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
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
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AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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NATIONAL SERVICE

AND

THE ARMY

Directorate of Military Training, AHQ.

The Aim of National Service.

No democratic nation can maintain in peace the necessary armed forces to resist premeditated aggression; consequently it becomes essential for the military framework of such a nation to be so constructed that it is capable of being geared for war before the nation is overwhelmed.

The aim of National Service, therefore, is the production of a militarily trained reserve of manpower with which the armed forces of the nation can be mobilized in the short space of time permitted under modern totalitarian threat.

In effect, the ultimate aim of any National Service scheme must be the preparation of the manhood of the nation to serve in the armed forces. It is in the interests of every member that he should be so prepared in advance of the call to arms. No individual would dream of taking part in a league football match or a boxing contest untrained and unfit. How much more important then that he should not engage in a battle of life and death similarly unprepared. A subsidiary aim on our part is to inculcate the principles of good

citizenship in the youth of the nation as they pass through our hands.

Membership of a nation carries with it certain obligations, and the greatest of them is to be prepared to defend it against aggression. The National Service training period contributed by the individual in times of peace is the measure of his personal contribution to the nation's preparedness. In terms of his working life, it represents a small fraction only, but in spiritual significance it is immeasurable.

The Structure of a Democratic Army.

The Army is a member of the Service trilogy, together with the Navy and the Air Force. The Services must be at a high state of readiness for defence. All three Services are complementary; neither the Navy nor the Air Force are fully effective without their Army partner.

The expansion of the Army to a war footing must, therefore, proceed expeditiously.

The Army consists of a variety of differing types of formations and units which are fully effective only

when operating in their proper relationships. Similarly each unit is a balanced aggregate of sub-units, each in its turn comprising a number of trained teams of soldiers, properly equipped and practised in their team accomplishments.

The smallest team comprises a number of trained soldiers, each trained individually, and each team including its correct proportion of soldiers specially trained in a particular branch of their art and taught to work in co-operation.

There are then many types of soldiers, but each and every one must have a certain common basic knowledge onto which, as appropriate, other skills and knowledge are grafted so that we have the components of the balanced team of all arms.

It is obvious that if every youth is given, as part of his upbringing, the common basic knowledge required of a soldier, we are well on the way to forming our series of military teams quickly and efficiently when we need them.

This is the primary task then of National Service training, and it is the task to be accomplished in the 14 weeks full-time duty period of training given to the youth in his 18th year.

The subsequent stage of training, the grafting of additional knowledge and skills in the correct proportions, and team training, will be accomplished during the subsequent annual trainings with the CMF unit of allotment. In this setting also we put the basically trained National Service man into his first military team.

The National Service Man.

Who is the National Service man? Just another fellow-Australian, who lives in the next house in the same street as you do; who does the same work and plays the same sports.

He is entitled to respect and he must get it, but he must pay his contribution to national security; he must prepare himself for service.

He must not, therefore, be antagonized; he must be led to see where his duty lies—he must be led, not driven. His training must be interesting and arresting and obviously valuable.

The first requirement of a soldier is physical and mental fitness; and since this is the aim of most youths of the 18-year age group, it will be used as the principal medium onto which purely military accomplishments are grafted. The secondary aim of a very high percentage of youths of this age is to become proficient in the use of a rifle or similar weapon and, as this is also a fundamental requirement of a trained soldier, it will be used as the second medium for the maintenance of interest.

The whole atmosphere of his statutory training must be encouraging and stimulating. He may not like being called up, he has resented doing things because he must all his life, so we must make any resentment look ridiculous to him in face of the circumstances he meets on arrival in camp and afterwards.

The surroundings must be human, clean and reasonably comfortable. His reception must be carefully planned and carried through without a hitch—he must be made to

feel welcome in a well-conducted establishment.

The programme of his training must be provocative and stimulating and developed from things he knows and appreciates. Dull, repetitive drills and meaningless evolutions must be eschewed; there must be meaningful method and good instruction throughout. There must be ample, balanced recreation and no senseless confinement to camp. In effect, the National Service man must be made to realise he belongs to a good and worthwhile show which knows what it is doing—and means to do it.

The Citizen Military Forces.

All Australian soldiers must clearly understand that there is not going to be two Citizen Military Forces, one composed of National Service men and the other of volunteers. There is going to be only one CMF. The men brought into its ranks by National Service will never have had the opportunity to volunteer because they will become liable for service as soon as they are old enough, that is to say, as soon as they become 18 years of age. Therefore there can be no reason whatever for "bone pointing" at the National Service men. Many of them would have volunteered if they had not been called up automatically. It is hoped that many of them will volunteer to serve on in the CMF after completing their statutory service, as officers, NCO's and specialists.

It is apparent that, as time goes on, practically everyone in the CMF, including those who have volunteered to continue their service, will have been automatically called up originally to fulfil their obligations

under National Service. It is important to bear this fact in mind at the present juncture.

In the CMF the National Service man will be required to serve three years, in each year attending 12 days home training, probably made up of some four days in half-day or night parades mainly for administrative purposes, and eight days of week-end or two-day bivouacs, and 14 days' continuous training in camp with his unit.

Thereafter he will be drafted to the reserve on which he will remain for three years, during which time he remains liable to recall in emergency.

As in the realm of sport, so in the Army, the successful team is composed of basically trained individuals, equipped with the appropriate skills in the right proportions, practiced in working as a team, and headed by a trained and understanding leader. Without a leader the team must fall short of attainment.

The CMF will provide the leaders; it will also supply the specialists. The National Service man will fill the teams with basically trained soldiers.

It must be appreciated, too, that National Service is a long term plan, intended ultimately to ensure a strong and efficient CMF without, at the same time, placing an unduly heavy strain on our already extended economy. It will be at least a year before the first drafts of National Service men have completed their basic training and passed to the CMF to be trained as members of a fighting team. Under present call-up arrangements it will take four years to bring the CMF

up to establishment, without allowing for any wastage at all.

Looking at the present ominous state of international affairs, at the dangers pressing heavily upon the Western democracies, it is apparent that there is an urgent need for volunteers to fill the ranks of the CMF until National Service has produced its full effects. Never before in peace-time has Australia needed volunteers so badly. She needs them for two reasons. Firstly, the fighting services, including the CMF, must be brought up to strength immediately in order to meet an emergency which might burst upon us at any moment. Secondly, the CMF must be brought to something like full establishment before the first drafts of National Service men enter its ranks. If the training of these men as team members is to proceed smoothly and quickly it is essential that they pass straight from their basic training camps to strong CMF units, to efficient "going concerns," rather than to weak, improvised units and sub-units.

It will be seen, then, that the CMF is cast for a vital role in the training of the National Service man, the role of integrating a basically trained soldier into a fighting team. In the early stages this role will demand a great deal of the CMF because it will be necessary to withdraw temporarily a proportion of its ARA cadres to provide instructors for the basic training camps. However, as more Regular Army instructors are trained the cadres will be built up to strength again. These withdrawals should be regarded as a loan, to be repaid in due course together with a dividend in the shape of a steady flow of recruits.

The National Service scheme is, therefore, a challenge to the CMF. The National Service man will come along disciplined and basically trained, and, we hope, keen to complete his military education. The CMF must maintain his interest and encourage his enthusiasm and it will not do this unless it is itself equipped for the purpose.

From a successful response to the challenge the CMF will get inestimable benefits. Its recruits will come to it basically trained, and ready to take their places in the team and to proceed with specialist training. When the scheme is in full operation units and sub-units will be up to establishment; consequently there will be no need for constant improvization to meet the difficulties of partly-filled ranks and erratic attendance. At home stations and in camp units will be strong enough to enable both leaders and led to obtain real benefit from collective training. This means that the CMF officer and NCO will be able to study and practice the art of command in all its aspects, from man-management to the tactical leadership of troops in the field.

We must be very active to ensure that conditions in the CMF give encouragement to National Service trainees, on completion of their statutory CMF service, to remain voluntarily in the CMF. Those who volunteer to do so may ultimately graduate through the ranks to the highest leadership positions. By the proportion that do so we may measure the success of the National Service training scheme.

Some Pre-requisites.

The Government is anxious to begin National Service training at

the earliest possible moment. The accommodation, the instruction, the training aids, the recreational facilities, the clothing, the cooks, the doctors, the bootmakers, the rifle ranges, will all need the most in-

tensive effort in the coming months to ensure that everything is at the highest possible state of readiness for the initial intake. The one essential thing that will count more than all these is the welcoming spirit.

STANDARDIZATION AN OLD PROBLEM.

And because we are credibly given to understand that the often and continual altering and changing of the fashion of armes and armours, some countrys and parts of the Kingdome having armours of one fashion, and some of another, do put many of our subjects to a great and unnecessary charge, and more than need requireth, for the avoiding whereof, our will and pleasure is, and wee doe hereby appoint and command, that hereafter there shall be but one uniform fashion of armours of the said common and trayned bands throughout our said Kingdome of England and domynion of Wales, when as any of the said armours shall be supplied and new made and that that form and fashion of armour shall be agreeable to the last and modern fashion lately set downe and appoynted to be used by the lords and others of our Councel of Warre (the patterns whereof are now and shall remayn in the office of our ordinance from tyme to tyme, which is our pleasure likewise concerning gunnes, pikes, and bandaliers whereof patterns are and shall remayn from tyme to tyme in our said office).



Invasion Without Laurels

PART 1

General Baron Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg.
Commander-in-Chief Panzer Group West.

Written by a senior commander of the German Armies in North-West Europe, this article presents the enemy view of the Allied invasion of Normandy. Copyright is reserved by the author. Permission to reprint the article in whole or in part must be obtained from the Editor of the Irish Defence Journal, through whose courtesy authority to publish it in the Australian Army Journal was obtained.—Editor.

Part 1.

The outcome of the Allied invasion of Normandy was a foregone conclusion. The invasion of the Western Front was bound to bring about a military decision. By 1943 even Hitler recognised this, at least in his written instructions, although in his mind he never admitted the truth of this fact.

By the latter part of 1943 the bulk of the German forces were heavily engaged in two theatres of

operation. In Italy the Allied sea-borne invasion had proved successful. Neither Hitler nor his continentally-minded Supreme Command understood the importance of this fact. The meaning of sea power was lost on them. Jodl, Hitler's chief adviser on strategical matters, was not even interested when the reason for the German failure at Salerno was explained to him. Jodl had not seen active service since the trench warfare of 1918. Moreover, he was an artilleryman, and that arm of the service during the First World War came a bad third to the French and Austrian artillery. Indeed, the German artillery was in many ways more obsolete minded than the infantry. Up to D-day the full extent of the superiority of air observation, the importance of smoke and the necessity for anti-aircraft defence were disregarded by the German military commanders. They

continued to think in terms of calibre and fire concentrations.

Hitler and Jodl alike were ignorant of the implications of armoured warfare. In addition they were satisfied that Germany was the only source of military science, and that beyond the German frontiers there had been no developments during the previous quarter of a century.

By the latter part of 1943 the Western Front formed a large semi-circle along the coasts from Holland to the Franco-Italian border. The coastal fortifications had been christened the "Atlantic Wall," and the German propagandists were busily engaged in emphasising its great strength, but from the military point of view it was virtually non-existent. As General of Armoured Combat Forces in the West, I reported to my superior, Guderian, the Inspector-General, in the summer of 1943 that the value of the Atlantic Wall was only proportionate to the strength of the panzer units in reserve behind it.

From our knowledge of Allied preparations and from the frequent Soviet demands for the opening of the "Second Front" by their Anglo-Saxon comrades-in-arms, it was obvious that a large-scale Allied landing was to be expected in the West. It also appeared certain that considerable airborne forces would be employed in such an operation. Our only doubt was whether the Allied training and experience had reached a stage of development which would permit the Anglo-American leaders to attempt strategic operations on a Corps or Army scale, or whether the airborne landings would have to be restricted to tactical manoeuvres only.

Up to this date research on defence against airborne assault had been going on only on a small scale. The panzer forces, being both the best ally as well as the most dangerous opponent of airborne units, considered it urgent to take up the question of defence against airborne attack on a theoretical as well as a practical basis. In this connection I should say that I was given no little assistance in deducing the type and extent of the Allied developments in airborne operations by an article which appeared in the British magazine "Illustrated London News" in the summer of 1943. Photographs included many interesting items, while the text mentioned General Browning, the airborne commander, and my old friend, Field Marshall Sir John Dill. In September, 1943, we opened the theoretical study of panzers versus airborne forces with a large-scale war-game. We assumed that the hostile airborne forces would be used in a strategic, not a tactical fashion. In the event, the Nijmegen-Arnhem landings in September, 1944, resembled what we expected. The airborne landings in Normandy in June, however, were merely tactical.

Apart from theoretical research, the practical side of the training in anti-airborne defence went ahead in a series of manoeuvres with our panzer divisions, especially in night exercises. On D-Day the battle drills which we had developed failed against the British 6th Airborne Division because Rommel was absent and had forbidden the 21st Panzer Division, which was billeted near the British landing-zone, to make any move without his authorisation. Our training methods proved themselves at Arnhem, however.

Two major strategic errors on the part of the Germans led to the Allied success in Normandy. The first was the continued belief by Jodl, Rommel and others for a full fortnight after D-Day that the Normandy invasion was preparatory to further and larger landings in the Pas de Calais region. This was clearly fantastic, since enemy operation orders, captured early in the battle, showed that Normandy was "the real thing." However, the 15th German Army was left in the Pas de Calais area until too late to help in Normandy.

The second error was Rommel's insistence upon coastal defence instead of defence in depth with strategic reserves. On paper, Field Marshall von Rundstedt was Supreme Commander West. In practice he had no decisive influence with regard to the employment of the Luftwaffe and the Navy. Rommel, who was the Army Group Commander, was also in practice independent of von Rundstedt, so that in effect von Rundstedt's post was merely nominal.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was, without doubt, one of the strongest personalities in the West during this period, and he dominated all the others. He was a genuine, soldier-like type, brave and bold, a tactical fox on the battlefield, but not a strategist. By appointing Rommel to the post of Commander-in-Chief Army Group "B," the German Su-

preme Command created a permanent division of control in France. Von Rundstedt was too weak a personality to enforce his point of view, and Rommel proceeded with his own plans concerning the method of defence to be adopted. Rommel had risen to fame initially because of Hitler's preferential treatment of him—he had commanded Hitler's bodyguard until 1940—and, although the reputation Rommel acquired in Africa was well deserved, it was grossly exaggerated by Goebel's propaganda machine.



Rundstedt.

When Rommel returned from Africa after decisive Allied victories in Libya and Tunisia his nerve was shattered. Above all, because in the open African desert air power so dominated the ground forces that armoured manoeuvres were virtually impossible without control of the air, Rommel lost all confidence in ground manoeuvres. He failed to appreciate that in close or wooded country movement by night involved no major risk from air attack. This was later proved by the fact that after the Allied invasion the bulk of the panzer divisions were moved by night without serious losses. Only the Panzerlehr Division, moved on the afternoon of 5 June by direct command of Field Marshall von Rundstedt, attempted a daylight march.

It was typical of Hitler's method to divide the control and power of his subordinates—a common fault

in those who fear to delegate authority. In addition, Hitler was opposed to all those who represented the "old army." Far from enjoying the support of the so-called "Junkers" class, Hitler distrusted it and gave it little say in the overall control of the war.

In the autumn of 1943, I as GOC Panzergruppe West (that is, all the Panzer forces in France), asked von Rundstedt whether the panzer divisions were to be trained for mobile warfare or coastal defence. The Supreme Commander's decision was, as I had hoped, for mobile warfare. When Field Marshal Rommel took up command of Army Group "B," however, a controversy arose between him and myself on this very question. Rommel held that it was essential to prevent the enemy gaining any foothold in France, because it would be impossible to throw him back once he became established. Accordingly, all available forces were to be distributed in a sort of cordon close to the coastal fortifications, the panzers well forward as tactical reserves. My view, on the other hand, was that, since the Allies had overwhelming superiority in naval gun-power and in the air it would be quite impossible for us to prevent them landing somewhere in an arc of some 1,300 kilometers in length. The only solution was to use the sole German superiority—the more skilful and flexible leader-

ship of the highly-trained panzer formations, undoubtedly our trump card—by the retention of a sizable operational reserve made up of five or six panzer divisions held initially outside the range of ship-borne artillery and under cover from air attack in the forests north-west or south of Paris, from which they could mount their assault when the enemy was already committed deep into the country, Colonel-General Guderian, Hitler's adviser on panzer tactics, was in entire agreement with this proposal, but without result. Rommel's method prevailed.



Rommel.

The result of Rommel's method was that one panzer division after another was moved up to the coastline. Apart from the fatal strategic results of this decision, the fact of the disagreement between the two schools of thought, which could not be concealed, had a detrimental effect upon the morale of the lower ranks. I personally felt so strongly about Rommel's plan that I requested permission to state my views to the Supreme Command at Berchtesgaden. Hitler conceded sufficiently to order that four Panzer divisions, Liebstandarte, Hitler-Jugend, Panzer-Lehr, and Gotz-von-Berlichingen—be retained as OKW strategic reserve, but on the first day of the Allied invasion this scheme was abandoned, despite Guderian's support for my point of view.

The supply system for the Wes-

ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN COMMAND IN THE WEST

1944

SUPREME COMMANDER WEST

FIELD MARSHAL von RUNDSTEDT

ARMY GROUP "B"

FIELD MARSHAL ROMMEL

ARMY GROUP "C"

COL. GENERAL BLASKOWITZ

SOUTHERN FRANCE

NETHERLANDS COMMAND

GENERAL of the AIR FORCE
CHRISTIANSEN

NETHERLANDS

15th ARMY GROUP

COL. GENERAL von SALMUTH

PAS DE CALAIS

7th ARMY GROUP

COL. GENERAL DOLLMANN

NORMANDY

PANZERGROUP WEST

PANZER GENERAL
BARON GEYR von
SCHWEPPENBURG

NORMANDY

tern Front was based too much upon the railways and centralised supply depots. Only a few months prior to the invasion the supplies for armoured units — in particular spare parts and fuel—were centralised and frequently stored in localities which presented excellent targets for Allied bombers. The enemy intelligence service seemed to discover and pin-point all these depots. Although it was quite impossible to convince the higher command of the need to have a flexible supply system for the armoured units as opposed to the static formations, we did succeed in having our fuel and ammunition depots guarded and manned by personnel of the panzer forces and not by the usual rear-echelon service troops.

Before D-Day one Seine bridge after another was destroyed by systematic air attack. Little bridging material was available to us and the mobility of the armoured units became more and more circumscribed. I proposed the construction of under-water bridges, such as we had used on the Eastern Front. These were extremely difficult to recognise from the air. However, my proposal was turned down.

The naval experts whose opinion was sought informed us that the effective range of enemy naval artillery would be ten kilometers inland where the coasts were steep and about twenty kilometers inland over low coasts. This estimate proved inaccurate, for hostile naval artillery was effective as far inland as the Bayeux-Caen sector, some thirty kilometers inland!

Estimates of probable enemy action varied considerably. Both Jodl and von Rundstedt's Chief of

Staff doubted whether the invasion would materialise at all, regarding the Allied announcements as merely a bluff. The staff at my Panzergruppe West held differently, arguing from our knowledge of the British mentality, especially as we knew that the King had inspected the invasion forces, and it was quite evident that the British monarch would not be asked to demean himself by taking part in a mere farce.

At regards the point of attack the sectors at the mouth of the Rhone river in Southern France, the Cotentin peninsula and the Channel coast were considered likely alternatives. Naval Command West regarded the Orne-Vire sector, where in the event the landings occurred, unsuited to amphibious operations. Accordingly no mine-barriers existed in the coastal waters of the Caen sector of "Omaha" beach. We estimated that if the invasion occurred in the Normandy area, some thirty enemy divisions might be employed; about ten or twenty in Southern France, and another twenty-eight for the Channel coast or whatever other point of attack the Allies might select. We calculated the hostile tank strength as about 10 to 1, armoured reconnaissance material at 15 to 1, but we had no yard-stick for estimating the degree of air superiority to be expected. Already in February, 1944, the battle for air command had been fought and lost. The number of trained enemy airborne divisions was also uncertain, ranging from eight to ten at the outside.

Von Rundstedt's G3 Branch had no illusions about the combat quality of our infantry divisions. All suffered from shortage of anti-tank, artillery and supply units. The standard of the German armoured divi-

sions was calculated at only 33½ per cent. of the 1939 standard, but, nevertheless, they were far superior to the panzer formations which took part in the "Battle of the Bulge" in December, 1944.

Jodl, in Berchtesgaden, von Salmuth, the C-in-C of the 15th Army, and Rommel were all three of them sure that a second and main landing would take place in the Pas de Calais area. It was not until a week after D-Day that this belief began to be shaken—and by the time the 15th Army was ready to move towards Normandy it was too late to influence the result of the battle there. As for the situation in the air, this was quite hopeless from the start.

With regard to the date of the invasion, we had a rough guide from a notice which appeared in the London "Times" and which appeared to have escaped the censor. The paragraph concerned the rate of compensation to be paid to British farmers by the American Government for injury to farm-land during armoured night exercises. The censor apparently disregarded agricultural news as being a possible source of information for the Germans. From this article it was evident that the invasion could not take place before mid-April, 1944, at the earliest. As time passed more and more evidence was accumulated regarding the probable date of the invasion.

During the period prior to the Allied invasion the weaknesses of German leadership were very obvious. First of all, the armed forces of Germany were under the control of one man. Over a year before D-Day Winston Churchill said that the

control of the German Army had passed from "the competent hands of the German General Staff into those of a private first class." He was quite right. The hopeless mental condition of this individual was clear at least since 1942. Furthermore, although he reserved the right to make all vital decisions, Hitler never visited the Western fighting front, spending the first four weeks after D-Day at Berchtesgaden and then returning to his Headquarters in East Prussia, near the Russian front.

The second defect in German leadership was the nature of the senior advisers with whom Hitler had surrounded himself. None of these men had any combat experience during the Second World War; none of them even visited the fighting fronts.

Thirdly, the Supreme Commander in the West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was an ageing man. He was an old and experienced soldier, but his authority was limited. His Chief-of-Staff was also unsuited for the task. Von Manstein had been sought as Chief-of-Staff to von Rundstedt, but this request was turned down. As a result it was quite impossible to get clear-cut decisions on broader controversial issues. The ship was drifting without a helmsman. Finally, although all the Army Commanders, with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief in Holland, were thoroughly experienced soldiers, there was no firm and well co-ordinated unity of command.

This was the background in which the defence against the coming Allied invasion of France was prepared. That invasion took place on 6 June, 1944. Its rapid success was

due, as has been noted above, to a number of weaknesses on the German side, many of them of a most grievous nature. First, there was the weakness in the chain of command, the constant direct intervention by Hitler and his staff, none of whom ever visited the Western theatre of operations, and the mutual lack of confidence which the various commanders in the West had in one another. Next was Rommel's insistence upon close coastal defence instead of defence in depth with the panzers held as operational reserve forces. Rommel entirely disregarded the advice of the many experienced senior commanders who were fully familiar with the characteristics and abilities of panzer formations. In addition, there was Rommel's mistaken belief that without command of the air the German panzers would be immobilised. Events proved him wrong. The advice of Naval Command West was false both as regards the possibility of the Orne-Vire front being used as the invasion area and also as regards the range of shipborne artillery. The refusal of Jodl, Rommel and others to believe that the Normandy invasion

was the main Allied operation and not merely a feint, which in turn resulted in pinning down the 15th German Army in the Pas de Calais area, helped to weaken the German front and render the task of the Allies easier than it would otherwise have been.

In the various conflicts of opinion, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who was Supreme Commander West, maintained a sort of neutrality, so that the poverty of the leadership was made even worse. When Guderian, Hitler's adviser on panzer tactics, approached Hitler in order to get a ruling on the question of armoured employment in France, Hitler would answer: "I must rely upon Field Marshal Rommel; you had better see him."

[In the next (November) issue of The Australian Army Journal General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg concludes this study of the Normandy invasion from the German view-point with a description of the manoeuvres of the German panzer units and criticism of the tactics of both sides during the decisive battles in Normandy.]

ADMINISTRATION

and

MAINTENANCE IN THE FIELD

Directorate of Administrative Planning, AHQ.

"The more I have seen of war the more I realise how it all depends on administration and transportation (what our American allies call logistics). It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors; and battles and wars are won only by taking risks."

—Field Marshall Lord Wavell.

Administration.

Scope of Administration.

Administration is concerned with the maintenance of the forces in the field; that is, the process of keeping them complete in personnel, animals, food, fuel, stores and equipment of all kinds. This process also includes the salvage, return and repair of all unwanted or damaged commodities, whether human or material.

In modern war the speed of movement of a mechanized army, the increased vulnerability of lines of communication to air or armoured attack, and the great quantity and complexity of maintenance require-

ments have all increased the importance of efficient administration.

The threat of modern mass destruction weapons has set the army thinking how best to avoid presenting the enemy with an attractive target. This problem is still to be solved, but one possible means is the simplification of our administration by standardisation. The essence of standardisation is that administrative units and installations should be made up of various standard components or "bricks." This gives flexibility in that standard "bricks" can be added to or subtracted from units to effect concentration into big installations or dispersion into a number of smaller ones. This leads

further to consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of a single base and main lines of communication as against a number of small bases and a multiplicity of lines of communication.

It is not intended to answer these questions in these notes, but rather to explain the existing system and to promote thought on the administrative problems of the future. Whatever the problems and whatever the situations to be faced, there are certain principles which will never vary.

Principles of Administration.

The following general principles have been found by experience to form the basis of sound administration:—

Foresight.

Administrative plans and preparations have to be started a long time in advance. In particular shipping and reinforcements take time to arrange. The first essential in ensuring foresight is that the General Staff should keep the Administrative Staff and Services informed of the probable future development of operations. Similarly, it is the duty of the Administrative Staff to keep the General Staff informed of the administrative problems and difficulties that are likely to arise.

Economy.

The frequent tendency towards over-insurance must be countered by a nice balancing of the resources required for an operation against the administrative risks involved. Over-insurance is not only wasteful in material and effort, but may also prejudice operational requirements on another part of the front or in another theatre.

Flexibility.

The speed of modern war, with its ever-changing priorities and sudden demands, and the necessity of switching of formations from one Army or Corps to another, calls for a highly flexible system of administration. Moreover, a proper balance must be maintained between stocks to be held forward to meet such sudden changes and those to be kept further back to enable major changes of plan to be made.

Co-operation.

Good administration depends not only on co-operation between the staff and services in a HQ, but also on complete confidence between them and their opposite numbers in higher and lower formations. Urgent demands of lower formations should always be met without question. Moreover, in modern war army administration cannot be successful without intimate co-operation with the RAN and RAAF, with allied formations and with Sea Transport and Civilian authorities.

Simplicity.

A good administrative plan is almost invariably a simple one.

General and Local Administration.

The subjects covered by the description "administration in the field" are classified as matters either of general administration or of local administration. This classification is made to define what HQ is responsible for each subject, and officers of all three Services should, therefore, know the main matters normally classified under each heading. Broadly speaking, the Force HQ controls the activities of certain installations in the rearward areas which hold reserves belonging to and controlled by that HQ; while a local

HQ controls the area in which those installations are located. It is not possible to say which subjects will invariably be controlled by the Force HQ in the field and which will be delegated to a local HQ, but directives will be issued by the Force HQ to define them. The following paragraphs show, however, the normal division of subjects into general and local administration.

General Administration.

This covers all matters concerning the policy and execution of the maintenance and movement of the force as a whole. It includes:—

- (a) Receipts, holdings and issues at all base installations of personnel and material.
- (b) Siting, construction, control and operation of all general administrative installations such as base depots and workshops.
- (c) Control of all through movement into, within and out of the theatre of operations.
- (d) Control of the construction, use and operation of all transportation facilities such as ports, railways and inland waterways. This also includes the control of L of C road transport.

Local Administration.

Certain administrative matters of a purely local application are delegated to local commanders, whether of fighting or administrative formations, e.g., Divisions, Corps, L of C Areas. The local administrative responsibility of such commanders extends not only to troops and installations in their areas, but also to troops passing through them. The

main subjects covered by local administration are:—

- (a) Purely local road movement and traffic control.
- (b) Discipline.
- (c) Accommodation, including water, light and power.
- (d) Sanitation.
- (e) Supply and welfare of the troops in the area.
- (f) Precautions against fire, theft and looting.
- (g) Allocation of the local pools of labour and transport.

Administration of the Lines of Communication.

The L of C extends from inclusive the base to the Army rear boundary. The local administration of the L of C is placed under the control of HQ L of C, the commander of which is directly responsible to the Force Commander.

A very long L of C may be divided into two or more L of C Areas. The L of C or L of C Areas are sub-divided into L of C Sub-Areas. In addition, in the area of each base port there is established a Base Sub-Area, usually commanded by a Brigadier.

In a port and base the Base Sub-Area commander is responsible for local administration as outlined above. The Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC) is responsible for the command and administration of naval personnel and installations and for certain naval tasks within the port and to seaward of it. The senior Air Officer is responsible for purely RAAF functions. These three officers may be jointly responsible for the defence of the port and base through the medium of a Defence

Committee, on which all three are represented. The working of the port is controlled by a Port Executive (or Control) Committee, on which all concerned with the working of the port are represented. The chairman of the Port Executive Committee may be either the Base Sub-Area Commander or the NOIC. The latter is probably the more suitable.

Administrative Responsibilities of the Army Towards the RAN and RAAF in Overseas Operations.

RAN.

The navy is administratively almost completely self-contained and the army is only concerned with its maintenance in the following ways:

- (a) In the early stages of a landing the army is responsible for the provision of supplies and common user fuel to naval personnel and establishments ashore.
- (b) In planning the lay-out of a base or other administrative area, the army and naval commanders are jointly responsible for the allotment to the navy of adequate space and accommodation for naval personnel and establishments ashore.

RAAF.

Army administration has more responsibilities towards the maintenance of the RAAF, chief of which normally are:—

- (a) The army maintains the RAAF in supplies, fuel, ammunition and other common user items.
- (b) The RAAF collects in its own transport within a radius of 40 miles from its airfields. If

airfields are over 40 miles from army depots the army delivers to agreed points within that distance.

- (c) The army is responsible for all airfield construction and maintenance forward of army rear boundaries and also for the construction and maintenance of airfields behind army rear boundaries that are required for units of the Tactical Air Force. All other airfield requirements behind army rear boundaries are the responsibility of the RAAF Airfield Construction Service.

The following is an extract from a memorandum on the subject agreed by the War Office and the Air Ministry:—

"It is a generally accepted principle that services of common usage in the Army and the RAAF in the field should be provided by one Service for the use of both. The guiding factor in deciding which Service is to make the provision is that responsibility should devolve upon that Service which, having regard to manpower, equipment, experience and organisation, can do so in the most economical manner."

Experience has shown that this principle is sound, and the whole subject will always be one of major inter-Service interest.

System of Maintenance in the Field. Outline Maintenance Organisation.

There is no rigid maintenance organisation since conditions vary in each theatre of war and in each operation. In order to achieve flexibility and to enable success to be exploited without delay, stocks of all important items of maintenance

SYSTEM OF MAINTENANCE IN THE FIELD




Figure 1.

may have to be held well forward within easy reach of the fighting troops. In order to ensure economy and to avoid waste and over-insurance these forward holdings must be closely controlled by the staff.

In order to meet these requirements a system of supply through a series of "bases" and "maintenance areas" has been evolved, which is explained in the following paragraphs. These "bases" and "maintenance areas" contain the administrative units and installations necessary to provide reinforcements, supplies, stores and workshop facilities. The administrative services have units and installations of various sizes and capacities to fit into these different types of "bases" and "maintenance areas."

The distinction between the two types described below is that the "main support areas, main and advanced bases" indicate a place that has a degree of permanence as compared with the various "maintenance areas" which are established for the maintenance of the armies in the field on a temporary basis.

The following notes trace the maintenance system in outline from the rear up to Divisions in the forward area. A sketch of a typical lay-out is shown at Figure 1.

Main Support Areas.

These are the major production areas which contain concentrations of manpower, industrial potential or sources of food or raw materials, which are essential to the war effort. It is from these areas, e.g., from Australia, UK, Canada, USA, that our forces are likely to be administratively supported.

Main Base.

This is a large area containing the complex organisation which gathers together, holds and issues the men and material needed to maintain all the activities of armies in the field. The area must necessarily be highly developed and contain all or most of the following facilities: Ports, railways, roads, airfields, hospitals, depots for men and material, workshops and other installations, factories, tele-communications, skilled and unskilled labour and a civil economy capable, if possible, of manufacture and the production of local materials and resources.

A main base will require a considerable time for development and may well be required to serve more than one area of operations. In World War II Egypt—Palestine was the main base for operations in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean; India was the main base for operations in Burma and Malaya; whereas for operations in NW Europe, UK was the main base. In the future, however, with the threat of new and powerful weapons, the tendency is likely to be to keep the main bases back in the main support areas.

Advanced Base.

An advanced base is established in a theatre of operations when it is impracticable to maintain the armies operating in the theatre directly from the main base, e.g., where the distance from the base requires it or where there is a defile (the English Channel in the case of operations in NW Europe in World War II).

During the operations of the Eighth Army in North Africa, ad-

vanced bases were established as the ports fell into our hands or were opened. For the reconquest of Burma the advanced base was initially at Manipur Road; as the advance southwards progressed and as air supply developed, further advanced bases were opened at Chittagong Akyab and Ramree from which the Fourteenth Army was maintained by air, and finally an advanced base was established at Rangoon. In NW Europe operations went so fast that Le Harvre was never opened for British use and an advanced base was eventually established in the Antwerp area.

An advanced base will require, to a much lesser degree, most of the facilities needed in a main base. Given time and the necessary natural and economic facilities an advanced base can be developed into a main base.

Beach Maintenance Area (BMA).

The initial maintenance is an assault landing is carried out through the beaches from a BMA, which is established in the vicinity of the beaches and comprises service units and detachments to provide the supplies, stores and facilities required by the troops. Units and formations draw their requirements from the BMA initially in their own transport.

Army Group Maintenance Area (AGMA).

Maintenance through the beaches cannot as a rule be continued indefinitely. On the other hand it takes a considerable time to bring permanent advanced base depots into operation. An AGMA may, therefore, be established which maintains the force ashore from tem-

porary depots from the time when issues cease from the BMA until permanent advanced base depots are operating. Corps transport, supplemented as necessary by Army transport, draws from the AGMA, until an Army Maintenance Area is formed to which maintenance requirements are delivered by Army or L of C transport.

An AGMA is also established when entry into the theatre of operations is through a port and there is no BMA.

The temporary depots of the AGMA are sometimes sited with a view to expansion into the permanent advanced base depots, if there is not room for them clear of the advanced base.

It is now for consideration whether in theatres like SW Pacific, where ports are few and far between, or in the face of mass destruction weapons, to which ports appear particularly vulnerable, maintenance through the beaches may have to be continued indefinitely. The main drawbacks are the weather and the expense in resources of men and material.

L of C Maintenance Area.

An L of C Maintenance Area is the term given to any maintenance area that may be set up under the orders of HQ L of C Area for the maintenance of troops located on, or passing through, the L of C.

Army Maintenance Area (AMA).

The transportation agencies on the L of C deliver to railhead, roadhead, riverhead, airhead, etc. These are known as L of C terminals, and from these points formation transport takes over and operates forward.

An Army Maintenance Area may be established for the sake of flexibility to enable formations to be switched at short notice from Corps to Corps or from Army to Army; to enable major operations to be mounted at shorter notice than if the necessary supplies, ammunition, petrol, etc., had to be ordered forward from the Advanced Base, or AGMA; or when there is danger of a breakdown of the L of C.

The Army Maintenance Area may well be served by rail, inland waterway or air as well as by road. It is established by Army HQ in the Army area with the permission of Army Group HQ, who also agree the amount of stocks to be held in it. It contains dumps or advanced depots holding stocks of supplies, petrol, ammunition and certain other stores.

Corps Maintenance Area (CMA).

On the Corps level, for the same reasons as those given above, a Corps may establish a CMA with the permission of Army HQ, who also agree the amount of stocks to be held in it.

Corps transport, supplemented by Army transport, stocks the CMA and maintains its level of stocks from the Army Maintenance Area. Divisions and Corps troops draw their maintenance requirements from CMA.

Divisional Maintenance Area (DMA).

A Divisional Maintenance Area is only formed when it is necessary for a Division, with permission of Corps, to hold dumped stocks in a central area in addition to those normally held in its 2nd line transport.

Corps Troops Administrative Area and Divisional Administrative Area.

These are areas in which Corps or Divisional administrative units may be located for administrative convenience or protection. Fighting units are often given a rest area in them. Also a proportion of unit non-fighting transport may be located there when not required forward.

Control and Priorities of Movement. Movement on the L of C.

Movement is an inseparable part of administration, and the rapid movement of forces and their effective maintenance depends on a highly organised and efficient chain throughout the L of C. Movement must be considered as a whole from the assault areas or base ports up to the L of C terminal. The various means of transportation (by air, sea, road, rail and inland waterways) must be so co-ordinated and controlled as to make the fullest use of them to meet the many competing demands for movement capacity.

Principles of Movement.

There are four principles of movement, departure from which has invariably spelt congestion or delay on the L of C and inefficiency or complete breakdown of maintenance. These are set out briefly below.

Centralisation of Control.—The HQ of a military force exercises control of movement on the L of C in the theatre of operations through a section of the QMG staff called Q (Movements), which in turn exercises executive control through a Movement Control Staff at all nodal points on the L of C.

Regulation of Despatches.—It is the function of the staff at Force

HQ acting on the advice of its Q (Movements) Section, to lay down priorities of movement, in order to restrict despatches to the capacity of the transportation agencies to carry and of the terminal and transfer facilities to receive and tranship.

Even Flow.—The capacity of a movement chain is that of its weakest link. The object should be to strengthen the weak links by use or construction of alternative methods of transport, and so to prevent congestion in one part of the system and wasted capacity in another.

Full Utilisation of Carrying Power.—Full utilisation of carrying power can be achieved by close co-operation on the following points between the administrative staff and the transportation agencies concerned:—

- (a) Quick turn-round.
- (b) Full loading.
- (c) Movement over full distance.
- (d) Uniform speed.

Q (Movements) is responsible for advising the other branches of the staff of the capacity of the transportation facilities available, based on the technical advice of the Transportation or Supply and Transport Services in the case of systems operated by the Army, and of the Sea Transport Service or the RAAF in the case of sea or air transport. Subject to any requirements for the move of personnel, or for the operational movements of formations or units which may be over-riding, the Q Branch (Maintenance) is responsible for determining the priority of movement of stores up to the limit of capacity, bearing in mind that any attempt to overload the system

is asking for breakdown and chaos.

**Transportation and Transport.
Transportation on the L of C.**

The movement system on the L of C up to L of C terminals usually consists of a combination of some or all of the following transportation agencies:—

- (a) Railways.
- (b) Road transport (L of C transport).
- (c) Inland water transport.
- (d) Pipe-line.
- (e) Sea transport.
- (f) Air transport.

Control of them, and of movement by them, is vested in Force HQ (see Principles of Movement above). Air transport has been included in the above list, but it must be remembered that, although it may deliver to a L of C terminal, it has the ability to combine also the functions of 2nd and even 1st line transport and to deliver direct to the most forward troops.

Transport on the L of C.

L of C Transport.—Certain transport companies are allotted as L of C transport and work under Force HQ, delivering to L of C terminal.

Army Transport.—Each Army has an allotment of transport companies for working between L of C terminal and depots in the Army Maintenance Area, for assisting Corps in opening new CMAs, and for allotment to Corps or Divisions for special tasks.

Corps Transport.—Each Corps has an allotment of transport companies primarily for stocking and maintaining the CMA. It may sometimes be used for refilling Divisional 2nd line transport when Divisions are

too far from the CMA to draw direct, and for allotment to Divisions for special tasks.

Divisional 2nd Line Transport.— Each Division has a transport column which carries a 2nd line reserve of supplies, petrol and ammunition for the Division, delivers to supply points, ammunition points, petrol points, etc. (normally in the Divisional Administrative Area), and replenishes itself by drawing from the CMA.

1st Line Transport. — Transport which is part of the organization of a unit is known as unit 1st line transport. Units draw maintenance stores from 2nd line transport in their own 1st line transport and deliver direct to the troops.

Supply by Air.

Supply by air is a study in itself.

It has its own peculiar advantages and disadvantages, but it is, none the less, just one of the methods of maintenance at the disposal of a commander and, as such, its use for the support of operations is a normal function of Force HQ. It may be necessary to supply troops by air when mobile operations are being conducted where no adequate surface L of C exist; in airborne operations, when forward formations have outrun their road transport; or when the L of C are interrupted by enemy action or weather conditions.

Reinforcements.

The system for the supply of reinforcements is outlined in Figure 2.

Reinforcements are received in the Advanced Base either from the Home base or from Convalescent

SYSTEM OF SUPPLY OF REINFORCEMENTS




Figure 2

Training Depots and other sources in the theatre of operations. They are held in the rear area by a Reinforcement Holding Group, which consists of one Reinforcement Holding Unit for each major arm and one for one or more for the smaller arms. The supply of reinforcements from the Advanced Base forward is controlled by GHQ.

Forward of the Reinforcement Holding Group reinforcements are dealt with under two categories:—

- (a) Normal reinforcements.
- (b) Armoured reinforcements.

Normal reinforcements go forward to Corps Reception Camps, probably in the area of the CMA, and thence to their Divisional Reinforcement Unit and Battle School. This holds 100 reinforcements for each battalion in the Division, is under divisional control and provides for the immediate replacement of casualties.

Armoured Replacement Group.

The Armoured Replacement Group operates under GHQ or Army control. It regulates not only the delivery of armoured fighting vehicles for armoured formations and of certain tracked self-propelled artillery equipments, but also the forward distribution of armoured reinforcements and RA reinforcements for the above artillery equipments.

The Armoured Replacement Group comprises:—

- (a) Armoured Reinforcement Unit, which holds armoured reinforcements received from the Reinforcement Holding Group.
- (b) Armoured Delivery Regiment, where the armoured reinforcements are "married up" with armoured fighting vehicles.

The armoured fighting vehicles thus manned by skeleton crews of reinforcements go forward to units through Army, Corps and Forward Delivery Squadrons.

Conclusion.

The above notes give in outline the general system of maintenance forward, showing the various types of bases and maintenance areas that may be established and the means of transporting maintenance requirements forward at each stage. The functions of the important units of the administrative services in this system are being given in a series of articles dealing with the role and organization of the arms and services.

It must be remembered that maintenance also includes the evacuation of casualties and the recovery of damaged equipments. The evacuation of casualties was dealt with in the article, "The Role and Organization of the Army Medical Service" (See AAJ No. 14). The recovery of damaged equipment will be described in an article to appear in an early issue.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY



THE AMF Gold Medal Essay Competition is held annually with the object of encouraging the study of military subjects, stimulating thought, and providing all ranks of the Australian Army with an opportunity to express their ideas in a useful and constructive way.

The subject for the 1950-51 competition is:—

"The true strength of any army lies in the moral character and the spirit of its soldiers. A man needs a sense of individual dignity and responsibility. He must know and believe in the ideals of his country, and he must be willing to protect and perpetuate them."

This quotation comes from General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Examine its application to the structure and composition of the Army in Australia, having regard to a CMF created on a voluntary basis, but maintained at strength by some form of National Service.

The rules for the competition are:—

The right to compete will be limited to officers and other ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

The essays should not exceed 10,000 words in length; they must be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate.

The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto, and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto written on the outside and his name and address inside.

The title and page of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, St. Kilda Road, Melbourne, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal Essay," and must reach him not later than 30th June, 1951.

THERE'S SOMETHING ABOUT A MORTAR

Major-General S. H. Porter, DSO, ED.,
GOC, 3rd Division.

THIS is one of those stories which requires a certain amount of shuffling of table ware, and the gathering of the table cloth into bulges and folds.

As he got to work doing this, the Commanding Officer of a well-known Australian battalion did what old soldiers the world over, have done for centuries. He relived past battles and commanded his battalion again, even if it did take the shape of matches, a couple of small coins and sundry articles which accumulate in the pockets of a civilian suit. Casting an eye around his group of listeners, he commenced:—

"Of course, I never did profess to be an expert OPO or MFCPO, or any one of those conjurers of "Black Magic" who chant jargon into a telephone or microphone and dispassionately watch the fall of shot during a shoot. Now, however, I am all for them—gunners and mortar-



men alike, but particularly those mortar fellows. There's something about a mortar which captivates you, holds you and rewards you for the constant application of energy—just like golf.

"We were fighting along this ridge which runs north from Jez-zine in Syria. Everything ran along this ridge, the road, the telephone line and the French, after we had chased them out of the town as a result of our surprise attack. Later, the French rushed three infantry battalions back along the ridge to drive us out, but we managed to stay. They turned our L of C into a "Mad Mile," by pounding it with their artillery, and they pasted our forward localities with a preponderance of mortars.

"To the right, where this untidy table napkin rests, was a mass of bare rocky mountains. To the left, however, was a pretty little spur which jutted like a long jetty from

the township, and, unlike the main ridge, it was dotted with cedars. It ran parallel to the axis ridge for several miles, and then dropped abruptly into the gorge which separated it from the latter. Both sides patrolled it, but neither side found it tactically vital.

"While we were doggedly resisting French counter attacks, Merdjayoun, twenty-five miles to our rear, fell, and for some days our ammunition and food supply ceased. Our artillery did a magnificent job in breaking up enemy concentrations of troops, while our infantry dealt with the French "Groupe de Combat" tactics in a fine fashion. The enemy's mortars, however, kept up a very troublesome hammering at our front. Although most of our losses were caused by enemy air attacks and the interchange of small arms fire, we felt apprehensive of this mortaring. We could not locate their positions for one thing, and we suspected that they were too intimate to be countered with searching artillery shoots. For our part, we had but three mortars and seventy bombs with which to retaliate.


"Anyone who knows the steep mountains, the deep gorges and the narrow crevices of the Jezzine terrain will readily understand our difficulties.

"Eventually Russia came to our aid, not the whole Russian army, but one deserter who had heard that Russia had joined the Allied cause. From him I gained a fairly accurate description of the crevice from which the French mortar fire originated. He was a member of a Foreign Legion Battalion, forward on our immediate front. After some

thought, I decided to examine the crevice, personally, by venturing along the ridge on the left until I was as nearly as possible opposite to the crevice. I hoped to drop a few of our precious mortar bombs into it, if I could identify it.

"So, armed with a telescope and a wireless set, I set out with a small party, on a lovely Mediterranean afternoon, while the bright sunlight bathed the main ridge and left deep shadows among the cedars of my little "Jetty" ridge. I hadn't really arranged the sun. It just happened that it was on its westward and downward journey, consequently it shone on the western slopes of the main ridge.

"Soon, I was warily taking up a position from which I could gaze across the separating gorge into the French localities. After a great deal of fumbling with the telescope, I thought that I could see the crevice. All was peaceful and unwarlike. Then I picked out a dozen or so



French soldiers lounging in the sun on the edge of the rift. Their blue dungaree uniforms toned with the hazy mountain blues of their surroundings, but did not prevent their giving me valuable information. 'At least,' I thought, 'the crevice is occupied.'

"Very carefully I set about framing a quaint fire order for transmission to the mortars. My signaller was a great help in making it sound like the real thing.

"It seemed like an hour before I heard the familiar 'pimp' as the bomb left the mortar, and another hour before a crash occurred in the valley below. So far off target was the fall that the soldats over the way barely stirred. I ordered a correction and waited like a miser at a bazaar. My precious bombs were more to me than the miser's crowns were to him

"Another crash—also in the gorge below, and further off target than before. I checked my former correction and made another, this time a decidedly bold one. The result was heart rending; the bomb fell away over on to the table napkin. The fourth bomb also appeared to fall miles away to the right of correct line, despite another careful correction. The fifth fell almost on the same spot as had the first. I was in the depth of depression as I had one more try. Alas! The explosion was back on the table napkin. Gremlins, 'Black Magic' or whatever it was—I hadn't a clue.

"A I sat pondering I thought of the strong down currents of air which cascade down the rocky slopes in mountainous country, I wondered whether some such cur-

rents were playing havoc with my bombs during their long downward flight. At any rate, I decided to pack up and go home. I told my signaller to convey such a message to the mortars, and was too disgusted to notice what form of jargon he used to translate my admission of failure.

"Hardly had I moved from my OP, when I heard a merry chorus of 'pimp, pimp, pimppimp, pimp . . . ' and realized that probably fifteen of my bombs were about to be scattered over Syria. They—my mortar-men — were registering Heaven knows what.

"Part of their drill when registering,' the signaller reminded me.

"I could not express my feelings as I waited to see the result.

"What a result! The French soldats suddenly disappeared, amid dust! All bombs fell on target! It's a perfectly true story, I tell you.

"Back home I went, with that 'winning thousands on the last race' feeling. There's something about a mortar, without a doubt. We had no enemy mortar fire that night. In fact, we were not troubled again. Nevertheless, I decided to go out again next morning, like a good golfer, who wants to prove that golf is not a game of flukes. This time I abounded with confidence.

"So, with the lovely Syrian sun bathing my ridge with gold and deepening the haze in my telescope as I peered at the target, I ordered the first round. I could't see the target too well, but who cared? The sun was on its upward journey from the east, warm and cheerful.

"Ah, yes! The French cared, and apparently they could see me.

Hardly had the echo of the first bomb died away — a reasonably good one, too—when, 'bang,' came a round of air-burst artillery fire, not far from my position. And, as I have said, this little tree-clad ridge ran parallel to the main ridge, and so did I—as fast as I could, with the French rounds falling in my wake.

"You see, I had omitted to arrange the sun, for one thing, and I had driven my truck too close to my OP

for another. But I managed to get home safely.

"Now will some kind mortar officer please list the lessons of this contribution to the common fund of tactical knowledge? Two free tickets to a whole season of lectures at the USI will be given to the one letting me down lightest.

"By the way, if I'd had a mortar officer at the time he would have been sent on the mission, instead of my going."

Military men have a vital obligation to the service, to their country, and to themselves to learn to speak well. Knowledge of speaking techniques is important, but it is not all. The best qualified speaker is the man of good character with superior qualifications to discuss his particular subject. The skills of good delivery may be developed with training and experience . . .

—*Military Review, USA.*

Physical & Recreational Training

This is an authoritative article written at the request of the Director of Military Training by Captain E. Balfour, Senior Instructor of the Physical and Recreational Training Wing of the School of Infantry. It is designed to give all officers a proper appreciation of the importance of this aspect of military training.—Editor..

Nearly a hundred years ago, in 1860 to be exact, the War Office took the first step to organize physical and recreational training in the British Army. In that year Colonel Hammersmith formed in the United Kingdom the Army Gymnastic Staff with a strength of 12, now known as the 12 apostles. The aim of this staff was the improvement of physical fitness through the German system of gymnastics, sabre fighting and rifle exercises.

In 1879 Swedish and Danish instructors were brought to England to demonstrate Ling's methods of physical training. The methods did not appeal to the Army authorities.

In 1900 many soldiers were in hospital with sprains and heart trouble, and the medical officers blamed the Army Gymnastics Staff for following methods which produced an unduly large number of casualties of this nature. The Swedish instructors were brought back, but their methods were not approved by the Army until 1906, although the Navy and Board of Education had adopted them two years earlier.

The Swedish system was used up to 1914, when it was found to be too slow for war needs. The Physical Training School at Aldershot was closed for a time, but was re-opened to train instructors for bayonet fighting, assault training, boxing and team games. The Swedish system came back after the war as there was really nothing to replace it. The physical drill produced excellent results for the really keen individual, but it failed to improve the physical standards of the Army as a whole.

In 1926 Danish methods were tried and a new manual was produced. These methods were used until 1942, and form the basis of the present *Basic and Physical Training Tables*, which were published in 1944 and are in use throughout the British Army. These tables are designed to:—

- Prepare the recruit physically to stand the strain of war.
- Maintain the trained soldier's physical fitness for his particular role in war.

- Assist in the physical rehabilitation of the sick and wounded.

The syllabus provided by the Tables is not designed to produce "muscle men," but to ensure progressive development under the following headings:—

Physical Aspect.

The soldier has to be made skilful physically, and the Basic Physical Training Tables contain a careful blending of exercises and activities for this purpose. The harmonious development of the whole body corrects any tendency to one-sided development. A well-balanced muscular development is ensured by including exercises and activities which employ all the main muscle groups.

Mental Aspect.

The development of the body assists in the development of the mind through the agency of the body. The performance of a skilled movement is achieved through the delicate co-ordination of the hand, foot, eye and ear, and this entails a conscious and concentrated effort by the brain until by repeated action the movement becomes automatic. The soldier has to acquire as many good automatic habits as possible so that, under the stress of battle, he will carry out many actions automatically, thus freeing the conscious brain to deal with events. Physical training, therefore, is not merely a means of developing physique. It also helps to train and influence the mind.

Moral Aspect.

Over 2,000 years ago the Greek historian Polybius wrote: "Of all the forces which are of influence in war, the spirit of the warrior is the most

decisive one." The statement still holds good. Although weapons change, the human factor remains constant. The correlation of physical training with skilled performance under war conditions will create interest and inspire self-effort to accept risks. Thus the soldier will acquire confidence in his own fighting efficiency and that of his comrades.

Games.

Individual and team games and sports have their special values in developing and moulding character. The individual games and sports inculcate self reliance and intensity of purpose, while team games promote comradeship, mutual trust and the "team spirit." Both team and individual games, by fostering whole-hearted co-operation and an unselfish attitude for the good of the side, are of the greatest value in training for war.

Games and physical training should be regarded as complementary to one another. Games cannot take the place of physical training because:—

They do not have the same corrective effects.

They do not promote all-round physical development.

The same systematic and objective results cannot be obtained.

Sufficient space is rarely available for all to play.

Apart from these factors, the greatest drawback to the use of games alone is that the weaker and less-expert performer—the very man who requires exercising—is often discouraged from playing by his lack of proficiency and tends to become a "looker-on."

Instructors and Equipment.

Experience has shown that good results from physical and recreational training are unlikely to be obtained unless the instructors are fully qualified in the subject. To meet this requirement the Physical and Recreational Training Wing of the School of Infantry has been established to train instructors for all arms and services. The aim is to enable every Regular Army unit, school and establishment to maintain a constant level of instructors, and to provide at least one instructor on the Regular Army cadre of every CMF Training Depot.

Revised and improved scales of physical and recreational training equipment have been approved to provide adequate material under the following headings:—

(a) Fixed gymnasium equipment

- (b) Portable gymnasium equipment
- (c) Games equipment
- (d) Athletic equipment.

Conclusion.

The importance of preparing the Army physically and mentally to overcome the extremely difficult conditions which will obtain in any future war cannot be over emphasized. The realization of this aim demands an informed and enthusiastic approach to the subject of physical and recreational training. The efforts of the best instructors will be nullified, as they have so often been in the past, unless commanders of all grades give them constant support. The new concept of physical training and its importance to efficiency must be woven into the fabric of our military consciousness and our general training methods long before the next war bursts upon us.

The King's English

Directorate of Military Training, AHQ.

SCARCELY a minute passes but some officer, somewhere or other, curses the system that keeps him tied to his desk struggling with piles of correspondence. Every minute some harassed soldier sighs for the "good old days" when armies managed to function without any paper at all.

Perhaps it is not the system that is at fault so much as the people who are trying to operate it. Perhaps those who complain loudest are the very ones whose misuse of the English language does most to impair the efficiency of a perfectly good system.

It is no use harbouring hard feelings against the person who invented paper. Paper work is here to stay. Armies cannot function without it. The sensible thing to do is to become really efficient at it, and thereby make time to engage in more agreeable pursuits.

Why do we write? We use the written word for the same purpose as we use the spoken word — to transmit ideas from our own minds to the minds of others. If what we have written fails to transmit these ideas accurately, if the reader is able to place on it more than one interpretation or has to ask himself, "What does it mean," we have failed in what is after all a perfectly simple operation. And let us be quite clear about one thing. With rare exceptions the failure occurs at the

transmitting end; it is the writer who fails not the reader.

Failure to transmit ideas accurately through the medium of the written word is not peculiar to military writing. Reflection, however, suggests that it is much more common in official writing than it is in private and commercial writing. Business letters are usually brief, clear and to the point. Few of us have any doubt about what the Taxation Commissioner means when we get a letter from him, or what the bank manager intends to convey when he writes that our account is overdrawn. And, despite the fact that many of us affect a fine contempt for what we are pleased to call the "journalese" of the daily press, we rarely have any trouble in reading the morning paper.

Observation shows that most educated people express themselves clearly and simply—until they become mesmerised by the ponderous, and very often meaningless, words and phrases commonly used in official correspondence. With these useless expressions they bemuse themselves and their readers, make the simple obscure, waste everybody's time, and create a general atmosphere of exasperation and frustration.

Despite all our training, all our insistence the the soldier must express himself in simple, straightforward language, our official correspondence

teems with slovenly, circumlocutionary words and phrases. We don't use them in conversation or in our private letters, but the moment we start to produce an official document we become scared by our simplicity. We may even feel ashamed of it. And we straightaway proceed to clothe our thoughts in elaborate and unbecoming garments. Very often, from a desire to be unambiguous we become unintelligible.

Because this "officialese" form of expression has eaten into our souls and become a bad habit, a real effort is required to break the vicious circle. It is no earthly use preaching simplicity to young officers and at the same time setting them a bad example by practising something quite different.

Three Rules.

Examination of the works of the best English writers discloses a marked preference for concrete expressions rather than abstract ones, and ample evidence of the care taken to select the right word to express exactly the shade of meaning the writer has in mind. It shows, too, that these writers studiously refrain from using several words where one would do. That is why their writing is so forceful, so exact and so graceful. From this examination we can formulate three rules for all good writing:—

- (a) Use no more words than are necessary to express your meaning, and make sure they are the right words. Do not use superfluous adjectives and adverbs, and do not use roundabout phrases where single words would serve.
- (b) Use familiar words rather than

uncommon ones, for the familiar are more likely to be readily understood.

- (c) Use words with precise meaning rather than those that are vague. In particular prefer concrete words to abstract, for they are more likely to have a precise meaning.

Superfluous Words.

If we study the writings and speeches of that great master of modern English, Mr. Winston Churchill, we become aware that he almost invariably uses simple, direct words and phrases. For example, he did not begin his famous broadcast of 17 June, 1940, by saying, "The position with regard to France is extremely serious." Nor did he end it with a ponderous, "We have absolute confidence that eventually the situation will be restored." He said, "The news from France is very bad . . . we are sure that in the end all will come right."

In a memorandum issued on 9 August, 1940, Mr. Churchill wrote:—
 "Let us have an end of such phrases as these: 'It is also of importance to bear in mind the following considerations . . . ' or 'consideration should be given to the possibility of carrying into effect . . . ' Most of these woolly phrases are mere padding, which can be left out altogether, or replaced by a single word. Let us not shrink from using the short expressive phrase even if it is conversational."

Perhaps if Mr. Churchill had been referring to Australian official correspondence he would have chosen his examples from phrases based on *appreciate*. It is *appreciated* that (anticipating an objection that is to be

met), and it will be appreciated that (introducing a reason for a decision that is to be given), are very prevalent. They can nearly always be omitted without harm to the sense and with benefit to the style.

Undue and *unduly* seem to be words that have the property of taking the reason prisoner. "There is no cause for undue alarm" really means, "There is no cause for alarm for which there is no cause," and that hardly makes sense at all.

Many writers seem to imagine that no noun can stand alone, but must have an adjective to support it or give it emphasis. This erroneous supposition often leads the writer to say something he did not intend. For instance, how often do we come across the expression . . . "There is real danger . . ." The expression *real danger* makes sense only when it is used in comparison with an imaginary danger. If you must emphasise danger find the adjective that expresses what you want to say, don't use one that says something you did not have in mind at all.

Strong words like *urgent*, *danger*, *crisis*, *disaster*, *fatal*, *grave*, *paramount* and *essential*, lose their force if used too often. Reserve them for strong occasions.

Every time a soldier finds himself writing a vague adjective like *considerable*, *appreciable*, *substantial*, he should pause and ask himself: Do I need an adjective at all? If so, would not a more specific adjective suit better? If not, which of these with their different shades of meaning, serves my purpose best? And *comparatively* should not be used unless you are actually making a comparison between two or more things.

One of our commonest errors is the use of such phrases as *with regard to*, *in the case of*, *in relation to*, *in connection with* and *as to*. More often than not they are clumsy substitutes for single prepositions and convey a meaning less precise. In the following examples the preposition that ought to have been used is added in brackets:—

"The attitude of the Army *in relation to* the Press." (*towards*.)

"More progress has been made *in the case of* the 2nd Battalion than *in the case of* the 1st Battalion." (*by*)

"The rates of pay vary *in relation to* the rank of the soldier." (*with*)

"There may be difficulties *with regard to* the provision of ammunition." (*in*)

Another common fault is the addition of unnecessary preambles to plain statements.

"*It should be noted that* the particulars of expenditure relate to gross stocks."

"*It is appreciated that* owing to staffing difficulties Commands may find it impossible to . . ."

"*It will be noted that* in the schedule no provision is made for . . ."

"Table 1 is intended to provide a broad picture . . ."

The words italicised in the first three examples are mere padding. They are no more needed than in Example 4, where the writer has wisely done without them. Perhaps he ran out of stock.

Perhaps the most common, and certainly the most distracting, of misused phrases is *in this connection*. A tally has been kept of the number of times this expression has occurred in correspondence passing over the

desk on which this paper is being written. In only five of 97 cases was the phrase used correctly. In seven it was barely passable; in the remainder it was just bad English. Obviously this expression has become a bad habit, like ill temper at the breakfast table.

Vogue Words.

Since the war there has grown up a regrettable tendency to use vague, high sounding and "smart" expressions rather than commonplace words with a precise meaning. Most of them are culled from the radio, and they are apparently used from a determination to be fashionable, even at the cost of good sense and good taste.

Feel.—This should not be used as a synonym for *think*. Thinking is a rational process, feeling an intuitive one. Official decisions should not be described as the products of intuition, however they may actually have been arrived at.

The new favourites, *global* and *overall* are often given jobs better performed by well-established words like *comprehensive*, *total*, *universal*, *world-wide*, *general* and others. Actually, *global* signifies treating a group of units not individually, but as an entity, while *overall* denotes the measurement of an object between its extreme points.

Liquidate.—The word *terminate*, having superseded the familiar *end*, is itself being superseded by *liquidate*. This irritating word is now used, nearly always erroneously, for denoting the ending of anything from massacring a nation to giving the milkman notice.

Bottleneck.—This is a useful metaphor to indicate the point of con-

striction. But you must let it go at that. You cannot, as some writers of official correspondence seem to imagine, have a *drastic bottleneck*, a *big bottleneck* or a *far-reaching bottleneck*.

Target.—Since this word means something at which missiles are aimed you can hit it or you can miss it, but you cannot reach it or attain it. *Overall target* is merely silly.

Directive.—This high-sounding word is obviously often used in the mistaken belief that it is synonymous with *order* or *instruction*.

The use of *prior to* and *following* as stilted substitutes for *before* and *after* seldom adds force to discussion and nearly always impairs the style.

Every time you are tempted to use *it would appear* or *it would seem* remember that you are in danger of informing your readers that you lack the knowledge or the courage to make a definite statement.

The use of the word *blue-print* as a florid substitute for simple and more exact *plan* is coming into fashion with writers of "officialese," while the original article is going out of fashion with architects and engineers. A *blue-print* is a copy of a drawing made on transparent material.

Clarity is often sacrificed by the use of words so general in meaning that the sense has to be deduced by a careful analysis of the context. For example, the word *indicate* is frequently used as a shoddy, and often misleading substitute for *show*, *state*, *report*, *instruct*, *demonstrate*, etc., *Indicate* is a vague, indefinite word which suggests a man waving his

arm through three quarters of a circle and saying, "The house is in that direction."

The tendency to convert nouns into verbs and thus attempt to make them do work for which they were never intended, probably arises from a desire to be impressive. Recently a speaker on the ABC national network complained bitterly about a journalist who wrote that Mrs. So and So had *hostessed* a party. The speaker said that after his talk he was going down the street to be *barmaided* a beer and, if his luck held good, to be *waitressed* a dinner. These expressions are no more absurd than the war-time instructions which frequently directed commanders to *obligate* the proper procurement authorities.

The Right Word.

Military writing, has one or more of the three following purposes:—

- (a) To give orders or instructions.
- (b) To teach.
- (c) To provide information.

Any one of these purposes is thwarted if the reader does not receive the idea exactly as the writer intended. Therefore the writer must always be careful to express the idea exactly as he wants it to be received. This is, of course, important in all writing. It is particularly important for the soldier because in time of war he is called upon to write many things from operation orders to signal messages, on the correct interpretation of which may well depend the issues of victory or defeat, of life or death for many thousands of his fellows. It behoves him, then, to attain perfection in the art by diligent practise in time of peace.

Sir Ernest Gowers, in his invaluable little book, "Plain Words," gives this advice:—

"The golden rule is not a rule of grammar or syntax. It concerns not the arrangement of words, but the choice of them. Only the right words can convey the right meaning. The golden rule is to pick those words and to use them and them only. Arrangement is, of course, important, but if the right words alone are used they generally have a happy knack of arranging themselves."

Sir Ernest gives as a good example of clear, simple English, the paper handed in by a child of ten in response to an invitation to write an essay about a bird and a beast.

"The bird I am going to write about is the owl. The owl cannot see at all by day and at night is as blind as a bat.

"I do not know much about the owl so I will go on to the beast which I am going to choose. It is the cow. The cow is a mammal. It has four sides — right, left, an upper and below. At the back it has a tail on which hangs a brush. With this it sends the flies away so that they do not fall into the milk. The head is for the purpose of growing horns and so that the mouth can be put somewhere. The horns are to butt with and the mouth is to moo with.

"Under the cow hangs the milk. It is arranged for milking. When people milk, the milk comes and there is never an end to the supply. How the cow does it I have not yet found out. The cow has a fine sense of smell; one can smell it far away.

That is the reason for the fresh air in the country.

"The man cow is called an ox. It is not a mammal. The cow does not eat much, but what it eats it eats twice so that it gets enough. When it is hungry it moos, and when it

says nothing it is because its inside is all full up with grass."

When you have finished chuckling take pencil and paper and, with all your superior knowledge, see if you can describe a cow as simply and clearly as that.

ADDITIONAL DUTY IN 1880.

In the library of the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, USA, are documents which describe what the problems of a commanding officer may have been in the 1880's. These dog-eared and faded papers are in the handwriting of a certain lieutenant who was simultaneously post commander and troop commander, with additional duty as post ordnance officer, post quartermaster and post inspector.

Certain articles of ordnance equipment were worn out through normal wear and tear. As troop commander, the officer wrote the post commander requesting that they be inspected and condemned. As post commander, he sent the communication to the post ordnance officer for remark. As post ordnance officer, he wrote to the post inspector that he saw no objection to the procedure. As post inspector, he sent the communication back to the troop commander for remark as to what precautions had been taken for the care of ordnance property. As troop commander, he sent a long endorsement to the post inspector detailing the precautions that had been taken. As post inspector, he approved this memorandum and sent it to the post commander, who sent to the troop commander an order that the worn-out equipment be destroyed. The troop commander thereupon supervised the destruction of the articles and signed a certificate to that effect.

"Soldier of the Month"

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fairclough, CRAASC, BCOF.

THE scheme for improving attendance at CMF parades, described by Corporal Middleton of the 6th New South Wales Mounted Rifles in Australian Army Journal No. 11 (Feb.-Apr., 50), is somewhat similar to the "Soldier of the Month" competition conducted by the Royal Australian Army Service Corps in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan.

Although the objects of the competition and the award are different there is similarity of purpose. It may, therefore, be of interest to both Regular Army and CMF units to know how the "Soldier of the Month" award is made.

The RAASC in BCOF consists of several sub-units. During the month each member of a sub-unit is allotted a number of points from a total for dress, tidiness of lockers, beds, quarters, etc., regimental deportment, sport played and initiative displayed.

Any member who commits an offence during the month under consideration is automatically excluded from the competition, but offences committed in previous months are not counted. This arrangement tends to encourage offenders to rehabilitate themselves.

A list of the top markers in each sub-unit, showing the points awarded to each member, is forwarded by the 28th of the month to HQ RAASC. On the 29th the RSM

assembles the top markers and tests them for dress, appearance, close order drill, rifle exercises and general knowledge of the RAASC, the latter by a number of questions to which written answers have to be given.

The finalists, with the points awarded by the RSM, but not the points awarded by the sub-unit OC's, then appear before a board of three officers who make the final selection.

Corporal Middleton's unit appears to be concerned about a suitable prize for the winner. We have had no difficulty about this as the "Soldier of the Month" receives the following rewards:—

- (a) A letter of commendation from his Commanding Officer.
- (b) Publication of his photograph and a personal paragraph about his career in BCON, the official BCOF newspaper.
- (c) Notification of the award in Routine Orders.
- (d) Freedom from all guards and extra duties for the succeeding month.

In this unit prizes (a) and (b) are valued against the day when the soldier will need tangible evidence of his worth and good conduct on his return to civil life. These considerations do not, of course, weigh to the same extent with members of CMF units. Nevertheless most

young soldiers would appreciate a letter of commendation and a suitable, well-written paragraph in the local newspaper. The latter should not be hard to arrange, particularly in the country, where editors are always on the look-out for news items of local interest. Besides giving the soldier well earned recognition, a regular monthly news item like this would serve to keep unit activities before the public. Regular Army units could arrange for the photographs and paragraphs to

be published in the newspaper serving the district from which the soldier comes. Besides being a reward for the soldier, publication of these paragraphs would tend to maintain interest in the Army and stimulate recruiting.

Of course conditions vary in different units and localities. Perhaps a combination of the ideas put forward by Corporal Middleton and the methods used in the RAASC in BCOF would be found suitable by most units.

For most men, the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for army officers, the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty.

—General Omar N. Bradley, USA.

LIBERTY AND DISCIPLINE



IF you get up from that chair you are sitting in and take out your car or bicycle, you can choose where you want to go, your own destination. That is liberty. But as you drive or ride through the streets towards it, you will keep to the left of the road. That is discipline.

You will keep to the left without thinking very much about it, but if you do think for a moment, you will find that there is a connection between liberty and discipline.

First of all you will keep to the left for your own advantage. If you insist on liberty to drive on any side of the road you fancy you will end up, not where you want to be, but on a stretcher. And there is not much liberty about that. So you accept discipline, because you know that in the long run it is the only way in which you can get where you want to, quickly and safely.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim,
GBE, KCB, DSO, MC.

Now other people have as much right to go where they want to as you have. If you career all over the road way, delay them, and put them in danger. So for their

sakes as well as your own you keep to the left.

But it will be no use your keeping to the left if others on the road don't do the same. You will expect them to. You will trust to their common sense. You will rely on their discipline.

Lastly, even supposing you are tempted to go scooting about on the wrong side, you probably won't. At the back of your mind will be the thought "If I do the police will be after me." In the last resort there must be some force which can punish disobedience of the law.

There are thus four reasons why you will keep to the left:—

- (i) Your own advantage.

This is a verbatim report of a broadcast delivered by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, over the Australian Broadcasting Commission's national network on 17 June, 1950.—Editor.

- (ii) Consideration for others.
- (iii) Confidence in your fellows.
- (iv) Fear of punishment.

Whenever we put a curb on our natural desire to do as we like, whenever we temper liberty with discipline, we do so for one or more of those reasons. It is the relative value we give to each of these reasons that decides what sort of discipline we have. And that can vary from the pure self-discipline of the Sermon on the Mount to the discipline of the concentration camp, the enforced discipline of fear.

In spite of all our squabbles we of British stock are united when it comes to most of the things that matter—and liberty is one of them. We believe in freedom to think as we like, work at what we like, and go where we like. Discipline is a restraint on liberty, so most of us have a very natural inclination to avoid it. But we cannot. Man, ever since the dim historic past when he got up on his hind legs and raised a human family, has had no option but to accept discipline of some kind. For modern man, living in complex communities in which every individual is dependent on others, discipline is more than ever unavoidable.

The problem is not shall we accept discipline, sooner or later we have to. The question is, how shall we accept it? Shall it be imposed by physical violence and fear, by grim economic necessity, or be accepted by consent and understanding? Shall it come from without or from within?

It ought not too be difficult for us, the British, to choose. We are not good at standing in masses and

yelling in unison for a dictator, but we can conduct quite a brisk political argument without recourse to grenades and Sten guns. While we are not much given to goose-stepping in serried ranks to show how united we are, we do generally file out in a quiet and orderly manner when the theatre takes fire.

That sort of discipline is within us, thank God, a tradition. And like all traditions, it has been a plant of slow growth. It is worth cherishing. Up to now the British way of life with all its faults, has, compared with most others, been full, free, and fair. It has been so because we have managed to hold the balance between liberty and discipline. It is that balance which will decide in the future whether it is still to be full, free and fair.

Let us beware of taking a word and tagging a picture on it. For some the word discipline flashes on to the screen of the mind jack-booted commissars and gauleiters bawling commands across the barrack square at tramping squads. Some kinds of discipline are that and nothing more, but not real discipline, not our discipline, not even on a barrack square.

True discipline is not someone shouting orders at others. That is dictatorship, not discipline. The voluntary, reasoned discipline accepted by free, intelligent men and women is another thing. To begin with it is binding from top to bottom.

I remember, when I was a very young officer, being told by my colonel, "Remember, discipline begins with the officers." And so it does. The leader must be ready, not only to accept a higher degree of

responsibility, but a severer standard of self-discipline than those he leads. If you hold a position of authority, whether you are the managing-director or the charge-hand, if you are really to do your job and lead, you must impose discipline on yourself first. Then forget the easy way of trying to enforce it on others, by just giving orders and expecting them to be obeyed. You will give orders and you will see that they are obeyed, but you will only build up the leadership of your team on the discipline of understanding.

That is the crux of the matter. Discipline is something that is enforced, either by fear or by understanding. Even in the Army it is not merely a question of giving orders. There is more to a soldier's discipline than blind obedience. To take men into your confidence is not a new technique invented in the last war. Good generals were doing that long before you and I got into khaki to save the world.

Julius Caesar when he "exhorted the legions" may have stood on a captured British chariot, while the modern general climbed on the bonnet of a jeep, but I will bet that each said much the same thing. So did Oliver Cromwell when he demanded that every man in his New Model Army should "know what he fights for and love what he knows." If you substitute work for fight you have got the essence of industrial discipline, too, to know what you work for and to love what you know.

I can recall one occasion on which a man flatly refused to obey an order I gave him. I was young and he was old. I, perhaps, was too young;

he was certainly too old to be a private in Kitchener's Army. He was one of a company digging a road through a cutting. I watched him shovel earth into an old tin tub and stagger off to empty it. I noticed that it was only a quarter full, so when he came back I told him, "This time fill it to the top." "Eh," he said, "if I do that I won't be able to carry it." "Never you mind that," I answered. "Do as you are told. Fill it." "But that's daft," he protested. "I tell you I can't lift it full." Then in exasperation he flung down his shovel with the historic gesture of the man who will soldier no more. If I had only told him at the start that I intended to help him lift the full tub he would have obeyed cheerfully.

That minor incident of long ago brought me up against one of the foundations of discipline—mutual confidence. If the old soldier had had more confidence in me he would have carried out the order realizing that, although he could not see the reason for it, there probably was one. If I had had more confidence in him I should not have been so ready to attribute hesitation to mere cussedness. Neither in war nor in peace can all orders be explained beforehand. That is all the more reason to explain them when it is possible. You will not have to give orders twice if people understand, the first time, why they are given.

It is only discipline that enables men to live in a community and yet retain individual liberty. Sweep away or undermine discipline and the only law left is "that they should take who have the power and they should keep who can." Security for the weak and the poor vanishes. That is why, far from it

being derogatory for any man or woman voluntarily to accept discipline, it is ennobling. The self-discipline of the strong is the safeguard of the weak.

Totalitarian discipline, with its slogan-shouting masses, is deliberately designed to submerge the individual. The discipline a man imposes on himself because he believes, intelligently, that it helps him to get a worth-while job done to his own and his country's benefit, fosters character and initiative. It makes a man do his work without being watched because it is worth doing.

In the blitz of the last war not a man of the thousands of British railway signalmen ever left his post. They stood, often in the heart of the target area, cooped up in flimsy buildings, surrounded by glass, while the bombs screamed down. And they stayed at their posts. They knew what they worked for, they knew its importance to others and to their country. They put their job before themselves. That was discipline.

Democracy means that responsibility is decentralized and that no-one can shirk his share. We all have to take some of the strain. It is no goodfunking it. Some of us, a lot of us, in all walks of life, don't.

If everyone—not only the other fellow we are always pointing at, but you and me—really worked when we were supposed to be working, believe me, we would knock any economic crisis for six. That takes discipline based not only on ourselves, but backed by a healthy public opinion that is not too gentle with the man, whether at the top or the bottom of the ladder, who is ready to let those he works with carry him.

The choice is between the imposed discipline of the police state or the self-discipline of free men and women voluntarily accepted, with its equality, fairness and dignity. We know more than any other race about freedom allied to responsibility. We still have throughout all our people at every level, a vast fund of neighbourly kindness and thought for others. Let us keep to those things and to the common factor between liberty and discipline—confidence in one another.

We are apt these days to think more of liberty than of responsibility. We all want liberty, but in the long run we never get anything worth having without paying for it. Liberty is no exception.

You can have discipline without liberty, but you cannot have liberty without discipline.
