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

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THE SOURCE
of
MILITARY MORALE

Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. Loughran.

"The true strength of any army lies in its moral character and the spirit of its soldiers. A man needs a sense of individual dignity and responsibility. He must know and believe in the ideals of his country and he must be willing to protect and perpetuate them."

TOTAL war has brought with it an increasing realization that the morale of military forces must have a broader and deeper base than in the past. Among the eminent soldiers who have expressed this opinion is General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, whose statement of the requirement is quoted above.

In this paper I propose to examine General Collins's statement, with particular reference to the problem of creating and maintaining in the Australian Army a morale which will carry it through any undertaking, no matter how hazardous or prolonged, in the decisive struggle to which the Western world is deeply committed.

Although we sometimes refer to a man as a "born soldier," no man is born a soldier. For the first, charcter-forming years of his life he is a civilian—acknowledging no discipline but that common to other civilians of his age and state. In his family circle he acquires his first vague philosophy of life and, in general, it is this initial philosophy, developed and adjusted by environment, that persists into manhood.

The Army, then, fills its ranks with civilians whose ideals have already in large measure been determined. So long as a man is not subversive, is medically fit and, theoretically, has reached the mental age of at least 11 years, he can be enlisted. He can be athiest or theist, radical or reactionary, moral or immoral. He can come from farm or factory, school or shop—and with him he brings his little world of dreams and ideas and, if he has any, ideals.

The task of the Army is to fashion this hotch-potch of humanity into an efficient fighting machine, which means a machine that not only *can* fight but one that *will* fight. We can

train an army until it is perfection itself amidst the blank cartridges and flour bombs, but can we train one that will function as flawlessly when death stalks every stride? And, quite apart from military training, can we produce a body of men who will tolerate the mental strain not of one or two short and vigorous campaigns, but an extended affair lasting many years or perhaps even a lifetime?

An army quite obviously needs something other than the mere ability to manoeuvre, to use its weapons to the best possible advantage, to cope with its supply problems and to sustain long drawn out physical effort. Those thing are important, certainly, but the vital, the decisive factor is the *will* to fight and win.

Now although the subject of this paper supplies the reputed answer to the question of what gives an army the will to fight and win, considerable elaboration is required before we can decide intelligently just how it is to be applied to our own army. What, for example, are the ideals of his country that the Australian soldier must know and believe in? What exactly is meant by "a sense of individual dignity and responsibility"? What factors determine moral character?

It is abundantly clear that no army will have the will to fight and win unless it is sustained and encouraged by the *nation*—unless, that is, the *nation* has the will to fight and win. There are various motives for which nations will go to war but the intensity and endurance with which a war is fought depend on one quality —the patriotism of the people. The abuse and over-use of this word must not blind us to the fact that it has a definite meaning—the love of and the desire to serve one's country.

It is important to note that there are two different types of patriotism having, it is true, certain features in common but otherwise differing greatly. The first of these is the pagan patriotism of the pre-Christian era, which has been revived in modern times by Italy, Germany, Japan and Russia. The second is the Christian concept of national patriotism on which Western Civilisation was nourished.

We must know the distinction between these two if we are to understand the spiritual forces which activate the various peoples of the world and if we are to harness these forces for our own use. For this reason I propose now to examine each of them in turn.

Pagan Patriotism.

Patriotism, considered solely in the pagan or material sense, has always been the best medicine of humanity and all the sterner and more robust virtues were matured to the highest degree by its power. More than any other influence it diffuses a steady fortitude that is equally removed from languor and timidity on the one hand and from feverish and morbid excitement on the other. It produces a capacity for united action, for self-sacrifice, for long and persevering exertion—an ability to pass through life with majestic dignity and to meet death with unfaltering calm. Almost all those examples of heroic self-sacrifice which antiquity affords, were produced by the spirit of patriotism. It pervaded all classes not only in times of national crisis but habitually. It formed a distinct type of character and was

the origin both of many virtues and many vices.

This picture of the brighter side of patriotism, however, looks gloomy in reverse. The Roman civilization, for example, exhibited the sterner virtues in abundance but it was notoriously deficient in the gentler ones. The pathos of life was invariably repressed. Suffering and weakness met with little sympathy or assistance. The slave, the captive, the sick, the helpless were treated with cold indifference or with the most cold-blooded ferocity. Hospitals and refuges for the afflicted were unknown. The spectacle of suffering and death was the luxury of all classes. An almost absolute destruction of the finer sensibilities was the consequence of the universal worship of force. The welfare of the state being the highest object of unselfish devotion, vice and virtue were often measured by that standard and the individual was habitually sacrificed to the community.

But perhaps the greatest vice of the old form of patriotism was the narrowness of sympathy which it produced. Outside the circle of their own nation men were regarded with contempt and indifference, if not with absolute hostility. Conquest was the one recognized form of national progress and the interests of nations were therefore regarded as directly opposed. The intensity with which a man loved his country was a measure of the hatred he bore to those outside it.

This, then, is the pagan patriotism which we have seen mirrored in our own time by Italy, Germany, Japan and Russia. Its most noteworthy feature is the subjugation of the individual to the state and, in fact, it would be hard to define it more clearly and simply than by quoting Mussolini's own words on Fascism: "Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which individuals are relative; individuals and groups are 'thinkable' insofar as they exist within the State."[1]

It is easy to see that the history of mankind has turned a full circle from the tribalism of savagery around and back to the nationalistic tribalism of the modern world.

Let us now examine the Christian concept of national patriotism and see how it contrasts with pagan patriotism, both ancient and modern.

Christian Patriotism.

The Christian concept of national patriotism stems from two basic postulates—the primacy of the individual personality and the essential unity of the human race.

To the Christian, man is not merely a material being; every man has a soul individually created by God and his destiny is partly in time, partly in eternity.

To help man to reach his destined end he possesses certain faculties and exigencies, both material and spiritual. To emphasise one of these to the exclusion of the other does violence to his nature and leads to disaster.

Amongst the aids which God has provided to enable man to achieve his destiny is society, i.e., the association of free human beings who need each other to get goods, satisfactions and the full development of their personalities which they cannot achieve in isolation.

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1 Mussolini, "Facismo-Dottrina," "Enciclopedia Italiana," Vol. XIV, col. 850.

The society a man lives in, together with the soil it occupies, constitutes his fatherland and, because of its contribution to his existence and development, he owes it, in justice, a debt of gratitude.

Every citizen, therefore, has an obligation to love in a special way and to render a special service to his country and to his fellow citizens who live under the same flag or belong to the same nation. This is the Christian concept of national patriotism.[2]

It will be noted that the Christian's debt to society derives from the fact that society helps *him* to achieve *his* destiny. The pagan (or modern extreme nationalist) concept, by contrast, holds that the State is the supreme good and that the individual exists only to help the state to fulfil *its* destiny. To some this might appear to be mere quibbling with words, but, philosophically, the two concepts are poles apart and, in their pure forms, mean precisely the difference between freedom and slavery.

"National patriotism or Christian nationalism, however, does not exclude internationalism. Nationalism and internationalism, as such, are not antithetical or mutually exclusive terms. But, just as there is a false and exaggerated nationalism, so there is . . . a false and exaggerated internationalism.

"The internationalism which accords with Christian principles is simply an honest and reasoned respect for the rights of all nations, great or small. It involves an appreciation of the essential ties of nature, culture and interest which transcend secondary differences and link individuals and nations in the whole human race.

"Christian internationalism presupposes, in our modern world, a sincere loyalty of the individual to his national state, language and traditions. It supplements and tempers national patriotism. Christian patriotism must lead to, and be crowned by, Christian internationalism. As Australians we are national, as human beings we are international, as Christians we are supranational."[3]

Our Choice.

I have made this comparison between the pagan patriotism of the pre-Christian era (revived in modern nationalism) and the Christian concept of patriotism (on which Western Civilization grew) to show the choice of ideals which lies before us, because the time is at hand when we must choose.

As a nation we have lost, as I shall show later, what ideals we once had. We are coasting uphill on a past impetus and our pace is getting slower and slower.

Perhaps nothing demonstrates our negativism more clearly than our fear of our ideological enemies. This is true not only of Australia but of Western Civilization generally. Whenever men fall into Russian hands we fear, not without reason, that they will be contaminated by communist ideology—that they will become loyal servants of the Soviet. Yet, in similar circumstances we

2 I have confined myself to "stating" the Christian concept of national patriotism as briefly as possible. In no sense is this statement intended as an apologetic. A full and clear analysis of the subject, together with an analysis of racial, linguistic and geographical theories of nationalism and the proposed social, economic and religious solutions to the problem of extreme nationalism will be found in "Christianity and National Patriotism," a pamphlet by Rev. James G. Murtagh, M.A.

3 "Christianity and National Patriotism," page 33.

fear our own inability to imbue others with our ideals, simply because we have none. Our Christian ethics are a legacy from our Christian ancestors and we are fast letting them die for want of nourishment.

There are many good fellows who, whilst possessing no conscious religious feeling, are nevertheless rich in Christian virtues. They appear to think that a sense of fair play, a helping hand to the weak, a sense of honesty and a high moral code generally are characteristics of their race—a sort of natural endowment. To be sure they know that way back their ancestors were barbarians but they never trouble to sutdy the influences that transformed those barbarians into such good fellows as themselves.

It is no secret, of course, that the code of ethics which grew with Western Civilization has its roots in Christianity. What is not generally realized, however, is that a decline in Christianity means a decline in our moral values, and the death of Christianity would mean the end of our moral code, which, I am sure, all good fellows would consider a jolly poor show!

The Australian Scene.

We have seen that the spirit of an army depends, to a great extent, on the spirit of the nation. We have seen, furthermore, that the soldier is, first and foremost, a civilian and that he reflects the feelings and ideals of the community. Especially is this true of the peace-time citizen soldier who comes under the influence of the Army for comparatively few hours each year.

It must be apparent, therefore, that a soldier can only "know and believe in the ideals of his country and . . . be willing to protect and perpetuate them" if his country (i.e., the community) has ideals which it deems worth preserving and, if necessary, worth fighting for.

Since a nation, in the Christian concept, is the popular community of free human persons, the ideals of a nation can only be the sum total of the ideals of its inhabitants. Australia, as we well know, is nearly equally divided on political ideals, so we must find some other common ground if we are going to get the unanimity necessary for an all-out effort.

Have we had any common ideal in the past in this country? And, if so, have we one now?

For a long time our national ideal derived from the land itself and its location. The folk who pioneered our continent made a long and dangerous journey to face unknown hazards. They were knit together by the knowledge of their isolation and their utter dependence on each other. They found their ideal in accepting the challenge of a vast, primeval wilderness which, side by side, they gradually subdued and conquered.

In course of time the discovery of gold, the growth of population and a wider appreciation of the potentialities of the country gave rise to a feeling of nationhood. The fledgling 'down under' was learning to fly and began to know it. Men like William Lane and Henry Lawson spread the doctrine of independent nationalism—Lane's medium being a Brisbane Labour journal, "The Boomerang," and Lawson's the Sydney "Bulletin." The common

people responded readily to the new doctrine and its fruits were to be found at the turn of the century in the Australian Natives' Association, the Australian Labour Party and Federation.

With these growing pains, as is often the case, there came a feeling of arrogance—a desire to prove to others that we were as good as they. After the first World War we had proved it to our own satisfaction and we hoped that others were duly impressed. Our ideal of independent nationalism had been achieved and tested in fire. But now, instead of looking forward, we looked back and contented ourselves with contemplating our past. Our nationalism began to show itself as almost completely negative, expressing itself in terms of what we dislike both with respect to foreigners and even to our own.

Between the two World Wars Australians were subjected to a barrage of extreme pacificism and exaggerated internationalism spread by left-wing propaganda. A truly Christian nation would have withstood this onslaught because Christianity, whilst stressing the equality of man in essential human nature and fundamental human rights, does not deny the inevitable inequalities in endowment, brains and ability amongst individuals. Only a spiritual and functional view of man in society can recognize and use these differences for the common good whilst respecting the essential equality of all. The secularization of Australian life, however, particularly in the sphere of education, had brought at least one generation of Australians to manhood with, at best, only a feeble knowledge of Christianity. To these, quite naturally, the concept of patriotism as a Christian virtue was unknown.

The sapping of the Australian spirit between the two World Wars was further aided by the press, the films and the radio—all of which reflected English and American ideas and discouraged the growth of Australian nationalism. But, worse than that, in general they depicted and glorified a philosophy of life which made earthly success and earthly happiness the sole criterion of right living. The Hay's Office might insist that the lawbreaker be punished, that frank pornography be banned; but nothing could stem the multitude of incipient and even blatant attacks on many of the standards of morality which our Christian ancestors had taken for granted. The idea that anything which thwarted mankind in the search for comfort, for success, for "having a good time" might be morally wrong was no longer thought valid. It was not, of course, *proven* wrong; it was merely disposed of by the simple but telling device which rationalists have always found so helpful—it was declared "old fashioned."

I do not propose to examine here in detail the influences which enabled Australia temporarily to rekindle the fire of patriotism during World War II. It will suffice to say that initially the response of the nation was not a spontaneous upsurge of idealism fighting for right and, in fact, it was not until Germany attacked Russia that Australia was genuinely united in its war effort.

This unity, however, was not destined to last for long. When the war ended and the Western powers no longer had a common aim with

Russia, Australia was split again. Once more our national spirit reverted to the condition in which it had weathered the 'thirties, but this time our status as a nation had changed to an extent which gave this condition vastly more significance.

The way in which we had acquitted ourselves during the war, plus the wider knowledge of our country resulting from the American and other "invasions," imbued us with a new national importance. For the first time we found ourselves genuinely accorded a voice in the councils of the world—our opinions really seemed to matter. No longer were our gibes and criticisms regarded as the tantrums of a naughty child—people began to take them seriously.

And then we made a startling discovery. We found that concurrently with the recognition of our manhood we had forfeited the privileges of youth. As youngsters we had expected (and received) grateful thanks for lending a helping hand to others in distress; as men we were expected to play a man's part —to help ourselves and others, not as a bountiful gesture, but as a duty.

The implications of this change in status are not yet fully realized. There is still a considerable body of opinion in this country clinging to the belief that Australia should accept no commitments other than for her own defence and that our importance as a granary and Main Support Area is sufficient to blackmail others into helping us merely to defend ourselves. I do not here criticize the politics or possibilities of this proposal but I do criticize its morality. Nothing, I feel, could indicate more clearly that many of us have forgotten or never thought of the foundations on which this civilization of ours has, with such immeasurable toil, been built. Adherence to such a concept indicates a callous disregard for others, a presumptuous evaluation of our own importance and a lack of sense of responsibility, all of which, together, spell death to idealism. In short, it indicates abandonment of the brotherhood of man—the Christian ethic on which Western Civilization is based—and a return to the pagan outlook of the pre-Christian era.

Dignity and Responsibility.

Australia, as it is today, has *no* national ideals. We have a civilization which was built on Christianity and we are vaguely hoping to maintain it on materialism or, alternatively, on nothing. It is like trying to run a petrol engine on water. Before our eyes we see the moral character of the community declining. This is reflected not so much in the police records (although the picture they show is not a pretty one) but in the genèral decline in moral standards. Pride in craftsmanship is waning fast, honesty is becoming old-fashioned. The new aristocracy comprises the black marketeers, the professional gamblers, the racketeers and sly-groggers. There is around us a widespread revolt against discipline. Policemen are brutally battered by angry mobs or even by angry individuals whilst bystanders merely look on with interest or amusement. Even football umpires have to be guarded against physical assault by hostile barrackers. Our national motto is: "To hell with you, Jack, I'm all right!"

This is the atmosphere in which the recruit of today has come to

manhood. If he has been able to salvage an ideal from the debris of modern life he is lucky and the chances are he will make a good soldier; if he has not been so lucky—which is most likely—he will tend to become a cartoon-type soldier whose toughness is an attitude rather than an attribute, a veneer without a base-board.

Our problem is to find a means of investing the individual with a sense of individual dignity and responsibility. How is this to be done?

The trouble with the modern, materialistic world is its tendency to believe that every solvable problem has a *practical* solution. By that I mean a solution which appears "down to earth," as opposed to one which belongs to the realm of philosophy. Unfortunately for this point of view the practical solution is very often the one which appears unpractical simply because we have ceased to realize—for all *practical* purposes—the nature of man. Our Christian ancestors had no such problem. Rightly or wrongly they had a clear-cut notion of man's origin and destiny and of the consequent dignity of the individual. In short they believed that every man had a soul individually created by God and that, in the long run, every man was answerable to God and God alone. This concept (I am not here arguing its merits or demerits) asserted the essential equality of man in a manner that can never be paralleled in the social sphere. It gave to every man the sense of individual dignity which his being craves; it reminded him that he was a rational being with a conscience and with a free will to follow the dictates of his conscience—that he was, in short, as well equipped as any of his fellows to fight the main battle of life.

This sense of individual dignity was quite naturally accompanied by a sense of individual responsibility—an awareness of duty not only to God but to one's neighbour; and this was the germ of Christian patriotism, loyalty, self-sacrifice, courage and the will to fight for right.

If we are honest we must admit that the recruit of today is poorer raw material than were his ancestors. Physically he may be superior but morally and spiritually, which, as we have seen is more important, he is undoubtedly inferior.

It is not my task to trace here in detail the reasons for this decline. No doubt, I repeat, it is largely due to the steady secularization of the state, chiefly in the sphere of education. When religious instruction was first banned from our schools its effects were not immediate. Both parents and teachers had been brought up in a Christian atmosphere and doubtless imparted many vital Christian principles to their children. With each generation, however, the effect has increased in geometric progression until today the child learns little or nothing about religious philosophy or ethics either in the school or in the home. It is therefore small cause for wonder if the modern recruit lacks the spiritual qualities so essential in a good soldier.

As this is, beyond all question, a spiritual problem, its solution is only to be found in the spiritual plane. The truly practical man is therefore the man who appreciates this fact and who suits his weapons to the task.

It is a terrifying reality that, in

our own generation, we have seen dictators mould the minds of youth to suit their purposes; that we have appreciated the enormous advantage that this has given them, yet we have done nothing in reply. In effect we have said: "It would be wonderful if we could only train our people to believe in a cause but, alas, we have no cause for them to believe in!"

This is our despairing cry and it stems from our abysmal ignorance of our heritage—from our lack of knowledge of our way of life. Until this state of affairs is remedied on a national scale the average recruit will continue to be a spiritual moron and our army will lack the spiritual strength which can only be nourished by a truly Christian community.

It may well be possible, however, for the Army to prime the charge —to set up a chain reaction which may revitalize the nation. But it cannot be done in five minutes or even in five months; it must be a continuous process and it must be prosecuted with sincerity and with vigour.

Education and Example.

I propose now to examine what can be done—what *must* be done—in order to produce an army that has the true strength of being spiritually equipped to fight. Having done so I shall try to show *how* it can be done, having regard to the structure of our post-war army as already planned.

It is important to bear in mind that, since this is a spiritual problem, its solution involves finding a way into the minds of men; in short, it is primarily a matter of education and example. Now "education" is not synonymous with "indoctrination." The former, strictly speaking, means "leading out"—in other words, training people to think for themselves; the latter, by contrast, means "to imbue with an opinion." These words, in a sense, summarise the difference between democracy and totalitarianism.

Men were not always educated. In far off days youths were taught only such essentials as to track, to hunt, to fish and to build the rude structures which served as homes. In short, man learned only to survive in the world in which he found himself.

In time, however, as traditions and customs grew, the child could not learn all that was necessary by this method. As a result the older men took it on themselves to instruct the young at certain times in traditions, customs and group lore.

The increasing complexity of life eventually dictated the need for certain members of the group to become thoroughly familiar with the traditions and customs and to devote most of their time to teaching the young. Thus there came the first schools.

This system of schooling grew and developed through the ages until today society has said, in effect, that it recognizes the necessity of education for its preservation. Further, society has designated what shall be taught in schools and has asserted the right to certify teachers and to set standards.

This has led many to argue that the fundamental purpose of education is to train and mould individuals into service to the State. The whole

educational system in modern totalitarian countries has been of this nature. It is controlled completely by the State and no one is permitted to do or teach anything except that which will contribute to the building of citizens who will devotely serve the State and be obedient to the will of the ruler.

In democracies, on the other hand, educators have tried hard to preserve the individuality of children, feeling that insofar as the individual is permitted to grow according to his nature and deviate from the group, he is able to make a contribution such as will further group progress.

The mistake of the democracies has been that, in striving to preserve unfettered minds, they have, in many cases, created empty minds. They have, in addition, produced a disunity which even endangers their survival against the regimented minds of dictator states. Even the most ardent educationalist must agree that the need for survival takes precedence over the need to encourage individualism. Society itself in other spheres admits this fact and punishes individuals whose deviations take the form of transgressing laws made for the good of the people as a whole.

We may derive some consolation from knowing that this whole problem *can* be solved—that it has been tackled and solved before. In the words of Paul McGuire: "The West, impoverished and menaced, must now decide whether it will turn again or not to the source of its strength and restore its moral and spiritual community. The situation resembles that of the sixth and seventh centuries, when another great thrust came in arms out of the East. Christianity had to renew itself or die. It did not die."[4]

The minds we must try to penetrate are those on which the significance of this statement will be largely lost because Christianity to them means just another religion. They do not know that Christianity is more than that—that it is a way of life, based on a particular view of man's nature. Everything that is good in what we call "our way of life" is due to that view; everything that is evil can be traced to our betrayals of that view.

There is no point in dealing with hypothetical situations when we can get down to actual cases. If we expect men to fight we must show them what they will be fighting for —what, perhaps without knowing it, they are already fighting for. ". . . I assure you it isn't only your soldiers in Korea who are embattled today; it is the highest attainment of mind, spirit and being of the last four thousand years."[5]

We must, therefore, educate men to an intimate knowledge of what divides the modern world. We must show them that it is not a mere conflict of political aspirations but of paganism and Christianity — of spiritual serfdom and our way of life.

"Communism is predicated on the emphatic rejection of God . . . Communist man . . . is pathetically dehumanized . . . severed from his divine origin and divine destiny; denied the spiritual principle which gives his reason access to the truth,

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4 Paul McGuire, quoted in the Australian Army Journal, No. 14, July, 1950, page 30.

5 Charles Habib Malik, former professor of philosophy at the American University of Beirut; now Lebanon's delegate to the United Nations, quoted in "Time," 29 Jan., 1951, page 25.

which endows his conscience and will with the craving for the good, which empowers his heart to love; imprisoned hopelessly in this world of strife and frustration, here to centre all his hopes and here to erect his paradise. . . . He is but a passing shadow of no duration, a fragment of no intrinsic or ultimate worth. . . ."[6]

Now the denial of God will appear to many to be the least important aspect of Communism whereas, in fact, it is the most important and we must educate men to see why this is so. To deny God is to deny the moral law, which is the intellectual guide of our conscience. Consequently the behaviour of the atheistic communist is unpredictable by Christian standards. To him the only good is the spread of communism, and he not only may, but is *bound* to help this objective by every conceivable method, whether or not it involves lying, deceit, torture, murder, treason or what you will.

Can we, then, get along with communism? "Obviously I cannot get along with one whose whole being not only contradicts mine, but is bent on destroying mine. Therefore, when anybody in the West says, '. . . We can get along with Communism,' then one of four propositions is true: (1) Either he is a communist himself; (2) or he is an appeaser; (3) or he does not know what he is talking about; namely, he does not know the nature of the thing with which he says he can get along; (4) or—and this is the most grievous thing—he does not know the supreme values of his own heritage, which Communism had radically rebelled against and desires to extirpate."[7]

We must therefore emphasise, and keep on emphasising, the social significance of Christianity. Communists are not fools. They know that Communism would surely wreck itself against a truly Christian front. That is why they seek to disarm Christians by spreading the myth that religious freedom exists in Russia, that Christianity and Communism can live side by side. By subtle (and not so subtle) propaganda and every conceivable perfidy the Communist must undermine the Christian view of man to prepare the godless soil which is necessary to the spread of communism. Only when man admits no arbitrator of the mind higher than the state will he tolerate his own enslavement.

It is, of course, idle to proclaim the virtues of Christian civilization and condemn the perfidy of atheistic communism if, by neglect, we are permitting our Christian ethics to drift away; if, in short, we are sliding into godlessness of our own volition. "Bolshevism is at once the product of the bourgeois society and the judgment upon it. It reveals the goal to which the secret philosophy of that society leads, if accepted with unflinching logic."[8] Our national leaders must arrest this drift by infusing Christianity into government. If Christian principles are used as a yard-stick to judge the social justice of every governmental measure there will be no dupes in our midst hankering after a communist utopia. This is necessary if our way of life is to survive, but it is beyond the power of the

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 "Bolshevism: Theory and Practice," by Dr. Waldemar Furian, translated by E. I. Watkin, page 242.

Army to achieve it *directly*. We must aim therefore not only at influencing the minds of soldiers but the minds of all citizens. Our military leaders must impress the importance of this matter on our national leaders with the same vigour and persistence as they would press any other military problem because, if the true strength of an army depends on it, it *is* a military problem.

In considering what form our educational programme must take we must bear in mind the vital difference between the mediaeval times to which Paul McGuire refers above and the present day, namely, the multitude of sects into which Christendom has since been divided. In Australia alone at the last census Christians showed themselves as belonging to no less than twenty-one major religions, plus a host of minor ones (i.e., fewer than 400 adherents each). Christianity might therefore appear to the sceptic to be a rather vague rallying cry. Such, however, is not the case. All Christian religions have certain factors in common which distinguish them from non-Christian religions and, above all, from atheistic materialism, and these common factors must be distilled and propagated. Only thus can we show clearly that our civilization depends for its survival on the survival of the Christian ethic.

". . . (Bolshevism) claims to represent immutable principles. Though it regards earthly existence, the economic and social organization, as the final end of human life, it follows this belief with a zeal and a devotion that gives it the appearance of a religion, in comparison with which the frequent panegyrics of man's spiritual freedom and dignity which carry with them no practical obligation appear worthless and hollow. It is, therefore, impossible to combat Bolshevism with arguments of a purely opportunist kind."[9] "Our way of life," instead of being a mere catch phrase which has no real meaning for many, must be codified and taught just as positively as totalitarian doctrines are taught, though not, of course, by the same methods. Only thus can we prepare the community to withstand the constant attack of propaganda which seeks to undermine our belief in ourselves.

Nor must the force of example, as a means of education, be overlooked. If the survival of the Christian civilization—the individual rights of man and social justice—be our ideal we must be prepared to sacrifice ourselves to that end. An ideal that is not worth an effort is no ideal at all; it is just a dream.

It is therefore the duty of all those who appreciate the reality of this problem to expose it on every possible occasion—to encourage people to think about it. Example is a great educating force and at its greatest when it comes from those who are most honoured, respected or admired. That is why many people who would shun the works, no matter how simply written, of eminent religious philosophers will eagerly devour such articles as "Why I Believe in God" by popular actors, sportsmen or other celebrities.

Our leaders must show that they realize the importance of this problem and, by their unflagging

9 Ibid, page 4.

example, awaken the faith of a nation that has been drugged by materialism for too long.

* * *

I have tried to show that our national ideal should be the preservation and development of Christian civilization, i.e., the preservation of all that is good in our way of life and the incorporation in it of other good things that would follow if our national outlook were truly Christian. Unless this is our ideal why should we resist the march of communism? What have we to muster against the burning faith of the communist in the ultimate triumph of his creed?

Our way of life is far from perfect but its imperfections are not due to Christianity—they are due to neglect of Christianity. We cannot therefore hope to perfect it if we lose sight of its foundations—if, that is, we forget that the survival of our civilization depends on the survival of Christianity. It might well be said that ours is the first civilization that has been able to diagnose the causes of its own decay. But knowledge of the disease from which we suffer will avail us little if we make no effort to effect a cure.

So important is this matter that there should be no question of vaguely wondering whether we can find time for it in our training syllabus. It should be accorded the priority it merits and, if necessary, our syllabus should be completely revised to ensure that it will succeed.

What of the Army?

If the problem and its solution are as I have stated them, it will be apparent that the need exists for a national effort to remedy the situation by some positive action. A nation, however, is largely an abstraction and a national effort can only be an effort by its component parts. The question that faces us is: "What can the Army do? How can we train our soldiers to understand the inner meaning of our way of life and show them just how seriously it is threatened?"

If we examine our army as it is at present the only worthwhile fact that emerges is that any Army educational programme can reach *directly* only a pitifully small proportion of our potential war-time army. Between 23rd October, 1939, and 30th September, 1945, there were 727,703 enlistments in the Australian Army. This is a figure that we might reasonably be expected to duplicate or even to exceed in any future major war. By contrast the total strength of our army (excluding cadets) is now, in round figures, 40,000 which, incidentally, is only 55 per cent. of its planned strength. Of the present actual strength 20,000 belong to the Citizen Military Forces which are expected to carry out 14 days' home training (made up of 2-hour night parades and 3-hour afternoon parades) per year and 14 days' annual camp training. The average attendance at any one home training parade is approximately 50 per cent. and about the same proportion goes into camp. Our scope here is obviously limited and, in any case, it might reasonably be inferred that those men who join the Citizen Military Forces and faithfully carry out their training are those members of the community who already have some appreciation of the problem and who are making sacrifices in their country's interests.

The introduction of National Service is producing an annual intake

of 27,000 who will be trained continuously for fourteen weeks and thereafter complete their three years' service in the ranks of the Citizen Military Forces. It is this group that offers the best prospects for an educational programme. Their minds will be receptive and they will be more influenced by the example of their seniors than would older men.

But we must not limit ourselves to any particular group. As far as is possible we must work on every officer and man whether in the Regular Army, the Citizen Military Forces, the National Service or on the reserve. Further, we must interest the Navy and the Air Force in our task and try to pursue a uniform programme throughout the services. Only by a widespread effort can we achieve our ultimate and vital object—to awaken the entire community to a realization of the fact that arms without spiritual armour are insufficient.

Charting the Course.

I do not propose here to put forward a detailed educational programme. Any such programme would require considerable preliminary discussion and planning because it is most important that it should grip and retain the interest of everyone from the start. I shall, however, indicate in narrative form the general lines which I think such a programme should follow.

The object of our educational programme might be briefly stated as: "To codify and propagate our way of life." Our idealistic enemies spend limitless time and money in spreading the germs of their propaganda both at home and abroad. Their faith is foreign to the very nature of man and yet, by subterfuge and hard work, they succeed in convincing many people that it is something good and desirable. We, on our part, have a way of life which is attuned to man's true nature—which takes account of individual rights and individual dignity. But unless we explain to people just what our way of life is —how it differs from that of totalitarian countries and how seriously it is threatened—we cannot expect them to understand it, still less to fight for it.

We must, therefore, begin by discussing in detail the rights and freedoms that we enjoy. To some this may seem unnecessary; they may argue that since we have these rights and freedoms we already know them or, at any rate, those of them which normally concern us. This, however, is not so. If you give a small child a threepenny bit he will look at it with a momentary thrill of possession and will then probably put it in his mouth and finally discard it. There is a big difference in his attitude when he learns that that small disc of metal may be exchanged for an ice-cream or certain other delicacies. Similarly, the average citizen will appreciate our way of life much more when its evolution and meaning are explained to him, when he realizes that all his ancestors did not enjoy similar rights and privileges and that his prospects of retaining them depend on the value he and his fellows place on them.

Our next step is to explain the notion of man's nature, on which our civilization is built. We cannot merely dogmatize on the nature of man because our own community is not in agreement on that. Some will say that man is simply a being with a body like any other animal,

only rather more developed along certain lines. Others will say that men and animals alike are only a particular arrangement of electrons and protons nad neutrons and positrons. Whilst still others would have no views on these matters but would, for practical purposes, assume that whatever a man is, he is not immortal: when he dies he is finished. Whatever may be the pros and cons of these views as views, the salient point is that they do not represent the view of man which was the genesis of our way of life. The Christian will tell you that man is composed of a body and a soul, and that the soul is spiritual and immortal, with a destiny beyond the grave. This it is that invests all men with a special dignity—that unites them in universal brotherhood. This is the sublime doctrine that was first preached by Christ 2,000 years ago in diametric opposition to the most cherished Jewish and pagan prejudices of that age. It is the doctrine which gave to Western Civilization its values—values which, albeit with set-backs here and there, have steadily been gaining acceptance. It can be shown, in fact, that in the area of Western Civilization as a whole the deliberate and self-conscious denial of these values did not begin to gain any ground until comparatively recently.

Even if our programme were to go no further than this it would, I am sure, achieve a great deal. After all, we are not striving to *indoctrinate* men with a theoretical ideal but to *educate* them to understand a way of life that actually exists and to show them how it came to be.

There is, of course, an inexhaustible field for further development of this theme, but I do not intend here to attempt any detailed programme. I realize, in fact, that the preparation of a suitable programme offers a considerable challenge to our educators, since it involves the reduction of history, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, physical geography, ethnology and economics to a form that will interest and enlighten men of all standards of education. However, I have, I believe, indicated the general lines on which such a programme should be built and any further elaboration would, at this stage, be pointless.

It would, moreover, be necessary to support any such educational programme by making available adequate supplies of relevant readable literature. Education in any field is not a matter of filling minds with facts and details—it is a matter of teaching essentials, stimulating interest and showing people how they can further their knowledge of the subject. There are innumerable books and pamphlets, both entertaining and instructive, which deal with various facets of Christianity and the part it has played in the development and growth of our social order.

These should be liberally sprinkled on the shelves of every Army library to enable soldiers to supplement the instruction given in lectures.

Unless we follow some such course of action we are offering no counter to the propaganda of our ideological enemies, which daily, by every conceivable method, seeks to sap our nation's will to fight.

Conclusion.

There is not much point in being prepared to fight and die, if necessary, for the survival of our way of

life unless we believe in our hearts it will progress to something better. "All progress is a continual movement from the Known to the Unknown. Men have always been creating what they could not understand. Had they limited themselves to observance of a purely rational social ethic based on the immediate advantage of the community, they might have been more prosperous but they would not have been culturally creative. They would have had no importance for the future. The highest moral ideal, either for a people or for an individual, is to be true to its destiny, to sacrifice the bird in the hand for the vision in the bush. . . ."[10]

But a nation's idealistic vision in the bush is not self-generating. It is formed in the minds of men of foresight and given reality by those who will follow a worthy lead. Is anyone shaping Australia's destiny or are we merely drifting an unchartered course on the seas of Time to an unknown destination?

The soldier, as I said at the beginning, is dependent on the spirit of the nation. But the soldier is no less a citizen than any other member of the community and, as such, must accept his share of responsibility for moulding the communal mind. The Army, perhaps, forms the largest secular block of idealism that our country has, since no man joins up in search of purely material prosperity. Is it not, then, logical that the Army should play a leading part in the war of ideas—that it should do its utmost to inspire all the creeds and classes which pass through its hands with a true national idealism?

History repeats itself only because men fail to learn from history. That our civilization is in imminent danger no thinking man denies. Whether, with the lessons of history at hand, we can save it from destruction only the future can tell; but this much is certain: if we live only for today we will surely die tomorrow.

10 "Religion and Progress," by Christopher Dawson, page 45.

Our dead are now alive. To us they cry
That we should wake and conquer, by them led;
For, should we sleep, unnumbered men will die,
Including all the dead.

—Louis Ginsberg

MACHINES AND MEN

Their Role in Modern Military Operations

Translated and condensed by the "Military Review" from an article by Major-General Kazimierz Glabisz in "Bellona" (Polish language military quarterly published in England.

Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, one of Great Britain's outstanding military writers, stated, in his book "Armament and History," that instruments or weapons, if used properly, constitute 99 per cent. of the causes for victory, while strategy, leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organization, and all other morale and physical factors account for the other 1 per cent.

This idea was voiced by General Fuller, influenced by the destruction of Hiroshimo and Nagasaki through atomic bombing. He reacted in the same manner as did Archidamus of Sparta, who witnessed the shooting of the first arrow from the Sicilian crossbow. Archidamus was led, at that time, to declare that, "The value of man has ceased to weigh in the scales of battle."

General Fuller, himself, showed how impulsive these estimates were when he voiced the diametrically opposite viewpoint a few months ago—obviously under the influence of the events of Korea. He laid aside the idea of the potency of the machine and announced, "Men and mobility . . . not machines and explosive means . . . win wars."

The inconsistency of these two ideas is obvious, although the first has reference to a special event and the second to war in general. Are not both of these ideas too extreme? Which of these two is closer to the truth?

There are two avenues of approach to the solution of these problems:—

1. By examining the influence of man on the machine, and of the machine on man.

2. By examining the role of the machine and man from the point of view of the various forms of war or combat.

General Considerations.

It is an obvious fact that an armed man has an advantage over an unarmed man. This is true whether it be only a club, a sling, or a lance. This advantage is increased the greater the reach or effect of the weapon. For example,

a lance will disable one man; a high explosive shell, 10 or more; a bomb or poison gas, hundreds; and the atom bomb, tens of thousands.

The role of the machine (as a weapon of war) has continued to increase, while the role of man has decreased. This does not mean, however, that the role of man already has fallen from first to second place, for the role of the machine is dependent, to a very high degree, on the man himself, as well as on the weather and the terrain.

In connection with this dependence on man, on weather, and on terrain, the machine may be either a terrible and decisive instrument of battle or a troublesome burden. It may be a burden particularly at those times when the quality of the machine is replaced by quantity and when its handling is faulty.

Combat With Disproportionate Strengths.

As a rule, the role of the machine in warfare will be greater when one of the opponents is weak from the technological viewpoint, and less when both opponents possess almost equal technological advancement.

Only in exceptional cases is the technologically weaker opponent able to resist or launch attacks. These exceptions would be possible, for example, when the stronger opponent:—

1. Is not the master of his machines (as was Russia in 1939-40 in Finland).

2. Does not receive sufficient fuel or ammunition (as Rommel in North Africa).

3. Is too cautious and methodical (as was Montgomery in North Africa and Italy).

4. Is unable to exploit his technological superiority, due to terrain or weather, and the weaker opponent is able to exploit his numerical superiority in manpower (as occurred in the first 10 weeks of fighting in Korea).

Normally, however, the opponent with technological superiority is the victor in battle—but not to the extent of 99 per cent.

Combat Between Equals.

The problem is entirely different when both opponents have relatively equal strengths. In this case, disadvantages in the technological field may be overcome by the advantages of better morale, better discipline, better leadership, and greater manpower reserves. However, it must be remembered that the unprotected man cannot save himself, even when he has greater courage, greater strength, and greater resistance, when he finds himself within the range of an atom bomb, a rocket, poison gases, or, simply, a bullet.

The human factor plays an enormous role in modern warfare when both opponents have relatively the same technological strength and technological advancement. This role becomes still more varied when we analyze its various elements, such as the morale of the front and the rear, the training level, command, endurance, discipline, and, lastly, the calibre of the men who are responsible for the direction of the war.

Contrary to General Fuller, "Fleets, armies, and air forces; conscription and militias; strategic

railways; military academies; and generals, admirals, and statesmen still continue to occupy a respectable place"—in spite of the miracles of the laboratory and industry!

Conclusions.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we can deduce the following conclusions:—

1. Every attempt at defining the military role of man and of the machine in percentages is useless. It cannot be calculated, nor can it be predicted.

2. Reliance, whether only on machines or only on men, is erroneous and dangerous, becaues the function and role of the machine is dependent on the attitude of man, and the attitude of man depends on his abilities, including technological strength.

3. The role of the machine will be greater as the numerical strength and technological advancement of the machine increase.

4. Even in push button warfare, which is still a long way off, final victory will not be won by the machine alone, even though its construction and exploitation be the best, as long as the weaker opponent has a minimum of the technological means to counter them and has the advantage from the standpoint of quality and quantity of men, of terrain, and climatic conditions.

5. The power of the modern means of warfare is terrible. Nevertheless, the role of man cannot be neglected nor reduced to microscopic importance, even when opponents have disproportionate strengths in the technological field.

The West in its defence preparations is placing its main emphasis on the quality of the machine in an effort to replace man with the machine. It is trusting in the potency of the laboratory, and in the efficiency of its techniques. The insistence of the West on a certain degree of comfort, even in time of war, lowers the quantitative efficiency of its gigantic production and cuts off from the battlefield too large a percentage of the men who are fit for combat.

The East, on the contrary, incapable of equalling the West from the point of view of the quality (and in time of war, of quantity) of equipment, attempts to counterbalance this by the quantity and plainness of equipment. In addition, it is able to place on the battlefield large masses of fanaticized human robots. Caring nothing for the comfort of the man or for the high quality of equipment, it is able, to a great extent, to deprive the rear in favour of the front, thus decreasing the technical disproportion.

In the event of a conflict between the East and the West, the superiority of the "machine-man" factor will decide the issue, in spite of Archidamus, centuries ago, and General Fuller, in 1945 and 1950.

Neither man nor the machine alone is supreme. Their ideal union is and will long be the king of battle.



BLENHEIM, 1704

DURING the first half of the seventeenth century Europe was riven by a succession of bitter religious wars. Against this background of strife France rose to a position of power and influence which rivalled that of the Austrian Empire, whose rulers claimed to be the successors of the Roman Emperors. Spain, ruined and exhausted, dropped into a position of secondary importance.

In 1661 King Louis XIV of France concentrated the government in his own hands and proceeded, with great energy and ability and considerable success to extend his power both on the continent and abroad. In 1667 he began a war with Spain and conquered a large part of the Spanish Netherlands. Five years later he attacked Holland but, as Philip of Spain had found before him, the Dutch proved to be heroic and obstinate adversaries. Elsewhere he had more success and added Flanders, Franche-Comté, Luxembourg, Alsace, Strasburg and numerous minor territories to his domain.

Whilst Louis was extending his power on the continent the English people were absorbed in their own affairs—the civil war between King Charles I and Parliament, the restoration of the Stuarts, and finally the calling of William of Orange to the throne. The discarded King James fled to the court of Louis, who undertook to restore him to the English throne. This undertaking forced the English people to take notice of events on the continent, and to identify their interests with the Dutch who were still stoutly defending their liberties.

By this time all Europe not yet brought under Louis' rule had become thoroughly alarmed at the steady expansion of the French power. Nations large and small began to fear that it was only a matter of time before they too would be forced to pay tribute to Paris, before all Europe would be ruled by one man.

In this state of trepidation and uncertainty Europe in 1700 heard the news that Charles II of Spain had died and bequeathed his dominions to Philip of Anjou, Louis

XIV's grandson. Not only did this event clash violently with the interests of the Austrian monarchy but it held the prospect of an accession of power that would enable Louis to realize his ambition of making himself undisputed master of Europe. Austria was furious, England became thoroughly alarmed, the Dutch almost fell into despair. The jealousies and fears thus engendered led to the formation of the "Grand Alliance" of Austria, England, Holland, and some smaller powers against France. The war that followed is known as the War of the Spanish Succession.

The Issues at Stake.

With the various national objects which England, Holland, Austria and certain German princes may have had in view when they joined the Alliance, military history is not concerned. It is enough to know that their objects, though combining them against a common foe, were not identical, and the degrees of interest with which they regarded the compulsion of Louis to forgo the placing of his grandson upon the Spanish throne were very different. All, however, joined in the common object of preventing any further extension of French power throughout Europe.

The immediate object of the Grand Alliance was the prevention of the union of the crowns of France and Spain in the hands of two branches of the same family. Tested by this particular issue alone, the Allies failed. Louis XIV maintained his grandson upon the throne of Spain, and the issue of the long war could not impose upon him the immediate political object of the Allies.

But there was a much larger and more general object engaged—the preservation of the balance of power in Europe by preventing Louis attaining a position of absolute supremacy. Only thus could the liberties and the rights of self-determination of the nations be safeguarded.

The Antagonists.

From the outset the Allies faced a unified command supported by a strong government which knew precisely what it wished to do and how it proposed to do it. Not only was the French government strong, but the country which it governed was strong—strong in its geographical situation, in the number and martial spirit of its inhabitants, and in their complete and undivided nationality and unity of interests. The government of Louis XIV was, in fact, the first that presented itself to the eyes of Europe as a power acting upon sure grounds, which had not to dispute its existence with internal enemies, but was at ease in its territory, and solely occupied with the task of administering government, properly so called. The government of Louis XIV was the first to appear as a busy, thriving administration of affairs, as a power at once definitive and progressive, because it could reckon securely on the future.

Not the least impressive facets of the Louis' genius were his unerring faculty for recognizing talent in others, and his ability to develop that talent and harness it to the furtherance of his projects. His generals were the most experienced in Europe, and they stood at the head of a splendidly trained, homogeneous army accustomed to victory and confident in its leaders. The

army was backed by a highly organized and competently directed system for the procurement of supplies.

The Allies, on the other hand, possessed neither unity of purpose nor unity of command. With the exception of England each of them tended strongly to subordinate the common aim of preventing the accession of Philip of Artois to the Spanish throne to its own particular interest. Each of them tended towards a defensive policy in which the desire to protect its own territories was the predominant idea. They had no central organ to formulate and direct strategy, and they were all loath to place their troops under command of a foreign general. Even when local unity of command was temporarily agreed to it was invariably hedged about with so many conditions that the commander's freedom of action was strictly limited.

Fortunately the Allies found two men whose characters, military talents and singleness of purpose enabled them to secure co-ordinated action at the critical time. One was produced by England in the person of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. The other was Prince Eugene of Savoy.

We are not here concerned with Marlborough's private life or the means by which he secured successively higher appointments in the English service. We are interested only in his military talents, and those talents, even if they do remain his sole title to respect and his only claim to renown, were of a very high and comprehensive order. He was at once a great strategist, an able tactician, a competent administrator and a brilliant diplomat. He possessed an imperturbable sweetness of temper which never showed the slightest sign of agitation or annoyance. His ineffable calm never broke under the strain of battle nor, what is far more important, throughout the long and tortuous negotiations by which he persuaded and tricked timorous allies into bold and decisive action. Even when his hidden purpose was suspected his bland innocence generally allayed fear and restored confidence. Not the least remarkable of his military talents was his meticulous attention to detail.

When a young man Prince Eugene had desired to enter the French Army, but an insult offered to his mother by Louis XIV threw him into the Austrian service. Thereafter he devoted his whole life to the purpose of humiliating Louis. Although he lacked Marlborough's precision in organization and detail he had no equal for rapidity of vision and for seeing the essential points in a strategic problem.

The French field commanders were all competent men with years of war experience behind them. They knew each other well, they were accustomed to co-operating, and they enjoyed the advantage of a unified high command unhampered by the necessity for considering the wishes and opinions of allies.

The Campaign of 1702-03.

The theatre of operations extended from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, embracing the Netherlands, the valley of the Rhine and northern Italy. The opposing forces were distributed in three main groups. The right wing of the Allies, consisting of the contingents of England, Hol-

land, Prussia and Denmark, under Marlborough's command, held the Low Countries; in the centre Louis of Baden commanded the main body of the Austrian Army; in the south Eugene held northern Italy with a mixed body of troops.

For the first two years nothing remarkable happened on either wing. In the north Marlborough, in constant difficulties with his allies, took some towns and fortresses. In Italy nothing of importance was accomplished by either side.

In the centre, however, things went badly for the allies. Louis secured the adherence of the Elector of Bavaria who captured the strong fortress of Ulm and effected a junction with the French armies on the Upper Rhine. In the autumn of 1703 the combined armies severely defeated the Austrians in Bavaria, and in the following winter captured several strong fortresses. The French Army of the Moselle also made important gains. Meanwhile an insurrection of his Hungarian subjects increased the difficulties of the Austrian Emperor.

Louis planned his campaign for 1704 with boldness and skill. In the north the French armies were to undertake nothing more than an active defence calculated to contain the Allied forces opposed to them. Since the French armies in this quarter were much stronger than execution of their role required, large detachments were taken from them and formed into an army to be led by Marshal Villeroy to the Moselle and Upper Rhine. The French army already in the neighbourhood of these rivers was to march under Marshal Tallard through the Black Forest and join the Elector of Bavaria and the French force under Marshal Marsin. Meanwhile the French army of Italy was to move through the Tyrol into Austria. When all the armies had concentrated between the Danube and the Inn they would march in overwhelming strength on Vienna.

At this stage Marlborough was still in the Netherlands, but Eugene had been recalled from Italy to take command of one of the Imperial armies in Austria.

Marlborough had watched with the deepest anxiety the progress of French arms on the Rhine and in Bavaria, and he saw clearly the futility of carrying on a war of sieges while death blows to Austria were being dealt on the Danube. About the time when he had fully appreciated the French design for the next campaign he received a letter from Eugene. Eugene proposed that Marlborough should move with the bulk of his forces from the Netherlands to the Danube, unite with Eugene and break up the French concentration by a rapid and decisive blow. Although this proposal conformed with the Englishman's own ideas, its execution was bound to be fraught with the gravest difficulties and dangers.

In the first place the Dutch field deputies would be most unlikely to agree to permit any considerable part of their contingent to be moved from the close defence of their own territories. Even the support of the British Government could not be counted upon with certainty. Secondly, Marlborough would have to be on the Danube before the French had concentrated superior strength in the same area. A glance at Map 1 will show that at this stage the French dispositions enabled them to concentrate rapidly in any

desired direction. Thus if they fathomed the Allied plan they could fall upon Marlborough before the junction with Eugene was effected.

The success of the undertaking turned upon a number of calculated risks. Firstly, it depended upon his ability to deceive the French. If, as he appreciated, they were nervous about the centre of their position on the Rhine, and if he could make them believe that it was either along the Moselle or, when he had left that river behind, it was in Alsace that he intended to attack, they would be a little too late in changing their dispositions, a little too late in discovering his real plan, and therefore a little too late in massing reinforcements on the Danube where he planned to be before them. In short, Marlborough planned to demonstrate the Principle of Concentration by massing superior force at the decisive point whilst at the same time imposing dispersion on his opponents.

The second risk was an administrative one. When he reached his destination he would be far from his base, and the country of the Upper Danube could not be relied upon to provide sufficient supplies for a long period. Unless he could win a decisive battle at an early date he would be unable to supply his army.

The third risk turned upon his ability to carry his allies along with him. If he failed in this his force would not be strong enough to accomplish his aim.

The March to the Danube.

Having persuaded his allies to agree to an offensive on the Moselle, Marlborough left Roermond on 18 May. When news that the Allies were on the move reached Villeroy the Marshal halted his detachments which had already started for the east. As Villeroy saw it, Marlborough could, on reaching Bonn, turn south and attack his right flank. Besides, he was not sure that the bulk of Marlborough's army was moving eastward, and he felt that he needed all his strength until the position became clearer. Until Marlborough has passed the Moselle, Villeroy remained in a state of uncertainty. But by that time the Allies were ahead of any reinforcements which Villeroy might now send eastwards.

When Marlborough crossed the Moselle he was in a position to attack Marshal Tallard. Tallard reacted by recalling his reinforcements for the Danube.

Marlborough had now "fixed" both Villeroy and Tallard. But the time was approaching when he would have to show his hand, not only to the French but to his allies as well. Once he crossed the Neckar near Mondelsheim his design would become apparent to all. However, because of the comparatively slow speed of communications—mounted messengers were the quickest means—he might still gain a few days before the French awoke to a full realization of what was afoot. Marlborough gambled on those few days and won. When the full import of the march became apparent to Tallard the Allies were well ahead of any French reinforcements that could reach the Danube from the west. At this point, too, he secured the adherence of the senior Dutch field deputy with the argument that matters had now progressed so far that it was too late to draw back.

On 2 July Marlborough reached the Danube at Schellenberg where he defeated the Bavarians and cap-

tured their magazines. He then crossed the Danube, avoided Marsin by some rapid marching and countermarching, and proceeded to ravage Bavaria. On 11 August he suddenly re-crossed the Danube and united his army with that of Prince Eugene who had marched to meet him.

Meanwhile the Elector of Bavaria had been appealing for French assistance and threatening to make a separate peace if it was not forthcoming. Louis ordered Tallard to join Marsin and the Elector with all possible speed. Villeroy also was moving eastward.

Tallard had to march through the Black Forest, a tangled mass of timbered hills and ravines holding no supplies at all. If Tallard's troops were to arrive in good condition their march would necessarily be slow. However, the junction of Eugene and Marlborough had placed Marsin in a precarious position, and he sent several messages to Tallard urging him to sacrifice everything to speed. Tallard responded but the effort exhausted his troops and his horses.

The moves that followed are a fascinating study in strategy, but there is not space to follow them here. On 12 August the Franco-Bavarian Army, under the supreme command of Tallard, took up a posi-



Map 1.—The March to the Danube.

tion in the vicinity of Blenheim. Marlborough and Eugene were a little further to the east.

Tallard's position was a strong one, both strategically and tactically. While he remained there the Allies could wreak no further damage in Bavaria, and their supply position was bound to become precarious. When this happened they would either have to retire to the north-west, or attack the Franco-Bavarian position in an attempt to retire up the Danube. And since this position was a strong one, Tallard felt reasonably happy in the conviction that Marlborough would choose the safe course and retire the way he had come.

Neither Marlborough nor Eugene had the slightest intention of abandoning Austria as tamely as that. They had not come to the Danube solely to engage in manoeuvres, no matter how brilliant, nor to win a few indecisive actions. They had come there to fight, and they were willing to accept battle even if the terms were not so favourable as they would have wished.

The Battle.

On 12 August Marlborough and Eugene carefully reconnoitred the Franco-Bavarian position which was on rising ground about three quarters of a mile west of the Nebel, a shallow stream with a soft, muddy bottom. (See Map 2). Tallard was on the right with his outer flank resting on the village of Blenheim which had been heavily strengthened for defence. His left was opposite the village of Unterglau, from which point Marsin and the Elector carried on the line, the bulk of the former's troops being around Oberglau, while the Bavarians were on the extreme left between the village and the wooded hills.

The Allied commanders discerned the following errors in the Franco-Bavarian dispositions:—

1. There appeared to be no general reserve.
2. Instead of defending the obstacle of the Nebel they had left a space of about half a mile between the stream and their front on which the Allies could deploy.
3. The broad extent of open ground between Blenheim and Oberglau was held almost entirely by cavalry.

The Allied commanders decided upon the following plan:—

1. Eugene was to attack and pin down the Franco-Bavarian left under Marsin and the Elector.
2. Marlborough was to capture Blenheim and roll up Tallard's line from right to left. Simultaneously with the attack on Blenheim, Marlborough would pin Tallard's cavalry by an attack on his left.

A glance at Map 2 will show that Blenheim was the key to the position. If Marlborough could break through on the French right he would be able to cut their only lines of retreat, the roads to Ulm.

On the morning of 13 August, the Allies deployed north of the Nebel as shown in Map 2.

Eugene began his attack about half past twelve. Marlborough immediately launched his attack on Blenheim. The assaulting troops suffered heavily from the murderous fire which was poured into their ranks from the strongly garrisoned

village. Although they pressed their attack with the utmost gallantry they could not break through the palisade surrounding the village. While they were trying to do so they were charged in flank by a body of French cavalry. Allied cavalry and infantry came to their support and much close and desperate fighting took place in front of the village.

Marlborough realized that Blenheim was too strongly held to be taken by direct assault. Ordering the assaulting troops to maintain sufficient pressure to pin down the garrison, he shifted the main weight of his attack to the centre.

While the Allied troops were struggling across the marshy flats Tallard launched upon them a series of cavalry attacks with the object of destroying them before they could be properly deployed. Very hard fighting followed, and Marlborough was forced to send to Eugene for assistance. Although fully extended himself Eugene despatched his Austrian cuirassiers without the slightest hesitation. These reinforcements enabled Marlborough to get his entire force across the Nebel and deployed on firm ground. Shortly after 5 o'clock he prepared to lead his massed cavalry against Tallard's centre.

Appreciating the danger, Tallard asked Marsin for help and ordered the regiments he had kept stationed behind Blenheim to move to his centre. Marsin considered that he was too hard pressed to spare any help, while the commander at Blenheim hesitated a little too long.

Marlborough swept up the gentle slope at the head of 8,000 sabres. The French infantry stood their ground with great determination, but their cavalry, after firing a few ineffective volleys from the saddle, broke and fled. The infantry were



Map 2.—Battle of Blenheim.

cut to pieces and a huge gap opened in the centre of the French line.

Meanwhile on the western flank Eugene had pressed his attack with the utmost vigour. Both sides were fully engaged when the French centre collapsed. Marsin was the first to become aware of this development and he managed to form a strong body of infantry to cover the withdrawal which he saw to be inevitable. Eugene's infantry were too exhausted to press the pursuit while his cavalry could make little impression on the steady covering detachment. Marsin succeeded in withdrawing the bulk of his troops in good order, though he had to abandon his guns and wagons.

In the centre, however, the rout was complete. Marlborough launched a relentless pursuit, and surrounded Blenheim whose garrison was compelled to surrender. Tallard and his staff were captured.

The victory was overwhelmingly complete. The French and Bavarians lost nearly 40,000 men. A marshal of France and several generals were among the prisoners, while nearly all the artillery, baggage and equipment of the defeated army fell into the victors' hands.

Louis XIV's plan for the invasion of Austria was in ruins. If the Empire was to be destroyed he would have to start all over again.

Comments on the Operations.

In the space available we have not been able to trace the course of the operations, from the beginning of the march to the Danube to the victory at Blenheim, in sufficient detail to do full justice to the brilliant manner in which they were executed.

The march to the Danube is an example of audacity, of an exquisite balancing of possibilities and probaequalled and never surpassed. This will be more fully appreciated when it is remembered that Marlborough had few, if any, reliable staff officers to assist him. He had to plan every detail himself, see to everything, supervise everything, deceive his friends and deceive his foes. The nervous strain on the man must have been terrific. Yet his sweetness of temper never broke. He was always agreeable, urbane. But behind that gently smiling countenance there lay an iron resolve, a resolve that refused to yield to the difficulties and disappointments which constantly crowded in upon him. These are the qualities of a great commander.

Broadly Marlborough's problem was to deceive the French as to his real destination until he was closer to Eugene than they were. If he had failed to do this they could have fallen upon either him or Eugene before the junction was effected. At one stage the whole scheme hinged upon how quickly it would take a mounted courier to carry to Tallard the news that he was heading eastward beyond the Neckar.

It was audacious, but it was not a gamble. It was a careful calculation of time and space.

The degree of co-operation achieved by Marlborough and Eugene was remarkable. These two men, so different in character and outlook, held for each other a degree of trust and understanding that has seldom been surpassed even by commanders of the same nationality. It was the secret of their success in many brilliant strategic combinations and on many victorious fields.

In his conduct of the battle Tallard's primary error lay in his failure bilities, that has seldom been to make proper use of the obstacle of the Nebel. The stream was a formidable obstacle, but Tallard, by forming up too far away from it and by failing to cover it with fire, allowed his opponents to cross it without hindrance. An obstacle is of little use unless it is covered with fire.

Tallard started with a substantial superiority in artillery, having 90 guns to the Allies' 60. But he dispersed his guns evenly along his front and some of them never had a worthwhile target throughout the battle. Marlborough and Eugene handled their guns so that their fire could be used to support their infantry and cavalry.

When Marlborough saw that the village of Blenheim could not be taken by a frontal assault he showed his flexibility of mind by quickly re-grouping and shifting the weight of his attack to a more promising point. But he still managed to adhere to his original intention of breaking through at a point which enabled him to get across Tallard's line of retreat.

Throughout the action the Allied commanders retained control of events. Through mutual co-operation and flexibility they were able to take advantage of every opportunity offered by the fluctuating fortunes of battle. From the outset Tallard surrendered the initiative by his failure to provide a strong general reserve, his faulty dispositions and the dispersion of his artillery.

It is not to be inferred that the French commanders were incompetent. On the contrary they were capable, experienced soldiers who knew each other well and were accustomed to working together. It was their misfortune to encounter the two ablest soldiers of their day.

Results of the Battle.

The number of wounded and prisoners in the Allied camp, as well as the shortage of ammunition, supplies and transport, prevented Marlborough undertaking a strategic pursuit. Consequently Marsin and the Elector, minus their guns and baggage, were able to make their escape through the Black Forest.

Nevertheless the object of the campaign had been accomplished. Austria was saved, the Bavarians sued for peace and surrendered their fortresses.

Blenheim did not end the War of the Spanish Succession. But it was there that the tide was turned, there that the initiative passed to the Allies, there that Louis' dream of making himself undisputed master of Europe came to an end. Thereafter he could do no more than stand upon the defensive.

Much that Louis XIV accomplished remains as a permanent memorial to his greatness and vision, much of it proved to be of inestimable benefit to mankind. That this is so is due, to a very considerable degree, to the thwarting of his ambition to bring all Europe under his dominion. Had the Allies lost the battle of Blenheim, the diversity of genius through which the people of Europe have contributed so much to mankind would have been stereotyped into a single

pattern. Even if Louis had maintained a measure of liberality in his rule it is most improbable that his successors would have followed his example. Power is the most corrosive agent known to man. The flame of freedom would have been extinguished, and men who are not free contribute little to the progress of the human race.

(This is the eleventh article in the series "Decisive Battles of the World." Next month we shall consider the Battle of Pultowa in 1709. —Editor.)

TACTICAL DOCTRINE.

After the last war, the majority of text books were out of date and it was to be expected that the habit of referring to them should be lost. There was also a vast amount of personal experience which could be called upon. There is, however, a danger that reliance on personal experience will make one inclined to go into the next war with the mentality of the last. Experience is, moreover, limited and local and to that extent may be dangerous. Now that the majority of up-to-date manuals have been issued, the habit of referring to them must be cultivated. They give the considered and authoritative doctrine; all teaching and training will, in future, be based upon them. Whenever discussion arises, all must be prepared to turn up the manual. This need not hamper free discussion or development of initiative. For those who have no war experience, the book is invaluable. It is the basis on which promotion examinations are set.

All new publications are issued on adequate scales to the units concerned. Every officer should now have ready access to authoritative doctrine on most of the subjects with which he is required to deal. In most cases, the scale of issue is sufficient to permit of every officer being given a set of those books essential to his studies and duties. He will be made responsible for those books while with the unit, keeping them up-to-date with authorized amendments.

—*AHQ Training Instruction*, 12/51.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY

The AMF Gold Medal Essay Competition is held annually with the object of encouraging the study of military subjects, stimulating thought, and providing all ranks of the Australian Army with an opportunity to express their ideas in a useful and constructive way.

The subject for the 1951-52 competition is:—

Leadership is an art that can be successfully practised by anyone qualified to be a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. In the ultimate sense, leadership is not inherent: it depends upon traits which can be developed, and upon the application of techniques which can be learned. It is an art which can be acquired, cultivated and practised by anyone who possesses the mental and physical ability and the moral and ethical integrity expected of a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Developing this art is a continuing process which involves the practice of leadership traits and the understanding and application of sound leadership principles and techniques.

—Extract from "Command and Military Leadership," U.S. Army.

Bearing the above statement in mind, discuss the elements of military leadership, and suggest practical methods by which the leadership qualities of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Australian Army may be fully developed.

The rules for the competition are:—

The right to compete will be limited to officers and other ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

The essays should not exceed 10,000 words in length; they must be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate.

The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto, and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto written on the outside and his name and address inside.

The title and page of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

The judges may withhold award of the prize if in their opinion no essay reaches a sufficiently high standard.

The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, St. Kilda Road, Melbourne, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal Essay," and must reach him not later than 30th June, 1952.



PANIC

Lieutenant A. Argent,
Royal Australian Regiment.

NO unit is panic-proof. The study of military history shows that panic may strike veteran and well-trained troops just as disastrously and quickly as it strikes green and badly-trained troops. Two classic examples bear out this point —the Confederate troops at Missionary Ridge in 1863 and the German XVII Crops at Gumbinnen in 1914. In both instances the troops were well trained and experienced, yet they broke and fled before the battles had been completely joined. At the other end of the scale there is Caporetto (1917) and Bull Run (1861) where ill-trained units and troops with low morale were involved.

The war in Korea has not been without its cases of panic and with subsequent heavy losses to the United Nations Forces. Thus commanders have again come face to face with the problems of collective fear and mass madness.

What then are the counters to panic, and what, if any, are the danger signals that indicate that a unit is panic-ripe? By what means can panic be avoided? Are there any deterrents? These are the questions a commander must ask himself. History can supply many of answers, as the following examples show.

Missionary Ridge—1863.

The Confederate Army of Tennessee with two and a half years' service to its credit and its great victory of Chickamauga only two months old was occupying commanding ground known as Missionary Ridge. Although this Army was not as strong in numbers as the opposing Federals, it was considered that the ground held was such as to make the position almost impregnable. The Confederates occupied trenches at the foot of the ridge and on the crest. The Federals were deployed in full view of the Southerners on the plains below Missionary Ridge.

The Federal plan of attack called only for the capture of the trenches at the foot of the Ridge. These were quickly taken and, completely disregarding orders, the Federal troops continued attacking up the Ridge. When a Federal flag appeared at the top of the Ridge something snapped in the Confederate ranks. Panic swept through one Confederate division after another. General Bragg, who commanded the Confederates, later reported: "A panic, which I have never before witnessed, seemed to have siezed officers and men; and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety regardless of his duty or his character. . . . Had all parts

of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could have ever disloged us. . . ."

Some of the reasons for this rout were:—

(a) The unpopularity of the Commander-in-Chief, General Bragg, who had only recently quarrelled with many of his subordinates and had dismissed a number who were respected and beloved by the Confederate troops. Furthermore, some of his high-ranking officers were openly disloyal to him, though not to the Southern cause.

(b) The forming-up of the Federal troops in full view of the Confederates. Their great numbers undoubtedly dismayed the defenders.

(c) The Federals were commanded by General Grant who had by far the greatest reputation for success in the Northern Armies.

(d) The splitting of Bragg's force by deploying at the foot of the Ridge as well as on the crest. On capturing the lower trench system, the Federals followed hard on the heels of the fleeing Confederates and thus the fire of the defenders on the crest was masked by the withdrawal of their own troops.

Adowa—1896.

Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1896 with a trained and equipped force of 15,000 men. They were opposed by 100,000 Abyssinian spearmen. The Italians, supported by artillery, advanced on Adowa during the night. Due to the wild and tortuous mountain terrain, the column lost its cohesion and at dawn was divided into three groups. All groups were too far apart to give mutual support. The Abyssinians swarmed to the attack at daybreak and the left group of Italians fled panic stricken. Unchecked, the spearmen continued their attack and quickly overran the centre group. Only the right group stood fast and withdrew in good order at nightfall. The Italian artillery was ineffective due to the difficulty of estimating the correct range in such mountainous country.

Only 3,500 of the original 15,000 Italians escaped from this debacle.

On the surface there seems to be no reason for such a disaster. However, the underlying causes were these:—

(a) The officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Italian force were comparative strangers to each other as the force comprised detachments from various home regiments. The artillery had never worked with the infantry. Therefore, there was a lack of mutual trust, understanding and confidence.

(b) The knowledge that the Abyssians tortured their prisoners is an important cause when one considers the vivid Latin imagination and mercurial temperament.

(c) The men were exhausted by a long and badly conducted night march.

(d) The Italian commander of the left group, in the presence of some of his troops, expressed his fears at being separated from the main body.

Haitshong—1904.

The Russian 140th Infantry Regiment and a rifle brigade were in army reserve near Haitshong. Between them and the Japanese were the main Russion Armies. Local outposts provided additional security

and precluded surprise. Both formations had had battle experience and were rested.

One evening shortly after dusk several Russian soldiers from the rifle brigade were in a nearby rice-field. One of them saw something that apparently frightened him. He immediately rushed back into the camp shouting: "The Japanese are coming." Panic was instantaneous throughout the brigade. Men seized their rifles and fired wildly. In a short time the brigade was racing in two columns to the rear—one towards Haitshong and the other towards the 140th Infantry Regiment. The Corps supply units stationed in Haitshong were soon infected with this mass madness. Soon a hopeless, milling tangle of men, vehicles and animals were streaming northwards. Days elapsed before this part of the brigade was rallied.

The fate of the column fleeing towards the 140th Infantry Regiment was markedly different. The noise of the firing and the screaming had reached the regiment. The buglers sounded the call to arms and the men fell in quietly. They ignored with phlegmatic calm the panicky troops streaming past them. The sight of the orderly and unperturbed regiment in the gathering darkness calmed the imaginary fears of this part of the brigade and they were soon able to re-form their ranks.

Outwardly both units were the same. They were well equipped, trained and led. They were rested. In common with the rest of the Russian Armies at that time they were pessimistic, due to the repeated Japanese victories. However, despite this, the morale of the 140th Regiment was high as the Commanding Officer was respected and his officers loyal and co-operative. There was *esprit de corps*. The reverse was the case in the rifle brigade. There was dissatisfaction and petty feuds amongst the officers and non-commissioned officers. As a consequence there was no *esprit de corps*. Thus, when a test came, one unit was a regiment; the other a crowd of men.

Panam-ni (North Korea).

In April, 1951, a South Korean Division moved out of reserve and took over the advance from the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. After continuing the advance another few miles they occupied commanding ground with one regiment forward and two in reserve.

The Division was equipped with United States small arms and were well supplied with ammunition. Artillery and air support were available on call. The troops were rested and the units were up to strength.

Yet when the anticipated Chinese night attack finally came, the South Koreans immediately broke and fled, abandoning arms and ammunition. Quickly moving groups of Chinese infiltrated to the rear and wreaked havoc on command posts and withdrawing transport columns. Officers tried unsuccessfully to create some order out of the confusion. The efforts of the Divisional Commander and his US army advisers were without avail. Two weeks elapsed before the Division was reformed.

The causes of this dramatic collapse can be summarised:—

(a) Morale was low, due to the false but widely circulated statements concerning the prowess of the Chinese. Furthermore, on all pre-

vious occasions upon being attacked by the Chinese, the Division had withdrawn. They had never had the opportunity to stay and fight. Confidence in their own abilities had fallen to a dangerously low level.

(b) Many of the South Korean soldiers had grown "soft" through false impressions gained by association with other troops.

(c) No system of leave existed for South Korean units at the time and many of the troops had not seen their families for two or three years, although the war had been in progress less than twelve months.

Conclusions.

To sum up, panic seems to split logically into two phases. These phases are:—

(a)The gradual building up of a tense psychological state of mind; and then

(b) The sudden surprise or shock, either real or imaginary, which sets off the actual panic.

Bearing in mind the above examples, the first or preliminary phase is charcterised by:—

(a) Excessive nervousness and with it, a quickened imagination;

(b) Pessimism;

(c) Growth of wild rumours;

(d) Loss of faith in leadership.

Defeats, loose talk by officers within hearing of the troops, national characteristics, and lack of faith and confidence in a unit that has not lived, played, and trained together all go towards producing the state of mind found in the first phase.

In the second phase, consider the trivial incidents that precipitated the panic—at Haitshong, a soldier frightened by a shadow; at Missionary Ridge, the appearance of a single Union flag on the crest. So it usually happens when troops become supercharged with nerves.

History abounds with further instances of panic—the Prussian Army of Hohenlohe at Weimar in 1806, the Austrian X Corps at Trautenau in 1866, the Rayau Cavalry Division at Coulmiers in 1870 and other French formations during 1871, some units during the Battle of France in 1940, and Malaya, 1941-42, to mention but a few of the more historically recent cases.

However, the study of all these cases will not reveal or produce a magic formula that, when applied by a leader to his command, will make it panic-proof. Furthermore, the solution is not one of man-management in itself. It goes deeper than that. The astute leader will find the ways and means of regaining and retaining the confidence and trust of his men, as Joffre did at the Marne, as the Colonel of the 140th Regiment did at Haitshong, and as Montgomery did when he assumed command of the 8th Army.

Common sense, a sympathetic understanding of his fellow man, a sound knowledge of his calling, and a calm and confident demeanour will prove to be the staunchest allies of the commander when faced with the problem of panic.

LESSONS FROM KOREA

Condensed from an article by William Courtenay, OBE, MM, in the Army Quarterly, United Kingdom, July, 1951.

Mr. William Courtenay is an experienced British War Correspondent who was with the United Nations' forces in Korea from the early days of the war. After giving a general outline of the campaign up to May 1951, Mr. Courtenay sets out his impressions of the principal lessons to be learnt from the fighting.—Editor.

Communist Tactics.

1. The excellent training in tactics peculiar to the country acquired by the North Korean Army. If this is an indication of Russian training it reveals the formidable nature of what we must expect to face in any war in the West against Russia.

The North Koreans used the peasantry as a shield to cover their advances across the Naktung river into UN lines. This callous conduct both saved the hard core of their forces for the assault and presented the defenders with a grave moral problem. If they shoot they kill defenceless women and children; if they withhold fire these clutter up the battle area and interfere to the disadvantage of the defenders.

2. The North Koreans were taught how to make bridges on sand-bag bases below water level of rivers, where they could neither be seen nor attacked from the air.

3. They used many varieties of novel feints to camouflage real intentions as to river crossings. These included such devices as assembling large bodies in the dark each equipped with lighted lanterns for "square drill" in the darkness. While defenders on one bank of the Naktung were both puzzled and fascinated by this display of night drill, river crossings were being attempted elsewhere.

4. Where villages were treated by UN Forces as sanctuaries and not attacked, so that refugees could be restored to them at later dates, the North Koreans used them as ammunition dumps and observation posts.

5. Their field intelligence was excellent — due to sending spies through our lines with refugees. Their knowledge of the country and language, and practice of stern reprisals against all who would not aid them, helped this task.

6. They proved flexible in many ways and well able to take advantage of local situations, as, for example, when they attacked after noting the misfortune which befell

the Argylls when they were "napalm bombed" in error.

7. They would at times avoid the direct frontal attack against infantry positions and detour round hills to enter the rear of our infantry lines and attack the guns. Such attacks took place at dawn and were sometimes productive of very encouraging results.

8. At other times they would erect road blocks in rear of an advancing column. They did not, however, indulge this or sniping from hill positions to anything like the extent which the country and situation provided.

9. They seemed to be impervious to air attack, to which they had little answer, and their morale never cracked through the weeks of the Naktung river defence phase, through July, August and to the 15th of September — possibly because they believed they were winning; possibly through the stern Communist discipline imposed by their officers (of which their prisoners complained) and partly due to the phlegmatic nature of the Korean.

10. By the time the U.S. Forces possessed the 3.5 bazooka, and with the use of the rocket-firing fighter plane, the T.34 tanks were ripped open like sardine tins. It was estimated that the original force of 400 was destroped and replaced, and again totally destroyed, and that a further 200 tanks were destroyed. Thus Air and Army together accounted for some 1000 tanks.

But the North Koreans would often accept attack from the air and not reply, knowing the sorties would last but a few seconds. If tanks were camouflaged and not seen they could then resume their journey. At other times they would be purposely left half-ditched to simulate an attitude of abandondonment and resume the journeys after air sorties passed over. In other cases they would join two damaged houses in a village, hiding the tank or guns between party walls. These could only be detected where new tiling or walls were spotted by suspicious airmen. At times villagers would be compelled to simulate normal activities with children playing in the streets and washing exposed on the lines. Airmen would not attack such scenes, but tanks, guns, etc., would be hidden in the houses.

11. They made some mistakes through keeping too close to orthodoxy as opposed to gains due to ingenuity and flexibility. Apart from their error in not following through at the Han river they might have pierced the Naktung river line at any time through August or early September had they concentrated each assault in one battering-ram attack at the selected point instead of dissipating the blow by aiming at three places at a time. The plan was to contain our forces round the perimeter, but we were so weak that a heavier blow at one point would have secured perhaps decisive results.

12. Above all they were able to deflect the worse effects of the boa-constrictor-like blockade which both strategic and tactical Air Forces were imposing by use of the "Jikkay." This is a frame shaped like an easel, which for 4,000 years Koreans have carried on their backs.

It has a comfortable spine pad backing made of rice straw, and rice straw thongs for armholes. It is carved in one piece from the tree. The two prongs are about 18 inches long. On these the Korean peasant is able to carry up to 500 lb. Ten of them can lift 5,000 lb. and this is a "Dakota" load. This became his "troop carrier squadron." Night and day thousands of men and women moved over hills and dales making good about two miles per hour with supplies for the front.

13. The North Korean had the patience and ability to hide from our aircraft by day in the summer months, in the thick foliage, and move at night. Being lightly loaded and largely independent of mechanized transport and without the long siege-train or "tail" we employ, he was more mobile and less restricted to the roads. He could operate in the hills where the best tactical ground lay and could take full advantage of his position against our columns, which were more road-bound and less inclined to leave the roads.

On all of these grounds, therefore, the North Korean was a well-trained match for the more orthodox trained occupation troops who formed the bulk of his opponents. Although many prisoners complained of the stiff discipline imposed by their officers and of being dragooned into the Army with little notice from their villages, they fought regardless of casualties, had little in the way of medical aids, and appeared prepared to shoot it out—whether because of patriotism or for the Communist ideal it is not easy to judge. When they attacked they nearly always selected the South Korean Front, or the junction between them and the American Forces, believing the South Koreans would fold up the more easily—as indeed always proved to be the case.

Lessons Learnt.

The lessons learnt and observed from the United Nations viewpoint included:—

1. The paramount importance of infantry being trained for the class of campaign they expect to fight. This includes the close indoctrination of all in the political situations through the years which give rise to possible military actions; an appreciation of where hostilities are most to be expected and thus preparation of training and equipment for the campaign in question. In this case the US Forces might have known that from Japan the place where they would naturally expect to fight would be Korea, because of the build-up of the North Korean Army and the general Russian plan of refusal to unite all Korea. Therefore the Occupation Forces in Japan ought to have been toughened and trained from the close of 1945 for mountain warfare in Korea.

2. Armies trained for mountain warfare must strip to the waist, rid themselves of all camp followers, non-combatants and civilian organizations; resist all pressure from such organizations to be allowed to enter the field of operations, learn to live in the hills and manage without heavy transport, and thus increase their mobility to a level as near that of their more elementary foes as possible. The narrowed difference can then be made good by superior intelligence, superior weapons and command of the air.

In Korea for many months the 8th Army was roadbound, untrained to leave vehicles and fight in the hills, too cluttered up with an expensive and extravagant "tail" and too apt to take camp followers and civilians into the field. These required transport, room on the crowded roads, accommodation, rations and protection—all of which acted in restraint of the 8th Army's mobility.

3. Armies campaigning in strange lands should learn to become "battle wise." This is different from being "battleworthy." Being "battle wise" comprises learning to adapt the country and its ways to military requirements. For instance, if for 4,000 years—as in Korea—there is a special method of transportation peculiar to the country (as in the case of the "Jikkay") then clearly there must be a basic reason for it. To study it and adopt it and adapt it to one's own use is clearly wise. British troops commenced using the "Jikkay" in the winter of 1950-51 for the carriage of timber up hills to make their own fires. This is precisely what the Koreans use it for in winter; from November to March their days are spent mostly in searching the forests for timber.

4. Since in this class of warfare troops must learn to live in the hills, fight in the hills and be victualled and succoured in the hills, it follows that the native method of transporting supplies to hill positions may have much to commend it. If used intelligently it aids mobility and may, as in this case, prove superior to mechanical means of transport. Most divisions were using the "Jikkay" with native labour, on a basis of an establishment of so many Koreans to a battalion, for just this sort of task. But the method ought to be studied in the training stage prior to hostilities so that it may be used effectively from the opening phase of operations. It was rarely used until after the first eight months of fighting were over. The 1st Cavalry Division were the first to adopt it.

5. Troops who do not experience air attack are inclined to ignore the ever-present possibility that it might visit them unannounced at some stage of a campaign. Having complete command of the air in the tactical area, our troops relied on it as a drug and accepted it for granted. Consequently none were taught how to take cover from air attack nor were rules for the spacing of vehicles on supply routes observed very much. If air attack suddenly develops we shall be placed at a disadvantage. The enemy was compelled, by hard experience, to learn how to disperse; how to take cover; how to conceal himeslf by day and thus minimize his casualties from air attack.

6. Infantry should be constantly taught what they owe to Tactical Air Force whose activities and protection they take for granted. In Korea it so affected enemy supply —despite the use of the "Jikkay"— that the enemy was never able to use his artillery for harassing fire at nights, for interdiction of supply roads or for counter-battery work. As a result our forces enjoyed immunity from such attentions while our own guns, with a safe supply line and ample supplies, could indulge these activities day and night. Infantry should be taught the nature of protection afforded by the Tactical Air Force, the blessings

which flow from that protection, and what is likely to happen to them if it is withdrawn or restricted through enemy action. By these lessons they will the more readily appreciate the work and problems of the Air Force, integrate their own work with it the more and appreciate the importance of training in taking cover, in concealment and in dispersal. These lessons will have to be learnt hard, and hurriedly, if the Chinese suddenly use the air power which they have available north of the Yalu river.

7. Since code names are used for divisions, brigades, regiments, etc., it is important to ensure that code names selected are not capable of double meanings or ambiguity. For instance, one US divisions bears the code name "Danger," and its advanced HQ being known as a "Forward Command Post," signs would be seen on its roads marked "Danger —Forward." To the uninitiated British troops this implied the need for caution in movement on the roads and conveyed the notion that these roads possibly had not been swept for mines or were subject to ambush.

8. The use of a helicopter both as a "staff car" and "air ambulance" was well demonstrated in Korea and the lessons equally apply in jungle country. Battalion commanders are called to divisional conferences almost daily. This involves a two hours' drive at times round tortuous hill roads each way. The helicopter could convey them in ten minutes each way, thus enabling them to spend another 3½ hours profitably daily with forward units.

Since most campaigns are fought along atrocious roads, and since roads are always infested with heavy traffic, movement rarely exceeds an average of 15 to 20 mph. The 100 mph helicopter can easily beat this. The two-seater helicopter should be on the establishment of all formations down to brigade level, with a pool of them available to convey battalion commanders to divisional conferences and for other movement duties. Officers should learn the handling techniques so that in the event of a pilot casualty in the air they can complete a journey.

9. The function of the stretcher-bearer has hardly altered since the Crimea War. The helicopter comes to take his place where there is complete command of the air in the battle area. In thirty minutes it can convey wounded from battlefield to rear hospitals fifty miles from the front, where full attention can be given to casualties. In Korea we lacked a sufficiency of helicopters, while having the conditions in which their full exploitation was available. Much good work was done by improvising arrangements for carriage of two outboard stretcher cases or two sitting cases per helicopter.

Consideration ought to be given at the United Nations to a Convention under Geneva Red Cross rules, which would enable all the attributes of the helicopter to be fully exploited for the evacuation of wounded.

10. Above all, the Korean campaign has taught the importance of operating in the hills and of avoiding the roads and the valleys. In this respect the British brigades were well trained beforehand and taught other units the drill. By moving in the hills, fighting in the

hills and living in the hills, the valleys were controlled, the roads made safe for convoys, tanks, artillery and supplies, ambushes avoided and the best use of tactical ground assured.

Where forces are inclined to "blind" along highways between hills without adequate flank protection they invariably lay themselves open to road blocks erected in their rear and to ambush.

These examples by no means exhaust the lessons from the Korean campaign; they are just some of those which occurred to one in observing the various phases of operations. Most of them prove once again that good leadership among officers and NCOs, and good training, discipline and resourcefulness among the men are still the chief ingredients which meet conditions in Korea—as they have in past campaigns and will be in the future.