceding decade.

The high morale of the Grand Army was based on an intense patriotism and pride in the new France, in confidence in its leaders and in equality of opportunity. Good organization and thorough training had given the troops a degree of skill and enterprise, and an offensive spirit almost unmatched in military history.



French Infantryman, 1805

In the French Army of the period merit was the only key to advancement. Many of the corps and divisional commanders had risen from the ranks in less than fifteen years, all of them had proved their worth in battle. In 1792 Murat, the brilliant cavalry leader, had been a sergeant. Now he was a prince, a marshal of France, and married to the Emperor's sister. Thirteen years ago rough, tough Lannes, who ruled his soldiers with a rod of iron and cared for them like a mother, had been elected sub-lieutenant by a company of provincial volunteers. Bessieres, commander of the Imperial Guard, had been a private when the revolutionary wars began. Marmont, the aristocrat who stuck to the Army throughout the revolution and, under Napoleon, made its artillery the finest in Europe, had graduated from a military college in 1791. Ney, "the bravest of the brave," had been promoted from the ranks in 1793.

The regimental officers were excellent. Some had been promoted from the ranks on the field of battle, some had been commissioned after a short intensive course of training, while some had graduated from the first class military colleges established by Napoleon. They were devoted to their profession, lived with their units, and gave their whole attention to training and administration.

The training methods followed in the Grand Army closely conform to the principles of training laid down in our modern doctrine. Each successive echelon was trained by the officer who would command it in battle. From top to bottom enthusiasm and thoroughness were the keynotes. The offensive spirit, al-

ready strong, was fostered by all possible means, while special attention was given to developing the marching powers of the troops on which mobility depended.

The basic formation of the Grand Army was the infantry division, the units of which remained with it permanently. Each division contained four demi-brigades, each of three battalions. One of the battalions remained at the base as a depot and training unit to provide drafts for its sister battalions in the field. In addition to the usual eight battalions of infantry of the line, each division normally contained two battalions of light infantry (skirmishers), but had no cavalry or artillery permanently allotted to it.

The infantry divisions were organized in corps. Each corps normally comprised three infantry divisions, a cavalry component which varied from nine to twelve squadrons, and its own artillery, engineers and medical service. The corps was, therefore, a powerful, self-contained formation able to undertake major independent tasks.

The reserve, or army, cavalry comprised five divisions of dragoons and two divisions of cuirassiers, the former normally being employed on deep and medium reconnaissance while the latter were reserved for shock action. However, all cavalry were trained for shock action, and all were armed with the carbine or pistol to enable them to fight on foot. In his use of cavalry to obtain information and to screen his own movements from the enemy Napoleon was well ahead of any other European commander of his time.

The Imperial Guard was a corps-

de-élite of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and usually constituted the general reserve under the Emperor's own hand.

General Foy, one of Napoleon's divisional commanders, has given us a description of the normal French method of attack: "The action was begun by a cloud of skirmishers, both horse and foot, thrown forward according to a general idea, and not directed as to the detail of their movements. They harassed the enemy, escaped his massed troops by their speed and his guns by their extended formation. The field artillery came up at the gallop and fired grape and canister at point blank range. The line of battle broke up in the direction of attack, the infantry in column since they had no fire to deliver, the cavalry in regiments or squadrons ready to act in any direction. When the infantry columns were close enough to the enemy they broke into the double and charged home with the bayonet."²

It was customary in most European armies of that time, when not in close contact with the enemy, to issue orders for the day early in the morning or the evening before. The morning method wasted much valuable time before the orders reached the troops and were acted upon, while evening orders deprived commanders and staffs of their night's rest. Napoleon solved this problem by going to bed very early. He arose about 1 a.m., by which time the latest intelligence reports had reached his headquarters and been collated by the duty officers. The Emperor usually issued his

orders between 1 and 2 a.m., and they reached the troops just before dawn. Thus no precious hours of daylight were lost, while everyone had time for a good sleep.

In these days of rapid intercommunication this point about orders may seem unimportant. However, with the means then available Napoleon's economy in the use of time maintained the vigour of his troops, gave them several hours' start, and usually placed them at least one jump ahead of the enemy. It is a good example of the methodical manner in which the French commanders and staffs went about their tasks.

When halted, intercommunication between the component parts of the army was maintained by relay riders provided by standing cavalry patrols stationed at convenient points. On the move the patrols marched by selected routes between the columns in accordance with a predetermined time-table.

Each formation commander had a staff of highly-trained, experienced liaison officers who could rapidly transmit verbal orders and keep their commander informed of the situation on his front and flanks.

At the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars the French Army was probably the worst in Europe. Thirteen years of sound leadership, of unremitting devotion to duty, and of thorough training had made it into the finest army on the continent. In 1805 it prepared to break up its camps on the English Channel and march against Austria and Russia supremely confident in its ability to overcome any enemy and any obstacle.

(To be continued)

2. From *Boulogne to Austerlitz*,
R. G. Burton.

The SOCIAL GROUP, INFILTRATION, and WAR.

Translated and condensed by the Military Review from an article by
Major Amund Bjerke, in "Militaer Orientering"
(Norway), 10 Sept., 1951.

IT has been said many times that strategic and tactical principles are immutable. Every time some younger officer questions this statement, recognized authorities show him the correctness of this view.

The Changing Picture of War.

However, when we consider how the over-all picture of war has changed since the Franco-Prussian War—how modern warfare has developed from its simpler forms until it now includes all the individuals and institutions of a social group—it is clear that there have been many changes which affect all aspects of conducting a war.

For example, in the Franco-Prussian War the troops were able to fight in the front lines with the confidence that as long as they held their positions their homes were secure against the enemy's brutality. Even in World War I, those at home were in relative security, although there was a little bombing in England and, at the end, the food situation was rather critical in Germany. However, in World War II, the soldier at the front knew that thousands were dying every day at home from the effects of the enemy's wea-

pons, even though the troops at the front did their best and held the enemy. And developments since that time have aggravated this situation.

Therefore, we must adjust ourselves to a new picture of war—an over-all picture which will look entirely different from the one that sufficed for World War II. The sooner we recognize this and adapt ourselves and our combat means accordingly, the better it will be for all of us.

The Social Group.

The social groups of the world have now joined themselves together into two blocs, with the democratic social groups in the one (the West bloc) and the so-called "peoples' democracies" in the other (the East bloc).

In the democratic social groups we recognize certain fundamental freedoms: freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of organization, and individual freedom, to mention but a few.

The peoples' democracies have the same elements, minus the word

freedom. The latter can best be replaced by the word **state**; that is, state press, state organization, and so forth.

As freedom of organization is one of the freedoms found in the free democracies, nearly every activity has been organized to such an extent that they may now talk of an "over"-organization of the social groups. Labour, the arts and sciences, sports, and youth activities are organized into great associations or unions. In addition, anyone can start an organization for this or that purpose, and no one checks the activities in which it engages. The result is that an organization, social in nature, may serve as a cover for activities which do not serve the group's best interests.

In the peoples' democracies, a comprehensive control over the entire life of the social group has been established. With a strong police organization (both regular and secret), operating with methods which, fortunately, are not used in the free democracies, the population is watched to a degree which borders on persecution.

For example, the German social group was tied and bound, and declared to be incapable of managing its own affairs, politically, by the Nazis from 1933 to 1945. As a result, it was impossible to influence it from the outside by ordinary political means. Germany, and the social group which had grown up during that period, had to be crushed by force of arms before the German people could obtain peace and the chance to win back their political liberty. During that period, there was no political power in the coun-

try which could assume control and bring the war to an end, as happened in 1918.

This same type of control exists in many countries today, and the chances that the social groups or the people themselves will be able to recognize the need for co-operation with the rest of the world and cease hostilities appear equally small.

Infiltration.

Since 1945, the term "infiltration" has assumed a startling reality, because the people of the Western nations have had their eyes opened to the increased activity in this field. It threatens to break up the social organization which has been built up through successive generations, and reveals a direct connection with preparations for open war. We have now come to realize this fact, and the battle against infiltration has begun with growing intensity, but it still will be a long time before it can be said that the Western nations are sufficiently armed to be able to fend off the danger which threatens.

The conflict in Korea has shown that such national infiltration may cause the outbreak of open war. Until recently, the term "infiltration" usually has been regarded as a purely military manoeuvre conducted by small patrols which, during darkness, slipped by the outposts of the defence for purposes of reconnaissance and limited attacks. Since the development which has taken place during the last few years, both military and civil authorities are beginning to accept the fact that infiltration is a many-sided problem which involves both

the military and the political fields. To a seasoned professional soldier, many of the military operations which have been undertaken in the conflict in Korea would seem strange, if he did not take into consideration the infiltration factor which, several times, has upset the manoeuvres of the United Nations' forces. This factor can produce the same tragic results here in Europe if we are not cognizant of how a social group can be undermined and prepared for an enemy conquest.

There is much to indicate that the conflict in Korea was set in motion as a test of the effectiveness of permitting infiltration tactics in a social group to expand to include open warfare. One is moved to draw parallels with Hitler's experimentation with the means and tactics of the blitzkrieg in Spain before World War II.

Regardless of what position a statesman or officer occupies, he must understand clearly the double nature of infiltration tactics and have a clear picture of the developments and events which characterize this new form of warfare. Because of space limitations, it is not possible to go into detail here, but, to set the reader's interest in motion, attention will be directed toward a number of factors which characterize it.

As a background, the reader must understand that a modern war will be a war between, and inside of, social groups; a revolutionary war which does not begin with the first shot, but long before. It starts with infiltration tactics in time of peace, an infiltration into the social group, a "cold war" which merges directly into actual warfare.

Revolutionary War.

It was Karl Marx who introduced the concept "revolutionary war" and who, in modern times, laid the theoretical foundation for this form of warfare.

Marxism was founded and developed in the preceding century following an increase in the industrialization of the European countries, coupled with an increase in the property-less classes in the social groups. This growing segment of the population had little or no political influence in the management or administration of their particular countries. To attain this, they first had to break the domination of the then ruling classes. A revolutionary war was, therefore, the method they had to use in order to take over the political leadership of a country. However, in and of itself, it was never conceived as a means of warfare against another country.

At the end of World War I, the Communists seized power in Russia in accordance with this concept, and overthrew the government which had been set up after the Czar was forced to abdicate. Since that time, this form of warfare has been adopted as a link in the tactical instruction in the Soviet military schools and in the political schooling of the Communist Party's leaders the world over. However, it was the Germans who first attempted to put these ideas into practice with the object of conquering another country. This was accomplished by propaganda, the establishment of political infiltration in the opponents' countries, and with the assistance of military demonstrations and threats. Even though a great amount of effort and money was

spent in this field, it was not sufficient to win World War II, although good results were obtained, particularly in the conquest of Austria, France, and Norway.

The Eastern bloc states have gone much further in this field, and have adopted the tactics of the revolutionary war to obtain the Soviet Union's old political objectives: ice-free ports to the open sea, the security of their western frontiers in Europe, and domination in the Orient.

The contents of the bottle are the same, even if the label is new.

What is it, therefore, that characterized revolutionary war? Roughly speaking, it is the underground and infiltration activity that is set in motion by the attackers in order to undermine the defence's social system and knock the props from under their opponent's defence organization in time of war. Revolutionary war is divided into two main parts; peacetime activity (the cold war), and the employment of the results of the cold war in actual combat. The first is a political infiltration of the social group; the second, a military infiltration of an extent unknown to earlier, orthodox warfare. There is really no sharply differentiated line between these two elements of warfare. The transition from the cold war to actual combat cannot be defined easily, nor can the development of the cold war be controlled easily with the means that the free democracies have at their disposal.

The Cold War.

The aim of the cold war is to conquer a state from within, prefer-

ably without engaging in actual warfare.

The action comprises an intense activity on the part of the attacker in the form of a political infiltration. This commonly begins by the attacker planting his own personnel in the administrative organization of the opposed state; by occupying key positions in its economic system, its political parties, its news services (press and radio), its police organizations, its transportation system, its trade organizations, its schools and educational system, its youth and sports programmes, and, especially, in its labour organizations. Military staffs, departments, and industries are, of course, objectives, and an enemy always manages to make contacts here in spite of the best of security systems.

Alongside this activity, a strong and reliable network of agents develops, which fulfils the double mission of checking and reporting.

When this organization begins to assume form, its fields of action are enlarged and its efficiency increased. It now stirs up strikes and causes unrest, engages in sabotage and propaganda activities which sow discontent, nourishes budding dissatisfactions, and creates unrest and a lack of equilibrium in the social group.

If the attacker is able to assume control over a political party in the state which is being attacked, it is a distinct help. When it comes to the East bloc's activity in this field, there are no difficulties, because Communist Parties are found in all countries, legally or otherwise.

Czechoslovakia's tragic fate is a warning. In 1948, the Czech social

group was so infiltrated that the Soviets were able to carry out a political conquest of the country without war. The Soviet occupation forces constituted the necessary threat. Afterward, the infiltration continued, and, with the undisguised employment of force and power, all possibility of opposition has been done away with, and the country itself is no longer able to formulate independent policy. Only force of arms will now free that country.

The only effective means to avoid this situation is to create a healthy state, with a contented population, where the individual, the people, and the political parties are awake and on guard against the danger of infiltration. The enemy interferes in everyone's manner of thinking, determines political persuasion and views of life, and is able to make pawns of the citizens of a country. The tragic but famous "Stockholm Peace Appeal" shows how even men of opposite conviction can be used by the enemy in the cold war.

Actual Warfare.

So much time has elapsed that even the picture of actual warfare is beginning to disappear. Of the two forms of war—cold war and actual war—it is natural and understandable that the latter draws the greater amount of attention from the professional soldier. The danger in this is that he will not be attentive to the first form and the intimate connection between these two military elements. I shall, therefore, cite a few factors which may clarify the relationship.

We must regard it as a fact that the organization which the enemy has planted in the social group be-

fore the opening of actual warfare is absolutely necessary as a basis for the military infiltration which is to come. Besides conducting attacks and sabotage activities, this organization has, as its special mission, the paving of the way for a regular attack with specially trained units which are carried into the country behind the defence lines.

War material is, today, so highly developed that, theoretically, any part of a country can be reached. Experience shows, however, that many targets cannot be attacked advantageously by regular combat means. This being the case, it is significant to note that a well-developed underground organization in the country subject to invasion is able to conduct such attacks.

Because it is necessary to build up such an organization before the war can begin, the time factor enters the picture as a far more important element than at any previous time. A long time is required to build up an underground organization, and the side which neglects to make use of this time during the cold war loses an advantage over the enemy during the course of actual warfare. Even the atom bomb will not suffice in this case, and an overwhelming air force is not enough to counter-balance the effects of a well-conducted infiltration.

Are We Arming Ourselves?

The thought is constantly being expressed that the Marshall Plan has been the thing which has made it possible for us to hold our own in the cold war. Why is this? Because, naturally, it provided the economic foundation for the reconstruction, industrial production, and

trade between the countries affected; making possible a raising of the standard of living in Europe. Dissatisfaction, discontent, and the cold war have not gained headway with us, and, if we have not won the cold war, we have, in any case, been able to limit its effects and strike back.

The East bloc's military strength becomes continually greater, and constitutes a potential threat. Therefore, the free democracies have found it necessary to engage in a rapid augmentation of their military strength. This means the assumption of a great economic burden which will affect our ability to hold our own in the cold war.

The rearmament programme al-

ready is beginning to create discontent, wage controversies, political unrest, and decreasing economic stability. When these burdens hit their peak, it will mean a crisis in the cold war, for the effects of this may mean that we have lost the war before it has begun.

We can beat that crisis, and, at the same time, win in strength of arms. However, we must maintain social group solidarity by making the "man in the street"—the common citizen—aware of the intimate connection between the cold war and actual warfare. He must be made to realize the fact that he, in his civilian clothes, in his daily life, and in his work, is as much a soldier in the cold war as the armed soldier is during actual combat.

More than most people in positions of leadership, military commanders must subject every aspect of their commands to the test of practical value. In a military unit, the practical value of any activity, policy or procedure rests on the simple question: Does it help us perform our mission? Whatever fails to meet this test has no place; whatever stands the test is militarily valuable and thereby an essential function of command.

—Officers' Call, USA.

THE ARMY in WESTERN AUSTRALIA



Major-General J. S. Whitelaw, CB, CBE,
With acknowledgement to Dr. J. S. Battye, CBE,
Miss M. F. F. Lukis, of the Public Library of W.A.,
and Athole Stewart, Esq.

IN 1826, the activities of French exploration ships gave cause for concern to both the Home government, and Governor Darling, of New South Wales. Both realised that their title to the western half of the continent was not clear, since the writ of the Governor of New South Wales ran only as far west as 135° East Longitude,—half way across South Australia.

In accordance with instructions from the United Kingdom, Governor Darling despatched from Sydney on 9 November, 1826, Major Lockyer of 57th Regiment, with instructions to land at King George's Sound and take possession; this was duly effected on 26 December, 1826.

With Lockyer was a detachment of 1 sergeant and 18 rank and file of 39th Regiment (now The Dorsetshire Regiment) under the command of Captain Wakefield, together

with 23 convicts, and this was the force which staked Britain's claim to half a continent.

From the very first, Lockyer, so far as he was able, enforced the law against visiting whalers and sealers who by their atrocities against the natives had tended to turn the latter against all white men. Security guards, building, and growing foodstuffs gave full occupation to the little community, but this service must have been most unpopular, due to the isolation of the settlement, and the uncertainty of supplies, which came irregularly and infrequently by ship from Sydney. The birth of a litter of pigs, or the death of a sheep, was an important event.

In June, 1829, Captain Stirling had formed the Swan River Settlement, with a jurisdiction separate from that of Governor Darling, and following this event a proclamation

on 7 March, 1831, ended the caretaking function of the settlement and its detachment of troops, and Albany came under the administration of Stirling. The convicts and the troops returned to Sydney, which must have seemed to them a veritable city of light and centre of civilization after their sojourn in the wilderness. Practically no trace of occupation remained,—even the site of the colour-hoisting being uncertain, — but curiously enough, many years later an observer of an aboriginal corroboree reported that the performers wore headgear to represent the shako, and were pipeplayed in imitation of the crossbelts of the 39th, whilst the dance gave a recognizable version of the "firing manual" or standard weapons drill of the period.

In 1827 Captain Stirling, R.N., had explored the South West coast, and strongly recommended a settlement at Swan River. His enthusiasm led to him being commissioned to carry out the project, and in June, 1829, he arrived in Gage Roads with H.M.S. Sulphur and the transport *Parmelia*.

First Footing.

From Sulphur on 17 June there disembarked Captain F. C. Irwin and 57 officers and men of the 63rd Regiment (now The Manchester Regiment). Irwin was destined to have a lengthy connection with Western Australia. As Commandant, he was a member of the Governor's Council, and when the Governor went to England, Irwin was appointed Lieutenant-Governor. He left the Colony with his detachment in 1833, but returned again as a lieutenant-colonel in 1837, and continued as Commandant till 1854,

again holding the appointment of Lieutenant-Governor in 1847/48, after the death of the Governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke.

Red-Coat Garrison.

The detachment of the 63rd Regiment was relieved in 1833 by two companies of the 21st Regiment (The Royal Scots Fusiliers) which in turn were relieved by two Companies of the 51st Regiment (K.O.Y.L.I.). Later reliefs were by one Company only, from the 99th (Wiltshires) and 12th Regiments (Suffolks). The last of the Queen's troops left Fremantle for Hobart on 8 March, 1863.

During this period the red-coats had provided a backing for the police force and security against native attack. They were quartered in Perth, and small posts were also established on the outskirts of settlement. Governor Stirling was insistent on humane treatment of the natives, and generally speaking, this policy bore good fruit. The scattered settlers could have been an easy prey for the blacks, and the growth of settlement would have been retarded greatly.

Several isolated outrages against the blacks undoubtedly occurred, and each was marked by bloody and indiscriminate reprisals against any white man caught unawares. These occasions caused Stirling and his officers great concern, as it was important to stop native killings without intensifying the war of reprisal. By a mixture of tact and firmness this object was attained, but the colony suffered some anxious moments. There was a near panic among the settlers when a soldier was speared in the Barracks

enclosure, which was in Barrack Street, alongside the present Town Hall site. On one occasion a concerted offensive drive was undertaken against a very truculent tribe, who were dealt with at the "Battle of Pinjarra," and after that event there was little additional trouble in the South West.

This period was one of exploration, and Army officers made notable contributions. Lieutenant Bunbury worked from York southwards to Williams and Pinjarra, whilst Ensign Dale covered York, Beverley and Avon Valley, and the routes across the Darling Ranges and to King George's Sound.

Reproduced on page 39 is a "State" of the 51st (K.O.Y.L.I.) dated 31 Dec., 1845, which illustrates the way the troops were distributed on the boundaries of settlement. The original is in the possession of the U.S.I. of W.A., and examination causes speculation as to the story behind the Absence Without Leave of one of the two company commanders.

The following newspaper report throws light on the casualty to Sergeant Dearden shown as "In Custody of Civil Power", and is an example of the severity of the criminal code of the day, as well as of newspaper moralising.

Extract from "The Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal" dated Saturday, Feb. 28, 1946:—

"The 'Frolic' removes from this one of the men of the 51st Regt., Sergt. Dearden. He was convicted at the last Sessions of forging Lieut. Irby's name to a cheque on the Bank.

It is much to be deplored that

a man of his standing should have been tempted by avarice, or indeed any motive, to commit an act which must inevitably entail upon him such serious consequences. The man, we learn, has a wife and family, and willingly would the offence have been overlooked by the parties called upon to prosecute had not a taint rested upon his previous character, which would have cast back a reflection upon their lenity. The person we have named was deserving apparently of every trust; he obtained the confidence of his commanding officers and had stood well in the ranks; how he could so foolishly commit himself for 40s. is an astonishment to all. Seven years' transportation awaits him, and his delinquency will be a mill-stone around his neck for life, seeing that he has so basely degraded himself."

Convict Period.

In 1850, the first convicts arrived, at the request of the settlers. Originally the colony had been formed with the high-minded resolve to have nothing to do with the convict system, but the temptation of plentiful labour for development and the stimulus of about £30,000 of Imperial funds entering the Colony annually for convict maintenance, broke down this early resolution. Transportation continued till 1868.

Guards on convict ships were provided by the Home Government by the expedient of employing military pensioners for "voyage only" duties. Their families came with them, and on arrival they took up civilian employment. The lack of guards for the convicts after ar-

rival caused a modification of the system, and for a while one ship's guards were retained in service until the arrival of the next ship. This was not satisfactory, and in 1850 some pensioners were employed in the "Enrolled Pensioner Force", later known as the "Enrolled Guard." The last parade of this body of very old soldiers was held in 1887. At one time they had numbered 600.

They were quartered in the Pensioners' Barracks, a pleasing building which now houses the Works Department at the west end of St. George's Terrace. In 1870, these Barracks were reported as having "accommodation for 60 families, there being 120 rooms, military hospital, magazine, cooking and ablution sheds, workshops, canteen, guardroom, and cells."

Various small detachments of Royal Sappers and Miners, and several R.E. officers arrived at different times. At one time they amounted to more than 100 in number, and their function was to supervise the work of the convicts on roads, bridges, etc.

The Army staff was very limited, consisting for many years of the Commandant and Staff Officer for Pensioners only. The Commandant was often unpaid as such, and the office was vacant from 1879-82, as the Legislative Council was not prepared to vote the funds for his salary. In 1894 R.S.M. J. A. Campbell, Cameron Highlanders, came from England as Instructor, and was appointed Lieutenant and Staff Adjutant; he continued in the service with increasing rank and renown until his retirement as Lieu-

tenant-Colonel and Commandant in 1902.

Volunteer Period.

Universal service was early contemplated, and Governor Stirling's first proclamation, on 18 June, 1829, includes the following section:—

"And whereas the safety of the territory from invasion and from the attack of hostile native tribes may require the establishment of a Militia Force which on emergency may be depended on to assist his Majesty's regular troops in the defence of the laws and property of the inhabitants of the territory, and moreover the efficiency of such an armed body, depending wholly on its organization, discipline, and preparation for service, all male persons whatsoever between the ages of fifteen and fifty are hereby required to enrol themselves in the Muster Roll of the Militia of the county in which they may reside, and to observe that the days for muster and exercise, and the names of the officers whom I may see fit to appoint to command them will be duly notified, and that on proof of their disobedience to such officers or of negligent performance of the duties required of them, they will be subject, in the absence of martial law, to a pecuniary fine and to imprisonment until the same shall be liquidated."

There is no trace of any use having been made of this ordinance.

In 1861 the Volunteer movement took root in West Australia, and it appears that a sudden upsurge of popular opinion caused the forma-

tion of a number of units whose existence was regularized by ordinance. In spite of popular enthusiasm, the units can hardly be said to have flourished. Few rifles were available, the Government was not disposed to buy any, and War Office regulations only allowed of the issue to 25 per cent. of establishment. The country associations quickly faded in face of the discouraging outlook, but in Perth on 13 September, 1861, The Metropolitan Rifle Volunteers began its official existence. It was the direct ancestor of The 11th Infantry Battalion (The City of Perth Regiment). Almost simultaneously a similar unit was formed at Fremantle, and known as The Fremantle Infantry.

Country Units.

In the country, a series of units were raised at various times, and although some had a very chequered existence, most survived till the new century brought a reorganization. These units, each of nominal company strength, were as follows:—Guildford Rifles (1874), Geraldton Rifles (1876), York Rifles (1878, disbanded 1886 and re-raised in 1893), Bunbury Rifles (1892). The 1900 reorganization consisted of forming a brigade, without staff, of Western Australian Infantry, 1st Battalion being raised in Perth, 2nd in Fremantle, 3rd Guildford, Geraldton, Bunbury and York. 4th, Perth, from a short-lived Civil Service Corps, and 5th Battalion was added later with companies at Kalgoorlie, Coolgardie, Boulder, Kanowna, Menzies and Broad Arrow. The establishment of battalions was 16 Officers, 224 O.R., except the 5th, which had 22 Officers and 338 O.R.

Cavalry.

It is surprising that in a country-side where the horse was an essential part of life, only two mounted units were formed in early times. The Pinjarra Mounted Volunteers, formed in 1862, existed till about 1882. The other was the Wellington Mounted Volunteers, which had a much shorter life, from 1877 till about 1882. About 1887 there was a move to raise mounted sub-units of existing infantry units, and the present Governor of W.A., Sir James Mitchell, was the first mounted soldier of the Geraldton unit. In 1889, Guildford Rifles of 4 Officers and 116 others included 36 mounted infantry, and Geraldton Rifles of 3 Officers and 56 others included 24 cavaliers. There is one reference in the records to Perth Mounted Rifles in 1894, with 3 officers and 41 others, but no further mention of the mounted arm till 1900, when, probably as a result of the war in South Africa, units had come into existence at Bunbury (South West District M.I.) of 4 divisions (troops), Northam, Cannington, Fremantle and Geraldton (Victoria District M.I.) each of 2 divisions (troops). All together they mustered 7 officers and 349 others.

Artillery.

In 1870 a Cavalry Troop was raised in Perth as "The Union Troop of Western Australian Mounted Volunteers", but in 1873 it became the "W.A. Troop of Volunteer Horse Artillery", and with a strength of 2 officers and 30 others, it had the use of two 12 pr. Armstrong B.L. guns belonging to the Enrolled Pensioner Force, but harnessed and horsed "at the expense of the Colony". The 32

horses allowed appear slightly inadequate for Horse Artillery. A change in 1882 turned the unit into "The Perth Artillery"—organized as a section and later as a battery of field artillery. It was equipped with 9-pr. R.M.L. guns, and practised from Mounts Bay Road in the vicinity of the Swan Brewery, firing at targets probably in Swan River. At the time the Commonwealth took over, it had become No. 1 Field Battery with an establishment of 4 officers and 86 others. Major-General Sir Talbot Hobbs and Brigadier-General Bessell-Browne received their early training as gunner officers in this unit, and the present 3 Field Regiment is its lineal descendant.

An equally varied history is that of the Coast Artillery. In 1879 the Fremantle Naval Volunteers, 38 all ranks, and armed with two obsolete guns, commenced its existence, but in 1888 it was transferred to the Army as "Fremantle Artillery", equipped with field guns. In 1900 it had 15 pr. B.L. guns and an establishment of 4 officers and 86 O.R's. In 1907 it became a Company of Garrison Artillery and had a continuous existence under various titles till the end of the 1939/45 War, manning the armament installed at Fremantle and later at Rottneest and Garden Island.

Albany residents had evinced a spasmodic interest in things military, and from 1878 possessed an infantry company, known as Albany Rifles, Albany Defence Rifles, and Plantaganet Rifles, each change of name being the indication of a disbandment and subsequent re-raising. Finally, in 1899 the resources of the town were turned to the

"Albany Volunteer Artillery", of 3 officers and 77 O.R's. (including a band), which had a continuous existence under various designations till late in the 1939-45 War. It manned the 6-inch guns mounted for the protection of King George's Sound.

With regard to coast armament, the history is a story of reports followed by inaction. From 1846 till 1885 many recommendations were made, but nothing eventuated; in the latter year the Home Government indicated that it considered that the W.A. Government should fortify Fremantle, but that the Australian Colonies as a whole, represented by the "Federal Council", should be responsible for the defence of Albany and Thursday Island. This meant that, for all practical purposes, the colonies of N.S.W. and Victoria should finance the work and provide the garrison for Albany. The War Office, however, offered some guns for all three places. The Fremantle guns duly arrived, lay on the beach for some time, and eventually found an honoured resting place in Kings Park, never having been emplaced. The Federal Council objected to the muzzle-loading guns offered for Albany, and were eventually successful in getting two up-to-date six-inch guns,—from a War Office probably glad to hear the last of the affair. Even so, the two gun mountings were not identical, and there is a suspicion that Albany got one gun intended for Thursday Island and vice-versa. The impetus of the Defence Council ensured that "Princess Royal" Battery at Albany was completed and manned in 1893, whereas nothing happened regarding Fremantle till 1904, after Fe-

deration. The garrison for Albany was a company of W.A. Permanent Artillery, the original personnel of which came from N.S.W. and Victoria, and it is thought were also paid for by those colonies. Subsequent enlistments were made in W.A.

Training.

In the early days of the Volunteer system, the standard of training was probably very low, due to lack of organisation and instructors, obsolescence and paucity of weapons, lack of funds, and an unsympathetic legislature. It was only in 1895 that the Government introduced the "partially-paid" system, with bounties for extra efficiency and musketry.

On the other hand, the enthusiasm of the Volunteers was very great, and they gave their time freely to military duties. Inter-unit rivalry was keen, and Captain Hillman of The Metropolitan Rifle Volunteers in 1882 complained of his bad luck in being the first corps inspected by the Commandant and that being "mixed up with that d-----d Artillery made all the difference."

The first camp was held at Cottesloe in 1884, and was attended by 355 all ranks. The camp area was lent by the local publican, who also made his premises available for the HQ Staff. No doubt the extra trade resulting more than compensated the publican for the wear and tear on his grass land. An original coloured sketch by Lieutenant-Colonel Angelo, the Commandant, hangs in the U.S.I. of W.A., and affords an illuminating and amusing vignette of military activity in those days.

The same year a camp was held about 17 miles north of Geraldton for the benefit of the local company, and the attendance of 40 was probably very creditable. The accommodation is noted by a visiting volunteer from Perth as being "good but rough", and although lacking in the public house amenity provided at Cottesloe, the visitor was "offered refreshment" and was very pleased with what he saw.

Subsequent camps were held at Greenmount and Guildford, with smaller attendances. From 1896 to 1898, probably due to the new pay code, more successful camps were held at Karrakatta, with the additional advantage of a new rifle range there, in succession to the original one constructed on Mt. Eliza (Kings Park) in 1863. At Karrakatta and on this range, the contingents for South Africa did all of their pre-embarkation training, such as it was. It now (1951) comprises a collection of training depots for divisional troops, and has been renamed "Irwin Training Centre" in commemoration of the first Commandant.

Administration.

As can be imagined with the small staff allowed, administration was fairly sketchy by modern standards. For instance, the order constituting the First Contingent for South Africa, including names and appointments of officers, rates of pay and allowances, deferred pay, secondment and relief of O.C. Albany Garrison and the intention of the Commandant to inspect the unit, takes only 1½ pages in long hand.

A further order for the inspection of the troops by the Governor took 11 lines, including train time-

table, and concluded with the paragraph—"During Captain Moor's absence from the Colony, his horse will be at the disposal of the Commandant for public service." Captain Moor, R.A., who had been in command of the W.A.P.A. at Albany, never returned to collect his horse,—he was killed in action on 19 July, 1900.

An order for the embarkation of the Fourth Contingent was very brief, covering less than two pages, longhand, and no returns were called for. Administration was catching up, however, and by the time the Ninth Contingent was embarked, the length of the order had nearly doubled, and six returns were required, one being of "temperance men who wish to receive tea and sugar." That the administrative tail sometimes wagged the executive dog is illustrated by an order which reads: "No recruits to be taken on between the 20th and end of each month, owing to the monthly State rendered on the 25th being an accurate State at the end of the month."

Administration in early days called for a robust individualism. "A cap badge for Infantry Corps having been approved . . . Officers Commanding Infantry Corps will take steps to see that their Corps are provided with this badge as soon as possible. The badge can be obtained from Messrs. Hobson & Sons, Lexington Street, Golden Square, London." Another order, written on Melbourne Club notepaper—"Captain P-----, W.A. Mounted Infantry, will proceed at his own expense to South Africa in the S.S. Sophocles, reporting himself on arrival to the Chief Staff

Officer, Cape Town, for duty with the West Australian Mounted Infantry."

Ceremonial.

General orders indicate that ceremonial parades were frequent. The Queen's Birthday, the arrival and departure of Governors and Admirals, the opening of Parliamentary Sessions, and the embarkation and return of foreign contingents, all called for ceremonial, often involving the concentration of all available troops from the country as well as from the metropolis.

The following extract from the diary of A. J. Hillman (Captain of Metropolitan Rifle Volunteers) is the record of one such parade on the Queen's Birthday:—

"Wednesday, 24 May, 1882.

Although rather cloudy with slight inclination to rain the day passed off without any downfall.

Our Corps fell in at 10.30 a.m. The Guildford Volunteers came down by the 9 a.m. train—they had 55 men all told—we had 118. After getting our ammunition at the Armoury I marched the M.R.V's. and G.R.V's. down to the drill ground, where I had a capital half hour's drill with the companies; they worked very well. The Fremantle Rifles and the Naval Brigade got in to the ground about 11.30, and soon after Lord Gifford arrived and took command of the whole—there were 340 men of all ranks present and made a very respectable line.

The Governor drove down with Lady Robinson a little before noon and walked down the line inspecting them, after which he took up his position at the saluting point and we marched past in quick time

and then at the double. The Perth Artillery, misunderstanding Lord Gifford's directions, got right in the road of the company I was leading at the double—we went right over them, to the great amusement of the spectators—it was Hayne's fault, he should have got out of the road. The Royal Salute of 21 guns was then fired by sevens at a time with a round of our "feu de joie" between each seven—the guns were fired in a most wretched manner insomuch that some wag said he thought they must have had a telegram saying the Queen was dead. The Artillery were firing minute guns.

After the Salute was finished the line was wheeled into column and closed to the front, and the Governor came down and made a very nice speech, not buttering up the Force in the usual manner but speaking very well about it and mentioning the appointment of Colonel Angelo and his intention to give a prize again this year, and winding up by calling for three cheers for the Queen. We all marched off then to our respective parades, and this great demonstration was over for another year. I left Sergeant Dean to call the roll and dismiss the men while I rushed home, put on my levee uniform and just got down to Government House to attend that interesting ceremony."

The visit of T.R.H. the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York caused some fast movement. No. 1 Field Battery was ordered to fire a 21-gun salute as the Royal Train passed West Perth Railway Station, and then join the Royal Procession for the march through the city. The

Guard of Honour at the station had to move fast to repeat their performance at Government House, whilst troops lining the first two sections of the route were to move as soon as the procession passed, take a short cut and subsequently line the latter portion of the route.

Orders for dress were many. Officers attending "Assaults-at-Arms" were to appear in Mess Dress, or if not in possession, in Review Order. Levees, Dinners or Evening Parties at Government House called for Full Dress Uniform, whilst for Garden Parties and Receptions, "frock coat and tall hat" were ordered. One order is extant in which the Commandant expresses his disapproval of Volunteer officers in plain clothes witnessing military displays, and promised that in future cases such officers might be "removed from the precincts."

Photographs and sketches reveal that till about 1900 West Australian troops were dressed generally to conform with Imperial troops—in scarlet or blue, but the helmet was generally white. In the late 'nineties the felt hat made its appearance, but it was worn cocked on the right side instead of the left, as at present.

South Africa.

In 1899 the Boer War found the Colony with a small Volunteer force of undoubtedly fine material but a sketchy if not altogether deficient organization. To meet the Empire's call, therefore, a newly raised unit was offered and accepted,—a company of mounted infantry, of 5 officers and 125 O.R's. with two Maxim guns. Things certainly moved fast, — war was de-

clared on 10 October, and the company, better known as the First Contingent, embarked at Albany on 7 November. In all, nine Contingents were despatched, of varying strengths from 58 to 226. The first six were officially known as "Western Australian Mounted Infantry" and the last three, raised after Federation, as "Australian Commonwealth Horse."

All in all, Western Australia sent 64 officers and 1,167 O.R.'s. with 1,179 horses. Casualties were 28 killed in action, 12 died, and 86 wounded, and Awards were, V.C., 1; C.B., 2; D.S.O., 7 and D.C.M., 7. The recruiting figures on a population basis were 50 per cent. higher than the average for Australia as a whole,—a standard which has been maintained ever since.

Federation.

The year 1901 was a busy one. There was a war still on, contingents departing and arriving, two Royal visitors to honour, a new Governor-General to receive, and a contingent to despatch to Melbourne for the inauguration of the Commonwealth. A very concise Order of 1st March, 1901, brings a Chapter to a close.

"The Military Forces of the State of Western Australia have this day been transferred to the control of the Commonwealth of Australia. All Acts, Rules, and Regulations at the present existing will continue in force until further orders.

J. A. CAMPBELL, Major, C.S.O."
