



Army



Chief of Army Professional Study Guide

2025

Serving the Nation



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Cover image: Australian Army troopers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment move through the jungle during Exercise REGIONAL WARFIGHTER 2024 at Tully Training Area, Queensland during low-level individual patrol and troop training.
(Source: Defence image gallery)


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'We studied everything we could get our hands on. You start working hard right from the first. You can't say later in life I will start studying. You have got to start in the beginning.'

General Omar Bradley



2419 George Griffin, D Coy. 53rd Battalion, A.I.F.¹

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Chief of Army's Foreword



Welcome to the 2025 edition of the Chief of Army Professional Study Guide.

The Australian Army is at once a national institution, a profession and a fighting force, which has proudly served our nation since its federation in 1901.

This study guide contributes to maintaining the health of the Army profession. Our profession is expressed through three pillars: our jurisdiction (the unique service that we provide for the society we serve), our expertise (the professional body of knowledge upon which we draw and for which we are accountable), and our capacity for self-regulation (the ability to maintain good order, discipline and accountability among the corrupting nature of war).

Our profession is characterised by a unique and profound commitment – every soldier voluntarily enters into the 'contract of unlimited liability', ready to give their life and to take the lives of our adversaries should either be required in the service of our nation. The stakes are high and they demand a corresponding commitment to continual learning through the study of our profession. We must develop our professional expertise if we are to fulfil our responsibilities to our fellow Australians and to one another in the crucible of war.

This guide distils and presents, through recognisable themes (command, leadership, the realities of war, intelligence, logistics and strategy, among others) the foundations of the Army profession via a proven route through our professional body of knowledge.

My intent is for this guide to be used in several ways. Leaders at all levels and in every unit and formation across our Army, who are responsible for the delivery of routine professional military education, should use it to focus effort. Those who design and deliver our professional courses should leverage it, principally as a source of inspiration for course design and content. Most importantly, it is designed for you – every soldier, regardless of rank, job or length of service.

The guide has a deliberately strong focus on military history. Given what is at stake, it is imperative that we learn from the experiences, successes and failures of those whom have gone before us. They help us to understand the enduring human nature of war, why and how its character is ever-changing, and how both have affected the soldiers and the armies doing the fighting. War has ever been a contest of adaptation. The lessons of yesterday help us to continually adapt today. As Professor Sir Michael Howard reminds us, the soldier must study history in 'width, depth and context' if we are to master our profession. This guide is intended to help us to do so.

While active reading remains the foundation of effective study, we ought to take a broad approach to learning. This guide includes movies, podcasts and works of fiction.

I ask that you engage with this guide energetically, work together, leverage our schools and colleges, and other fora and resources – I commend to you the [Australian Army Research Centre \(AARC\)](#), [The Cove](#) and the excellent 'Brothers N Books' and 'Sisters N Books' initiatives. I would also welcome your feedback on the first iteration of the guide. Please send this feedback to the AARC: <https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/contact-us>

Books have been constant companions throughout my own service. Many of the most impactful are listed in this guide, and I use this opportunity to share some personal favourites: the first of which is the first book listed – *18 Platoon* by Sydney Jary, a remarkable account that captures the essence of junior leadership. The list then broadens. Rommel's *Infantry Attacks*, a study in tactical excellence and adaptation in war; *Defeat Into*

Victory by Field Marshal William Slim captures the essence of generalship and the moral component of fighting power in the face of defeat; Sir John Keegan's *The Face of Battle*, unambiguously conveys the human impacts of violence – instantly recognisable by those who have witnessed its pernicious effects; *Warrior Politics* by Robert Kaplan and *The Lessons of Tragedy* by co-authors Hal Brands and Charles Edel offer (which I have collectively found to be deeply-researched and historically-enduring ways to help make sense of the world and times in which we live); Professor Michael Evans' essay *Captains of the Soul*, which somewhat-poetically and at the same time with eminent pragmatism and economy applies stoic philosophy to our profession; and for a long form exposition of stoicism and how to live a good life there are few better than *Meditations* by Marcus Aurelius.

On ANZAC Day this year I stood at dawn before the Sandakan memorial in North Borneo, which commemorates the Sandakan-Ranau death marches; a profound place indeed to reflect upon the human cost of war. After the dawn service, in a clearing on the site of the prisoner-of-war camp Miss Amalia Cailles, a high school student from Western Australia and the 2024 Sandakan Scholarship winner recited her poem, 'A Shadow of Oneself'. Amalia's insight is extraordinary. In six short verses, she captures the horror of war and the gravity of the 'contract of unlimited liability' at a very human level. Amalia has kindly allowed me to share her poem – it is reproduced on the next page. I encourage you to read Amalia's poem first and as a preface to how you, as a professional soldier, engage with the wisdom, insight, dilemma and inspiration that lie within the pages of this guide and the works that it introduces.

Good Soldiering.

Simon Stuart, AO, DSC

Lieutenant General
Chief of Army

June 2025

A Shadow of Oneself

by Amalia Cailles, Sandakan Scholar 2024

One foot in front of the other,
Toes encrusted with tropical ulcers.
Fingers spotted with jungle rot,
Japanese attitude; *to hell with this lot.*
Trudge, breathe, trudge breathe.

Eyes down, humidity up,
Ragged clothes cling to starved, skeletal frames.
Shots heard from the back of the line,
What on earth has happened to mankind?
Trudge, breathe, trudge breathe.

Primitive tools hack at the web of green,
Stomachs growl, leeches feast.
Bodies are flogged with iron and rifle butts,
Scabies and maggots spread into cuts.
Trudge, breathe, trudge breathe.

Ranau camp is finally reached,
Stragglers culled, restless sleep.
Beards infested with crawling lice,
A camp full of hunger, teeming with mice.
Trudge, breathe, trudge breathe.

The death march continues for those 'deemed fit',
Nightmares a reality, eyes play tricks.
Hands to mouth reach for fungus, tree ferns and snails,
Beri Beri takes over, the nervous system fails.
Trudge, breathe, trudge breathe.

A good-bye is mumbled, a brief hand is shook,
A prisoner steps off the trail, a silent prayer is said.
Stumble, gasp.
A son,
brother,
soldier dead.

Chief of Army Professional Study Guide

The Australian Army's officers, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers are members of a profession. The Army's purpose is to win Australia's wars. To win Australia's wars Army officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers must possess a thorough understanding of war and they must be expert in warfare. Both subjects are as complex and important as any other professional field of knowledge including medicine, law or engineering. Just like other professions, the military profession meets a unique societal purpose, which is to wage war. It has a system of self-regulation, a degree of autonomy in the execution of its necessary purpose, an agreed body of knowledge, and a formal process of lifelong learning.

The nation depends on the Army for its defence and for the pursuit of its national interests. There are few higher purposes, so it is self-evident that attaining knowledge of war and warfare is one of the military professional's most important obligations to Australia. When the Army has been found wanting in its professional knowledge, the consequences have been profound. The failure of officers to appreciate the corrupting effect of war on those who participate in it, as well as the corrupting effect on the societies that engage in it, was causal in the war crimes of over a decade ago. The steady intrusion of managerial and bureaucratic speak into the Army's lexicon at the expense of direct and plain professional speech also suggests the state of professional knowledge and expertise in the Army is not as good as it should be. Soldiers are by definition servants of the public, and their capacity to provide frank and fearless advice to policy makers is a function of their professional knowledge.

The purpose of this study guide is to ensure the officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the Army have a sound basis of professional knowledge. The guide is intended to stimulate professional study over and above the more technical learning Army and joint schools provide. It is a basis for exploration of the deep and complex subjects of war and warfare. While it is essentially a reading list – a cross section of the body of professional knowledge for the martial arts – the guide's root is the Chief of Army's Reading List of 2012, compiled by renowned Australian military historian Jeffrey Grey. The reading list in this guide is modified only slightly to address a slightly different purpose and to accommodate material written since 2012.

This study guide is more than a reading list. Each thematic area in the guide includes mandatory and extended reading by rank. The mandated reading sources are to be used by sergeants through to lieutenant colonels to further their professional military education. Officers and warrant officers are strongly encouraged to also read from the extended reading sources. Discussing the reading material between superiors and subordinates is a good way to ensure the base level of professional knowledge of war and warfare in the officer and non-commissioned officer corps is reinforced and maintained.

The presence of a certain text within the study guide does not imply the Army endorses it. Several books in the guide are controversial and contain material contrary to the Army's values, and in some instances, contrary to the laws of war. Included in the guide are several essays on the study of war and warfare, which includes an essay explicitly recommending against inclusion of some of the books in this guide. The guide includes controversial texts because it assumes the reader has the capacity to discern between different viewpoints and recognise material that is inaccurate, out of date, unethical or unlawful. Controversial materials are in the guide because it is important for military professionals to understand the full breadth of ideas about war and warfare – the good, the bad and the ugly.

Army officers, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers must think critically, test their reasoning, and challenge orthodoxy. This study guide assumes a level of critical thinking capacity in the reader. It neither gives instructions to the reader on how to read the material, nor alerts the reader to where the controversial material is located. Furthermore, the study guide

is the basis for professional discussion and debate in the barracks, the sergeants' and the officers' mess. Readers should not only read the texts, but also read what others have written and said about them. It is, after all, a study guide, not a reading list.

To that end, the list is divided into two parts, broadly aligning to two ten-year periods in a military career. Section one is foundation reading for sergeant, warrant officer class two, lieutenant and captain. You are expected to read all mandatory material within the foundation reading section. Section two is advanced reading for warrant officer class one, major and lieutenant colonel. Reading items in the mandatory section is encouraged for the development of professional military education of all ranks within Army.

All mandatory reading texts in the study guide are available via the Defence Library Service (DLS), despite some being available only in limited quantities. Most of the extended reading texts are available publicly or via the DLS. Some however are out of print, with many not available electronically. Some texts may only be available by purchasing them. This circumstance is not ideal. That said, professional officers (like members of any other profession), should consider establishing personal collections of professional texts. There are government tax incentives to do so.

The reading load may be deemed by some Army members to be too great. However, this amounts to reading about four books a year. For professionals whose charge is war and warfare, Army does not believe this requirement is too onerous. Australians expect nothing less from those charged with their defence. That point notwithstanding, accommodations are made for members of the Army Reserve and service category 3 and 5 workforce more broadly. Given the demands of working multiple jobs, there is no mandated reading for officers, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers in the Army Reserve and service category 3 and 5 workforce. This exemption acknowledges the demands on the citizen soldier versus the professional soldier.

The Chief of Army professional study guide is a tool developed to stimulate intellectual rigour, discussion and professional excellence. The study guide affirms that mastery of war and warfare is neither a luxury nor an academic indulgence – it is a duty. The credibility, moral authority and preparedness of officers, non-commissioned officers, and warrant officers is rooted in a deep professional knowledge. It is through study and critical engagement with this body of knowledge that we ensure Army's leaders are prepared for the realities of war and uphold the integrity of the profession of arms.

Colour Key for the Mandatory Readings:



Sergeants and Lieutenants: **SGT & LT**



Warrant Officer Class 2 and Captains: **WO2 & CAPT**



Warrant Officer Class 1 (Tier A) and Majors: **WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ**



Warrant Officer Class 1 (Tiers B & C) and Lieutenant Colonels:
WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

The Importance of Professionalism

Professionalism is fundamental to effectiveness in war. During Operation Market Garden in 1944, 18 Platoon of the 4th Battalion, Somerset Light Infantry had been holed up for two weeks in Elst, exchanging fire with German defenders only 100 yards away. Many had died, with snipers particularly effective in causing casualties on both sides, with little definable tactical gain. As Sydney Jary, 18 Platoon commander, later observed:

‘While appreciating that by 1944 we were predominately an army of civilians, I wonder if much higher standards of battle efficiency might have been achieved.

Supposing our cadre of professional soldiers, instead of having an Empire to police, could have spent their time studying the science and art of modern warfare as the German had undoubtedly done. Public funds were the key to achieving this goal and clearly these had not been made available. However, it seemed to me that far too many regular officers had given little positive and creative thought to their chosen profession.

The prospect of brilliantly led, highly trained and well equipped troops, able to act and react at lightning speed, appealed to me as a way of winning battles without fighting.

Whether or not the Territorial Army and our civilian army could have achieved these standards, I am not competent to judge. I would like to think that we were able to, but I have grave doubts. To me, this sordid act of sniping seemed as unprofessional as it was unnecessary, and, I suppose, it encouraged my mind to reach for pie in the sky’.

Sydney Jary 18 Platoon

Foundation Reading

LEADERSHIP

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Sydney Jary, *18 Platoon***

This is a personal account of the author's time in the 4th Battalion the Somerset Light Infantry north west Europe in 1944–45 as an infantry platoon commander. A rather slim volume, it has nevertheless been a staple of military reading lists since it was published in 1987 as a case study of small-unit leadership in combat.

■ **Ron Milam, *Not a Gentleman's War***

The author served as an advisor to Montagnard units late in the American war, and in this book takes issue with the popular notions that US Army officers were generally poorly trained and unmotivated and that the best and ablest avoided service in Vietnam. More than 4000 junior officers were killed in-theatre, and Milam seeks to restore their reputations through exhaustive research and wide-ranging analysis. There are very few books that dissect the experience of command in war at more junior levels, and this one makes an important contribution to the field.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Gerard Windsor, *All day long the noise of battle: an Australian attack in Vietnam***

Windsor takes a single Australian rifle company from 7RAR in early 1968 and examines it inside-out as it fought its grueling way through an enemy bunker system over a three-day period of the Australian war. Along with a great many sharply observed comments about the nature of combat and the relationships forged between soldiers caught up in it, he offers compelling and beautifully written analyses of the stresses and challenges of command in an Australian infantry battalion at every level from the section corporals to the unit commanding officer. If you read only one book on Australia's war in Vietnam, this should be it.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Ronald A Heifetz, *Leadership without easy answers*

Leadership without Easy Answers persuasively presents the theory and practice of leadership within the context of our time to offer a clear and practical approach to leadership. As part of this, Heifetz argues the need for a new social contract to revitalise our civic life. Drawing on dozens of years of research among leaders and managers in all spheres of life, this book discusses how complicated leadership is and how challenging it can be to lead responsibly and ethically. Though published in the 1990s, the leadership approaches offered by Heifetz remain as relevant today as ever and provide useful ideas for further developing leadership skills.

Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, Marty Linsky, *The practice of adaptive leadership: tools and tactics for changing your organization and the world*

The Practice of Adaptive Leadership argues that adaptive leadership, occurring in the face of complex organisational problems, is essential for successfully responding to the inevitable challenges arising during systemic effort towards a goal. Drawing on decades of experience in helping people and organisations create cultures of adaptive leadership, the authors assert that expertise is not the defining factor in solving adaptive problems. Rather, with a strong emphasis on accurate diagnosis before action, *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership* proclaims the need for learning, calculated risk taking, and the capacity to decide which parts of past culture and procedure have ceased to be valuable – and must be discarded. This hands-on, practical

guide comprises stories, tools, diagrams, case studies and worksheets to develop the adaptive leadership skills necessary to address the toughest organisational challenges. *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership* is an invaluable tool for all leaders seeking to grow and lead better, and is essential for anyone engaging in complex organisational change.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ John Hackett, *The 1962 Hackett Lectures 'The Profession of Arms'*

Encompassing a series of lectures delivered by the Australian-born British Army officer, General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, GCB, CBE, DSO & Bar, MC, this book emphasizes the relationship of war to our evolution as a society. Hackett served with great distinction in the Second World War – fighting in the Syria-Lebanon campaign; raising and commanding the 4th Parachute Brigade for the Allied Assault on Arnhem in Operation Market Garden; and, escaping a German-held hospital by way of the Dutch underground following severe injury at Arnhem. An officer of prodigious talent and experience, General Hackett's perceptive observations on professionalism, training, and discipline are essential reading for military leaders and provide a good historical basis upon which to continue building an understanding of the profession of arms.

■ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*

A product of the Cold War era, Janowitz's seminal study of civil-military relations seeks to answer who soldiers are, what they do, and what they believe. Janowitz, himself a World War II veteran, conducted extensive surveys of over 1,500 US military members, spanning flag and general ranks, active-duty officers, and officers serving in staff positions in the military services, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Staff. Key among the messages that emerges is that military leaders are not born – they are *made*. Despite publication in 1960, *The Professional Soldier* remains an invaluable resource for the professional soldier. Whilst analysing the issues sitting at the heart of civil-military relations, Janowitz interrogates what it means to be a military professional – a crucial question all Army officers, commissioned and non-commissioned must answer for themselves and for the Army they want to be a part of.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805***

As its title suggests, this book chronicles the 1801 creation of the Militarische Gesellschaft (Military Society) in Berlin by Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, Clausewitz's teacher and mentor. His country's most significant military reformer, Scharnhorst was fundamental in precipitating Prussia's intellectual military tradition, and White illustrates how this fundamental shift to perceiving warfare as a creative and intellectual act underpinned Prussia's future successes. One foundational aspect to this evolution was the importance on acting creatively to fulfil the commander's intent rather than merely following prescribed actions, which Australian soldiers will recognise as reflective of Army's emphasis on Mission Command. Moreover, in illuminating the military's transformation into a profession requiring study and intellectual rigor, White's book offers valuable insight for the importance of study and deepening one's understanding of the profession of arms.

THE REALITIES OF WAR

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Hugh McManners, *The Scars of War***

A powerful report from the frontlines, *The Scars of War* offers keen insight into the modern battlefield and its effects on soldiers, drawing on extensive interviews and McManners' own experiences serving as a British Army officer during the 1982 Falklands War. The book does not seek to provide a chronological account of the war, but rather focuses on leading the reader through a structured exploration of the men who go to war, including their training, reactions to initial combat, and the damaging psychological effects endured by many veterans. In providing a unique and thorough insight into the effects of combat on soldiers towards the end of the 20th Century, *The Scars of War* offers valuable insight – particularly for soldiers and officers of a peacetime Army, whose own experiences with the realities of warfare may be limited.

■ **Guy Sajer, *The Forgotten Soldier***

Originally published in French in 1965 as *Le Soldat Oublié*, *The Forgotten Soldier* is the memoir of a teenage German soldier's experiences on the Eastern Front during World War II. A young half-French, half-German boy who joined the Wehrmacht in 1942, Sajer's recount provides a distinctive opportunity to view the horrors of World War II through the perspective of a German infantry soldier. Though the book's accuracy has been questioned by some historians, *The Forgotten Soldier's* value in vividly capturing a young German soldier's personal emotional recollections of a chaotic period in German military history make it an important and captivating read.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Theodore R Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: the Classic Korean War history***

This Kind of War is a vivid account of the Korean War by journalist and Korean War Veteran T. R. Fehrenbach. An intense narrative told from the perspective of the common soldier, the book explores the conflict from the North Korean invasion in June 1950 through to the ceasefire of July 1953. Fehrenbach takes the reader into key battles of the war, as well as the advances and retreats, the prison camps, and the months-long stalemates among the ridgelines of central Korea. The depictions of soldier experiences are personal and reflective, exposing the reader to the human face of battle. Where Fehrenbach moves away from the battlefield and into the Cabinets and offices of the national leaders his analysis is less insightful and often poor – the work of more modern scholars such as Allan R. Millet are more valuable in this sphere. Regardless, Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War* is a classic historical text that presents the human experience of war and frontline conflict masterfully.

■ **John Keegan, *The Face of Battle***

This 1976 classic history from the battlefield revisits the three crucial battles at Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme to concentrate on conveying the visceral reality of conflict for the common soldier in the heat of battle. Exploring the direct experience mental and physical aspects of individuals in war, Keegan examines in detail the physical conditions of fighting, emotions and behaviours generated by battle, and the motives impelling soldiers to stand and fight, rather than run away. *The Face of Battle*

relies upon the diaries and oral histories of soldiers from these battles to probe the nature of leadership, self-sacrifice, comradeship under fire and resolution in the face of horror. In forcibly bringing the human face to the forefront, Keegan's work serves as an invaluable insight into the humanity sometimes overlooked within the grinding machines of war.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Thomas Rid, *Cyber war will not take place*

Within *Cyber war will not take place*, Rid explores the argument contained within his title, arguing that as of 2013 cyber war had not, was not currently, and would not take place in future. This is, as Rid asserts, because war (in the Clausewitzian definition) is synonymous with physical violence. This volume, while the subject of debate since its publication, offers a useful challenge to the hyperbole often written or heard on cyber war.

Paul Fussell, *Wartime: understanding and behavior in the Second World War*

As a 20-year-old Lieutenant, Paul Fussell led a rifle platoon in the 103rd Infantry Division on the Western Front of World War II and *Wartime* is his intensely personal yet wide-ranging and informative exploration of the psychological and emotional impact of the war on common soldiers and civilians. Central among these impacts, Fussell emphasises the damage wrought by war on intellect, honest, complexity, individuality and wit, exposing how conflict serves to homogenise and dehumanise. Described by readers as 'brilliant', 'cynical', and 'angry,' *Wartime* unashamedly exposes the horrors of World War II, providing a compelling account of the war experienced by everyday people, and the conditions they strove to survive.

Jim Frederick, *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death*

Black Hearts is an unflinching account of the tragedy and horrors of the 'Black Heart Platoon' and the factors that contributed to disaster during their deployment to Iraq. 1st Platoon of Bravo Company, 1st Battalion (from the 101st Airborne Division's fabled 502nd Infantry Regiment: the 'Black Heart Brigade') found themselves deployed to Iraq's 'Triangle of Death' just south of Baghdad in late 2005 – arguably among the country's most dangerous locations, at its most dangerous time. Suffering a heavy death toll from intensive targeting by the enemy, immense daily stress,

and a chronic breakdown in leadership, members of Black Heart Platoon descended in poor discipline, substance abuse and brutality over their year-long deployment, culminating in the slaughter of the Janabis, an Iraqi family, following the brutal rape of their fourteen-year-old daughter. This book is essential for all soldiers and teams to confront issues of ethics and morality, peer pressure and dealing with the reality of operations; simultaneously, *Black Hearts* illustrates the centrality of command climate and military leadership in stressful environments, making its lessons invaluable for Officers and NCOs.

Dave Grossman, *On Killing*

Hailed upon its first publication as a landmark study of the military techniques used to overcome an aversion to killing, *On Killing* argues that these techniques carry significant psychological cost for the soldiers who experience them, and for society more broadly. Indeed, Grossman argues that contemporary civilian society's predilection for replicating military conditioning strategies has precipitated rising rates of murder amongst young people. In the 2009 update to this text, Grossman includes further information on 21st Century military conflicts, suicide bombings, school shootings and more; however, there are concerns about the validity of these claims. Grossman's reliance upon the research of S.L.A Marshall, which has been thoroughly disproven, has been critiqued by other historians and academics, who also note that *On Killing's* central theories are inconsistent with the broader fields of research into human behaviour. This text should be approached by the reader with a sharply critical eye.

Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda*

This work by embedded combat journalist Naylor was the first to publicly reveal the details around Operation Anaconda (Battle of Shah-i-Kot) which targeted al-Qaeda and Taliban forces across 2-18 March 2002. The book outlines the assumptions that underpinned the planning, the concentration of the fighting force (intelligence agents, special and conventional forces – including Australian special forces), and the events that unfolded against an enemy that stood and fought. While at times employing some creative licence to set the scene, the fundamental narrative and motivations of key players are recreated faithfully to tell the fullest account available until the eventual publication of respective national Official Histories.

PHILOSOPHERS OF WAR

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Michael Howard and Peter Paret translation)

On War is one of the classic theoretical works on the nature of war, and arguably the greatest. Clausewitz, a Prussian general of the Napoleonic Wars era, sought to understand both the internal dynamics of his calling and the function of war as an instrument of policy. Clausewitz also established the critical concepts of friction and chance and their limiting effects on command. *On War* is essential reading for officers desiring high command. It should not be read in a single sitting but thoughtfully considered over the course of a career.

There are various editions of Clausewitz available, the best and most highly regarded of these is the version edited and translated by Michael Howard, Peter Paret and Bernard Brodie (2nd edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984). Those with an interest in the development of his ideas should consult Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, edited and translated by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992). The literature on Clausewitz and his military thought is vast; the most accessible recent guide is Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography*.

■ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (the Landmark Version)

The account of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides is the most comprehensive version of the war, and hence the most prolific. It is a detailed account of the war between Athens and their Allies, and Sparta and theirs. There are many lessons, from statecraft and domestic politics in war through to the criticality of logistics and centrality of sea power in the ancient Greek World. This included not only naval combat, but also the projection of land power ashore. It is important to remember that Thucydides is a source for the history and should not be taken as the definitive source for the war. Such a reading of the text leads to ahistorical fallacies such as the so-called 'Thucydides Trap'. Thucydides' version charts the war from events before the outbreak in 432/1 BCE down to the year 411, four years before the end of the war, where the narrative

of Xenophon (and others) picks up to conclude the war. The Landmark version edited by Robert Strassler is the most detailed, with a litany of maps and explanatory notes, and appendices, though it is an old (19th century) translation of the text. Thucydides work is particularly useful for understanding the relationship between war and society, and war's corrupting effect on society, is of particular note.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Warfare***

Corbett's classic work explores the theoretical and practical foundations of maritime warfare, providing a critical grounding for land practitioners in understanding the maritime environment as a military space. The work demonstrates why military strategies must link tactical operations to political objectives, and – written in a pre-air power age – describes how the integration of naval and land operations can achieve ultimate military success.

■ **Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy***

Strategy is among the 20th Century's most pivotal theoretical works on warfare, analysing wars from the fifth century B.C. to the middle of the twentieth century, and drawing upon the author's own experiences in World War I. A renowned British military historian and strategist, Liddell Hart was most famous for his advocacy of the 'indirect approach' and widely considered to be the 'Clausewitz of the 20th century'. Indeed, many military strategists argue that *Strategy* provides the ideal companion to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* – particularly for the author's incisive critiques of what he considered to be the application of poorly-understood Clausewitzian strategy in the conduct of World War I. *Strategy* is essential reading for officers desiring thorough understanding of strategy and military history.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*

Douhet's classic work – first published in 1921 – echoes the thoughts and fears of the immediate-post WWI age. Though air power was in its infancy, Douhet considers future military expression, advocating for independent air forces (rather than as auxiliaries to land and maritime forces) as a vital element for military success. Drawing upon WWI practices (such as the use of poison gas against combatants), some aspects of Douhet's work are problematic, or even controversial, for modern readers – arguments for 'mass' in aerial attacks, strategic bombing campaigns, and the legitimate targeting of civilian population centres, among them. Nonetheless, *Command of the Air* stands as a landmark work exploring air power principles at the dawn of military aviation.

Miyamoto Musashi, *The Book of Five Rings*

Written in 1645, Musashi was a Samurai in Japan's Edo period. He wrote this book shortly before his death describing his 'ways'. One of few well known East Asian books written on the art of strategy, Musashi asserts that the skill of a swordsman comes from professional mastery and seeing your weapon as an extension of yourself. While the content of the time was considerably different, many of the lessons Musashi espouses can be applied to the modern context.

Antoine-Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*

Dating from 1830, Jomini's classic work has been a staple of professional military reading for almost 200 years. While Clausewitz is primarily targeted at the strategic level of war, Jomini is aimed more at the operational level, and introduces concepts that are still applicable to the modern practitioner. Its primary thesis is the methods and ways of war, covering military policy, strategy, grand tactics and battles, logistics, and the formation and employment of troops in battle.

Anthony M Schinella, *Bombs without Boots: the Limits of Airpower*

Analysing five airpower-centric military operations and their post-conflict outcomes since the 1990s, *Bombs without Boots: the Limits of Airpower* proffers thoughtful new discussion about the balance between the advantages and limitations of airpower when employed in isolation, without

supporting ground forces. Can such operations achieve decisive victory without the commitment of external ground forces? Schinella, a long-time US intelligence analyst, wades headfirst into this thorny contemporary military issue with his examination of Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011, asking whether the long-term outcomes of these operations are in fact aligned with policymakers' original intent. His conclusions in this thoroughly sourced and excellently crafted work provide useful insight for officers at all levels to consider when assessing appropriate military response through varying applications of force.

THE MIND

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations***

Generally identified as a 'timeless classic', the ruminations of Roman Emperor and General Marcus Aurelius are still relevant today. Aurelius thought deeply about life and personal duty, and applied his philosophy to his tasks and responsibilities. While generally accessible, Aurelius can make frequent allusion to specific philosophies or historical figures, so it may be best to have an internet connection nearby while reading.

■ **Viktor E Frankl, *Man's search for meaning: a classic tribute to hope from the Holocaust***

A book that stands amongst the most consequential of works produced in the second half of the 20th Century. Frankl was a Holocaust survivor who catalogued his concentration camp experiences, and through that suffering, shared the meaning that he found in life. This work demonstrates that purpose and meaning can be derived from almost any hardship to build resilience, strength and will.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich, *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession***

A collection of essays from writers important in the field of military studies, this anthology explores the significance of history to the military profession. The first section of the book includes essays on the general theme of

historical learning and military practice, whereas the second section focuses on specific historical events and their applicability to modern day military action. This book presents lucid and well-written arguments explaining why and how history should be studied and used. In this world of rapid change and future focus, the importance of military history can often be overlooked; by examining and learning from the past, soldiers can build the knowledge and insight that is required for the tasks they may face in the future.

■ **Nancy Sherman, *Stoic Warriors: the ancient philosophy behind the military mind***

A work that applies the philosophy of the Roman Stoics (Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius) to the military. Through military themes of leadership and character, anger and control, resilience and fear, and camaraderie and brotherhood, Sherman unpacks the benefits that the moderate adoption of Stoic approaches can have upon the development and improvement of the military professional.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile: things that gain from disorder*

A thought-provoking examination of how elements can thrive, or gain, from disorder. The idea behind the work has natural linkages to the uncertainty encountered by militaries and through military operations; individuals and organisations can become sufficiently robust to benefit and thrive from volatility, rather than just be resilient to it. The author proposes that being 'antifragile' may be the most useful way to operate in a world of Black Swan events.

Roger von Oech, *A whack on the side of the head*

Critical and creative thinking are the hallmarks of military genius, and this classic book provides simple exercises and explanations to help people break free of constrained thinking patterns. Thinking outside traditional constraints can help to unlock an individual's full potential, and to contribute innovative solutions to challenging situations.

Nicholas Fearn, *Zeno and the tortoise*

This book provides a short and accessible guide to the major elements of philosophical thought in the Western tradition from the Socratic method to deconstructionism. Intended as an introductory text, it is clear, amusing and avoids the pitfalls inherent in many such 'guides'—becoming bogged down in arcane or highly theoretical discussion.

James Bond Stockdale, *Courage under fire: testing Epictetus's doctrines in a laboratory of human behavior*

Vietnam veteran, POW and Medal of Honor recipient, Stockdale's work draws upon his experiences of being held captive for eight years by the North Vietnamese. Stockdale explores how the wisdom of Epictetus shaped his approach to military service, combat and survival as a prisoner, applying Stoic principles to demonstrate how humans can rise with dignity to prevail in the face of adversity.

Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Dialogues and essays*

The collected works of a classic Stoic philosopher whose musings on how to live in a troubled world continue to resonate 2,000 years later. Seneca touches upon subjects useful for the military practitioner to dwell upon; anger, happiness, to be merciful with power, grief, shortness of life (comparing time to a commodity), and the tranquillity of the mind.

Epictetus, *The Discourses*

The collected extracts of the 2,000 year-old teachings of Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, explore themes of the power of judgement, the faculty of choice, the inevitability of challenges; and the importance of character and virtue in relationships with others. These lessons sought to help students apply his teachings and live better lives through doing so, providing practical considerations upon which the individual may dwell.

Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking fast and slow*

A work with application across all fast-paced environments, Kahneman identifies that the way we think is divided into two systems: fast, emotional and intuitive; and slow, logical and deliberate. Understanding how these cognitive biases function together can assist to maximise the benefits that each system brings to problem solving, judgements and decisions.

Charles Duhigg, *The power of habit: why we do what we do in life and business*

This book explores the possibilities that can be unleashed through the transformation of regular habits. From describing the neuroscience research explaining how habits work in the brain, Duhigg offers practical advice about how to create new habits to transform and improve our lives and the functions of our organisations, implementing positive, lasting change.

Sebastian Junger, *Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging*

Tribe examines post-traumatic stress disorder and the challenges faced by veterans who have returned home from war. Junger uses an anthropological lens to argue that societal constructions and middle class patterns of life contribute to the dislocation and alienation many feel – even for veterans who did not see combat. While the central thesis is refuted by some, the work will provoke consideration around the importance of ‘tribes’ to cohesion and belonging.

Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag archipelago 1918–1956: an experiment in literary investigation*

Soviet dissident, Solzhenitsyn’s classic work recounts the establishment, expansion and operation of the Soviet Union’s gulag system. Serving as both an historical and literary history of Soviet gulags, the work recounts the author’s experiences and the personal testimony of other prisoners to create a compelling narrative of the entire penal process – arrest, trial, camps, transit centres, informers, secret police, and interrogation. *The Gulag Archipelago* has been lauded around the world across both popular and academic circles.

Hal Brands and Charles Edel, *The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order*

In the work, the authors claim that decades of peace between the great powers has led to faded memories in America (and by extension, Western nations) of the extremes of state relations. Yet, ‘tragedy’ in international politics has been the norm throughout history, and the authors argue the potential for great power conflict is at its greatest since the Cold War. Eschewing ‘hubris’ and ‘complacency’, this book is a call to intellectually prepare for an uncertain and possibly tragic future.

LAND WARFARE

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle***

This is a very valuable analytical work by one of the most insightful civilian commentators writing in the realm of contemporary military affairs. Biddle analyses the emergence from the carnage of the Western Front in 1917 of what he terms ‘the modern system’ of combined arms warfare. Most Australian officers, familiar with the Battle of Hamel and the operations of the AIF in 1918, intuitively understand the imperative of applying Monash’s orchestration to the close battle. Biddle produces compelling statistical evidence to analyse success in battle since 1917 and concludes that the close collaboration of infantry, armour and fire support with all arms and services is indispensable to survival and victory on the modern battlefield. This is a salutary reminder that there is no technical panacea to solve the problem of the last one hundred metres, nor has precision technology eliminated close combat from war. That being the case, a thorough grasp of the modern system of combined arms fighting is a core element of professional mastery.

■ **Jim Storr, *The Human Face of War***

Published in 2009 by retired British Infantry officer Jim Storr, *The Human Face of War* seeks to analyse current military thought and in doing so, derides many of the key military ideas and theories that have underpinned contemporary military debate in the last thirty years. Rather than posit an alternative, Storr argues war is so chaotic and fundamentally human that any attempts to confine it to a theoretical framework are doomed to failure – instead, we should approach each situation with perfect openness of mind so we may make better decisions, faster and win. The supporting examination of key combat factors such as shock, attrition, command and the role of leaders is centred in conventional combat, but the analytical techniques at work are robust enough to provide valuable insight regardless. In seeking to render accessible those key concepts of warfare that are often confusing and contradictory, Storr presents an invaluable new way to consider war and warfare that will enrich the understanding of those who read it.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War***

A ground-breaking work that has revolutionised the study of civil war, Kalyvas's book proposes a detailed framework around levels of violence used in numerous fields to examine interactions between armed groups, states, and civilians around the globe. *Logic* argues the violence used in civil war – be it selective, indiscriminate, large-scale or micro-violence – correlates to the degree of control exerted upon a given territory by any warring party. Regardless of political and ideological beliefs, civilian populations cooperate with a locally dominant warring parties out of the necessity for self-preservation, calling into question the theory underlying 'hearts and minds' campaigns in counterinsurgency operations. Particularly relevant for its considered discussion of the functions of violence, control, and influence during civil wars and how this interplay between state and non-state actors should be understood, this text thus offers valuable insight for military leaders and commanders likely to operate in complex modern battlefields.

■ **John A English and Bruce I Gudmundsson, *On Infantry***

Originally published in 1981 and revised in 1994, *On Infantry* traces the development of the infantry throughout the 20th Century and its impact on the major conflicts of our time, including the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, and the Arab-Israeli Wars. The authors provide an excellent summary of the evolution of the infantry tactics, especially at the section and platoon levels, as well as changes in infantry squad organisation and roles over time. A key valuable takeaway for the reader is the ongoing importance of small infantry groups on the battlefield despite the evolution of technology and strategy, and how infantry plays a crucial role in warfare, regardless of battlefield or broader context.

■ **Eric M Bergerud, *Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific***

This expansive single volume history explores the lives of ordinary infantrymen who fought in the SW Pacific Theatre. A thematic structure provides an assessment of respective national strategies (Australia, USA and Japan) applied to the reality of the theatre: the impact of the severe environment, of disease and medical treatment, the respective forces'

strengths and weaknesses, logistics, weaponry, and morale. First-hand accounts add vital colour and depth to the true human experience of fighting a brutal war in the region to Australia's immediate north.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Ernest Dunlop Swinton, *The Defence of Duffer's Drift*

This renowned short book, first published in 1904, is often touted as the origin point of the 'tactical narrative genre', where a fictional tactical scenario is used to convey a series of lessons. In *The Defence of Duffer's Drift*, a young lieutenant commanding 50 men defends a river crossing (or a 'drift') over six successive scenarios in which the various defensive strategies yield differing outcomes and key lessons for the reader. Swinton, who served as a captain of the Royal Engineers in South Africa during the Boer War, provides rich and detailed scenarios complete with terrain features, political situation, conflict with civilians and limits on available military support. The result is a quick but valuable read that has become a military staple around the world for learning about small unit tactics.

Albert Palazzo, *Land Warfare: an Introduction*

As an introduction, this work is a starting point for an exploration of the nature and character of war. It is not meant to be the final say on land warfare, or war more generally. Rather, it is intended to find a place in the professional military education of the next generation of those wearing an Australian uniform, no matter the rank, trade or service. It is meant to be the starting point for a career-long journey of study and reflection. Finally, to foster ongoing study, the work includes a list of further reading as an appendix.

Eugene B Sledge, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa*

The inspiration behind the HBO series *The Pacific*, this World War II memoir by United States Marine Eugene Sledge was first published in 1981 and recounts Sledge's experiences in the Pacific Theatre. A 60mm mortarman in the battle of Peleliu as part of the war's famous 1st Marine Division (3rd Battalion, 5th Marines) and later fighting in Okinawa, this book honestly relays the brutality of the Pacific Theatre. Crucially, *With the Old Breed* distinguishes itself from other books of its kind by describing war trauma as it is happening: Sledge breaks down three times over the course

of the book. Yet Sledge also illustrates the immense bravery and courage displayed by the soldiers who overcame these conditions to continue fighting. Described as one of the finest memoirs to emerge from any war, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* is essential reading for a deeper appreciation of military history and land warfare.

Lawrence Freedman, *Modern Warfare: lessons from Ukraine*

This relatively short book presents an accessible summary of the first twelve months of the war between Russia and the Ukraine. *Modern Warfare* concentrates more broadly on strategic considerations and modern warfare in general, with minimal deep exploration of tactical employment of weapon systems and technology but does take the opportunity to analyse why cyber warfare – touted as the future of modern conflict – has been less cataclysmic against Ukraine than many might have expected. Assessing the contrasting strategies of the two sides, Freedman explores how a seemingly superior Russian force has been unable to defeat Ukraine and proffers his diagnosis for the likelihood of ceasefire or peace between Russia and Ukraine. Investigating a conflict that has to date drawn significant commitment from Europe, the USA, and Australia, this text offers a quick and easy starting point for better understanding the war in Ukraine.

Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle*

An officer with nearly thirty years' experience in the Crimea, Syria and Algeria, du Picq was killed leading his men against the Prussians in 1870. This French classic examines the moral force and psychological endurance of soldiers in battle, demonstrating that the human elements of war are eternal factors in defeat and victory. *Battle Studies* advocates the importance of unit discipline and cohesion, especially important to du Picq as he experienced and analysed first-hand the increasing lethality of battlefield firepower.

Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*

Written by legendary German General Heinz Guderian during his imprisonment by the Allies after the Second World War, this candid autobiography provides the valuable inside story of a strategic visionary whose armoured combat skills brought Germany's initial World War II victories. In this classic account, Guderian covers in detail his role in developing both the Panzer tank forces and the doctrine of rapid, deep

strikes that proved so effective in combination with Luftwaffe attacks to create the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Guderian shares his recollections of the politics of Nazi warfare and his personal views on what could have led Germany to victory, and what steps ensured it did not.

Erwin Rommel, *Infantry Attacks*

In this renowned classic study of the art of war first published in 1937, 'The Desert Fox' Erwin Rommel offers a firsthand account of his experiences and greatest battles in World War I. Encompassing his progression from platoon leader to company commander and the achievements of his various units across a variety of theatres during the war, Rommel outlines how he cunningly used battleground terrain to his advantage to seek out and exploit enemy weaknesses. His emphasis on careful map analysis and reconnaissance as central to his tactical successes provides valuable insights into warfare that remain relevant across the decades. An aggressive and versatile commander, Rommel's engaging and timeless reflection offers an indispensable guide to the art of war that is a must-read for all Australian Army officers.

Roger Trinquier, *Modern warfare: A French view of Counterinsurgency*

A classic counterinsurgency text, *Modern warfare* provides an accessible, practice-orientated handbook to fighting insurgencies based on the author's own experiences fighting in Indochina and Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s. Among Trinquier's central critiques is what he considers to be the conventional army's struggles to adapt to the thinking, training, equipment, and operations necessary for counterinsurgency operations. He was among the first authors to recognise the importance of population-centric tactics in counterinsurgency operations and stresses the requirement for government forces to adapt to the conflict at hand and reassure the population of its security and support. A product of his time and experiences, Trinquier views the enemy's terror tactics as a normal part of modern warfare and supports similarly severe methods amongst friendly forces – including population relocation and control, as well as torture – as a normal part of modern operations necessary to defeat such an enemy. Trinquier's work is seminal in the field and remains relevant today, but some aspects should be weighed carefully, including his support for extreme measures in counterinsurgency operations.

Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A genius for war*

In this intimate and insightful biography of the famed World War II General, D'Este draws upon exclusive access to Patton's private and public papers, and the full cooperation of his family, to craft a comprehensive portrait of the real man behind Patton's famed public facade. Considered by many to be the finest general and tactician of the Second World War, Patton was a student of military history inspired by warrior heroes to hone his intellectual and military skills, determinedly training himself for greatness and, simultaneously, a poet who doubted his own ability. D'Este skilfully illustrates these varying aspects of Patton's character to render a powerful and engaging image of the complex and contradictory hero.

Robert M Citino, *The German way of war: from the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich*

Starting with the birth of the Prussian Army in 1675 and examining in depth how strategies and tactics evolved from the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War through to the end of World War II, *The German way of war* centres on analysing the German military mindset. Citino's central argument is that the German military tradition prioritised operational flexibility, deception, and the exploitation of opportunities on the battlefield, and his detailed exploration of Prussian and German military history allows him to illustrate precisely how that theme repeatedly played out. Offering a fresh and insightful look at one of the most remarkable militaries of the past five centuries, *The German Way of War* is an essential read for anyone interested in the evolution of military strategy and tactics.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **J H Alexander and M L Bartlett, *Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945–1991***

Written by two noted Marine Corps historians (and former Marines), this is an operational study of the post-war period, heavily slanted to American experience. It provides scattered comment on Soviet practice and includes good chapters on the Falklands campaign and the evolution of US maritime doctrine in the 1980s.

■ **M L Bartlett (ed.), *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare***

This collection of essays (some by leading scholars, others by military officers) examines case studies in amphibious operations from ancient Greece to the Falklands War, ranging across the globe and including East Asian, Spanish Atlantic, British colonial and Soviet studies, as well as many from the Napoleonic, First and Second World Wars and the Cold War era.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **D J Trim and Mark C Fissel (eds.), *Amphibious Warfare 1000–1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion***

This volume reconceptualises amphibious warfare and also fills an important gap in its historiography, examining how it was conceived, practised and employed, from the Crusades, through the first wave of European exploration and colonisation, the Price Revolution and the European wars of religion, up to the early Industrial Revolution and the beginnings of a new wave of imperialism. Essays examine issues related to strategy, operational art, tactics, logistics and military technology, but also consider commerce and culture. They reveal that amphibious warfare was often waged for economic reasons and was the quintessential warfare of European imperialism, for sea power was required to deliver and sustain land power.

■ **T Lovering (ed.), *Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea. From Gallipoli to the Gulf—A Definitive Analysis***

Edited by a British officer with both Army and Navy service experience and a background in amphibious warfare education, this excellent collection of concise operational case studies, many by leading scholars, ranges across the twentieth century from Gallipoli to the Iraq War and identifies operational lessons at the end of each chapter with focused bibliographies.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Heck, Friedman and Mills, *On Contested Shores*, 2 Volumes (2020 and 2024)

These two edited volumes study different aspects of amphibious operations throughout history and their enduring relevance. Case studies go back as far as the 16th Century, and many of the modern examples are less well known but critically important to understanding both the history and the future of amphibious warfare.

Dayton McCarthy, *The Oboe Landings, 1945*

Operation Oboe was a series of three amphibious operations that saw the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions land around Borneo in mid-1945. This book describes the planning and execution of the three landings: Oboe 1 on Tarakan, Oboe 6 on Brunei and Oboe 2 on Balikpapan. Oboe was the culmination of all the Australian Army had learned about amphibious warfare over the course of the war, and combined with sea and air dominance was a highly effective operation. McCarthy focuses on the planning of the operations as well as the operational and tactical conduct. It is an excellent case study of Australia's last major amphibious operation, and a critical study for how the Army needs to think about its future operating in the Indo-Pacific littorals.

Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (4th Edition)

In *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, noted maritime strategist Geoffrey Till provides an expansive introduction to the maritime domain, exploring the broad principles involved and, as of 2018, the challenges Till saw ahead. Till frames his analysis through five principal factors that naval strategists need to consider: the sea as a resource, the

sea as a medium for transportation and exchange, the sea as a medium of information and the exchange of ideas, the sea as a medium for dominion, and the sea as an area of sovereignty. As Till emphasizes within this valuable volume, the maritime domain is a complex environment and a continuing field of both competition and collaboration.

Ian Speller, *The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy 1945–56*

An academic study of the relationship between British amphibious capability and defence policy during the onset of the Cold War, this book argues that the relative neglect of expeditionary forces in favour of a continental European focus left capability deficient at the time of the Suez crisis. This is a useful case study of the intersecting dimensions—political, financial, strategic, historical and force structural—which together influence the making of defence policy.

Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, *Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics*

Despite its illustrated coffee table format, this primer by two British defence academics analyses the step-by-step preparation and execution of amphibious operations and has valuable chapters on logistics and equipment.

David Stevens, *Strength Through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise*

This paper examines the contribution of multinational sea power during the crisis intervention in East Timor in 1999–2000 with emphasis on the maritime logistical dimension which enabled INTERFET to function effectively.

Carter Malkasian, *Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present*

This paper is an academic analysis of the US Marine Corps' concept for amphibious warfare, operational manoeuvre from the sea (OMFTS), examining the history of amphibious warfare from 1941 to the present and arguing that OMFTS is an incomplete concept, neglecting historical constraints and demands on amphibious warfare, and needs refinement. There is a useful bibliography.

URBAN WARFARE

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Patrick K O'Donnell, *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah***

We Were One's focus is on the tactical level of operations in Iraq. Patrick O'Donnell was embedded with a company of Marines who helped take Fallujah. The result is a turbo-charged depiction of combat in the urban environment that is not for the fainthearted. In an age of asymmetric warfare, O'Donnell shows that there will always be a need for soldiers capable of closing with and killing the enemy.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Alice Hills, *Future War in cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma***

Discusses the moral and legal constraints on the use of force that the armies of liberal states must face when fighting in urban areas. Hills examines the experiences of the Russians in Grozny, the Americans in Hue and Baghdad, and the British in Northern Ireland among others. Hills concludes that the best approach for Western forces facing the daunting task of urban operations is to resort to well trained and well led infantry—an approach that commanders have followed throughout the ages when faced with the strategic conundrum of their time.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad*

A classic, hailed by historians worldwide as the definitive account of World War II's most harrowing battle. Recounted as a narrative history, *Stalingrad* showcases Beevor's skill for combining a storyteller's skills with academic rigour: the result is a gripping read that conveys the horrors experienced by soldiers on both sides of the conflict, and of the civilians trapped on an urban battlefield. Considered to be an unprecedented work of military history, *Stalingrad* is essential reading for any Army officer, regardless of rank.

MILITARY ORGANISATION AND CULTURE

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ James Kitfield, *Prodigal soldiers*

This modern history documents the transformation of the US military from the draft force of Vietnam to the professional volunteer force of the modern era, spanning from Vietnam to the Gulf War. Written by journalist James Kitfield, the text draws heavily on the personal recounts of officers and proffers valuable insight into the efforts and changes required for the US military to recover and rebuild following the Vietnam War.

■ Trevor N Dupuy, *A genius for war: the German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945*

A US Army officer who commanded American forces during World War II and served in both Burma and China, Colonel TN Dupuy draws upon his own military experiences in this rigorous examination of the characters and manoeuvres behind German warfare throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries. Beginning with the Prussian Generals of the 1800s (including Frederick the Great), Dupuy explores in detail the influence of the General Staff, suggesting that the German Army's renowned battlefield successes results from a German General Staff system committed to inculcating excellence across their organisation. Though first published in 1977, *A Genius for War* remains an interesting read for Australian Army officers, providing relevant parallels across the military officer corps and offering opportunities for deeper insight into the influence of General/Joint Staffs on military operations.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*

The authors address one of the most intriguing questions of warfighting—how do well trained, professional and technologically advanced armies sometimes fail against a lesser opponent? Relying on a number of case studies, Cohen and Gooch highlight the effects of bureaucratic malaise and institutional culture on a force's ability to anticipate, react and learn. The capacity to fail, they conclude, lurks within even the best military organisations.

■ Peter R Mansoor and Williamson Murray, *The culture of military organizations*

An edited collection of essays, in this book Peter Mansoor and noted historian Williamson Murray offer a history of organisational military culture. Culture, the editors argue, is perhaps ‘the most important’ factor ‘involved in military effectiveness’ (p. 3). Divided into 4 parts, *The culture of military organizations* provides two chapters exploring theoretical frameworks of culture and military organisations and a range of accompanying case studies exploring how militaries (including maritime forces and air forces) came to think in certain ways and how this contributed to their approach to warfare. Part II, which covers land forces, includes case studies of Ulysses S. Grant and the Union Army of the Tennessee, the German Army (1871–1945), the British Army, the Imperial Japanese Army, the Israeli Defence Forces, and the US Army (1973–2017). *The culture of military organizations* reminds readers to consider how culture has, or continues to, affect the military capability and effectiveness of their force (positively and negatively), and to achieve maximum value it should be read in conjunction with Mansoor and Murray’s *Grand Strategy and Military Alliances* (2016).

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Rick Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point’s Class of 1966*

The West Point class of 1966 straddled a fault line in history. Their class suffered more deaths in Vietnam than any other and they served during a turbulent period in the development of the US Army. This is a superb and atmospheric narrative history that inevitably captures the unique spirit of this revered American institution. But it also sets the personal experiences of a group of young officers in the context of the anarchic 1960s. It is military sociology at its best, while also offering insights into the human factors that contribute to effective leadership and team identity in combat.

Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August*

This Pulitzer prize-winning classic deals with the opening weeks of the Great War on the Western and Eastern fronts as these emerged from the early rounds of fighting. The book is essentially a thought-provoking study of what the author sees as a succession of mistakes, miscalculations and misconceptions that led to a protracted and highly destructive conflict, including the 'short war' delusion, the belief that economic interdependence would prove a limitation on willingness to declare war, the disconnect between politics and war making, and the reliance on the cult of the offensive.

Charles Kirke, *Red Coat Green Machine: Continuity and Change in the British Army 1700 to 2000*

Using the methods of social anthropology, this book looks at the ways in which the British Army functions as an organisation by considering the ideas, attitudes, and conventions of behaviour displayed by its members in order to understand its 'organisational culture'. It is not a history of the British Army in any conventional sense, and there is interesting discussion of the ways in which formal, informal and functional structures exist side-by-side within the organisation. The book also has some interesting things to say about relations between officers and other ranks in earlier, pre-twentieth century periods.

John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army 1989–2005*

A lengthy and detailed 'insider' account of the wide-ranging changes in the US Army, written by a former brigadier general whose last assignment was as Chief of Military History. Acknowledging that an institution as vast as the US Army sometimes appears impervious to change, the book examines the ways in which successive chiefs of staff and senior officers drove major institutional and organisational change from the 'tectonic shift' of the end of the Cold War through attendant social and financial pressures, the technological challenges unveiled in DESERT STORM, the attacks of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent tests of a transformed organisation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book includes discussion of the evolution of force structure and a lengthy account of the developments in family support structures in an all-volunteer military.

Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*

This book has become the most well-known account of the US involvement in Somalia, and articulates many of the reasons why the mission was not a success. In a step-by-step manner the author takes the reader through the battle from start to finish. He pays great attention to the tactical decisions, both good and bad. At the same time, he considers the strategic environment, giving a well-rounded account of all the relevant factors. The great strength of this book is how the author pays attention to tactics and military reality in the pursuit of personal drama.

MEMOIRS

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Henry Baynton 'Jo' Gullett, *Not as a Duty Only: An Infantryman's War***

A classic of Australian war writing, Gullett's book deals with his experiences in the Middle East and New Guinea firstly as a sergeant and then after receiving his commission. His account of the battle of Bardia and his company's successful assault on Post 11, in which he was badly wounded, is justly famous, while his descriptions of the functioning of an Australian infantry battalion at war is widely quoted. At times almost meditative in style, this remains the most profound memoir of war service ever written by an Australian soldier.

■ **Field Marshal Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory***

A memoir of the war in Burma and India by the 14th Army's commander, who led British and Indian forces from early defeats at Japanese hands through to the final victorious advances of 1945 and the re-conquest of Rangoon. Slim hoped, in part, to 'give, to those who have not experienced it, some impression of what it feels like to shoulder a commander's responsibilities in war'. His modest and deeply human memoirs succeed in this admirably, and it remains one of the best books about the challenges and pressures of command in modern war to emerge from the Second World War.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ **Ulysses S Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S Grant***

Written while he was dying of throat cancer after a controversial second term as President and a financially disastrous business venture, the *Memoirs* were intended to provide for Grant's wife and family. They focus overwhelmingly on his military career in the Mexican War and the US Civil War. With a clear and concise style not always found in military memoirs, the book was both a critical and financial success, and remains one of the key contemporary texts for understanding the Union conduct of the Civil War, especially in its second half.

■ **Peter Ryan, *Fear Drive My Feet***

This classic Australian memoir of the Second World War has lost none of its power and emotion since its first publication in 1959. Ryan spent much of 1942 and 1943 patrolling forward of friendly lines in Japanese controlled territory around Lae in New Guinea. Often working only in the company of a handful of indigenous police and porters and under arduous and dangerous conditions, Ryan maintained his coolness and resourcefulness as he kept watch on the Japanese. *Fear Drive My Feet* highlights the enduring soldierly virtues of courage, initiative and resilience to which every Australian soldier should aspire.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Philip Caputo, *A Rumor of War*

Caputo served as a Marine officer in Vietnam in 1965–66, and the book contains autobiographical elements. The novel's protagonist is accused of war crimes, and the book deals intelligently with the effects of a poorly-understood insurgent conflict on a conventional military force. Caputo went on to become an award-winning correspondent, and covered the fall of Saigon in 1975 for the *Chicago Tribune*.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY HISTORY

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ **Craig Stockings (ed.), *Zombie Myths of Australian Military History***

This collection subjects ten popular myths about Australian military history to cold-eyed scrutiny and shows that some cherished beliefs about our military past have no basis in fact or are simply wrong. It also demonstrates that the truth is often more complex and interesting than the myth.

■ **Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (3rd Edition)**

Grey provides a detailed, chronological narrative of Australia's wars, from the arrival of European settlers at Botany Bay, across more than two hundred years, into the first decade of the 21st Century and the 'war on terror'. The author sets this history in the contexts of defence and strategic policy, the development of society, and the impact of war and military service on Australia and Australians. It is peerless as an authoritative, single volume account of the arc of Australian military history.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Peter Dean (ed.), *Australia 1944–45: Victory in the Pacific*

This thoroughly researched collection of essays from a team of internationally regarded military historians provides the compelling final instalment to Peter Dean's Pacific War series, where it examines the importance of 1944 and 1945 to Australia's strategic development. The collection considers the importance of the preceding years in 1942 and 1943 and revisits the home front, but its focus remains the complex and fascinating period of Australian, Allied, and Japanese strategies and campaigns in the Southwest Pacific theatre and Australia's pivotal role in achieving victory.

Craig Stockings (ed.), *Anzac's Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History*

In *Anzac's Dirty Dozen*, a team of renowned historians seek to uncover the truths lying behind twelve stubbornly pervasive and socially venerated myths of Australian military history. Key amongst these include probing the notion that Australia 'punches above its weight' militarily and querying the

importance of the US-Australian alliance. Importantly, some of these myths are most keenly valued amongst the military itself and this insightful book, grounded in empirical research, argues for applying a balanced gaze to our military history. In interrogating the sacrosanct position of these Anzac legends within the psyche of the general Australian population, *Anzac's Dirty Dozen* offers a crucial prompt to remain curious and critical about what we might hold to be 'truths' so we might better understand military history and our place within it.

Peter Stanley, *Bad Characters: sex, crime, mutiny, murder and the Australian Imperial Force*

Joint winner of the 2010–2011 Prime Minister's Prize for Australian History, *Bad Characters* is a ground-breaking book that tackles head-on a crucial gap in Australia history. Here, renowned historian Peter Stanley explores in detail the poor discipline that characterised the service of the Australian Imperial Force throughout World War I, supported by archival sources ranging into the hundreds and drawing upon court martial files and soldiers' letters to illuminate numerous uncomfortable truths. Beyond the AIF's celebrated 'larrikinism' lay problems spanning from bludging and dumb insolence, to serious riots and strikes, through to serious civil crimes culminating in several murders. Stanley skilfully interweaves these events into an engaging and informative chronological narrative that demonstrates how the AIF became an incredibly effective fighting force despite its record for military misbehaviour – and, perhaps, because these bad characters made the AIF the superb force it was.

James Brown, *Anzac's Long Shadow*

A work that has attracted controversy for the author's criticism of what some see as the social, emotional and financial costs of an 'Anzac industry'. Investment of large sums for military commemoration is contrasted against funding levels for national defence and veterans' support services, asking – provocatively – if *Anzac's Long Shadow* is to the detriment of modern defence and veterans issues. Irrespective of the reader's position, the book stimulates thinking around national funding priorities in defence, veterans support, and commemorative activities, and asks if the balance is right.

Colin Smith, *Singapore burning: heroism and surrender in World War II*

This comprehensive history of the fall of Singapore draws in British, Indian, Japanese and Australian sources to narrate the surrender of Singapore to Japanese forces. The book examines strategic rationales, command action and inaction, and military capacity, strength and performance to detail the British-led failure to defend the island against a skilful and ruthless enemy, which ultimately led to 100,000 troops falling into brutal Japanese captivity.

Jeffrey Grey, *The Australian Army: A History*

Jeffrey Grey provides holistic coverage of Army's 20th Century history, tracing policy, administrative, and training priorities in response to strategic and political direction, and authoritative treatments of Army's major conflicts. This work encompasses assessments of Army's shortcomings and failures, and triumphs and successes, demonstrating land power's historical role in national defence and the achievement of political objectives.

Albert Palazzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901–2001*

Palazzo's study of the Army from Federation through to the turn of the 21st Century is an important resource for understanding the changes to the institution, the development of the field army, the shifting relationship between full-time and part-time components, and the evolution of the machinery for their higher direction. Differing from Grey's wider-ranging account, this work traces Army's changing structure within the context of defence policy, strategic necessity, political expedience and financial reality.

David Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*

This history of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) traces the evolution toward the formation of a joint force from the Tange reorganisation in 1973. This institutional history outlines how the separate services developed their capabilities for application by the joint force through trial and error, exercises, and operational deployments, coalescing into an ADF that was able to deploy successfully to East Timor in 1999. This book is essential to anyone seeking to understand the formation of the modern ADF, the challenges it faced, and the opportunities it will provide into the future.

John Coates, *An Atlas of Australia's Wars* (2nd edition)

The most authoritative single volume pictorial map reference of the Australian Army's battles. This large format volume accompanies narrative descriptions of the battles with large and clear maps, ensuring Coates' atlas a place on the bookshelves of all serious Australian military historians.

Joan Beaumont, *Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics*

This book is the single most useful reference for key statistical data on Australian defence to 2001. Comprising a historiographical Introduction and 122 contributions from various contributors, the numerous tables, charts and graphs on topics as varied as defence expenditure, military strengths, casualty figures, national service enlistments and more, remain relevant for historical context. While the section on historiography is now dated, the book continues to be an important foundation for research.

Bill Gammage, *The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War*

A classic work that pioneered a resurgence in Australian intellectual interest in soldier's experiences in the Great War. While not an assessment of the AIF's military performance, Gammage's work surveyed approximately 1,000 soldier's letters and diaries to create a foundational understanding of Australian Great War experience which, importantly, shared what war 'felt like' to combatants.

Bernard Callinan, *Independent Company – the 2/2 and 2/4 Australian Independent Companies in Portuguese Timor, 1941–1943*

Written by the commander of 2/2 Independent Company, this detailed history of the 2/2 and 2/4 Australian Independent Companies and their operations against the Japanese in Portuguese Timor remains one of the best Australian personal histories of any WWII campaign. The work explores the relationships that developed between the Independent companies and local Timorese which supported military operations against the Japanese occupation. The book amply illustrates the challenges of fighting in hostile terrain in the islands north of Australia.

Australian Army Campaign Series²

The titles listed in this section are produced by the Australian Army History Unit and provide succinct and authoritative treatments of battles and campaigns, designed for an Australian military readership.

1. Albert Palazzo, *Battle of Crete*
2. Glenn Wahlert, *The Western Desert Campaign, 1940–41*
3. Albert Palazzo, *Australian Military Operations in Vietnam*
4. Glenn Wahlert, *Exploring Gallipoli: an Australian Army Battlefield Guide*
5. Brian Farrell and Garth Pratten, *Malaya 1942*
6. Phillip Bradley, *Wau 1942–1943*
7. Jean Bou, *Australia and the Palestine Campaign 1916–1918*
8. Roger Lee, *The Battle of Fromelles 1916*
9. Craig Stockings, *Bardia*
10. David Cameron, *August Offensive at Anzac 1915*
11. Michele Bomford, *The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Peronne 1918*
12. Chris Roberts, *The Landing at Anzac 1915*
13. Michael Tyquin, *Greece February to April 1941*
14. Nicholas Anderson, *To Kokoda*
15. Michael Tyquin, *Sudan 1885*
16. Mesut Uyar, *The Ottoman Defence Against the Anzac Landing 25 April 1915*
17. David Coombes, *The Battles of Bullecourt 1917*
18. Craig Deayton, *The Battle of Messines 1917*
19. Jonathan Passlow, *The Battle of Polygon Wood 1917*
20. Roger Lee, *The Battle of Menin Road 1917*
21. William Westerman, *The Battle of Broodseinde Ridge 1917*
22. Meleah Hampton, *The Battle of Pozières 1916*
23. Dayton McCarthy, *The Battle of Maryang San 1951*
24. Nicholas Anderson, *The Battle of Milne Bay 1942*
25. Colin Matthey, *The Battle of the Lys, April 1918*

2 All titles available from the Defence Library Service and the Australian Army History Unit

26. Adam Rankin, *The Hindenburg Line 1918*
27. Peter Edgar, *Counter-Attack Villers Bretonneux, April 1918*
28. Ian Finlayson, *The Battle of Passchendaele*
29. Robert Stevenson, *Australia's First Campaign: the Capture of German New Guinea 1914*
30. Phillip Bradley, *Salamaua 1943*
31. Bob Breen, *Australian Force Somalia 1992–1993*
32. Dayton McCarthy, *The Oboe Landings 1945*

Australian Military History Series³

The titles listed in this section are produced by the Australian Army History Unit and provide succinct and authoritative treatments of deployments or activities, designed for an Australian military readership.

1. Kevin O'Halloran, *Rwanda UNAMIR 1994/95*
2. David Connery, *David Cran and David Evered, Conducting Counterinsurgency: Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan*
3. David Connery (ed.), *The Battles Before: Case Studies in Australian Army Leadership after the Vietnam War*

Australian Army Combat Service Support Series⁴

The titles listed in this section are produced by the Australian Army History Unit and provide succinct and authoritative treatments of historical Australian Army practice, designed for an Australian military readership.

1. Michael Tyquin, *Gallipoli: an Australian Medical Perspective*
2. Glenn Wahlert and Russell Linwood, *One Shot Kills: a History of Australian Army Sniping*
3. Andrew Ross, *Mine Warfare: 1st Australian Task Force's Struggle for South Vietnam*

3 All titles available from the DLS and the Australian Army History Unit

4 All titles available from the DLS and the Australian Army History Unit

MILITARY AND OTHER FICTION

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ Robert A Heinlein, *Starship Troopers*

Heinlein graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1928 and continued his involvement with the military right through the Second World War. His award-winning book explores profound territory—what makes a citizen and what is the military’s responsibility to the state that supports it? A simple tale of a young man joining up and going to war with an alien race, ‘the Bugs’, hides layers of deep and complex moral and political philosophy, the core of which is the notion that social responsibility requires individual sacrifice.

■ Orson Scott Card, *Ender’s Game*

Ender Wiggin is six years old when he is taken from his family and sent to Battle School, where he is taught the art and science of war. Ender’s advantage is his creativity, and he rises to command of all of the Earth’s military but at the expense of his physical and mental health. The book investigates the use of simulation and networked forces to select leaders and manage combat, and has a subtext about the burden of leadership and the importance in commanders of both compassion and ruthlessness.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ Cormac McCarthy, *Blood Meridian; or, The Evening Redness in the West*

This historical novel set in the mid-19th Century American frontier subverts the normal conventions of the Western genre. The Kid joins a gang that murders native Indians, soldiers and civilians for bounty or sadistic pleasure, leaving a trail of violence. This dark dramatisation of violence explores the motivations and actions of people who demonise their enemies and whose extreme and violent urges are unchecked, recreating a horrifying world without constraints upon the individual.

■ **Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness***

Sailor Charles Marlow recounts to his friends his time as a Steamer captain for an ivory trading company in the African interior. After a harrowing trip via steamboat up the Congo River to visit Mr Kurtz at the company's Station, Marlow finds Kurtz gravely ill. The return journey invites reader consideration of philosophical questions on colonial and imperial exploitation, the corruption of man, and the 'darkness' of the human heart as a cause of evil; 'civilisation' is fragile, and perhaps only a veneer.

Extended Reading: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels*

Michael Shaara's work portrays the Battle of Gettysburg, the turning point in the American Civil War, and examines the conflict on many levels. The author explores the motivations of the leaders and their soldiers, and contrasts the fortunes of the poorly supplied but buoyant Confederacy, and the superbly equipped but demoralised Union. At the end of the battle, it is the professional Union commanders who have won—fighting a battle that maximised the value of the terrain and firepower. The idealists and romantics of the book, like the Confederate General Lee, succeed only in wasting away their own forces by 'following their hearts'.

Stephen Crane, *The Red Badge of Courage*

When published in 1895, Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage* was an international bestseller, went into numerous reprints, and has remained widely available ever since. It is the story of the psychological component of combat, and one young warrior's struggle—in this case an ordinary private—to contain his fear and fulfil his duty. In the course of this brief novel Crane captures the realism of the personal view of war. When it first appeared, *The Red Badge of Courage* was immediately acknowledged as a masterpiece of war literature, a recognition that it continues to hold to the present.

Joseph Heller, *Catch-22*

Heller joined the US Army Air Force in 1942 and flew sixty combat missions. In 1961 he published this masterpiece of satirical fiction about the murderous insanity of war. Yossarian, a B-25 bombardier in the Second World War, can be sent home if he is crazy and if he asks to go, but asking to go home proves he is sane; the binding logic of military and bureaucratic paradox—expressed as ‘Catch-22’—has now entered the public lexicon to mean a ‘no-win situation’ or absurdity in choice. This novel is funny and touching, outrageous in its cynicism and honest with its portrayal of men at arms trapped in a system where the big questions are unimportant and the trivial is crucial.

James Webb, *Fields of Fire*

The author is a 1968 US Naval Academy graduate and retired Marine Corps officer who was badly wounded and highly decorated for service in Vietnam. Widely praised for its unromantic and graphic depictions of infantry combat and life in a Marine platoon in the field, it was one of the earliest novels to emerge from that war, and remains one of the best. Having served as the youngest ever Secretary of the Navy during Ronald Reagan’s second term in office, Webb is now the junior Senator for Virginia in the United States Congress.

Ford Maddox Ford, *The Good Soldier*

Set on the brink of the Great War, this elegant story is a touching lament about the nature of self-deceit and flawed character. It examines the ways in which people deny who they are and strive for unrealistic ideals, and around them the old world of Europe crumbles beneath pretence and artifice while the American Century unfolds.

Kim Stanley Robinson, *Years of Rice and Salt*

The award-winning science fiction writer imagines a world in which the European population died of the plague in the fourteenth century and in which China, India and the Islamic world come to dominate. Essentially an alternate history and a novel of ideas, this is a challenging book that rewards the reader on a number of levels.

Humphrey Cobb, *Paths of Glory*

A soldier in the Canadian Army during the First World War, Cobb produced one of the best anti-war books of all time. Based on true events—the execution of innocent French soldiers for cowardice—this is a tale of privates and generals, of ordering men into battle and the difference between ‘command’ and ‘leadership’.

Jean Larteguy, *The Centurions*

This is the first of two novels (the second was *The Praetorians*) dealing with the French war in Algeria, a highly contentious subject at the time of publication. Larteguy, a pseudonym, had served with the Free French during the Second World War and had been decorated several times. After the war he served as a foreign correspondent and witnessed the collapse of the French colonial empire first-hand. His novel reflects the dilemmas faced by French soldiers in Algeria following their defeat in Indochina, and also deals with the gradual process of demoralisation and loss of faith among men who feel themselves to be holding the lines of ‘civilisation’ against ‘barbarism’.

Herman Wouk, *The Winds of War / War and Remembrance*

A grand historical melodrama that views the Second World War through the eyes of an American family; the first volume begins in mid-1939 and ends with the US poised on the brink of Pearl Harbor, the second takes them to the war’s end. Through various plot devices and intermarriage Wouk manages to encapsulate the major themes of the war—the aero-naval combat in the Pacific, the critical role of the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and the unfolding holocaust of European Jewry—into the experiences of his central characters. The novels were made into a pair of hugely successful television mini-series in 1983 and 1988.

James Jones, *The Thin Red Line*

A fictionalisation of the Guadalcanal campaign in the Second World War, this book is based on the author’s experience in the US 25th Infantry Division. The theme is that war, despite being a mass human occurrence, is a very personal and lonely experience each individual suffers alone. With depictions of violence and murder, dread fear and frustration, this oft-confronting book is renowned for its realism.

Pat Conroy, *Lords of Discipline*

In the 1960s in Charleston, South Carolina, a young outsider attends a military academy steeped in history and tradition, and struggles to cope with the physical and emotional brutality of cadet life. When he is ordered to mentor the first black cadet as an upper-classman, his morals are tested. A gripping coming-of-age story, this book explores themes of loyalty, shared experience and courage in the face of greater and lesser evil.

Pat Barker, *The Regeneration Trilogy*

Based on real historical events and characters, Barker's books deal with the emotional and mental trauma suffered by those who served in the First World War, an often overlooked element of the war experience. The novels are based on meetings between the psychologist WH Rivers and the poets Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, and they explore the development of ideas around 'shell shock' as a medical condition, and the burgeoning science of psychology. These books also paint a believable portrait of British society during the Great War, looking at some of the less-investigated issues such as attitudes towards homosexuality, pacifism and the dissonance between conditions on the frontlines and how they were presented at home. Each book comes with historical notes and recommended further reading about the people involved.

Kurt Vonnegut, *Slaughterhouse Five*

Billy Pilgrim has become unstuck in time—he keeps re-living his experiences in the Second World War, as well as jumping ahead in time to where he is kept by aliens in a zoo. Vonnegut, a prisoner of war held in Dresden, lived through the Allied firebombing, and this incident forms the core of Billy Pilgrim's character. Funny, tragic and often irreverent, the book explores fate and fatalism as well as post-traumatic stress and the appalling impact of war on people and societies.

Len Deighton, *Bomber*

Deighton weaves a masterly tale of a Lancaster crew's final raid over Germany during the Second World War. While a novel, his meticulous research gives the book a documentary feel, which serves to heighten the foreboding sense of approaching death, destruction and terror that was strategic bombing. The themes that Deighton explores are central attributes of warfare and include the effect of acute stress on capability, the value of teamwork, and the unexpected emergence of courage—Deighton also captures Clausewitz's idea of friction. Despite its detailed planning the mission slowly goes wrong, culminating in the obliteration of the wrong target.

Bernard Cornwall, *The Sharpe Books*

Cornwell is a prolific historical novelist best known for his Sharpe series, which deals with the exploits of a British soldier in Wellington's army. Mostly set during the Napoleonic Wars in the Peninsula, Sharpe is a former ranker commissioned after saving the Duke's life. His various exploits have been made into a series of telemovies, themselves often loosely based on the novels. The broad history is correct, although twentieth century attitudes and sensibilities are sometimes allowed to intrude for entertainment's sake.

Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World*

Along with *1984*, *Brave New World* is the masthead of dystopian fiction, worlds created to explore what makes a good social order and how best to achieve it. Depicting an ideal society full of happy and fulfilled citizens, where sex and drugs and music are hedonistic tools to pacify the population, Huxley illustrates the dangers of rampant technology and the elegant beauty of human frailties. Military personnel, defending a nation and its interests, must develop a sense of what they serve and why, and this book will prompt many such examinations.

Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*

Published in 1958, this is the seminal African novel written in English. Often viewed as a reaction against Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, which treated African cultures as if undifferentiated and 'primitive', Achebe presents the beauty and complexity of Ibo culture and tradition. The benefit for the soldier in today's globalised world lies in the exploration of how other societies can view external influence as 'colonialism'.

John Masters, *Bugles and a Tiger: my life in the Gurkhas*

This memoir of the twilight days of the British Empire in India serves as the background to a young subaltern's transformation into a professional soldier. Although Master's descriptions are Kipling-esque in tone, this work has a serious side—the development of leadership skills. *Bugles and a Tiger* recounts Master's experiences in India up to the outbreak of the Second World War. A sequel, *The Road Past Mandalay*, covers his part in the Burma Campaign against the Japanese.

Karl Marlantes, *Matterhorn*

Written by a former Marine officer and set in 1969, the novel deals with a Marine company as it builds, abandons and then painfully retakes a hilltop firebase near the Laotian border. The accounts of combat are extended and unsparing, but the book is about war and its absurdities, less about combat and its terrors. It is especially direct in its treatment of racial tensions and indiscipline in the context of that time and place.

Anton Myrer, *Once an Eagle*

A powerful military novel, *Once an Eagle* spins a classic tale of leadership, honour, and courage spanning over half a century of US military conflicts. From World War I through to Vietnam, Sam Damon's battlefield successes, coupled with his dedication to his country and his troops, sees him promoted, first to Lieutenant and then beyond. Simultaneously, his lifelong adversary, Courtney Massengale, uses cunning and political connections to do the same. As the two men rise through the ranks together, their inevitable clashes throw into brilliant relief what it means to be an officer and a leader.

Glendon Swarthout, *They came to Cordura*

This intense 1960s historical novel chronicles the strange and violent journey of five brave men, a coward, and a woman suspected of treason across the Mexican desert. Set against the backdrop of the 1916 Punitive Mexico Expedition led by General John J. Pershing to capture Mexican revolutionist, Pancho Villa, Swarthout interrogates the nature of courage and of cowardice as his deeply flawed protagonist struggles to answer why some people seem to possess the mental or moral strength to be courageous, and others don't.

Frank Herbert, *Dune*

A masterpiece of 20th Century American science fiction, *Dune* is a novel of epic proportions replete with Machiavellian intrigue, mythology, religion, politics, imperialism, and an incisive examination of the nature of power. Paul Atrides is the heir to House Atrides, a noble family tasked with ruling an inhospitable world, the desert planet Arrakis. In this world, a life-extending and consciousness-enhancing 'spice' known as melange is the only substance of value – a prize worth killing for. When his House is betrayed and his family destroyed, Paul embarks on a journey towards a great destiny, one that asks vital questions about the inescapable link between power and corruption.

William Golding, *Lord of the Flies*

In this classic novel first published in the 1950s, a plane carrying a group of schoolboys crashes on an uncharted island, stranding them. What follows is a chaotic and horrifying unravelling of the boys' humanity and reason as their attempts to forge their own society fail in the face of sin and evil. A brutal and thought-provoking book, *Lord of the Flies* has challenged readers for over sixty years about what it is that serves to strip away our humanity and allow brutality and violence to reign.

Feature Films, Documentaries and Dramatised Series

Feature Films

Mandatory: SGT & LT

■ *Twelve O'Clock High (1949)*

Director, Henry King. (132min)

This fictional film released in 1949 explores the moral and emotional challenges faced by the Eighth Air Force during the early days of daylight bombing raids on Germany. It tells the story of a General who takes a failing and disheartened bomber group and turns them into proud aviators. As the characters come to know each other, it highlights the psychological challenges of making life and death decisions for those under your command. While the story itself is fictional and based on a book of the same name, some of the shots shown of fighter planes is genuine footage.

■ *The Caine Mutiny (1954)*

Director, Edward Dmytryk. (124min)

Based on a book of the same name, this award winning film was released in 1954. It tells a fictional story of a minesweeper crew operating in the Pacific Theatre during World War Two. When the Captain begins to act strange and then freezes while facing a severe storm, the ships executive officer removes him from command. Back in the United States,

the executive officer must defend his actions and the division among the crew become clear. This film explores the moral and ethical decisions made by ship captains and other officers while at sea and their impacts on the ship's crew.

Mandatory: WO2 & CAPT

■ ***Paths of Glory (1957)***

Director, Stanley Kubrick. (88min)

Directed by Stanley Kubrick, *Paths of Glory* gives an insight into the heavy moral cost of war. Originally banned in the United States and parts of Europe, the film highlights the absence of empathy in war through the eyes of the main character Colonel Dax as he navigates sending men to their deaths and witnessing the inhumane treatment of captives. The film is a poignant reminder of the ethical challenge of war and the importance of small moments of shared humanity. This film and the book it is based on have been included on reading lists for members of the military for decades.

■ ***Master and Commander: the Far Side of the World (2003)***

Director, Peter Weir. (138min)

This is a movie adaptation of beloved author Patrick O'Brian's books on the Royal Navy in the age of sail, centred on the characters of Captain Jack Aubrey and his ship's physician Stephen Maturin. The movie splices together stories from several of the novels, specifically *Master and Commander* and the later book in the series, *The Far Side of the World*. It follows Aubrey and Maturin in the frigate HMS *Surprise* as they hunt a commerce raiding French ship (changed from the books, where the ship is American). The movie is an excellent adaptation of the books, true to the characters and themes: of duty and service, the loneliness of command, and leadership in war.

Extended Viewing: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

Saving Private Ryan (1998)

Director, Steven Spielberg. (169min)

Set in the first few days after the successful D-Day landings in Normandy, Spielberg's award-winning film offers some intensely realistic depictions of late-Second World War combat, especially in the opening half hour sequence devoted to the Rangers' landing at Omaha Beach. Loosely based on real events, the film has proven highly influential in shaping popular cultural views of American participation in the war and 'the greatest generation' who fought it.

Hamburger Hill (1987)

Director, John Irvin. (110min)

The film deals with the US assaults on Ap Bia mountain (or Hill 937) in May 1969 in which US forces made successive costly assaults and seized the feature only to abandon it soon after. The focus is on a single platoon in a single, specific operation, which allows consideration of the tensions within the sub-unit between veterans and replacements, across racial and rank lines, and between Americans and the local people. Not a great film, but a very good one.

Arn the Templar (2007)

Director, Peter Flinth. (139min)

A recent Swedish epic playing to the revival in cinematic interest in the Middle Ages, this one is more careful than most with the period detail. While the story is essentially fictional the broader context in which it unfolds is not, and the recreations of monastic life and service in the military religious orders in the Holy Land is well above average.

Capitaine Conan (1996)

Director, Bertrand Tavernier. (129min)

Set in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the film follows the activities of a French infantry company serving in Bulgaria. Long exposure to grinding combat has brutalised the soldiers and Conan discovers that his war service has left him unsuited to peacetime. Tavernier reflects on the martial values that have made his characters effective soldiers but leave them with nowhere to go in the absence of war. The film's climax returns the company to battle against Bolsheviks along the Soviet border but the contradictions explored in the film remain.

Days of Glory (2006)

Director, Rachid Bouchareb. (123min)

Released with the title *Indigenes* ('Natives') in French, the film looks at the experiences of North African men recruited into the French Army to fight for France through the eyes of an Algerian unit sent to take part in the liberation of France in 1944–45. The injustices and inequalities that come their way from the French military system even as they are fighting and dying for a country not their own are subtly handled; the climactic fight with a German company in a village in which the remnants of the Algerian unit has taken shelter is one of the best in recent cinema. About two thirds of the Free French Forces in 1944–45 were North Africans and black colonial soldiers who, following the war, had their Army pensions frozen by successive French governments; this injustice was partially reversed after the release of this film raised the question of their treatment for a new generation.

Intimate Enemies (2007)

Director, Florent Emilio Siri. (111min)

This is another intense recent French film that explores the stresses and contradictions inherent in France's attempt to hold on to Algeria against a vicious and successful insurgency. The film faces the issues of torture, atrocities, and conflict within the French forces over 'ends and means' squarely and without sentimentality. The 'war without a name' (1954–62) was largely off-limits as a subject in France for many years and this film was an important part of a move to re-open consideration of a controversial chapter in recent French history.

Alatriste (2006)

Director, Agustin Diaz Yanes. (145min)

The film is based on a series of novels by Arturo Perez-Reverte (available in English translation) and stars Viggo Mortensen (Aragorn in *The Lord of the Rings*) as a mercenary captain in Spanish service in the first half of the seventeenth century. A visually lush production, it ends with the climactic battle of Rocroi (1643) and the presumed death of the central character as the Spanish army is overwhelmed by their French adversaries.

Beneath Hill 60 (2010)

Director, Jeremy Sims. (122min)

Drawing on the activities of the 1st Australian Tunnelling Company on the Western Front, this recent Australian film won generally positive accolades for its depictions of the war underground and the stresses and dangers of the tunnellers' war. Although it plays to the apparent need in Australian films to caricature British officers, the general presentation of the realities of war on the Western Front is plausible and convincing.

Zulu (1964)

Director, Cy Endfield. (138min)

A classic film and highly influential on other filmmakers, this account of the defence of Rorke's Drift by a company of the 24th Regiment in the Zulu War of 1879 is unlikely to be bettered. Dramatic and compelling, it is nonetheless a good example of the liberties that feature film takes with historical events in order to improve a good story.

Apocalypse Now (1979)

Director, Francis Ford Coppola. (147min)

Based on Joseph Conrad's novel *Heart of Darkness*, a young Army captain is sent on a mission to eliminate a 'rogue' colonel waging his own war in-country. Filled with memorable lines and scenes ('I love the smell of napalm in the morning ... smells like victory', 'terminate, with extreme prejudice', 'Charlie don't surf '), the film is more philosophical than strictly historical in its meditations on truth, corruption and the brutalising effects of war.

Gettysburg (1993)

Director, Ron Maxwell. (254min)

Based on Michael Shaara's novel *The Killer Angels* (1974), the film offers an epic treatment of the three-day Battle of Gettysburg in 1863. More than four hours long, it concentrates on three key events in the battle, one for each day: the initial defence of Gettysburg by Buford's Union cavalry and Reynold's infantry corps as an encounter battle; the desperate defence of Little Round Top by Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine; and 'Pickett's charge' and the 'highwater mark of the Confederacy' on the afternoon of the third day. Made with thousands of re-enactors as extras and a galaxy of heavy weight names in the major roles, the film takes pains with the history while respecting the need to tell a good story.

The Frontline (2011)

Director, Hun Jang. (133min)

The official Korean entry for best foreign film at the 2012 Academy Awards, it deals with a battle fought by a unit of the ROK Army on the eastern end of the fighting line in the days and hours before the 1953 ceasefire is due to come into effect. 'Soldiers live and die by orders' says one of the characters, and the film asks questions about the purpose and sometimes futility of fighting for little obvious gain, set against a visually compelling recreation of the vicious positional warfare that characterised the second half of the Korean War.

Battle for Haditha (2007)

Director, Nick Broomfield. (97min)

Uses a documentary style and a largely unknown cast to recreate events surrounding the killing of civilians at Haditha in Al Anbar, Iraq in late 2005. The film plays no favourites and shows how events can quickly get out of hand and that the stresses soldiers face in a counterinsurgent environment can lead to disastrous outcomes.

The Hurt Locker (2009)

Director, Kathryn Bigelow. (131min)

An award-winning and highly acclaimed account of a bomb disposal team operating in Iraq in the early stages of the insurgency, the film seeks 'to immerse the audience' in the experience of combat in Iraq. While generally regarded as the best of the Iraq War movies thus far, it has been criticised by some US veterans for technical inaccuracies.

Restrepo (2010)

Directors, Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington. (93min)

Another award-winning film, this time a documentary on the war in Afghanistan that follows the deployment of a platoon of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Korengal Valley. The directors were embedded with the unit during its 15-month tour.

The Thin Red Line (1998)

Director, Terrence Malick. (170min)

The Thin Red Line is based on a book of the same name and - with a huge line-up of famous actors – explores the competition between peace and war. Director Terrence Malick fought in the Guadalcanal campaign and brings authenticity and vulnerability to some of the most hardened characters. Malick magnificently conveys the inner dialogue of some of those fighting through voice overs and poignant conversations among friends. As the film progresses, each character faces their own challenges and confronts the reality of war. *The Thin Red Line* was nominated for seven Oscar Awards when it was released in 1998 and is still considered one of the great war films.

DOCUMENTARIES

Extended Viewing: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT

The Civil War (1990)

Director, Ken Burns. (690min)

Ken Burns' magnificent and incredibly influential take on the American Civil War. The 'Ken Burns effect', involving panning and zooming with still images, is widely imitated and has become an 'industry standard'.

The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the life of Robert S McNamara (2003)

Director, Errol Morris. (107min)

This documentary on Robert S McNamara has been praised for its candour and introspection. Looking back on his time as Secretary of Defense in the lead up to and during the Vietnam and Cold Wars, McNamara confronts his decisions openly and honestly. While only short, at less than 2hrs, the film is broken down into 11 sections, each based on lessons learnt. Each has ongoing applicability to decision making in the fog of war and should be carefully considered by those responsible for the lives of others.

The War (2007)

Director, Ken Burns. (867min)

Burn's treatment of the impact and experience of the Second World War on the United States through treatment of four otherwise unremarkable American towns. The intent is made clear in the voice introduction to each episode: 'The Second World War was fought in thousands of places, too many for any one accounting. This is the story of four American towns and how their citizens experienced that war.'

The Great War (1964)

Director, Tony Essex. (1040min)

A classic 26-part series produced by the BBC for the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of war, containing numerous interviews with participants who were then in their sixties and seventies and who speak cogently and at length of their experiences. John Terraine was the major influence on the interpretations offered.

The World at War (1973)

Directors, Hugh Raggett, John Pett, David Elstein, Ted Childs, Michael Darlow, Martin Smith. (1352min)

In its day the most expensive program commissioned for British television, and making innovative use of early colour footage, this 26-part series also included extensive interviews with a wide range of key participants. *The World at War* is still regarded as 'the' classic World War 2 documentary.

The First World War (2003)

Directors, Corina Sturmer, Marcus Kiggell, Simon Rockwell. (503min)

Charting the war across ten episodes and based on the bestselling book by Oxford Historian Hew Strachan, this series drew on more recent concerns with the social, economic and cultural dimensions of the war while giving even-handed and extensive treatment to areas other than the Western Front.

Culloden (1964)

Director, Peter Watkins. (69min)

Another pioneering work, this time a 'docudrama' written by Peter Watkins for BBC and dealing with the defeat of the Jacobites by the British Army in 1746. It was made in black-and-white with an amateur cast and extensive use of hand-held camera technique. Controversial in its time for stressing the brutality of the battle and its aftermath and for a sympathetic, non-romanticised depiction of the destruction of the clan army.

Australians at War (2001)

Directors, Steve Best, Geoff Burton, Tim Clark, David Goldie. (446min)

An eight-part series dealing with the Australian experience of war from the South African War onwards. Extensive use of interviews and a willingness to deal with 'hard' issues, such as killing of enemy wounded. The full suite of interviews—more than 2000 individuals and over 10,000 hours—plus transcripts are available online at <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/> (8 episodes roughly 55mins each = 7.3hrs)

The Sorrow and the Pity (Le chagrin et la pitié) (1969)

Director, Marcel Ophüls. (251min)

Powerful French documentary that punctures the myth that most Frenchmen hated the Germans and worked against the occupation between 1940–44. It makes extensive use of interviews and contemporary footage, and was banned in France until the 1980s.

DRAMATISED SERIES**Extended Viewing: SGT, WO2, LT & CAPT*****Band of Brothers (2001)***

Created by Tom Hanks and Steven Spielberg. (705min)

This HBO miniseries is based on the 1992 book by Stephen A. Ambrose, with additional research and memoirs used for the series. It is focused on E (Easy) Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. The series follows them from initial training in the US through to preparation for battle in England and then their first combat jump into Europe as part of Operation Overlord, through Operation Market Garden, the Battle of the Bulge, and the end of the war. It is primarily a story of camaraderie and brotherhood under fire. Ambrose based his narrative on the recollections of a few core members of the Company, specifically Major Richard 'Dick' Winters, and so many of the personal relationships and characterisations are based on these more subjective accounts. Nevertheless, it is a powerful series, eminently deserving of the high regard with which it is still held over two decades after its release.

Advanced Reading

WAR

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ **Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (3rd Edition)**

This highly acclaimed study was originally published in 1973, and the 3rd edition has been expanded to include a complete discussion of World War II and the road towards nuclear war. Analysing conflict over the last three centuries, *The Causes of War* explains and interrogates numerous theories on the causes of war and how these have evolved over time, using historical examples and searching for patterns. Blainey's insights into the genesis of international armed conflict demand simultaneous consideration of causes of peace, and thus provides an invaluable resource for deeper understanding of conflict (and its resolution), geopolitics, and international relations.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Colin S Gray, *Another Bloody Century***

A masterful exploration of the theory of warfare and how our best view and prediction for future wars comes from the mirror of the past. With a prominent reliance upon the work of Clausewitz, Gray argues that while causes, techniques and the technologies of warfare may and likely will change over time, the fundamental nature of war is as an extension of politics: an escalation to the use of force to impose one's will on the enemy.

Another Bloody Century encapsulates Gray's wide-ranging predictions for what future of conflict will look like: from the treatment of geopolitics and possible uses of NATO to cyber and space warfare.

■ John A Lynne, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*

Consciously fashioned in part as a refutation of arguments advanced by Victor Davis Hanson, Lynn agrees with the latter on the key importance of culture in shaping the ways nations fight, and on little else. In a series of case studies ranging from Classical Greece to the Egyptian assault on the Bar Lev line during the Yom Kippur War, he discusses the ways in which culture and warfare interact in different societies through the ages. He also argues that many societies have maintained a discourse or representation of war and military activity that is at variance with the realities of war in their time.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Gwynne Dyer, *War: the lethal custom*

While there can never be one definitive volume on a topic as vast and varied as 'war', Gwynne Dwyer has done an admirable job of writing a book about the custom of war, placing it within historical and cultural contexts. This is a large book, brimming with information, not all of which will be absorbed on first reading. It is well worth the effort, however, being one of the best books on the subject that is currently available. This book reminds the reader that war is a natural condition of human beings. Dwyer explains why this is so, and goes a long way to explaining how war has evolved.

Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes*

The recent emphasis on 'culture' as an explanation for differences in the ways that armies, nations and peoples fight is subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting, at least in the more simplistic ways in which 'culture' has been offered as a key factor in the changing character of war. Porter argues that 'culture matters', but that it must be used carefully like any other complex analytical tool if it is not to mislead.

Jeremy Black, *War and the Cultural Turn*

Another volume from the highly prolific pen of Jeremy Black, this book examines the cultural dynamics of warfare. He argues that culture, like any other variable, is a changeable and not a constant force in military activity and that cultural 'explanations' for military behaviour and outcomes need to be used with discrimination and an awareness of the dangers of simplification. He warns that 'culture' is in danger of taking the place of 'technology' as a 'grab-all' explanation that may not, in fact, explain that which it seeks to describe. He makes his case with a series of case studies drawn from the Renaissance to the immediate present.

Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*

This is a work of panoramic scope that examines the interplay of technological and social change, warfare and shifts in epochal constitutional orders. Bobbitt applies Clausewitz's insight as to the intimate connection between politics and warfare and examines the evolution of the liberal democratic constitutional order that prevails in much of the West today.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS (ADVANCED) AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ Michael Hastings, *The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War in Afghanistan*

This account expands on Hastings' explosive revelations for *Rolling Stone* magazine in which he accompanied General Stanley McChrystal and staff across Europe in 2010 to build additional allied assistance for the US-led war in Afghanistan. There, Hastings described the key characters of the Afghan leadership, and recorded unguarded opinions from McChrystal's staff criticising 'what they saw as a lack of leadership' from the Obama administration. These reports saw McChrystal summoned to Washington where he was ultimately sacked. A book not without faults, it contains some salient lessons about how militaries and journalists interact and report on wars.

■ **Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State***

First published in 1957, this classic text develops and advances Huntington's theory of the ideal model of civil-military relations that advocates for a stark division between politics and the military. The text's salient focus is Huntington's account of historic and contemporaneous US civil-military relationships where, examining the historical conflict between the imperatives of military professionalism and a liberal culture, he critiques the undesirable (and escapable) politicisation of the military and the concomitant political influence of military in public life. A military populated by professional soldiers is essential – and *The Soldier and the State* advocates for a professional officer class arising from those who both bear responsibility and possess the requisite expertise coupled with the crucial dedication to service. In a contemporary society with increasing investment in the ADF's role in Australian society and actions both at home and abroad, this text poses important questions for all ranks about the intersection between the military and the political world.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Jorg Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the US Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940***

This is an important (though intemperate) study of the relationship between officer education and the evolution of command culture culminating in the Second World War. Muth is highly critical of the training that US officers received at the tactical level, while equally faulting German officers' moral failure and performance at the operational and strategic levels. He is especially good (i.e., highly critical) on the weaknesses of the US system at the institutional level.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Harold Winton, '*An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession*', *Journal of Strategic Studies*

Argues that theory should be 'studied assiduously but used with caution'. Winton uses several US case studies to underpin his argument and provides assessments of the ongoing utility of both Clausewitz and Jomini to the military profession.

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*

The classic book on just war theory, originally published in 1977. Now a little dated, since each new edition only includes an updated preface which discusses an issue of concern at the time (4th Edition preface discusses regime change and just war, 3rd Edition preface discusses humanitarian intervention, 2nd Edition discusses the 1991 Gulf War). Later editions do not include the prefaces to previous editions, so the 4th Edition only has the original preface plus the one discussing regime change.

Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*

A discussion of how just war theory has changed through history and how it might apply in the modern world. This includes examination of recent major military conflicts to identify evolving thinking in the just war tradition, and how historically enduring moral rules are being applied and verified. It includes discussion of problems of terrorism and preemptive self-defence as well as discussion of the main alternatives to just war theory: realism and pacifism.

Michael L Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict*

As the subtitle suggests, this book examines some contentious issues in modern warfare, including limitations on the use of both lethal and non-lethal weapons, assassination and targeted killing, terrorism and counterterrorism, and humanitarian military intervention. The author scrutinizes how asymmetric conflict has altered how we think about war, and offers a practical discussion for soldiers, policy makers and scholars.

Paolo Tripodi and Jessica Wolfendale (eds.), *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*

An edited collection of papers discussing modern interpretations of just war theory, problems in humanitarian intervention, new technologies in the battlefield, private contractors, combat training and psychological problems for combatants. This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis across the breath of military ethics and the state of modern warfare.

David Whetham (ed), *Ethics, Law and Military Operations*

Aimed at mid-ranking officers, this book provides a discussion of the ethical and legal problems faced at the operational planning level. The book explores legal and normative issues across the spectrum of military operations, providing a frameworks for assessing and applying fundamental legal and ethical concept within the contemporary operating environment.

Shannon French, *The Code of the Warrior*

An examination of warrior codes through history, from ancient times through to modern terrorists. This book examines the ethical dimensions of emerging military technology such as drones, cyber warfare, and bio-enhanced troops, providing an assessment against the backdrop of historic and modern warrior codes. The central questions examined are: 'Why do warriors need codes of behavior, why were such codes important in the past, and are such codes still relevant today?'

Peter Rose, *Soldier's Conscience: The Ethical Complexity of Vietnam Service*

A series of case studies examining ethical problems that actually arose for an Australian Engineering officer and his colleagues during their period of service in Vietnam.

Peter W Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*

An examination of the ethical problems that have arisen due to the rise of private military companies and contracted personnel in modern conflicts. This book provides an account of the privatised military industry and its broader implications, inclusive of how the business works, as well as portraits of each of the basic types of companies (tactical providers, military consultants and logistical support companies). The author highlights how the introduction of the profit motive onto the battlefield raises ethical, security and human rights questions.

Peter W Singer, *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century*

An examination of the ethical problems that have arisen out of the development of new military technologies. It includes discussion of remotely piloted and semiautonomous vehicles, automation of weapons systems, developments in the area of non-lethal weapons, cyber warfare, and so on. The author synthesizes historical evidence with interviews to show how technology is changing not just how wars are fought, but also the politics, economics, laws, and the ethics that surround war.

Stephen Coleman, *Military Ethics: An Introduction with Case Studies*

This book provides a practical introduction to the real-life ethical issues faced by those serving in modern military forces, and is of particular relevance to those serving in leadership positions at the cutting edge of military operations. It includes more than fifty specially selected case studies, many previously unpublished, which enable the reader to examine, in a real and understandable way, the ethical problems that military personnel face in modern operations, including professional military obligations, the problems of operations in irregular military environments, and the problem of responding to terrorist tactics.

Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*

Authored by a Veteran Affairs psychiatrist, *Achilles in Vietnam* is Dr Jonathan Shay's compassionate and moving effort to foster understanding and empathy for the effects of war on those who fight it. Treating Vietnam combat veterans diagnosed with PTSD, Shay repeatedly encountered devastating stories of men's lives torn apart by the psychological devastation of war and how soldiers returning from combat in Vietnam became unable to function in society. *Achilles in Vietnam* draws parallels between these veterans and the soldiers of Homer's Iliad to illustrate the ongoing effects of combat trauma. War damages the mind and spirit – the timelessness of this fact makes Shay's work persistently relevant for the military leaders and commanders of today.

Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*

Fiasco is an exploration of the decision-making behind the plans to invade Iraq and the actions, both on the ground and in Washington, once the invasion had begun. From the first sentence, this book is a denouncement of the whole Iraq 'adventure', which the author argues was based on bad premises and deceptions. Such misdirected reasoning led to forces on the ground that were never aware of the real nature of their mission, and muddled strategy that has led to unnecessary deaths and a country on the brink of civil war. This book, dense with information and analysis, will probably become the 'go-to' book for future readers looking for information about the Iraq conflict, with its ability to lead the reader through the various aspects of a complicated and ill-begotten military fiasco.

Mark Willacy, *Rogue Forces: an explosive insiders' account of Australian SAS war crimes in Afghanistan*

Winner of the 2022 Prime Minister's Literary Award for Non-fiction, *Rogue Forces* is a compelling and confronting piece of investigative journalism into alleged SAS war crimes in Afghanistan. Preceded by Willacy's award-winning *Four Corners* program, 'Killing Fields', *Rogue Forces* draws upon the testimonies of those encouraged to come forward in the program's aftermath, and who shared harrowing insights into a culture of brutality, excessive liberty and poor leadership that facilitated the horrific actions of a few. This book is an essential read for all military personnel as a reminder of the terrible consequences that can result when discipline and leadership fail.

COMMAND

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ **Garth Pratten, *Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War***

This is an outstanding analysis of infantry battalion command in the Australian Army that strips away popular stereotypes and considers the reality. Pratten shows that soldiers had most faith in commanding officers in whose professional competence they could trust and rely, regardless of whether they conformed to populist ideas of what a commanding officer should be. The book concludes that commanding officers as individuals and the Army as an organisation had to adapt to the changing demands of the war, and that the wartime profile of battalion commanders changed not only by the war's end, but by its middle years as well.

■ **Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, *Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green***

Written with the cooperation of the Ministry of Defence and based on extensive interviews with those involved supported by the operational records from the campaign, this book provides a hard-hitting critique of command style and failure. In particular it examines the system of 'restrictive control' as practiced by Lieutenant Colonel 'H' Jones and contrasts it unfavourably with 'directive command'.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War***

A study of command over two millennia, *Command in War* traces the evolution of command and control alongside the development of warfare from the ancient world to the late 20th Century. Van Creveld examines the scope of command problems – including staff organisation and administration, communication methods and technologies, weaponry, and logistics – to analyse how these problems influence, and are influenced by, military strategy. Technological advances have not fundamentally changed the problem of command; rather, command must be tailored to the troops and the mission, rather than remaining static. Among the book's key

conclusions is that progress in command invariably revolves around finding ways to transcend the limitations of the current technology or capability rather than being reliant on technological advances; a valuable reminder in an ever-increasingly computerised military world.

■ **Lawrence Freedman, *Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine***

In war, command is about forging and implementing effective strategies and ensuring appropriate, timely, well-communicated orders are obeyed to achieve objectives. But as Freedman explores in this text, beyond its centrality to military action and leadership the concept of command is also deeply political. Taking a global perspective of the revolution of military command since the Second World War through a series of eleven case studies, *Command* investigates the practice and politics of command as it has evolved through a range of serious conflicts and influenced by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. In thus illuminating the political nature of strategy, *Command* clearly demonstrates how military decision-making remains inseparable from civilian priorities, and the necessity for commanders to navigate politics as well as warfare.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Herbert R McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*

The author, who at time of writing the book was a serving member of the US military and had recently been cleared for promotion to two-star rank, has compiled a well-researched history of the actions of President Johnson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the lead-up to the Vietnam War. Dense with recollections of actual correspondence and conversations, this gives an exhaustive—and damning—account of the slide into disaster. It leads the reader to consider what level of responsibility is held by both military and civilian leaders when it comes to the planning of military intervention and conflict, and at what stage a campaign gains its own momentum and becomes ‘inevitable’.

David Horner, *Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat 1941–1943*

A classic account that subjects the interwar and wartime rivalries within the Australian Army to cold-eyed analysis. Horner dissects the tensions between regular and militia officers, and within both these commissioning streams, and examines the interplay between these and the series of reverses and crises in Papua in 1942 that led to several celebrated sackings of senior officers and further poisoned the well of internal relations between senior ranks.

Gary W Gallagher (ed.), *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander*

Commander of the artillery in Longstreet's Corps at Gettysburg at the advanced age of twenty-eight, Alexander was an engineer, artilleryist and staff officer whose lengthy recollections provide a rich and varied account of virtually all the major engagements in the Eastern theatre of the Civil War, in nearly all of which he was personally involved. His closeness to the senior figures of the Army of Northern Virginia and his discussion of operations and personalities with candour and clarity make this an unrivalled Confederate perspective on the Civil War and ranks it as one of the key participant memoirs to emerge from that conflict.

Basil H Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American*

William Tecumseh Sherman is sometimes regarded as 'the quintessential American soldier'. Liddell Hart was drawn by the parallels in trench warfare between Virginia 1864–65 and his own experiences on the Western Front. In this study Sherman becomes a vehicle for the development of Liddell Hart's ideas about the strategy of the indirect approach and the revival of mobility in warfare that was a significant strand in Liddell Hart's thinking and advocacy between the two World Wars. The treatment of Grant is overly critical and Liddell Hart perhaps misses the fact that Grant and Sherman were engaged in pursuing complementary and not rival strategies, but the book remains an important example of the maturing of Liddell Hart's strategic thinking. Sherman should perhaps be read alongside Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought*.

Alex Danchev and Dan Todman (eds.), *War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke*

These diaries caused enormous consternation in Britain when partially published in the 1950s, since they presented an unflattering picture of Churchill as a strategist and of the command process at its very highest levels. This much fuller edition includes much more of the original diaries and should be read with the understanding that Brooke, one of the ablest heads of the British Army in the twentieth century, was under enormous pressure for most of the war and used his diaries as an outlet for his frustrations. They provide a nuanced picture of the complexities of the highest direction of the British war effort and should be read alongside Eliot Cohen's *Supreme Command*.

David Horner, *Strategic Commander: General Sir John Wilton and Australia's Asian Wars*

General Sir John Wilton was one of the most significant senior officers that the Australian Army has produced, his career spanning more than forty years. It began before the Second World War as a graduate from the RMC and ended with command of Australian forces during the Vietnam War. As Horner outlines, Wilton's story provides lessons on a number of levels—staff officer and tactician, institutional manager and innovator, and strategic operator. Wilton's career also provides a case study on civil-military relations. As Chief of the General Staff (now Chief of Army) and Chairman of the Chief of Staff's Committee (now Chief of the Defence Force) Wilton was responsive to a series of prime ministers and Defence ministers.

Thomas E Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*

Published in 2012, *The Generals* explores the history of American military command, emphasising the growing divide between performance and accountability in the US military's upper echelons. In the context of historical generals such as Matthew Ridgeway (Korea), David Petraeus (Iraq), George Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower (World War II), Ricks argues that poor management of the American Army's senior officers, and a failure to hold them accountable, is directly responsible for the declining performance of the American Army. Among *The Generals'* key themes is the difference between an organisation that learns and one that fails, a vital thought exercise for all members of modern militaries, in a world evolving at an unprecedented rate.

STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ **Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age***

Makers of Modern Strategy comprises twenty-nine essays analysing war, its strategic characteristics and its political and social functions over the past five centuries. This text spans a vast array of themes and perspectives through to the end of the Cold War – including theorists such as Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels; political and military leaders including Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao; and the interaction of theory and experience over generations. Every essay capably orientates the specifics of military thought and action within the broader political, social, and economic milieu. *Makers of Modern Strategy* is essential reading for any student of war and those with a keen interest in military theory.

■ **Hal Brands, *New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age***

Following in the footsteps of *Makers of Modern Strategy*, this comprehensive anthology of essays by world-class scholars brings a keen focus to the evolving landscape of warfare and the strategic challenges engendered by the digital age. Amongst the text's key achievements is an ability to draw parallels between historical and modern strategic thought, with vital attention devoted to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. In evaluating the timeless requirements of effective strategy and the revolutionary changes that challenge contemporary strategists, these contributors brilliantly capture the complexities of warfare in the twenty-first century.

■ **Edward N Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace***

The author of more than a dozen books, Luttwak is an internationally recognised scholar in the area of military strategy. In this breakthrough work he addresses the idea of strategy at all of its levels. Luttwak's most important insights are that strategy follows a paradoxical non-linear logic and the need to avoid being defeated by the extent of your own success.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Williamson Murray, Alvin Bernstein and MacGregor Knox, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War***

This book's objective is to provide the reader with an understanding of the varied factors that influence the formulation and outcome of national strategies. It offers a tour de force of historical examples, ranging from the origins of strategy under the Athenians to the intricacies of the nuclear age. It is comprehensive, inclusive and written by leading scholars.

■ **Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective***

In this engaging and thought-provoking book, Strachan examines the interaction of policy, strategy, and operational frameworks. Contending that the wars of the 21st Century in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to widespread frustration and a sense of failure, *The Direction of War* asserts that these failures resulted from fundamental misreading and misapplication of strategy.

Using detailed historical studies leading into an analysis of modern civil-military relations, Strachan argues that the US and Britain must adopt a more historical approach to contemporary strategy to identify what is really changing – and what isn't working – in how we wage war. A vital read for enhancing one's understanding of national strategic thought.

■ **Colin S Gray, *Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion***

Published in 2015 by the US Joint Special Operations University, this 62-page report examines how tactical operations can be converted into strategic effects. As Gray outlines throughout, this conversion often does not occur, potentially due to wide misunderstanding of what tactics and strategy actually are and how they differ. Comprised of three parts, Part One examines the problem, namely the disharmony between the levels of action and the desired consequences. Part Two then explores how strategy and tactics can be differentiated. Finally, in Part Three Gray argues that, for the special forces community to enhance its strategic effect, it needs to ensure its role in modern warfare is better understood both internally and externally.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Archer Jones, *Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach*

The focus is American, but Jones uses US historical experience from the early conflict with Native Americans, through to the Second World War, and the Gulf and Vietnam Wars, to illustrate developments and continuities in strategic and operational theory and practice. The book is an excellent example of the intersection of good history with serious consideration of strategic art.

Steven Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*

Developments in Iraq and their impact on US military and national strategy are the book's primary focus, but it sets these in the context of evolving US national strategy in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and with additional emphasis on counterterrorism and the growth in thinking about counterinsurgency. Metz is highly critical of American inability to deal with opponents whose cultural contexts and worldview differ from their own, and has some highly pertinent things to say about dealing with the enemy you face rather than the one you expect or have prepared to meet.

John Stone, *Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War*

Concentrating on the 19th and 20th centuries and with particular emphasis on strategic practice in Western democracies from the Second World War to the 'War on Terror', Stone examines the function of strategy (defined as 'the instrumental link between military means and political ends'), and argues that effective strategy reflects the political context in which it is derived. Like Clausewitz, he sees politics as the key determinant and argues that an overemphasis on techniques and technologies frequently leads to failure.

Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*

This big, thick book grapples with the history of strategic thought and its implications for current and recent practice. It is not an easy read, but repays the effort. The first chapter, which examines the ways in which the concept of 'strategy' has been understood across time is worth the price of admission by itself.

**Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey,
*The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy and War***

Just as happened after the Vietnam War, when the US military turned to Clausewitz to make sense of its defeat, the US military has renewed its interest in the study of strategy—the relationship and interaction of ways, means and ends—informed by recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. This collection takes as its first premise that grand strategy is the prerogative of great states ‘and great states alone’. A series of historical case studies explores the implications of grand strategy. Great states may practice it, but smaller and medium states frequently feel the consequences of its employment.

William Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict*

A critique of United Nations’ peacekeeping missions during the 1990s, the author explains how the United Nations is often hamstrung by its own member states and their inability to act, rather than the organisation of the United Nations itself. Based mainly on his own high-level access to world leaders and bureaucrats, Shawcross gives an in-depth analysis not only of the missions the United Nations endeavours to carry out, but also the *realpolitik* basis for why these missions usually fail to realise their objectives.

Arthur Herman, *Freedom’s Forge: how American business built the arsenal of democracy that won World War II*

This gripping and rarely told narrative recounts America’s entry into World War II and the vital role of American industry in their subsequent successes. *Freedom’s Forge* explores in detail how the United States’ industrial capacity was realised through rapid expansion – from producing a few aeroplanes per annum to over 90,000 aircraft in 1944 alone. In particular, Herman discusses the crucial roles of automobile magnate William Knudsen and shipbuilder Henry J. Kaiser in corralling and inspiring business leaders around the country to support the war effort. In recreating American industry’s finest hour, *Freedom’s Forge* offers a fascinating insight into the astonishing efforts of American business in helping the Allies win World War II and is a superb resource for all students of military history.

Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: the politics of national security - from World War II to the War on Terrorism*

This political history text uses original archival findings to explore national security lawmaking from the early 20th Century to 2008 and in doing so, clearly illustrates how partisan fighting has always shaped American foreign policy. Recognising that the issue of national security has always been part of US domestic conflict, Zelizer provides engaging new insight into how this has eventuated throughout key epochs of American history – from FDR’s management of World War II through to Reagan’s fight against communism and George W Bush’s War on Terror. This definitive account of sixty years of interplay between US domestic politics and foreign affairs is essential reading for students of the politics of national security.

Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*

This is a comprehensive account of the largest naval battle of the First World War, Jutland, where the British and German battle fleets met for the first and only time during the war. This book explores the battle from more than just a tactical or warfighting perspective. It is, as the title suggests, about leadership. Gordon explores the culture of the Navy that set the environment in which the battle was fought. It looks at culture, training, and doctrine, as well as the aftermath of the battle.

Elbridge A Colby, *The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict*

The lead architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Elbridge A Colby presents a clear framework for the changes need in America’s defense in response to China’s growing power and ambition. Deeply engaged with current policy, *The Strategy of Denial* outlines the necessary goals for America’s confrontation with China, how US military strategy must change, and the need to prioritise these goals over lesser interest – including a strong case for Europe managing Russia’s growing threat. Colby argues for American security first, and as such his book is an essential and rewarding read for Australian army officers in seeking to better understand one of the world’s most important security issues.

Gideon Rose, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle*

In this piercing and critical text, Rose scrutinises the past century of US military history to argue that despite the ability to dominate the battlefield, the USA has repeatedly demonstrated a failure to create a stable post-war environment. While Iraq and Afghanistan offer potent 21st Century examples, *How Wars End* convincingly argues that rather than exceptions to the rule, these wars provide further examples of a trend that began with Woodrow Wilson in World War I through to the four US Presidents caught up in Vietnam. *How Wars End* asserts that creation of a stable political outcome should be the goal of all wartime plans; certainly, the shifting and uncertain contemporary political environment only reinforces the relevance of this text now and into the future.

Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influence*

Originally published in 1966, this landmark book by Nobel laureate Thomas C Schelling concentrates on how military capabilities – real or imagined – are used as bargaining power on the global stage. Schelling uses game theory in the context of international relations to explain the state actors' behaviours and analyse international strategy, and among his key arguments is that the use of military might as a bargaining tool is, in fact, diplomacy: the diplomacy of violence. Considered a classic on nuclear strategy, this book is vital reading for anyone working in foreign policy, especially around issues of national and international security.

Ian M Easton, *The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia*

A skilful blend of strategic, operational, and tactical concepts, *The Chinese Invasion Threat* expertly illustrates the possible horrors of a future invasion of Taiwan. Published in 2017, Easton draws on internal Chinese military documents and restricted access studies to illuminate the shadowy world of conflict planning and strategy, espionage and national security. *The Chinese Invasion Threat* is essential for militaries with an interest towards, or operating within, the Pacific.

James D Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism*

In *Special Operations and Strategy*, James D Kiras explores how special operations, and their strategic effects, have been generally poorly understood. The root of strategically effective special operations, he argues, is in the concept of strategic attrition and the continual infliction of moral and material damage upon an enemy by both conventional and special operations force. Kiras utilises a number of case studies within this book to explore his argument, while offering a theoretical framework on how special operations can best achieve strategic effects for practitioners and scholars alike.

OPERATIONAL ART

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld, *The Evolution of Operational Art: from Napoleon to the Present*

Operational art – the ‘grey area between strategy and tactics’ – has always existed, encompassing the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in a theatre of operations. Yet, as a distinct concept that encapsulates a systemic deliberate plan of campaign for major operations, the idea of operational art is only roughly two centuries old. *The Evolution of Operational Art* explores this developmental trajectory through individual chapters dedicated to country-specific case studies, including the Soviet Union / Russia, the United States, Israel, and China.

■ Brian S Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero*

In this important work, Brian S. Petit offers a useful examination in how special operations forces can support operational art in non-wartime environments. Utilising case studies from Yemen, Indonesia, Thailand, and Columbia, the author argues that small, highly skilled, joint-force teams can have a significant, outsized influence on the maintenance of peace, mitigation of conflict, and the prevention or early resolution of crises. By their very nature, these kinds of operations and effects have received far

less attention than the more visible and headline-grabbing deep raids and close combat actions, but they are a fundamental capability of any modern special operations force.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ Brett A Friedman, *On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines*

Friedman traces the developmental history of military staffs and concepts of the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to the present day, considering how military staff organisation has manifested in Prussia / Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States over time. Based on this analysis, *On Operations* argues that the operational level of war is fundamentally flawed and should be rejected, proposing alternate methods of staff organisation to be explored in the future. Well-researched and thought-provoking, *On Operations* poses important questions about how best military staffs manage the complexity of modern military operations, and whether their current structure best allows them to do so.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Justin Kelly and Michael James Brennan, *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy*

Alien is an extensively researched, fast-paced book which argues for the return of military campaign design to the political and strategic leadership of the country, rather than being held at the operational level of war. In the modern day, tactics and statecraft are no longer immediately and intimately connected – rather, the actions of contemporary militaries are increasingly removed from the observation and influence of the political leaders who have ostensibly directed them, and who thus have reduced oversight of the strategic importance of tactical actions. The result, the authors argue, is that while militaries may have a demonstrated ability to win battles, these may not necessarily contribute to strategic success: creating ‘a way of battle rather than a way of war’. An interesting and engaging read that questions the validity of the operational level of war as a venue for campaign design (which is driven by strategic goals), rather than remaining focused on the tactics required to win battles.

Chris Smith, *Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century*

In this *Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper*, Chris Smith explores ways to improve the design of campaigns and operations in the 21st Century. In this volume, Smith explores the evolution of modern warfare, operational art and strategy, and their mastery in the Australian context. As Smith articulates, the problems of strategy and operational art are unique and dynamic, requiring practitioners to maintain an adaptive mental stance and approach to problem solving, and exercise bold action when necessary.

William H McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*

This work, written by a former US SEAL Team Commander, outlines six essential principles for the conduct of special operations: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. These are explored through analysis of eight historical 'spec ops' activities (six from WWII, two from the 1970s), that are selected and linked by the achievement of partial or complete success. McRaven's focused case studies provide consistency of assessment across each historical mission, demonstrating the criticality of each of the six principles to mission success.

INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*

Spanning 700 years, this collection of essays considers a series of military revolutions that have altered the basic context of waging war. The authors take a broad approach to their subject, addressing the social, political, technological and institutional change that shaped the evolution of the Western way of war. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* is an important introduction to the subject of military innovation.

■ **Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military***

Winner of the 1992 National Security Book Award, *Winning the Next War* provides a critical analysis of the process of military innovation. Relying on case studies, Rosen compares the efficiencies of innovation in wartime and peacetime, and the effect of technological advances on the need and pace of adaptation. *Winning the Next War's* primary contribution, however, is its understanding of the innovation process and the identification of the factors that shape the direction of military change.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Williamson Murray and Allan R Millett (eds.), *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period***

The volume brings together a series of comparative studies of British, German and American experience in adaptation and innovation between the two world wars. Subjects include developments in armoured warfare and mechanisation, surface and sub-surface war at sea and developments in maritime aviation, and the exploitation of the electro-magnetic sphere through developments in radio and radar. The book concludes with several deeply insightful chapters on the patterns of military innovation and the difficulties of innovation in peacetime.

■ **Williamson Murray, *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change***

Murray is one of the most important US scholars dealing with the issues of innovation, adaptation, technology and military organisations. Along with a valuable essay on the historical framework of adaptation, Murray here provides case studies across the twentieth century on land, sea and air culminating with the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He concludes that a capacity to adapt successfully at the strategic, technological, operational and tactical levels simultaneously is the hallmark of an advanced and highly professionally-educated military culture.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

David Barno and Nora Bensahel, *Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime*

Clearly written and thoroughly researched, *Adaptation Under Fire* critically examines how and why the US military must become more adaptable in preparation for future wars. Exploring the complexity and importance of rapid adaptation in the military, especially while in conflict, Barno and Bensahel examine doctrine, technology, and leadership changes across three historical eras to identify the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable. The authors convincingly argue that while militaries must make significant choices for future conflicts without definitively knowing their nature – yet it is the ability to adapt quickly and effectively to unforeseen circumstances that will define success on the battlefield. Concluding with innovative recommendations for improving military adaptability in the future, *Adaptation Under Fire* is essential reading for all military personnel seeking to improve their own adaptability and prepare for future war.

Harold R Winton and David R Mets (eds.), *Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941*

Challenge of Change presents a series of essays that focus on military change during the interwar period, an era whose technological advances rival the complexity of the present information revolution. The contributors examine how US and European military institutions attempted to meet the demands of emerging strategic, political and technological realities.

Jon T Hoffman (ed.), *A History of Innovation: US Army Adaptation in War and Peace*

A series of short focused articles that examine innovation not only in equipment and technological applications, as one might expect in the US military, but also in doctrine and training. The chapter on ‘the Benning revolution’ dealing with changes in the training of infantry officers in the interwar period is especially suggestive.

Allan Doughty, *The seeds of disaster: the development of French Army doctrine, 1919–1939*

A significant work on the development of doctrine within peace time, Doughty's *The Seeds of Disaster* explores the French army's development of doctrine in the interwar period. In a thorough and balanced analysis, Doughty argues that the interwar French Army was neither hollowed-out by underinvestment nor did it attempt to re-fight Germany in 1939–40 in the same manner it had in 1918. The French Army undertook serious experimentation with combined arms warfare, had opportunities to gain battle experience in colonial battles, and developed a military doctrine that was logical. Instead, Doughty argues that the primary cause for French military failure in 1940 was overcentralisation in the command and control system and rigidity in tactical doctrine. *The Seeds of Disaster* provides a continuing reminder of the dangers of institutional over-bureaucratisation, hyper-centralised command and control systems, and group-think.

LOGISTICS

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ Julian Thompson, *Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict*

Julian Thompson, a British brigade commander during the Falklands War, provides a sweeping overview of the principles of operational logistics. Thompson starts his study with an examination of the logistics of the Assyrians, although most of this case study deals with warfare in the twentieth century. Through his analysis Thompson identifies the essential elements of successful logistics, and highlights the consequences when support fails.

■ William G Pagonis, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*

Lieutenant General William G Pagonis served as commander of 22 Support Command, the organisation during the First Gulf War responsible for maintaining US forces in the Middle East. In his outline of the logistic lessons of the war Pagonis writes for both the military and business communities. This is a personal account, but one that places the US Army's logistic requirements into the broader context of the campaign.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **George C Thorpe, *Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation***

Thorpe's minor classic, *Pure Logistics*, was written while he was a student and instructor at the US Naval War College. Although first published in 1917, Thorpe was well ahead of his time in his perception of the place of logistics in development and projection of military power. Thorpe identified logistics as a distinctive branch of warfare—one of equal importance to strategy and tactics—and understood the need to address logistics at the national defence level.

■ **John A Lynn (ed.), *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present***

This volume brings together short accessible chapters on logistic issues across 1500 years of experience. Lynn notes that 'Mars must be fed', and that while logistic needs have changed across time (though not as much as might be supposed), logistics has always been a key determinant of both strategy and operations.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

John Ellis, *Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War*

Published in 1990, *Brute Force* offers two simple theses to explain Allied victory in the Second World War. First, he suggests that allied victory largely rested upon their quantitative superior in material, productive capacity, and manpower. Second, he argues that that victory occurred often in spite of the poor generalship, strategy, and tactics of the Allied forces. Ultimately, Ellis asserts that the Allies relied upon 'brute force' to batter Germany, Italy, and Japan, into submission. Accessibly written, *Brute Force* is principally a synthesis of existing literature and critiques drawn from the flawed post-war U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey rather than an original work. Ellis' critiques of Allied generals often lack context or appreciation of the difficult circumstances many commanders faced both in planning and execution, and have themselves been questioned by more recent scholarship. Nonetheless, *Brute Force* is an important reminder of the role strategic advantages such as manpower or production capacity can have in deciding the outcome of a world-wide conflict.

INTELLIGENCE IN WAR

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ **John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda***

Renowned military historian John Keegan returns with another invaluable offering in *Intelligence in War*, a study encompassing the effect of good intelligence on military operations. Across a range of historical vignettes ranging from Admiral Horatio Nelson's chase of the French Mediterranean fleet in 1798 through to the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, Keegan's analysis of these six campaigns and battles illuminates how quality intelligence, well-applied, serves to shift the course of warfare. Crucially, Keegan acknowledges that despite its valuable contribution, military intelligence can never be the sole determinant of battlefield success – and yet *Intelligence in War* reinforces that gathering and judiciously applying intelligence remains a vital tool in warfare across history.

■ **Keith Neilson and B.J.C. McKercher (eds.), *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History***

This collection, prepared for a symposium on the history of intelligence, spans an assortment of nine interesting and accessible essays that examine the significance of military history throughout history and in particular epochs and conflicts. These essays range from discussions of military intelligence in Ancient Rome to Cryptography in the 16th and 17th Centuries, and the role of intelligence on British foreign policy towards Imperial Russia throughout the reign of Queen Victoria. Throughout the authors argue for both the centrality of intelligence to military planning and for its essential changelessness across time, despite changes in technology and society.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Martin S Alexander (ed.), *Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War***

While critical analyses of intelligence gathering and application continue to expand understanding of how military and strategic intelligence impacts statecraft and warfare, there remains a key shortfall in these conversations: namely, the vital aspect of intelligence focused on friends and allies, both actual and potential. *Knowing Your Friends* seeks to fill this gap through a range of contributions examining how intelligence gathered within alliances can shape (or fail to shape) policy formulation and strategic action.

■ **Blair Tidey, *Forewarned Forearmed: Australian Specialist Intelligence Support in South Vietnam, 1966–1971***

One of the Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence series, *Forewarned Forearmed* is a detailed exploration of the activities of the Australian Army Intelligence Corps in support of the 1st Australian Task Force in South Vietnam between 1966 and 1971. Here, Tidey examines the effectiveness of this specialist intelligence support, focusing predominantly on the organisation, equipment, and operational activities of the Detachment – 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit and 547 Signal Troop. An interesting study into a little-known aspect of Australian military intelligence history.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Walter T Hitchcock (ed.), *The Intelligence Revolution: An Historical Perspective. A historical perspective : proceedings of the Thirteenth Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, October 12-14, 1988*

Originally presented in 1998 at the US Air Force Academy through the thirteenth Military History Symposium, this collection of essays and commentaries examines the transformation of the military intelligence community due to World War II. Precipitating international willingness to share intelligence on an unprecedented scale, the period of 1939–1945 was therefore characterised by a revolution in intelligence collection and cooperation. The concurrent (and subsequent) acceleration in technological advances also markedly influenced growth of the military intelligence community, leading to a previously unseen level of acceptance

in operational circles that persists today. A revelatory insight into the development of military intelligence in the 20th Century, *The Intelligence Revolution* is a valuable resource for a deeper understanding of modern military intelligence and its ongoing role in contemporary warfare.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Mandatory: WO1 (Tier A) & MAJ

■ **Eliot A Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime***

Using four historical case studies drawn from the 19th and 20th centuries, Cohen analyses the relationship between the highest levels of military command and political leadership at the civil-military interface. This is set against a discussion of the 'normal' theory of civil-military relations advanced in Samuel Huntington's famous *The Soldier and the State*, which Cohen substantially revises. This book should be read conscious of the US political system it rests within, which has fundamental differences to Australia's Westminster system.

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ **Lewis J Sorley, *Honorable Warrior: General Harold K Johnson and the Ethics of Command***

Sorley presents a wide-ranging and thoroughly researched biography of the Chief of Staff of the US Army during the worst years of US involvement in Vietnam, 1964–68. Johnson survived the Bataan Death March in 1942 and was a deeply moral, highly intelligent and compassionate soldier. He fundamentally disagreed with the US Administration's conduct of the war, and wrestled with the idea of 'resignation in protest' that, towards the end of his life, he came to believe he should have done. The book charts the dilemmas of senior command in an unpopular, losing war and investigates the moral and ethical challenges this offers.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era*

An account of dissent within the US military over policy regarding the Vietnam War, this book has enjoyed a resurgence of interest following the frustration of US policy in Iraq. The focus is resolutely on civil-military relations and high politics, and tends to tail-off in its discussion of the period after 1968. It provides an important revisionist perspective on policy formulation and relations between the highest levels of the US military and successive administrations, and is extensively documented.

Lewis Sorley, *Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam*

This book argues that Westmoreland occupied a crucial command in the critical years of the American war in Vietnam that was, in fact, beyond his abilities or understanding. In part it offers an indictment of the post-war culture of the US Army, showing that Westmoreland's energy, effective self-promotion, and capacity to 'work the system' led to a command in Vietnam that needed more than unbounded ambition and energy to create success. Sorley sees one of Westmoreland's basic failings as his avoiding attendance at any of the US Army's major military education institutions; he was, as a result, an uneducated soldier: 'doing it by the book, even though he hadn't read the book or studied at any of the Army's great schools'.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY HISTORY

Mandatory: WO1 (Tiers B & C) & LTCOL

■ Craig Stockings, *Born of Fire and Ash: Australian operations in response to the East Timor crisis 1999–2000*

Australia's involvement in East Timor from 1999–2000 was this nation's largest missions conducted under United Nations auspices, the single largest deployment of ADF personnel since the Second World War and an instrumental part of Timor-Leste gaining its independence. It was the first time that Australia led such a large multi-national force, and this history is an honest, challenging and compelling account of the 1999 crisis and the stabilisation efforts to bring peace to a near neighbour.

Extended Reading: WO1 (All Tiers), MAJ & LTCOL

Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, *Emergency and confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950–66*

Emergency And Confrontation details Australia's military involvement in the Malayan Emergency, waged against the armed forces of the Malayan Communist Party between 1948 and 1960, and in Confrontation, an undeclared war initiated by Indonesia to destabilise the emergent Federation of Malaysia and fought largely along the common border in the northern part of Borneo between 1962 and 1966. In each case the conflict was determined by the wider movement for decolonisation in Asia, and by the context of Cold War competition, which saw Western forces pitted against Communist, or Communist-backed, movements.

Ian McNeill, *To Long Tan: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966*

As the first volume of the Official History covering ground operations in Vietnam, McNeill's work outlines the growth in Australian military participation fighting communist forces – from the first advisors in 1962, through the deployment of a single battalion in 1965, to an independent task group (1st Australian Task Force) in 1966. Written in an easily accessible style, the book moves easily from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical level, and provides a detailed treatment of the Battle of Long Tan and the path to Australian dominance in Phuoc Tuy province.

Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, *On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 1967–1968*

This history outlines how the Australian Task Force coped with the difficulties and dangers of operating with two infantry battalions and limited resources against an elusive and aggressive enemy. It describes the construction of the controversial barrier minefield and the consequences and failure of this project. It also covers the pivotal Tet Offensive and the Australian response, which culminated in the fierce actions around Fire Support Bases Coral, and Balmoral as Australian soldiers fought their most sustained and intensive battles of the Vietnam War. Included is a new interpretation of the failures in planning and execution of operations on the eve of the major battles around Fire Support Base Coral, which almost resulted in disaster for the Australian force.

Ashley Ekins and Ian McNeill, *Fighting to the Finish: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968–1975*

Describes the activities of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam during its peak years, from the middle of 1968 to the end of 1971. For most of this period, the army maintained a force of over 6,000 troops in Vietnam. Eleven infantry battalions and their supporting arms undertook tours of duty and carried out almost 100 major operations. The work details the fierce clash between Australian infantry and armour and North Vietnamese Army forces in the village of Binh Ba, and the most authoritative account of the clearing of the controversial barrier minefield that led to alarmingly high numbers of Australian casualties. The book also analyses the difficulties faced during the phased withdrawal of the task force, as enemy pressure increased the burden and dangers for the remaining soldiers. This work includes the first detailed account of the aftermath of the war in Phuoc Tuy province, leading to the communist victory in 1975.

The Study of Military History⁵

Colonel EG Keogh, MBE, ED

How do you study military history? How often have I been asked that question, and how often have I found that all the enquirer wanted to learn was how to pass an examination? If that is all you want to do don't bother to read any further, for I am afraid that I don't know any short cuts, I don't know of any substitute for work. But if you want to enrich your mind with the military experience of the ages, if you want to broaden your professional knowledge and enhance your capacity to command, if you want to really understand the nature and climate of war, the following paragraphs may be of some interest to you.

There are, of course, plenty of people who can see no value in history — any sort of history. Well, one of the outstanding characteristics of most of the great men [sic] of our age is their awareness of the historical context in which they stand. Would Winston Churchill have reached the pinnacle on which he stood without this awareness? Would Charles de Gaulle have been able to set France once more on the road to power and influence without it?

We cannot escape our past. Our whole culture — the way we think, the way we look at ourselves and others, our institutions, are the product of our national experience.

5 This article was first published in the *Australian Army Journal* in January 1965 and again in 1976. It is again reprinted because of its continuing relevance as a guide to all those who undertake a study of military history.

Military history is the story of the profession of arms, of the influence that profession has had on the general course of events, of the contribution it has made to our national life. We need to know something of the history of our army, of its exploits, for that history conditions our professional outlook. It explains why we find it best to do things in our own particular way, and it constitutes the basis of our form of discipline

Military Experience

So far, we have talked in general terms. Can military history do more for us than that? To begin with, let us forget the expression military history and think in terms of military experience.

Now the knowledge that every professional person has is not built up entirely from his own experience. Far from it. Law, particularly Common Law, is a code, which has been built up from centuries of experience of many men. Medical knowledge is a compendium of the things that have been found out about human anatomy by all the doctors of all the ages. Doctors don't wait to find out everything from their own experiences. When a doctor, or a group of doctors, engaged in research make a discovery they usually publish the result. All other good doctors accept this finding and apply it to their patients.

In other words, the doctors are learning from the experience of others. Should the soldier do less? As a rule, a bad doctor kills only one patient at a time, but a bad soldier can get a great many men killed for nothing.

So let us think of military history as the study of military experience.

Actually, whether we know it or not we are continually using this experience. If we did not use it, our ideas on many things would never advance.

For example, before and during the First World War British doctrine held night attacks to be more or less impossible. It was held that control was too difficult and direction too hard to maintain. Few night attacks were undertaken by the British on the Western Front. After the war, this doctrine was maintained.

Then when the war histories came out an officer named Liddell Hart noticed the frequency with which the early stages at least of the most successful attacks had taken place in fog. Liddell Hart pursued this idea, and found that nearly all the big and successful British and French attacks had taken place under foggy conditions. On the German side, the phenomenon was even more striking. Of their six attempts to effect a major breakthrough in 1918, only three were successful and they were shrouded in fog. Liddell Hart then asked, 'If the most successful attacks were those which took place in fog, an accident of the weather which had not been planned for, would not night attacks be equally successful?'

The War Office nibbled at the idea cautiously and more attention began to be paid to night operations.

When Brigadier Pile (later General Sir Frederick Pile), who was at that time commanding the troops in the Canal Zone in Egypt, heard about Liddell Hart's finding he said, 'If troops can attack in dense fog when they are not expecting it, they ought to be able to attack at night when they are expecting darkness.' He then proceeded to prove that it was all a matter of thorough training, and night attacks became accepted.

This change in tactical doctrine resulted directly from the study of experience in the First World War.

But the results did not stop there. If night operations became fairly general, there would be plenty of occasions on which one would want some light, perhaps temporarily. Perhaps one would want darkness up to a certain moment and then have the light switched on.

The tacticians stated their requirement and the engineers turned up with the answer — artificial moonlight.

So, from a study of the experiences of the First World War there evolved two things — a new tactical concept and artificial moonlight.

That, I think, is a fair example of the practical application of military history. Of course, those are not the only things we can learn from the First World War. The students picked out a few other useful tactical ideas, and they learned a lot about administering very large armies in the field.

We need to look at the failures as well as the successes. We need to find out the real cause of all the useless butchery, the real cause of all the shockingly bad generalship that characterised most of the operations on the Western Front.

Why were most of the generals such poor, pedestrian soldiers? What had happened to the heirs of Wellington, Frederick, Napoleon? Was it their training or the lack of it? Was it the prevailing professional outlook? Was it because too much emphasis was placed on the wrong values? For example, was there too much emphasis on sport and social activities and not enough on serious work and study? Or was it because they had failed to learn from military experience?

It was probably a combination of all these things, but it is at least certain that they had failed to read correctly the lessons of the American Civil War and the South African War.

They were still seeking victory in terms of the Napoleonic concept as expounded by Clausewitz. This formula postulated the massive assault as the essential ingredient in the recipe for victory. But they failed to take into account the principal lessons of the American Civil War, namely:

- The breech-loading rifle and the spade, used in combination, had made the defence too strong to be overthrown by Napoleonic methods.
- And since the American Civil War the machine-gun had enormously increased the strength of the defence.
- They ascribed the American failure to employ cavalry in shock action to amateur leadership instead of to the real causes — the breech-loading rifle and the carbine, and trenches.

The result of this failure to learn from the experience of the employment of these new weapons and methods was the terrible battles on the Somme and in Flanders. The effects on Great Britain's man-power and national economy were enormous and far-reaching. It was on these stricken fields that Britain's decline as a front-rank world power began, though the full effects were not felt until later.

And all this because her officer corps had failed to read the lessons of recent wars and to see therein the changes demanded by the introduction of new weapons. They did not have to speculate. The things experience

had demonstrated had actually happened. Actual experience had demonstrated what would certainly happen in the future unless counter-measures were devised.

Let us take an Australian example of the misreading of experience. In the Palestine campaign of the First World War the Australian Light Horse Regiments were mounted infantry armed with the rifle and bayonet. They were not armed with the sword or lance. They were not trained or armed for the mounted charge. But at Beersheba, one brigade did undertake a most successful mounted charge. And at a couple of other places the British Yeomanry, who were armed with the sword, successfully charged the enemy.

After the war, on the strength of these isolated actions, we arrived at the conclusion that despite the firepower of modern weapons, trenches and barbed wire, the mounted charge was still a feasible proposition. The argument that led to this conclusion violated the rules of simple logic because:

- It failed to take into account the special conditions obtaining at the time of the successful charges.
- It failed to take into account the negative side of the question — all those occasions when a mounted charge would certainly have failed, and even the occasions when charges actually did fail.

This superficial examination of the available evidence, plus unsound logic, led us to arm our Light Horse Regiments with the sword. They were still carrying the things right up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Worse still, they were thinking about trying to use them.

From these examples it follows that close study of experience in the sphere of weapons and devices — new weapons, new machines, new means of transport, etc. — can help us very much in the development of tactical doctrine, organisation and administrative methods.

What about the art of war, of strategy, of tactical insight, of leadership? It is in these fields, perhaps, that we can extract the most value from military history. It is in these fields that we really do need experience, and it is just these fields that firsthand experience is so hard to get in peace. We can get this experience only by the study of military history.

If we become involved in a great war, the army is going to expand very rapidly. Promotion is going to be correspondingly rapid. Some of our officers are going to find themselves in positions of great responsibility in the field, or writing staff papers which may influence governmental decisions. We need not find ourselves in those positions entirely devoid of experience. By the constant study of military history, we can acquire the experience, which we shall need very badly.

I hope to show presently that the acquisition of this experience need not be all hard work, in fact a good deal of it can be a recreational pursuit.

How Do We Study Military History?

Now, how do we study military history? Two things are essential, namely:

1. The wise choice of study material. I should like to leave that till later and go on to the second essential.
2. The development of a critical approach.

When you begin any piece of serious study, as distinct from the recreational reading, which I shall mention presently, first think yourself into a highly critical frame of mind. Challenge everything; accept nothing without thinking about it.

For example, an Official History says something like this — ‘The Divisional Commander ordered — etc., etc.’ Before you go any further think about that order. Think it out for yourself. Was it a sound plan? Did it take all the essentials of the situation into account? If you had been in his place, what plan would you have worked out?

Another example of challenge, of the refusal to accept statements at their face value, is to be found in the Australian offensives on Bougainville and in the Aitape-Wewak area. The necessity of these offensives was queried in Parliament, and one of the arguments put forward to justify them was: ‘To commit any troops to a passive role of defence ... is to destroy quickly their morale, create discontent, and decrease their resistance to sickness and disease.’ From this are we to assume that troops committed to an arduous offensive under severe climatic conditions are bound to have a higher morale and to be healthier than troops engaged in defence? It is

true, as a generalisation, that the offensive generates higher morale than the defensive. But is it true in particular cases? And do you have to mount a full-scale offensive to maintain morale, or would a modified form of the offensive be sufficient? The formation on New Britain did not undertake a big offensive; it seems to have successfully maintained morale and the offensive spirit by aggressive patrolling.

Morale is an attitude of mind. In defence, the correct attitude can be fostered by means short of full-scale attack. Take the 9th Australian Division for example. Besieged in Tobruk, the division maintained morale and the offensive spirit by 'giving away' the deep and commodious Italian dugout in favour of fighting trenches, by deep patrolling, and by establishing their dominance over no-man's-land — 'Our front line is the enemy's wire, no-man's-land belongs to us.' After being shut up in the fortress for months on inadequate rations, the troops might have been a bit on the lean side, but they were still full of fight. And their health was surprisingly good — until, on relief, they got in amongst the fleshpots of Egypt.

Beware of generalisations. Ask yourself, always, is this statement true of this particular situation, of these particular conditions? Unless you cultivate the habit of asking yourself these questions you will degenerate into a mere mechanic, and a bad one at that.

In the beginning, this takes up a fair amount of time. But as you gain in experience, you will find that you do it almost subconsciously. One side of your mind is taking in the written facts; the other side is working on the problems. And that is just the sort of mind that successful commanders have and that all officers need.

Don't forget to apply the same critical approach to the administrative side of war. Learn to read between the lines, particularly the lines of the official histories. Official historians expect their professional readers to be able to read between the lines. For example in speaking of Singapore, the War Office history says, 'Many stragglers were collected in the town and sent back to their units.'

What does this statement suggest? In an advance, stragglers are to be expected. Men become detached from their units for quite legitimate reasons. We provide for them by establishing stragglers' posts to collect them and direct them back towards their units.

But when we get large numbers of stragglers behind a defensive position, and a long way back at that, it suggests that units have been broken up or that there has been a breakdown of discipline somewhere. And that in turn suggests that the general situation had reached the stage when a lot of people had lost confidence, when morale was at least beginning to break down.

Once you have started to develop this critical, challenging approach you will be on your way to acquiring the habit of sorting out fact from fiction. Our history is full of great military myths, most of which we thoughtlessly accept at their face value.

Take, for example, the story of Dunkirk. This episode has so captured public imagination that authors are still making money writing about it. It has come to be generally regarded as a glorious page in our military history. And so it is so far as courage, fortitude and discipline are concerned. But is this picture good enough for the professional soldier? Ought he not to see Dunkirk as a military operation stripped of all the glory? Looked at with the cold eye of the critical student, Dunkirk is seen to be what it actually was — a shocking military defeat which came within a hair's breadth of bringing Britain to her knees.

At the time, Dunkirk was represented to be a glorious feat. This was fair enough because in it the British people found the spiritual strength to carry on the war. To that extent, the soldier was justified in supporting the myth. But privately he needs to have a good hard look at the generalship — on both sides of course — which brought about this terrible disaster to British arms.

Each year in Australia, we celebrate Anzac Day. How many of us look beyond the bands and the flags, and analyse the operations? If you want to ascertain how not to mount an amphibious operation, or any operation at all for that matter, you will find all you want to know in the real story of Gallipoli.

Sometimes these myths grow after the event. Sometimes they are deliberately created at the time and ever afterwards are accepted as truth, too often even by soldiers. Take for instance the myth of the 'Spanish Ulcer'. Wellington's campaign in Spain was imposing a tremendous strain on the British people. The Government explained that the campaign was imposing a still greater strain on Napoleon, that the 'Spanish Ulcer' was 'bleeding him white'.

In actual fact, the campaign was having far more damaging effects on Britain than it was on France. It is extremely doubtful if Britain could have continued the war much longer for the long-suffering public had very nearly had enough when Napoleon abdicated and retired temporarily to Elba.

We are often advised that the best way to study military history is to test the decisions, plans and actions by applying to them the principles of war. In my opinion, this is a bad line of approach for the following reasons:

- It restricts the scope of our inquiries from the very beginning.
- It channels our thoughts along pre-determined lines, which is the thing to be avoided at all costs.
- In the world today there are several lists of principles, lists which differ from each other in substance and in emphasis. Which one do we take? Our own has been changed at least twice in my lifetime.

Suppose we reverse the process. Suppose we set out to test the validity of our list in the light of experience. I think that would be slightly better because it will at least half open our minds to some original thinking. However, the object of our study is not to test the validity of this or that principle, it is to cultivate our minds, to fill them with the wisdom of experience. I suggest that the best way to do this is to set out to discover some principles, some constantly recurring patterns for ourselves.

We know that throughout nature similar causes always produce similar effects. If we can discover in the military sphere some recurring chains of cause and effect, some constantly recurring patterns, we will have learned much from experience. We will also be struck by the frequency with which the rules or principles established by these recurring patterns are violated. And we will be struck by the fallacious arguments put forward in support of each violation.

One of the clearest patterns that emerges from military history is the one, which demonstrates the evils of failure to concentrate upon the attainment of the aim. Time after time, war after war, large forces are sent on missions which cannot possibly further the attainment of the aim. At the worst they jeopardise, or even prevent, the attainment of the aim because they weaken the main effort. At the best, they are a wanton waste of human life. This pattern seems to apply at all levels of activity. In the field of strategy, there is the example of the Mesopotamian Campaign in the First World War. Closer

to home we have our own Solomons and Aitape-Wewak campaigns in the later stages of the Second World War. The real war against Japan had moved 1000 miles to the north. The Japanese forces left behind in these areas were isolated and helpless. They could do absolutely nothing. Why on earth did we engage in costly offensive operations to clean them up when they could have been safely left to wither on the vine? We could have collected the lot with scarcely a battle casualty when the main Allied forces brought about the collapse of the Japanese main forces.

My own reading over the last few years leads me to believe that we ought to have another principle of war in our list—the Principle of Command. It seems clear enough that the organisation and maintenance at all times of a proper system of command is vital. By system of command, I mean not only the commander, but the means, staff, signals, etc., to enable him to exercise command. At any rate the evidence demonstrates that neglect or failure to organise a proper system of command has frequently been the primary cause of failure at all levels. We are all familiar with the arguments about the organisation of the high command. It is astonishing how often we come across failures to adhere to this principle further down the scale. In the Second World War in the Middle East alone, there were at least four major failures of this kind. The chaos, which prevailed in the later stages of the withdrawal from Greece, and probably the loss of several thousand men, was directly caused by the failure of GHQ to establish a proper command in the Peloponnese. And they had available the means of doing it. In all probability, the real cause of the loss of Crete was the failure to provide the commander with the means of exercising command. Here again the means were readily available. A corps headquarters was actually on the island. It was taken off and sent to Palestine where it remained unemployed while Crete was being lost for want of some good staff work. It remained unemployed while the first phase of the Syrian operations degenerated into a fiasco caused by a patently imperfect organisation of command. After the battle of Gazala, the whole structure of command in the Eighth Army was broken up, and remained broken up until Montgomery came along and promptly put it together again.

Throughout history, we find time and time again a commander winning through the exploitation of the 'Line of Least Expectation'. That is to say, he found and used a line of approach, which the defender had neglected to guard because he thought it to be an impossible one. We could produce a

long list of examples of this. What would we learn from such a list? I think it suggests that we ought always to make sure that the impossible is in fact impossible — and then keep an eye on it.

Methods of Study

Methods of studying military history will vary to some extent with each individual, but I suggest that in all cases there are two essential requirements for success.

1. A critical, challenging approach.
2. A mind alert to discern recurring patterns, recurring chains of cause and effect.

Although method will vary with the individual, I think the following preliminary steps are necessary whatever method we pursue.

1. Be quite clear about the political aim of the war.
2. Be quite clear about the national strategy by means of which the political aim is to be secured.
3. Be quite clear about the aim of the campaign you are about to study:
 - a. How does it fit into the national strategy for the winning of the war as a whole?
 - b. How does it contribute to the overall aim?
4. Study the features of the theatre of operations, particularly:
 - a. The terrain.
 - b. The weather.
 - c. The people (friendly, hostile, or neutral).
 - d. The communications.
 - e. Resources, including foodstuffs, skilled and unskilled labour, etc.
 - f. Climate for effects on health.

These four points constitute a firm base for our study of the campaign.

Now the actual method of study. Each individual must find the method that suits him best. One method I would suggest is to set about it as though you were preparing a series of lectures on the campaign. Actually, write the

lectures, remembering that each lecture has a time limit. This limit forces you to concentrate on essentials, to discard the irrelevant detail. When you have written a series of lectures, which give an intelligible account of the campaign, and a running commentary, you will have learned a lot about it.

Now all this sounds like hard work and so it is. Unfortunately, there is no substitute for work. However, there is another very important side of military history — the study of the human factor in war — which need not be so frightening.

The basic material which the soldier uses in his profession is human nature—men and women. He must know how people react to the stresses of war, and how they react to danger and adversity, to triumph and disaster.

Where Do We Find the Material?

Where do we find the material for the study of the human factor in war, of the actions, emotions and thoughts of ordinary men and women and of the art of leadership? Fortunately, this part of our study need not be hard work. It can indeed be a recreation. Nearly everyone reads for recreation. Why not systematise this recreation and turn it to good account by reading for pleasure books with a direct or indirect bearing on the subject?

What sort of books should we read to give us an insight into the human factor? Well, we can read the heavy tomes with the psychological slant but we can hardly call them recreational. I think we will get on far better, we will acquire a deeper and more lasting knowledge of human beings at war if, with our minds always alert to pick out the lessons, we read:

- Biographies.
- Appropriate novels.

It is unnecessary to labour the value of biographies, but it is desirable to add a word of caution. The author is sometimes apt to be carried away by his admiration of the person he is writing about, to make out he was always right, to make him into too much of a paragon of all the virtues. And the autobiographies, the books written by the actors themselves, very often suffer from the same defect. They seldom admit they were wrong and, writing from hindsight, they are usually able to prove that they were right.

So read these books with a critical eye. Don't let yourself be carried away by the author's plausibility or eloquence. With this proviso, these books are a very valuable source of information, and are generally quite easy to read.

Historical and War Novels

Now the novels. Don't despise the novelist, but make a distinction between the author who writes merely to spin a good yarn and the author, the serious novelist, who writes because he has something to say, some important comments to make. It is probably true to say that the novelist and the dramatist have done more to directly influence the development of thought and ideas than all the philosophers. While it is true that the philosophers and the thinkers produce the basic idea, it is the novelist and the dramatist who 'put it across' by translating it into terms which ordinary folk can understand and appreciate, into terms of universally experienced human emotions—love and hate, courage and cowardice, hope and despair. Consider, for instance, the tremendous influence of the novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Up to the time of its publication, there was a chance that the issues which divided the Northern and Southern States of America could have been settled by wise statesmanship and public forbearance. Its publication made the Civil War virtually inevitable. It focused all the issues upon a single point—slavery. It enraged the South and it inflamed the North. In faraway Europe, particularly in England and France, it created a public opinion, which compelled the governments to drastically modify their policies of active sympathy towards the Southern cause.

The First World War produced a crop of novels, which profoundly influenced the course of events over the two following decades. With few exceptions, all these books expressed the violent revulsion of the common man against the stupidity and futility of the dreadful blood baths to which they had been subjected on the Western Front. You can learn all about the strategy and the tactics of the Western Front in half a dozen printed pages, for there was precious little of either to write about. But if you really want to understand, if you want to find out what the war was like from the point of view of the fighting man, read novels like *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *Not So Quiet*, *Her Privates We*, *War by ex-Private X*, *Covenant With Death*, etc. Read the poetry of Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, and plays like *Journey's End*. Above all, read CE Montague's *Disenchantment*. Every officer ought

to have this little volume of beautifully written essays. He ought to keep it by his bedside and read a few pages every night. That will keep his feet on the ground and his head out of the clouds.

From these books, you will learn more about the real nature of the First World War than from all the learned volumes of strategy and tactics put together. You will learn about the incredible imbecility of the worst vintage generals in all history, of the shocking staff work, of the sheer ineptitude of military leadership all the way down the chain of command. You will understand why the people who make and unmake governments in democratic countries cried out in revulsion 'To hell with brass hats and red tabs, to hell with generals, we shall have no more of that nonsense'. And when you have understood that, you will understand the motive force behind the policies of disarmament and appeasement, which led step by step to the Second World War.

In Service circles, it is fashionable to blame the politicians for this disastrous disarmament policy. Anyone who has given thoughtful attention to the literature of The First World War would know that this view fails to trace the chain of cause and effect back to its origin. The politicians were simply reflecting public opinion. That public opinion had been created by the war itself. It had been expressed, focused and consolidated by the literature of the war. Some of the writers, CE Montague for instance, went right to the heart of the matter — the downright ineptitude of the military leadership and the reasons for it — others saw only the result. If the soldiers had conducted their business more efficiently, as they did in the Second World War, the literature would have had quite a different tone. In the ultimate analysis of cause and effect, the soldiers were responsible for the wave of pacifism, which swept the democratic world after the war, not the writers or the politicians. They only expressed the public opinion, which the soldier had created.

The novels of the Second World War reflect a totally different feeling because the field leadership at any rate was infinitely better. The value of these books lies in the presentation of the cold facts in a way, which enables us to grasp the 'feel' of the thing in a very vivid manner. For example, we may read that the Allies sent to Russia by the Arctic route so many tanks, aeroplanes, trucks, so many millions of tons of shell, that so many ships were sunk, so many lives lost. All good stuff for a planner to know, but it leaves you stone cold, it raises no feeling at all. But if you read *HMS Ulysses*, you will have a very good idea of what the cold statistics meant to the Allies in terms of human values — in terms of human courage, resolution and suffering. And if you read David Forrest's *The Last Blue Sea*, you will learn more about the impact of the jungle on young troops than all the textbooks can give you. If in the pursuit of your profession in peace or war, you forget those human values, all the rest of your knowledge will go for naught. Those values are your indispensable tools of trade.

The Documentary

There is another, though rarer, type of book which presents both the technical and the human aspects of war in an easily digested form. I don't know the literary term for this kind of work. It resembles a documentary film, which presents the dry facts of some particular aspects of life, or some particular persons or events, by clothing them with human values, reactions and emotions without passing into the realm of true fiction. The characters, instead of being creatures of the writer's imagination, are real people, people who have actually lived and whose actions have influenced the course of history. Instead of simply giving us the bare, and often unimpressive facts, the writer brings them back to life, recreates the scenes and the actions he wants to present to us. Treated in this way by a skillful writer, the facts we are seeking become more vividly impressive, more easily remembered and more easily read.

This form of literary expression has been brought to near perfection by a school of American writers. In the sphere of military history perhaps the leading exponent is Bruce Catton, whose magnificent works on the American Civil War vividly depict its strategy and tactics, the personalities, and the varying degrees of abilities of its leaders, the reactions of the troops to the ebb and flow of victory and defeat. All the great lessons are there, timeless as time itself — the results of half measures, of indecisiveness, of bad staff work, the influence of selfishness and personal ambition, the little things that go wrong and cause great disasters, the over-riding importance of the human factor with all its strength and frailty. These things always have been and probably always will be, the factors, which determine the issue of victory or defeat.

In his book *A Stillness at Appomattox*, Catton gives us an almost exact representation of one of the major problems of the atomic battlefield — the exploitation of the hole punched in the enemy's defences by a nuclear explosion. The Union army faced the Confederates in strongly fortified lines at Petersburg. When several assaults had failed a Union engineer suggested driving a tunnel under a vital point in the Confederate works and blowing it up. That part of the programme was an immense success — what was probably the biggest explosion in any war up to that time blew a huge gap in the Confederate line. The rest was a pitiable fiasco. Through the neglect of elementary principles, through the failure to do simple things, which could reasonably be expected of a junior subaltern, experienced generals failed completely to exploit the opportunity. It is remarkable how monotonously disasters occur through the failure to do simple, elementary things. History may not repeat itself, but by Heavens, the mistakes of history do. Are some of us going to make the same mistakes on an atomic battlefield?

Recently an Australian author, Raymond Paull, made a very creditable attempt to give us in this documentary form the story of the early stages of the war on our own northern approaches. His *Retreat From Kokoda* is, I think, the first military classic this country has produced. Despite certain attempts to discredit this book, it is chock full of lessons which are of the utmost importance to the Australian Army. More recently, an Englishman has given us the story of the destruction of the Normandie Dock at St Nazaire in *The Greatest Raid of All*. While this book lacks something of the power and sweep of the other works referred to, it could almost be regarded as a textbook on the organisation and conduct of an amphibious raid.

Some years ago, during a wet spell on a holiday, I picked up a book with the unpromising title *Prepare Them for Caesar*. Up till then Julius Caesar had been for me a shadowy, academic figure. In the book he came alive, a very human figure. Reading it, I found what Wavell tells us to seek. I began to understand why men followed Caesar, why his soldiers stuck to him when his cause seemed hopelessly lost.

The great merit of these books—the novels and the documentaries—lies in the fact that they do not require hard study, they are truly recreational. Nevertheless every one you read adds a little more to your knowledge of war. Subconsciously your trained mind will be at work criticising, evaluating, picking out the lessons great and small, lessons, which are more likely to stick because they are expressed by living, human characters instead of cold, inanimate print in a textbook. Subconsciously the climate of war, the vision of men and women in action from the cabinet room to the forward area, seeps into your soul and becomes a part of your being. A sympathetic understanding of human nature will be created in your mind, an appreciation of its grandeur and its frailty, its varying motives, its hopes and ambitions and fears, its cruelty and its compassion. It is not sufficient for the soldier to be aware academically of the various facets of human nature. He must have a far deeper awareness than that. The best way to acquire that essential awareness is to read the works of good writers whose talent enables them to present human beings in a way, which touches our hearts as well as our minds.

Conclusion

The officer who studies military history along the lines of recreational reading and analytical research will benefit in three ways:

First, he will develop a mind rich in the experience of war in all its aspects. The climate of war will become an integral part of his subconscious being. Without consciously thinking about it, he will have a cultivated awareness of the pitfalls, which strew the path of the commander and the staff officer, and he will be able to see the possibilities and the dangers of any situation or any course of action.

Secondly, he will develop the power of analysis — the power of breaking up the problem into its component parts, balancing one against the other, and arriving at a sound solution.

Thirdly, it will fill his mind with knowledge of human beings in combat, and that is essential knowledge for the soldier.

I have recommended two types of literature. Each type complements the other. The official histories give you the bare facts, the skeleton. The biographies, novels and the documentaries clothe the bare bones with the flesh of human beings in action.

Finally, remember that unless your critical analysis of fact is not tempered with sympathy and compassion you will never learn anything about humanity.

The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: an American Marine's view⁶

Paul K Van Riper

When I enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1956, the American military placed little emphasis on nontechnical professional education. The well-developed curricula—much of it based on the study of history—that served World War II's leaders so well no longer existed. In their place, stood courses dominated by political science and management philosophies. Fortunately, for the United States, the situation altered considerably over the next forty years, although only at great cost. Advancing from private to lieutenant general during those four decades, I found myself initially a victim and later a beneficiary of military schooling. The weak and uninspiring education system I first encountered might have survived far longer had it not been for the tragedy of the Vietnam War. That conflict and its aftermath provided the catalyst for much-needed change. At the center of the transformation lay a renewed interest in the study of military history. The American military's performance in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as its recent accomplishments in Afghanistan, offer compelling evidence

6 Paul K. Van Riper, 'The relevance of history to the military profession: an American Marine's view' in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Reprinted with permission.

of the value of the improvements made in the American armed forces between 1974 and 1991, none more so than the fundamental alterations in professional education.

In the following pages—after briefly outlining how the American military education system progressed over a century and a quarter only to lose its way in the early Cold War years—I have chronicled my own professional education and its importance to my development as a leader. I close with a cautionary note expressing concern that the gains of the past twenty years may be slipping away in a manner reminiscent of that earlier era.

The American military, along with many European militaries, evidenced a disdain for overt intellectual activities by its officers for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To most officers, such interests fell short in reflecting the manliness expected of those in uniform. Hard fighting, hard riding, and hard drinking elicited far more appreciation from an officer's peers than the perusal of books. Commenting on a recent study of the nation's military profession, one present-day commentator notes, "[w]e glimpse in finely wrought microcosm the current of anti-intellectualism that has coursed through American arms from its earliest beginnings to the present day."⁷ Seeds of this anti-intellectualism remain, despite the efforts of several generations of reformers dedicated to improving professional military education.

Emory Upton, a U.S. Army officer who spent his adult life urging reform of the American military, laid the foundations of officer professional military education in the United States. Others in the early part of the nineteenth century, such as Stephen B. Luce, Tasker Bliss, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Elihu Root, built on Upton's initial efforts in their own attempts to further the professional development of officers. All met resistance in their time, but by the mid-1920s, their ideas guided the study of war in most service academies, staff schools, and war colleges. History formed the core of much of the instruction in such institutions, especially in those courses focused on operations and strategy. During the 1920s and 1930s, Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Admirals Chester W. Nimitz and Raymond A. Spruance, and a host of other World War II leaders attended

7 Lloyd J. Matthews, "The Unified Intellectual and His Place in American Arms," *Army Magazine*, July 2002, p. 1. The book he references is William Skelton, *The American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*.

classes enriched with military history. Many later attested to the importance of that historically grounded education. In his autobiography, Eisenhower described his time at the Army's Command and General Staff School—from which he graduated first in the class of 1926—as “a watershed in my life.”⁸

Victory in 1945 seemingly validated the content of prewar professional military education; therefore, major changes appeared unlikely. However, a number of defense authorities concluded that the advent of atomic weapons negated any value to be gained from studying the past. In the ensuing years, even some prominent military historians questioned the relevance of their field. In 1961, Walter Millis wrote: “It is the belief of the present writer that military history has largely lost its function.... [I]t is not immediately apparent why the strategy and tactics of Nelson, Lee or even Bradley or Montgomery should be taught to the young men who are being trained to manage the unmanageable military colossi of today....”⁹

Through both design and neglect, those in positions of influence contributed to the virtual elimination of history from the core curricula of nearly every American professional military institution throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. In its place, they inserted courses not only on nuclear war, but also on systems engineering, operations analysis, and management. Senior officers clearly deemed the emerging quantitative methods as far more relevant to the new demands of command in the nuclear age. The shortsightedness of these post–World War II leaders meant that the Vietnam generation of military officers—of which I am one—learned its early professional lessons in programs largely devoid of history. America paid a high price for such myopic views and the resulting undue emphasis on the science of war to the detriment of the art of war.

8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, NY, 1967), p. 200. For a detailed description of Eisenhower's experience at Command and General Staff School (now called a “College”), see Mark C. Bender, *Watershed at Leavenworth: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Command and General Staff School* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990). Ronald Spector, maintaining that the Naval War College curriculum was too narrow and technically focused, calls into question claims of senior World War II navy leaders that their War College education proved invaluable to prosecuting that conflict. See Ronald Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, RI, 1977), pp. 149 and 150. My own interpretation is that war games provided strength to the college's curriculum during this period, although these games focused on refighting past battles, especially Jutland.

9 Walter Millis, *Military History* (Washington, DC, 1961), pp. 16-18.

An Early Interest in Military History

My first exposure to military history came in the late 1950s as a squad leader in a Marine Corps reserve unit. Enrolled in a college program with a history-centered curriculum, I found study of the past enjoyable. At the same time, knowledge of history appeared as if it might prove useful if I earned the officer's commission I sought. Not surprisingly, whenever I came across an advertisement for an inexpensive book on military history, I usually invested in a copy. Of the several books I bought during this period, two made notable and long-lasting impressions. The first, S.L.A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Command in Future War*, cost only \$1.35 in paperback.¹⁰ I eagerly read and heavily annotated Marshall's analytical history of recent battles. I discovered much that seemed intuitively correct although not always obvious. In field exercises, I routinely tried to take into account Marshall's insights into leadership and small unit tactics.

The second influential book, T.R. Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War*, graphically detailed the penalties paid by poorly prepared U.S. Army units early in the Korean War. It made an indelible imprint on my mind in regard to the absolute necessity for challenging training and strict discipline in military organizations. The reputation I acquired as a hard-nosed leader found its start not only in the stern lessons taught by my drill instructors at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, but equally in those I drew from this book. I copied many passages from *This Kind of War* and returned to them for inspiration. My favorite was and remains: "In 1950 a Marine Corps officer was still an officer, and a sergeant behaved the way good sergeants had behaved since the time of Caesar, expecting no nonsense, allowing none. And Marine leaders had never lost sight of their primary—their only—mission, which was to fight."¹¹

10 Although initially troubled by allegations concerning Marshall's research raised in several venues in the 1980s, as well as the subsequent controversy, I regained my former confidence when Dr. Roger J. Spiller, who questioned many of Marshall's research methods in the winter 1988 issue of the *RUSI Journal*, said he did not doubt the combat historian's conclusions stating, "Forty years later, as the quest for universal laws of combat continues unabated, Marshall is still right." (Quoted in a review of *Men Against Fire* in the July 1989 edition of *Military Review*, pp. 99 and 100.)

11 T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York, 1963), p. 188.

As a newly commissioned second lieutenant and student at the Marine Corps officers' basic course in early 1964, I encountered history only as a means of reinforcing the customs and traditions of the Marine Corps. This instruction involved little more than story telling—often inaccurate when it came to details, as I discovered afterward when I read that the red stripes along the trouser seams of officers' and noncommissioned officers' uniforms, usually referred to as "blood stripes," were not awarded in recognition of the high casualties Marine leaders suffered at the Battle of Chapultepec in the Mexican-American War. Apparently, the stripes served simply as a decorative flourish to officers' uniforms. Fundamentally, these classes offered a narrowly focused review of the organisation's heritage—"drum-and-trumpet" military history at its finest—useful for its purpose, but not professionally enlightening.

Arriving at my first operational unit—a 2nd Marine Division infantry battalion— in late summer 1964, I found minimal interest in military history. Those officers who read of past battles and campaigns seldom advertised the fact. They judged it, I imagine, more an avocation than the heart of professional learning. Some bright spots existed. The *Marine Corps Gazette* offered military history books for sale at reduced prices and frequently presented articles examining past battles. A collection of Gazette articles appeared in an edited work entitled, *The Guerrilla – And How to Fight Him*, proving reasonably popular. Although more theoretical, Robert Osgood's *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* also attracted attention. The magazine even identified a set of "military history classics" for purchase in a suitably marked box. Several new books on World War II generated moderate interest among my contemporaries, including the first two volumes of the official History of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II and Kenneth Davis's *Experience of War: The United States in World War II*. Although my own interest centered on reading and studying books dealing with irregular or small wars—because we seemed more likely to face such wars in the near future—I made efforts to at least peruse others. Perhaps most important, my career-long habit of always having professional reading near at hand as a guard against wasting unexpected free time began in this assignment.

When it came to small unit fighting, however, nothing surpassed the wisdom I found in *Men Against Fire*. After returning from my initial baptism of fire in spring 1965 in the Dominican Republic, I re-read Marshall's book and found my original evaluation reinforced. Over the succeeding thirty years, I made revisiting his book a habit after each combat episode I experienced. Always, I came to the same conclusion. This author-historian possessed an extraordinary understanding of the close fight and wrote about his insights as clearly and succinctly as anyone before or since.

Interest in reading military history increased among my fellow Marine officers as the war clouds over Vietnam grew darker. Reading about the French experience in Indochina and the British experience in Malaya became fashionable. Copies of Bernard Fall's *Street Without Joy* appeared on more than a few officers' desks. Still, many believed that sharpening their tactical and technical proficiency outweighed the potential of intellectually preparing for war. I confess to conflicted feelings at this point in my military life. Upon receiving orders assigning me to an advisory billet with an infantry battalion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, I devoted more time to readying my personal equipment, boots, knife, map kit, and survival gear, and to improving my physical fitness than to professional reading. I did, however, re-read *Men Against Fire*.

A gunshot wound to the stomach shortened my tour in Vietnam by more than half and placed me in a series of military hospitals for several months. Thus, I was offered the opportunity to contemplate recent events. A growing desire to understand my wartime experience led to a renewed and intense interest in reading. I mentally created a more expansive and sophisticated menu of books than the one I had turned to prior to my departure from the United States the previous summer. I began with a survey of the history of war with Lynn Montross's *War Through the Ages*. I then revisited the situation in Southeast Asia with Bernard Fall's *The Two Vietnams*; tried to understand the new type of war through David Rees's *Korea: The Limited War*; and looked at the larger issues of war in B.H. Liddell Hart's *Strategy* and Walter Goerlitz's *History of the German General Staff: 1657–1945*. I formed no agenda or reasoned plan for my reading. Instead, I simply tried to satisfy the gnawing feeling that I had known too little about war before going to Vietnam.

After convalescence, there followed an assignment as an instructor at The Basic School in Quantico, where all the Corps' lieutenants undergo training to become rifle platoon commanders, regardless of their future occupational specialties. Faced with pending postings to Vietnam, these young officers readily sought advice on how to prepare themselves. When they asked how long it took to get ready for combat, my most common response was, "At least 100 years!" I then explained that no one wants to risk his life and those he leads without taking every opportunity to acquire the necessary skill and knowledge to succeed. Thus, any allotted time is always too short. The most frequent follow-up question concerned what to do in the time available. Here, I invariably urged each lieutenant to read, making clear the logic and efficiency of tapping into the collective wisdom of generations upon generations of warriors. I often repeated a quote from Liddell Hart, "There is no excuse for any literate person to be less than three-thousand years old in his mind."¹² By this point, I possessed my own list of recommended books to share, though; in hindsight, it was weak in many respects, particularly regarding the nature and character of war.

I soon found myself in a position to follow my own advice, because after completing the instructor tour and attending the Amphibious Warfare School, I received orders returning me to Vietnam in summer 1968, on this occasion to serve as a rifle company commander.¹³ My free time before this second tour in Southeast Asia focused on specialised reading instead of overly preparing personal equipment and exercising my body to an extreme. I wanted to know more about what it meant to be a professional warrior, so I struggled through both Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* and Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, devoured Martin Russ's *The Last Parallel* to gain a better appreciation of infantry combat, and sought lessons on irregular war from Samuel B. Griffith's translation of Mao Tse-Tung on *Guerrilla Warfare*. I once again re-read *Men Against Fire* to great benefit. An article by then Captain Allan R. Millett—later to become a noted historian and a reserve "colonel of marines"—supported my notions about the importance of history, so much, so that I

12 B.H. Liddell Hart, *Why We Don't Learn from History* (London, 1946), pp. 7–8.

13 The use of history by Amphibious Warfare School instructors during my time there as a student appeared selective and primarily designed to support a specific teaching point. I often recalled examples that ran counter to the ones being cited. Such biased use of military history in military schools occurred all too frequently in the 1960s and 1970s.

clipped the piece, "Military History and the Professional Officer." To this day, it remains in my files.¹⁴

History offers no "lessons" for military officers. It does, though, provide a rich context for understanding the terrible phenomenon that was, is, and will remain war. The vicarious experiences provided through study of the past enable practitioners of war to see familiar patterns of activity and to develop more quickly potential solutions to tactical and operational problems. My several years of professional reading, for example, gave me a sense of confidence on the battlefield that I did not have during my previous tour in Vietnam. To the degree that the word has meaning in such circumstances, I became comfortable, whether under enemy fire or pressed to make rapid tactical decisions. "Mike" Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, soon developed a division wide reputation for success in battle, as well as for its ability to handle unique problems. The Viet Cong continue to fire long-range rockets at the Da Nang Airfield: put Mike Company on it. Need to stop North Vietnamese infiltrators: send for Mike Company. Only the inevitable casualties made command less than ideal. I could never identify a direct cause and effect relationship between the orders I gave in combat and the books I had previously read, but clearly, a symbiotic connection existed. The secondhand wisdom gained from reading thousands of pages of military history synthesised over time in my mind and eventually merged with the experiences of previous firefights in the Dominican Republic and during my first tour in Vietnam. This combination of real and vicarious learning provided the ability to make well-informed judgments despite the inherent stresses of war.

Finding a Wider World of Professional Study

Eight years of varied postings after my second tour in Vietnam—instructor at the U.S. Army's Institute for Military Assistance, staff officer at Headquarters Marine Corps, battalion and regimental operations officer, and battalion executive officer in the 8th Marines—allowed sufficient free time to continue reading military history. Although I never doubted the value of my ongoing efforts, my methodology never seemed sufficiently organised. Selection

14 Allan R. Millet, "Military History and the Professional Officer," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1967, p. 51.

and assignment to the Naval War College's naval command and staff course in summer 1977 soon eliminated this problem. Admiral Stansfield Turner had recognised the harm done to professional military education in the pre-Vietnam era, and upon assuming presidency of the college in 1972, he had completely revamped the curriculum. History became the mainstay of all war-related instruction. At the start of the academic year, students read Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* from cover to cover with the expectation that they would understand the significance of this ancient text and its relevance to the present day. The admiral believed in the value of the humanities and demanded students cover a minimum of 900 pages of assigned reading each week. His insistence on academic excellence proved intoxicating to those of us who previously had studied in relative isolation. He tossed us into the "briar patch," and individuals who arrived at the college with an appreciation of history loved every minute of it.¹⁵ Nonetheless, some disappointment surfaced within this group when the next major assignment turned out to be the Napoleonic Wars because we leapt over some 2,000 years of history with only a nod to its existence. However, when a school needs to cover the sweep of history in a single trimester, major compromises inevitably occur.

Personally, I resolved in the months ahead not only to work my way through the missing two millennia of military history, but also to return to the classical period of the Greek and Roman world and read in far greater depth. With a growing family and the associated expenses, I welcomed the advantage of soft cover books such as Penguin Books' translations of Xenophon's *The Persian Expedition*, Arian's *The Campaigns of Alexander*, and Livy's *The War with Hannibal*. My endeavor nearly floundered at the outset, when curiosity and an insatiable appetite caused me to expand my horizon even further in attempts to better understand the Greek and Roman civilisations, and then their art and architecture. Tempting as these new venues proved, I soon returned to the "main attack", an effort that continues to the present.

15 I always sensed that officers with a specialty that potentially brings them closer to an actual fight—infantrymen, pilots, artillerymen, etc.—most appreciate the study of history. A study done by a fellow student at the Army War College in 1982 that found combat arms officers "most likely to view military history as highly valuable" supports this thesis. See David W. Hazen, "The Army War College and the Study of Military History," *U.S. Army War College*, April 19, 1982, p. 22.

Admiral Turner's introduction of the works of the classical strategists, most particularly Clausewitz's *On War*, proved as important to Naval War College students as his revitalisation of historically based instruction. For nearly a quarter-century after World War II, America's military schools failed to ground their students in the fundamental philosophies of war. Few understood the nature of war, much less its underlying theories. Without a basic knowledge of concepts and devoid of any historical context, there is little wonder that the mid-twentieth century officer corps led America into the Vietnam quagmire. Military leaders in the 1950s and 1960s proved quite adept in the science of war—mobilisation, logistics, personnel management, and other peripheral activities—but demonstrated an almost complete lack of awareness of the art of war.

Turner insisted on a rebalancing of the equation. Michael Howard and Peter Paret's 1976 translation of *On War* greatly aided the study of Clausewitz's masterpiece, and thus, war itself. No more complete and enduring theory of the subject exists than the one contained in this volume. Clausewitz's complex style of writing means the knowledge enclosed in his tome is extremely difficult to comprehend with simple reading. It requires close reading, aided by an adept teacher. Above all, Turner assembled a first-class faculty, which over time led the American military back to solid intellectual ground. The course of instruction provided me the basis for even more advanced study. Equally important, it prepared me for high-level command.

My next assignment to the United Nations (UN) Truce Supervision in Palestine promised the possibility of again seeing conflict, although as an observer trying to prevent renewed war. In preparation, I refocused my reading from the theoretical to the practical. More knowledgeable now about the wealth of military literature available, I turned to an earlier military-scholar, Ardant du Picq, whose *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* in many ways closely paralleled S.L.A. Marshall's book. I had secured this volume earlier as part of the Marine Corps *Gazette's* collections of "classics". However, I had never felt inclined to read it—a huge mistake. Du Picq's observations on the moral effects on men in battle and the importance of cohesion seem in retrospect self-evident, but it took his book to make them so for the soldiers of his time.¹⁶ Marshall carried forward

16 Azar Gat provides a valuable critique of du Picq in "Ardant du Picq's Scientism, Teaching and Influence," *War & Society*, October 1990, pp. 1–16.

this form of military research and writing, although without the extensive research he claimed. But the close examination of war's sharp end truly came into its own with publication of John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* in 1976. A genre of similar books soon followed, including Paddy Griffith's *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam* (and a revised edition entitled *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future*) and the works of other lecturers in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

I learned an important lesson reading Keegan's book: not to downplay the ability of those without active military service or actual combat experience to write meaningfully about battle. I nearly went no further than the first sentence in *The Face of Battle*, in which Keegan states, "I have not been in a battle; not near one, nor heard one from afar, nor seen the aftermath." I again thought of closing the book two pages later when the author revealed he had never served in uniform. Luckily, I chose to ignore my prejudices and pressed on. As a result, I learned much from this now-famous military historian, not the least being that it is possible to become schooled in the profession through vicarious means, and in some cases, even more so than those who spend an unreflective lifetime in military attire.

Overall, duty in the Middle East supported my continuing professional reading and opened up a new vista, battlefield studies, or using today's more common term, staff rides. I discovered such a plethora of sites in this region that selecting which to visit presented a huge challenge. Meggido, the location of the first recorded battle of history, won by the Egyptian Pharaoh Thutmose III in 1469 BC, lay at one end of the time spectrum, while at the other lay the various battlegrounds of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Second Battle of Meggido, fought by General Allenby in September 1918, offered another possibility for study at both the original position and over the surrounding area traversed by the likes of Lawrence of Arabia. At the time I visited in 1979, one could imagine the possibility of a future battle between the Soviet Union and the United States at this same spot with the Soviet backers of Syria moving down from the Golan Heights to meet Americans assisting in the defense of Israel. It was certainly an eerie thought at the time because Har (hill) Meggido is the location of the biblical Armageddon.

The earlier wars between the Arabs and Israelis—in 1948–9, 1956, and 1967— offered numerous additional battlefields for examination. Bookstores in the region carried many publications on these wars that imparted viewpoints not elsewhere available. A few of these remain in my personal library. Among those I found most useful were Chaim Herzog's *The War of Atonement* and Mohamed Heikel's *The Road to Ramadan*. Such readings were reinforced by the opportunity to study the campaigns of 1941 and 1942, especially El Alamein. Good map reading skills aided my travels over these positions because the desert looks much the same from horizon to horizon in this part of North Africa.

No nation tends to its overseas battlefield burial sites as well as the United Kingdom. Walking through the El Alamein cemetery along row upon row of gravestones—each inscribed with a message from loved ones at home— invariably caused me to reflect deeply on the terrible costs of war and the immense responsibilities borne by those who practice the profession of arms. No words affected me more than the simple ones from a young son to his departed father: “Goodnight Daddy – Wee John.” Such a loss cannot be measured in the normal calculus of war. The safety of one's nation and the sacrifices many pay—some the ultimate—must motivate every officer to master his or her profession.

For nearly a year, the United Nations schedule of a week of duty followed by a week off allowed me much time for staff rides accompanied by a handful of equally interested officers from a variety of nations. The chance to explore old battlefields also arose occasionally in the normal course of conducting patrols. I always tried to precede these events with detailed reading of works on the battle of interest. In the first half of my tour, I worked out of Cairo, Egypt, where a preponderance of the Soviet observers also served. This meant that normally two out of three patrols I participated in included a Soviet partner.

The arrangement provided a unique opportunity to talk freely with members of a potential enemy nation, while driving over desert routes or relaxing in our small encampments. The subjects ranged from politics and religion to areas of mutual professional interest. The Soviet officers—all from the Army—often gave us copies of history books as gifts, some in Russian, others English translations. Apparently, their government made these available free. Although a few consisted of pure propaganda, most contained credible material on the past performance of Soviet forces.

The chance to discuss professional military matters with these officers offered a perspective on past and future operations unavailable anywhere else in the world at the time. The course at the Naval War College had prepared me well and allowed me to hold my own in some great debates. When patrols brought us to the scene of a 1973 battle, we usually stopped and walked over it, examining destroyed Soviet equipment and an occasional American tank, always attempting to understand how the particular engagement was likely to have unfolded. On several occasions, our accompanying Egyptian liaison officer described his own wartime experience at or near the site and suggested English translations of books related to the action.

The second half of my tour with the UN took me to southern Lebanon, where ongoing hostilities between various guerrilla factions and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) often made the work of an observer difficult. I never became comfortable under fire or near small but deadly engagements while unarmed. Nonetheless, professional rewards abounded. Observers normally alternated duty at positions near or collocated with units from the IDF and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Again, circumstances often allowed professional discussions with the two antagonists. Somewhat surprisingly, I never felt any hostility directed against me from members of the PLO, despite the official American attitude toward that group. Militarily related conversations in these surroundings naturally tended toward various aspects of irregular warfare. As had the Soviet officers, members of the PLO often gave us free literature, usually pamphlets. Approximately 75 percent turned out to be pure propaganda of an incendiary nature; the remainder were well-written features on the history of the region.

The insecure countryside and the reluctance of both sides to venture beyond fixed posts limited opportunities to see old battlefields. Instead, our responsibilities took us to sites of conflicts only minutes or hours old, with the object of separating the warring parties and investigating the circumstances of the action. A few PLO positions located on or near Crusader castles and in the ancient city of Tyre allowed some limited study, however. I left the Middle East with a much-enhanced understanding of warfare over the ages and of the many similarities between armies around the world. The Naval War College experience, coupled with that of a UN observer, served as an unsurpassed professional school that provided an exceptional education.

Formalising My Study Efforts

When I returned to the States, I assumed command of a Marine Barracks near Jacksonville, Florida. No Marine duty is undemanding when one is the commanding officer; yet, regular hours and no requirement to spend days away on field exercises provided more time for professional study than I had found in earlier assignments. A combination of formal schooling, overseas travel, and four tours in combat zones over the preceding twenty-four years had widened my reading interests immensely. To continue my tactical education along with my understanding of combat leadership, I turned to the newly published (in 1979) translation of Erwin Rommel's *Attacks* and a reprint of the U.S. Army Infantry Journal's landmark *Infantry in Battle*, originally published in 1934 under the signature of George C. Marshall. These seminal works provided me with a wealth of new and important knowledge. To expand my understanding of strategic thought, I probed Edward Mead Earle's *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* and Michael Howard's *The Theory and Practice of War*.

In summer 1981, I reported to the Army War College. After a quick review of the program of instruction, I ascertained that this institution at the time failed to offer much of a test for any serious student. There appeared to be little opportunity for the study of war at this war college. To illustrate, World War I and World War II studies each consumed approximately eight academic hours, whereas instruction in U.S. immigration policy took up nearly twenty hours. Furthermore, reincorporating history into the curriculum remained an ongoing effort with little evidence of any significant impact. I found no surprise in one scholar's earlier observation that, "Perhaps the most conspicuous shortcoming of the lectures offered [in an elective course on military history] is that too few of them deal with conflict."¹⁷

Finally, the 1981–2 academic year saw the first introduction of Clausewitz's *On War*, a text I felt comfortable with after the rigors of the Naval War College. Determining how to best fill the many hours the college scheduled for personal study—hours obviously not required to meet the limited demands of work outside the classroom—became my immediate mission. Visits to the campus library and bookstore promptly revealed the best way

17 Russell F. Weigley, *New Dimensions in Military History* (San Rafael, CA, 1975), p. 11.

to accomplish this task, and the upcoming months looked considerably brighter as I contemplated the possibilities for personal reading and research. In a few days, I established two goals for my year at the Army War College: first, determine how best to approach the professional study of military history, an issue raised after Vietnam by critics both in and out of uniform; second, create a self-directed study program that could guide officers in their own continuing professional education, a responsibility too few seemed to recognize rested on their own shoulders.

Michael Howard's highly regarded 1961 article, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," looked like a good place to start my research on the role of military history in professional education.¹⁸ I found a treasure trove of advice in this piece beginning with Sir Michael's counsel to study in width, depth, and context. The U.S. Army Center of Military History's *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* proved equably valuable.¹⁹ It offered everything from specifics on how a student might approach military history to bibliographic guides on great military writers and military history in specific periods. This became one of the most well worn books in my library. I uncovered several additional aids to studying history: "timeless verities of combat," "recurring themes," and "threads of continuity." These conceptual schemes help an officer understand a specific aspect or a unique instance of war through the perspective of time. Trevor N. Dupuy explained the use of the timeless verities of combat in *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*. The Naval War College and the U.S. Military Academy organized their military history study around recurring themes and threads of continuity, at least in 1982. My research enabled me to write a short paper describing the techniques a student might use to better direct his or her study of history. I shared the ideas in this paper with other officers for the remainder of my career.

18 Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Royal United Service Institute Journal*, February 1962, pp. 4–8.

19 The Army intended this guide, published in 1979, to serve as a tool for the self-education of officers. However, little evidence existed in 1981 of it accomplishing that purpose. Although the Army War College gave a copy to each student, I never heard it referenced during my time there as a student.

At the outset of my studies at the Army War College, a letter to the school's professional journal, *Parameters*, caught my attention. Retired Army Major General David W. Gray suggested, "that each officer should set forth the guidelines which he intended to follow throughout his career. These guidelines would encompass principles of conduct as well as skills essential to professional fitness, including not only those of a purely physical or technical nature but also those designed to train and discipline the mind. Presumably these skills would be modified or expanded as the officer progressed in rank."²⁰ I set out to review studies made of officer education in the recent past, talked with numerous authorities on officer education, and surveyed a variety of literature on the subject. From this endeavor, I concluded it best to divide my proposed self-directed program into three parts, the humanities in general, military history specifically, and communications, that is, reading, writing, speaking, and listening. Broadening the program allowed me to consider the "whole man," while centering on the military characteristics. Over the next months, I wrote a paper describing the importance of each of these categories to an officer's self-education: how he or she might go about studying subjects within these categories. As an unexpected benefit, my paper met the requirements of the college for an individual research essay; thus, it performed double duty.²¹ More important, it guided my own professional development efforts over the next fifteen years and informed my later work directed at improving professional military education in the Marine Corps.

Classes with Harry G. Summers, author of *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, certainly counted among the few highlights of my time at the Army War College. In both his book and classroom, he correctly refocused responsibility for failures in Vietnam from the liberal media and antiwar protestors to the real problems: a lack of strategic thinking and realistic understanding of the nature of war. Along with Admiral Turner, Summers forced thoughtful military officers to revisit their own deficient professional educations. General Robert Barrow, who served as Commandant of the Marine Corps during the year I attended the Army War College, also provided a beacon of light during this period with his scholarly manners.

20 David W. Gray, Letter to the Editor, *Parameters*, September 1981, p. 93.

21 Paul K. Van Riper, "A Self-Directed Officer Study Program," student research paper, U.S. Army War College, April 19, 1982.

A man of exceptional physical stature and presence, he evidenced an extraordinary intellect. As a serious student of history, he frequently employed historical examples in talks and speeches. In his annual visit to the college, he opened his remarks with a spellbinding story of Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar. In a telephone call the following weekend to my twin brother, a student at the Naval War College, I mentioned the favorable reaction Barrow had received during his visit. My brother indicated that the general's visit to Newport that same week elicited a similar response. I asked about the effect of his historical example, and my brother answered that it clearly motivated the students. We continued our conversation for some minutes, with my assuming that it centered on the same example—Nelson at Trafalgar—only to realize eventually that to the Naval War College audience, Barrow had spoken of Wellington at Waterloo. Unique among senior leaders, the commandant provided a navy example for an army school and an army example for a navy school.

Putting My Ideas to the Test

Following the Army War College, I returned to the operating forces for six years, first as the executive officer of the 7th Marines and then as commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines. From there I went to Okinawa, Japan, and assumed command of the 4th Marine Regiment. Duties as the operations officer and chief of staff of the 3rd Marine Division came afterward. Each of these billets offered the chance to implement my self-directed study program. Among the many books I read during this period, none proved more influential than Martin van Creveld's *Command in War*. In the first chapter, he offered an enlightened view of command and control as practiced over the ages. In the following chapters, he expanded on his ideas with clear historical illustrations. From the outset, van Creveld recognized the inherent uncertainty of the modern battlefield. That fact, virtually unacknowledged elsewhere, supplied the underpinning for my own approach to modernizing the command and control of every unit I served in during these and subsequent assignments. I insisted subordinate commanders and staff read the book and held my own command-level workshops to review van Creveld's ideas. In my mind, *Command in War* reached the status of classic almost upon publication. Surprisingly, when I asked Martin van Creveld at a conference in 1989 how he evaluated his many writings, he did not place that book at the top but stated that his then

yet to be published *The Transformation of War* would likely hold that honor in the future.

An obscure pamphlet filled with historical illustrations in its first chapter, *Combat Operations C3I Fundamentals and Interactions*, written by Air Force Major George E. Orr, also influenced my thinking on command and control in the mid-1980s. The only other officer I ever encountered in this period who demonstrated familiarity with this little booklet, General Al Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, enjoyed a reputation as a prolific reader. One of my fondest memories remains discussing the merits of Orr's book with General Gray, while escorting him through a display of 3rd Marine Division command posts in 1987, as the officers in trail looked on with puzzled expressions. John Keegan's *The Mask of Command*, an analysis of generalship over the ages, became another of my "must read" books on command and control during this time, mainly for the way it dealt with the issue every commander faces in combat—how far forward to go.²²

By this point in my career, I had organised my reading to ensure I regularly covered the three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic. At the tactical level, a number of worthwhile books appeared in the mid- to late 1980s. John A. English's *On Infantry* and a reprint of E.D. Swinton's 1907 edition of *The Defense of Duffer's Drift* serve as excellent examples. English addressed the infantry arm in a scholarly way and to a depth not previously matched.²³ Swinton used a literary technique whereby a young officer in a series of dreams refights the same battle several times – improving the performance of his unit on each occasion until he finally masters the mission.

22 The commander of the 1st Marine Division provided a traditional answer to this question during operations in Iraq in March and April 2003: "At a time of increasing reliance on sophisticated sensor and communications technologies to paint a 'picture of the battle space' to top generals far from the war front, a key Marine Corps commander last spring opted to lead his troops in Iraq the old-fashioned way: He went there. 'In two minutes at the front edge of the combat zone, you know if the troops feel confident, if the battle's going the way they want it to, [or if] they need something,' said Maj. Gen. James Mattis, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division. 'You can sense it. And you can apply something.'" Quoted from Elaine M. Grossman, "Marine General: Leading from Iraqi Battlefield Informed Key Decisions," *Inside The Pentagon*, Washington, DC, October 2003, 20, p. 1.

23 English's style of writing and his organisation of material made *On Infantry* difficult reading for many. A revised edition in 1994 with Bruce I. Gudmundsson proved to be an easier read, although it discarded much useful material.

Although substantial interest in the operational level of war and operational art arose throughout the American armed forces during the 1980s and generated numerous articles, few books on the subject appeared. The opposite occurred with strategy. Peter Paret's edited *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* and Edward N. Luttwak's *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* gained much attention throughout the defense community. Andrew F. Krepinevich's *The Army and Vietnam* led the way for a more introspective series of works on the Vietnam War. Reprints of Lord Moran's *Anatomy of Courage* and John Baynes's *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage* expanded the available literature on the human element in war. They stood solidly alongside the works of du Picq and S.L.A. Marshall. All became part of my expanding library, and I urged peers and subordinates alike to read them.

Two studies materially aided those seeking guidance on what to read, Roger H. Nye's *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* and Robert H. Berlin's bibliography, *Military Classics*, the latter published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute. A little pamphlet retitled *Literature in the Education of the Military Professional*, edited by two members of the U.S. Air Force Academy's English Department, encouraged me to venture again into areas and subjects not directly related to war. In his foreword to this booklet, Vice Admiral James Stockdale urged military professionals to study the humanities:

From such study, and from the lifetime high-minded reading habit it frequently spawns, come raw material for reflective thought in times of quietude, sixth-sense inspiration in the heat of battle, and a clearer vision of the big picture in peace or war from a philosophic and historical plane high above the buzz-word filled bureaucratic smog layer which can be counted on to contaminate the atmosphere of the nether regions.²⁴

24 Donald Ahern and Robert Shenk, eds., *Literature in the Education of the Military Professional* (Colorado Springs, CO, 1982), p. vii.

Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps University

Despite my protest—as far as a serving officer can protest orders—General Gray denied an extension of my tour in Okinawa, and in summer 1988, directed me to report as Director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia. In the midst of his Corps-wide effort to enhance professional military education, he made clear his purpose from my first day of duty. He said simply, “This school needs changing. My intent is for it to become the premier institution of its kind in the world. You cannot achieve that goal in the time I expect you to be here, but you will have time to lay a foundation that allows it to happen.” I received no more guidance, except a pointed edict to base all instruction on history and the concepts of maneuver warfare. General Gray wanted no separate classes on military history—he insisted on weaving history into all the instructions on operations and tactics. The same admonition followed for “maneuverist’s thinking,” with a strong suggestion that I ensure the infusion of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu into the course. Basically, he wanted the entire course to rest on military history and established ideas of strategy.

Turning to the faculty, I sought to understand the existing curriculum. Years of tinkering with the course of instruction made attempts to explain it confusing at best. Three bodies of thought crystallised concerning corrective actions. One group thought the commandant wrong and argued against change. A second group recognised and supported the requirement to revamp the curriculum, but argued that instruction be halted for at least a year, and perhaps two, to accomplish such a large task. A third, smaller faction wanted to press ahead. I elected to take my counsel from Timothy Lupfer’s *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. I reasoned that if the German Army in a matter of two months in the winter of 1917–18 could completely alter its tactical doctrine in the midst of combat, certainly the U.S. Marine Corps was capable of changing a program of instruction while teaching it. Thus, in fall 1988, we set out to revise the program of instruction completely while presenting it. For inspiration, I turned to the example Admiral Turner had established fifteen years earlier. For new content, I looked to my own work at the Army War College, the Naval War College curriculum, the critiques of outside observers and military historians

such as Williamson Murray, and the thorough study of professional military education commissioned by Representative Ike Skelton, member of Congress from the state of Missouri.

To support professional education within Marine Corps schools as well as throughout the Corps, General Gray tasked the doctrine writers at Quantico to prepare a new “capstone” manual that captured the essentials of warfare. Although many of my contemporaries —experienced colonels — hoped for assignment to the project, a young captain, John Schmitt, received the mission. In short order, Schmidt gained an understanding of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu worthy of any war college graduate and transposed their weighty ideas to simple prose. Drafts of his manual circulated among Command and Staff College instructors, informing them even as they critiqued the material. The final document—*Warfighting*—dramatically influenced education throughout the Marine Corps and in other organisations in the Department of Defense. Moreover, translations appeared in Spanish, Japanese, and Korean within a few years of its publication.

Part way through the year, General Gray announced he wanted a reading program developed for Marine Corps officers. The task eventually found its way to my desk. The mission seemed simple because my self-directed officer study program created at the Army War College already contained a list of recommended readings for officers. I spent several weeks updating and adding to this list, querying other institutions such as the service academies, the other command and staff colleges, the war colleges, and civilian universities. Much to my surprise, the fifteen copies of the initial draft list elicited twenty-one responses. Clearly, some who learned of the list felt compelled to offer their thoughts, although not officially asked. Some respondents wanted every book written by a particular author on the list, while others demanded we include none from the same author. Other equally strong suggestions materialised. Plainly, recommended reading lists bring out deep-seated emotions and prejudices. I sensed in this deep interest a pent-up desire for a Corps-wide reading program. Relying on the wisdom contained in the Center of Military History's *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*, Nye's *The Challenge of Command*, and Berlin's *Military Classics*, I pressed ahead to produce a list approved by General Gray.

In the midst of the curriculum change and the construction of a professional reading list, General Gray sent out another task: Draw up plans for establishment of a Marine Corps University. Again, primary responsibility for this undertaking fell on the Command and Staff College. Once more, I looked to history. A review of Scharnhorst's efforts to establish the *Kriegsakademie*, Upton's labors to create the schools at Fort Leavenworth, Commodore Stephen Luce's work to establish the Naval War College, and others gave me the grounding for this new endeavor. The work of a dedicated staff created the new organization, and in 1990, I assumed the position as the first President of the Marine Corps University. My assignment at Quantico ended in summer 1991, with orders to report as the commanding general of the 2nd Marine Division. The work to overhaul professional military education continued under the sure hands of others and reached its culmination before the end of the decade. Perhaps no better manifestation of the results the commandant anticipated exists than the performance of the senior Marine commanders, Lieutenant General Jim Conway and Major Generals Jim Mattis and Jim Amos, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Bringing Things to Fruition as a Senior Commander

Senior officers influence subordinates through a combination of direction and example. As a division commander, I was in the position to order and inspire 18,000 marines to make history part of their professional development. As a first step, I added an hour of professional reading to my own official schedule, promulgated daily throughout the division. I reasoned that if subordinates saw the division commander setting aside an hour each day for reading, others might follow. I also issued a memorandum that stated in part:

The professional reading program is a key part of the continuous professional education that is necessary to develop the minds of our Marines. It is most valuable for developing the sound military judgment that is essential for practicing the maneuver warfare doctrine contained in [the Warfighting manual]. Just as we expect them to maintain their mental fitness, so should we expect them to maintain their mental fitness through a career-long professional reading program.

In addition, I directed the purchase of more than 6,000 books for unit libraries, ordered the establishment of a historical reading room and the conduct of monthly seminars, required the division's regiments and battalions to sponsor reading groups and hold regular discussions of selected books, sponsored staff rides to Civil War battlefields for the division staff, and asked my units to carry out their own series of staff rides. The closing sentence of my memorandum stated, "Marines fight better when they fight smarter, and a systematic and progressive professional reading program contributes directly to that end." The proof of the value of reading is not straightforward. Performance on the battlefield provides the final test. I have no doubt marines from the division later fought smarter and therefore better because of the wisdom they gained from these various programs.

After an assignment at Headquarters Marine Corps—one that not only allowed me to read more, but also to attend several college-level history and defense-related courses—I received orders to take command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico. That organisation is responsible for all Marine Corps training and education, creation of operating concepts, and writing of doctrine. Thus, it possesses considerable ability to affect professional development across the entire Marine Corps. Again, I employed a combination of direction and example to advance the education of marines everywhere. Early on, I took action to ensure history provided the basis for all doctrinal development and the curricula for all schools. I invited noted historians to speak not only to students in formal schools, but also at professional gatherings. Monthly, I hosted a reading group – comprised of officers from lieutenant to major general – at my quarters for dinner and a follow-on discussion. Often, we were fortunate enough to persuade the author or the subject of the book under discussion to join us. Admiral Sandy Woodward, author of *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* and former Army Major Dick Winters, commander of the airborne company featured in Stephen Ambrose's *Band of Brothers*, honored our reading group in this manner. When visiting units or conducting inspections at the various commands around the Marine Corps that fell under my cognizance, I made it a habit to ask questions about publications on the Commandant's Reading List and gave away copies of books to those answering correctly.

I often noted in my two years at Quantico that the primary “weapon” that officers possess remains their minds. I followed with the observation that books provide the “ammunition” for this weapon. Always I cautioned against looking for answers in reading, especially history. Rather, I urged officers to read with the goal of absorbing the material as part of their being. To underscore my meaning, I referenced a scene from the movie Patton where the general, in a near trancelike mood, observes an ancient battlefield and replays in his mind how he trod this ground during the original battle. Most viewers, I believe, concluded Patton to be either some sort of mystic or perhaps a little deranged, while I supposed his many years of reading and study gave him the sense of having been there previously. I wanted to impart a simple lesson: a properly schooled officer never arrives on a battlefield for the first time, even if he has never actually trod the ground, if that officer has read wisely to acquire the wisdom of those who have experienced war in times past. My thought was far from original, for Clausewitz observed,

Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his knowledge within. He must always be ready to bring forth the appropriate decision. By total assimilation with his mind and life, the commander's knowledge must be transferred into a genuine capability.²⁵

25 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976), p. 147.

A Loss of Momentum

Six years into retirement, my worry grows that the erroneous ideas on military education held by post–World War II military leaders are again creeping back into the system. Evidence of such an unsatisfactory situation appears regularly. The promise of information technology and the rewards that it seemingly offers in terms of automated command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision- guided munitions holds a place in the minds of many defense leaders similar to the technological advantage allegedly provided by systems analysis, nuclear weapons, and computers in the 1950s and 1960s. Methodical planning techniques like those currently promised by advocates of “effects-based operations” and “operational net assessment” stand in for Robert McNamara’s systems engineering of military decision-making. Having been a victim—along with an entire generation of American military officers—of such shallow thinking, I find myself habitually warning those who will listen of the potential for repeating the tragic mistakes of the 1950s and 1960s.

The value of military history to the professional military officer remains incontestable. Those who might urge its reduction or elimination from military schools and colleges are woefully uninformed at best or completely ignorant of the basic underpinnings of their supposed profession at worst. The American military cannot afford to lose a second battle to keep history at the core of professional military education.

Intellectual Spring Cleaning: It's Time for a Military "Do Not Read" List; and Some Sources that Should be on that List

By Aaron P. Jackson, Ben Zweibelson and William Simonds

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Abstract

Military reading lists, intended to promote professional reading and in turn enhance education and develop critical thinking skills and sound judgement, recommend key texts to military personnel. This is a noble intent but the list themselves, while generally good, are not flawless. Critiques of military reading lists often focus on what sources they are missing. This article offers its own critique but from a different perspective. It does so by analysing why some sources, which have become outdated, are based on faulty or incomplete research, have been thoroughly disproven, or some combination of the above, nevertheless linger on military reading lists. It then offers a short list of such sources, which it recommends be either removed from existing reading lists or accompanied by other sources that place the original source in appropriate historical context. Where applicable, it also recommends alternative sources

that provide insights into the same subject matter. In so doing, this article is intended generate debate and to assist militaries to achieve a better balance between evaluation, induction and retention of valid knowledge on one hand, and rejection of outdated or flawed knowledge on the other.

Introduction

"The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."

Basil Liddell Hart (quoted in: Westenhoff, 2007, p. 235)

"Thinking occurs only when circumstances are unfamiliar and old routines do not work."

Karl E. Weick (1983, p. 25)

Military reading lists are today fairly ubiquitous. It seems that the chief of every military service in the English-speaking world has promulgated one, as have several other military commanders and institutions including, for example, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Military Academy at West Point and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom (O'Neill, 2016). Indeed, military reading lists have become so prolific that business organisations have started emulating them, often recommending several of the same texts as their military counterparts (Fortune Editors, 2015; Brooks, 2014). Military organisations across the Anglosphere appear unanimous in their desire to educate the military profession on critical concepts, history, and fresh ideas; to the extent that one compendium website claims that it lists "2387 books on 90 revisions of 51 different military reading lists" (Anon., 2017).

Reading this statistic, one can't help but wonder if anyone has ever read all of these books and, if they have, how long did it take them? This is not to say that we are opposed to military reading lists. On the contrary, we are convinced that they serve a purpose that is both essential and valid, which is that they "play a vital role in developing the knowledge that will assist with good judgement, effective leadership and the pursuit of excellence" (Royal Australian Navy, 2006, p. 1). Put simply, undertaking professional reading helps one to develop as a military professional and reading lists provide a good starting point for personnel eager to engage in professional reading but unsure of where to begin.

This noble intent does not mean that existing reading lists are flawless, however. For example, in a recent critique of US Army and Air Force reading lists, one of this paper's authors highlighted that almost all of the sources listed fit within a functionalist paradigm, before going on to propose sources from other paradigms that could be added to achieve greater ontological balance (Zweibelson, 2016). While it presents a valid criticism, this earlier paper nevertheless aligns with the bulk of the criticism levelled at military reading lists, which focuses on what additional sources need to be added that have not yet been included. In this article, we will level an alternative criticism of military reading lists by taking the opposite approach to this norm.

Specifically, instead of proposing what else to include we will argue that there are several sources remaining on military reading lists that ought to be removed. This is because these sources have either become outdated, are based on faulty or incomplete research, have been thoroughly disproven, or some combination of the above. The continued widespread reading of these sources, which is brought about by their ongoing inclusion on military reading lists, runs counter to the intent of the reading lists themselves because it is detrimental to the development of good judgement and the pursuit of professional excellence.

We admit that arguing about books that ought to be "unread" by a military profession potentially enables an organisation to create "echo chambers" that further calcify thinking and prevent innovation. To avoid this potential we are not arguing that individual military professionals ought not to read any of the books we recommend be removed from military reading lists. We are instead suggesting that military organisations, charged with creating influential military reading lists, avoid recommending several books that have either contributed to stagnant practice, already calcified military curiosity beyond the focus of the book itself, or become victim of their own success, and thereby remaining a ritualised artefact constituting an organisation's comfort food. In all of these cases, individual professionals should continue reading any and all books that they desire. But for military organisations, the potential impact of required or "strongly suggested" reading lists means that more is at stake than it is for individuals who have particular reading preferences.

Accordingly, this article proposes the establishment of a military "do not read" list. It does so by listing several books currently on military reading lists, which meet the above-mentioned criteria for removal from these lists (that is, the books listed below have either become outdated, are based on faulty or incomplete research, have been thoroughly disproven, or some combination of the above). First, however, it is pertinent to briefly examine why the sources that ought to be on such a do not read list have lingered for as long as they have.

Why do outdated or disproven sources linger?

Answering this question is not as straightforward as one would expect, because most sources addressing knowledge acquisition do precisely that: they focus on how new knowledge is acquired, not on how existing knowledge is evaluated and, if need be, discarded. Despite this, a few sources examining knowledge evaluation are useful here. The first of these is Margaret Masterman's work applying Thomas Kuhn's conceptualisation of "paradigms" to the social sciences. Kuhn, in his seminal text *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, primarily used the term in two related ways: to describe an overarching set of common beliefs that underlies a particular approach to the conduct of scientific research; and to describe an exemplary example employed by a scientific community to convey, or perhaps symbolise, their shared commitments (or common set of rules or beliefs). Kuhn also referred to these definitions as "global" and "local" paradigms, with this description highlighting the hierarchical nature of their relationship (Kuhn, 2012, pp. 173-90; Kuhn, 1977, pp. 293-319).

In her own subsequent development of this concept, Masterman labelled the social sciences "multiple paradigm sciences...in which, far from there being no paradigm, there are on the contrary too many". She then argued that this state of affairs causes paradigms to apply to narrower areas of research than in the natural sciences. This results in turn in an increased rate of short-term local paradigm change, but also a decreased rate of longer-term global paradigm change, because "each sub-field as defined by its technique is so obviously more trivial and narrow than the field as defined by intuition, and also the various operational definitions given by the techniques are so grossly discordant with one another, that discussion on fundamentals remains" (Masterman, 1970, p. 74). In other words, the social

sciences status as a multiple paradigm science leads to a slower rate of knowledge rejection of overarching beliefs underlying its fields of enquiry. Military reading lists are no exception to this phenomenon.

Another source that may explain the ongoing presence of outdated or disproven sources is military reading lists in Karl E. Weick's (1996) paper "Drop Your Tools". Here, Weick discusses the failure of two groups of firefighters to drop their heavy tools so that they could outrun rapidly approaching forest fires and reach safe areas. The result of both groups failing to abandon their tools was the death of a total of 27 firefighters. Weick employs these examples as an allegory explaining why organisations and individuals hold doggedly to familiar paradigms, especially when they feel threatened. He observes that "of singular importance in making them [the tools] hard to drop is ... identity. Identity, the fusion of tools with group membership, makes it hard for firefighters to consider tools as something apart from themselves that can be discarded, just as it makes it hard for scholars to consider concepts as something apart from themselves" (Weick, 1996, p. 312).

It should come as no surprise to even the most casual observer that militaries foster especially strong institutional identities. Carl H. Builder (1989, pp. 3-92), for example, establishes that the US Army, Navy and Air Force each have their own institutional identities. Exploring these leads Builder to unpack the deep cultural beliefs that self-defined their strategies and organisational forms, harking back to what Builder termed the "golden era" of World War Two, where each service gained its modern forms in high intensity conflict. Since then, each service has continued to seek similar conflicts within which they can wage war in the manner that best suits the roles established upon their own values and beliefs about how to conduct war.¹ Such a phenomenon is not exclusive to the US military, either. Allan D. English (2004), for instance, concludes that the Canadian services also have their own unique and significant institutional cultures, which vary from both the US services and from each other.

So what does this mean for military reading lists? Because many of the books included appear in multiple editions of the same service's reading list over time, and many discuss the history of that service, they are likely to become entwined with the institution's identity. As a result, they become harder for the institution to "drop" as time goes by, even as the likelihood that they have become outdated increases.

Finally, another factor leading to the continued citation of outdated or disproven sources in military reading lists may be a failure to adequately or widely communicate the rejection of existing knowledge. This theme is explored elsewhere by one of this paper's authors in relation to the proliferation of military concepts that are either oversimplified or taken out of context (Jackson, 2014a). Here, analysis was enabled by applying Ludwig Fleck's (1979) concept of "thought collectives" to military thought. Fleck posits the existence within any field where ideas are exchanged of an "esoteric circle" consisting of specialists and an "exoteric circle" consisting of their followers. Core ideas within a field are generated by the esoteric circle, but the opinions and feedback of the exoteric circle are nevertheless important as they validate and give impetus to thought generation by members of the esoteric circle.

In the case of military reading lists, this feedback cycle may be broken. As will be seen, our suggestions to remove certain books from military reading lists are not based merely on our own whims or personal preferences. Rather, our suggestions are based on research undertaken by those in both esoteric and exoteric circles relative to the books they are critiquing, which we cite in support of our argument regarding each book we list below. The feedback on these books has clearly not reached those who develop the reading lists themselves. To return to Weick's allegory, perhaps outdated or disproven books linger on military reading lists simply because military organisations do not hear the instructions being shouted at them to drop some of their tools.

What should be on a military "do not read" list, and why?

What follows is our list of books that currently appear in military reading lists, but which ought to be removed because they are either outdated, based on faulty or incomplete research, have been thoroughly disproven, or some combination of the above. These books are listed alphabetically by author surname, as they often appear in the reading lists themselves. What follows may therefore be considered to constitute a military "do not read" list. For each publication listed, we also provide a brief summary of the reasons why it ought to be removed, along with references to sources critiquing the publication. Where appropriate, we also provide an alternate

source that should be added to a military reading list to replace the publication that we propose removing.

It should also be noted that some sources that are out-of-date or disproven, are nevertheless still valid as historical documents that indicate the state of military thinking at the time of their publication. In the case of these sources, we do not recommend their removal from military reading lists entirely. Rather, we would prefer that steps be taken to ensure that these sources are viewed in their proper historical context. Accordingly, for some publications listed below we recommend more recent sources that provide such context be included in military reading lists alongside these historical sources, and that people consulting the reading list containing these publications be encouraged to consider them together, or not at all.

Clausewitz, Carl von, 1976. *On War* [1832] edited and translated by Michael Howard & Peter Paret, with introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie, and a commentary by Bernard Brodie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Appears on: Almost every military reading list in the English-speaking world!

Reason it should be removed: Actually, it shouldn't be removed. On the contrary, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* should remain on all of the reading lists that currently feature it. The three introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie, on the other hand, dote on their subject matter and are problematic because of this. It is this part of the book that ought to be removed from the reading lists.

Critiques: English-speaking militaries have for the last generation absorbed Clausewitz's *On War* into their practice, doctrine and policy, as well as broad professional education. Ultimately, Clausewitz has become the de-facto military philosopher upon which the entire foundations of Anglo-Saxon military thought and organisation are structured (Paparone & Davis, Jr., 2012, p. 66). Dale Eikmeier (2012, p. 135), for example, went so far as to assert that "[military] doctrine has treated Clausewitz's *On War* as if it were divinely inspired, handed down from Mt. Sinai". We do not seek to challenge the dominance

that Clausewitzian military logic (with a “curious mixture” of Jomini (Vandersteen, 2012, p. 34)) now has upon nearly all Western militaries. This particularly dominant version of *On War*, edited and translated by Howard and Paret, ought to remain well stocked in military libraries.² However, the introductory essays are rather conventional, dryly written, and have been characterised as “pep talk for doubtful readers” with an implied bias as to why Clausewitz is valuable (Lowenthal, 1977, pp. 608-9; Dennis, 1977, pp. 114-5). Lastly, this version seems to have become the most popular edition of *On War* due to Harry Summers’ influential *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, which drove military libraries to initially fill their shelves with it as a way to ride on the literary coattails of Summers’ own book (Olson, 2013; Melton, 2012, pp. 85-6).

Instead read: Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport, published in 1968 as part of the Penguin Classics series. While its translation of *On War* itself is problematic and incomplete, Rapoport’s introductory essay offsets many of these issues. This suggested alternative will no doubt be contentious. Rapoport’s perspective is so vilified by some Clausewitzian enthusiasts that one of the more popular Clausewitz analysis websites has a warning upfront that readers must avoid “the atrocious Penguin edition, edited in 1968 by Anatol Rapoport”, which is considered “badly misleading” and “hostile”, and which features ad hominem attacks on Rapoport (Clausewitz.com, undated).³ Yet what led to this criticism of Rapoport is also what has led us to advocate the inclusion of Rapoport’s essay in military reading lists. Rapoport does what few before or since have done with Clausewitz: he directly challenges the text and provides multiple alternatives for war philosophy. Written during the Cold War and directed towards understanding Moscow through both Western and non-Western lenses, and contrary to the charges levelled at it, Rapoport’s introduction takes a masterful trans-disciplinary philosophical approach to the decidedly difficult topic of organised human conflict. If military reading lists really are designed to encourage critical thinking and stimulate the intellectual development of military members, then what better way to do this than by providing a clearly critical introduction to the books they include? At the very least, military organisations ought to include Rapoport’s introduction as an accompanying counter-view to the introductory section in the dominant Howard and Paret edition of *On War*.

Diamond, Jared, 1997. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Appears on: US Navy Professional Reading Program (2017 edition);
Australian Army Chief of Army's Reading List (2012 edition)

Reason it should be removed: *Guns, Germs, and Steel* seeks to explain why some societies have managed to succeed over others over the course of history, asserting that geographical and environmental factors have advantaged certain societies, particularly those in Western Europe. Anthropologists and historians have since criticised *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, arguing it suffers from selective and uncritical use of sources, flawed arguments, and overlooks the role of political and social variables to explain the dominance of the West. While Diamond's work provides an interesting perspective, its flaws are many, and there exist better analyses as to how history has unfolded and how the West came to occupy its present dominant position.

Critiques: Andrew Sluyter's review in *Antipode* strongly critiques *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, noting that it ignores established literature, uses flawed logic, and glosses over the importance of colonisation in shaping global history (Sluyter, 2003, pp. 813-7). In a less scathing assessment, J.R. McNeill gives some praise before criticising Diamond's disregard for non-geographic factors in explaining the successful spread of technology and agriculture (McNeill, 2001, pp. 165-74). Lastly, Michael Wilcox outlines the problems of Diamond's arguments in relation to American Indigenous cultures, particularly his selection of evidence, and highlights how Diamond assesses Indigenous peoples using different metrics than those he applied to Europeans (Wilcox, 2010, pp. 92-117).

Instead Read: *1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus* and *1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created* by Charles Mann. Both books have been lauded as being meticulously researched, well-argued, and written to be both entertaining and educational. Rather than presenting new research, they distil findings from within the academic sphere and present them in a way that a layperson can understand and learn from.

Douhet, Giulio, 1984. *The Command of the Air* [1921], translated by Dino Ferrari. New York, NY: Coward-McCann, 1942. Reprint edition by Ayer Publishing Co.

Appears on: US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's Reading List (2012 edition); Royal Australian Air Force Chief of Air Force's Reading List (2011 edition)

Reason it should be removed: Our issue with this source is not that it appears on reading lists, but rather that it appears under headings such as "air power strategy, concepts and theories". Although Douhet's work is indeed theoretical, it is now almost a century old. Its core theses were that to win a war it is both necessary and sufficient to have command of the air and that strategic bombing within enemy territory would completely break down morale and resistance of the enemy population. Since it was published, both of these theses have been disproven by events. Accordingly, this book needs to be viewed in its proper historical context: as a key text that profoundly shaped early thinking about air power, but which has since been superseded. We therefore recommend that this book remain on military reading lists but as a historical rather than a conceptual or theoretical source, and that it be accompanied by other sources that establish its historical context.

Critiques: David MacIsaac's (1986) chapter on air power in Peter Paret's *The Makers of Modern Strategy* even-handedly summarises other critiques of Douhet, inasmuch as MacIsaac both endorses various criticisms yet also defends Douhet where he considers these criticisms have been levelled unfairly. Most significant amongst the criticisms MacIsaac endorses is Douhet's failure to predict the invention of radar, which led to Douhet completely missing the potential of robust air defence to threaten his conception of command of the air.

Instead read: Our recommendation is not that people stop reading Douhet, but that reading lists strongly recommend that they accompany their reading of his work with another source that places it within its appropriate historical context. There are several sources that do this. Amongst them, Stephen Budiansky's (2003) *Air Power: From Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II* is recommended because in addition to placing Douhet's work within the context of its times, it also offers insights into his contemporaries and successors, thereby placing his contribution within

the broader context of air power theory development during the entire 20th century (regarding Douhet, see in particular pp. 136-9).

Grossman, David, 1996. *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*. New York, NY: Back Bay Books.

Appears on: Commander Canadian Army's Reading List (2015 edition); US Marine Corps Commandant's Professional Reading List (online, updated 20 April 2017); Royal Australian Navy Reading List (2006 edition)

Reason it should be removed: Grossman's book, along with some of his subsequent work on what he calls "killology", provides an analysis of the psychology underlying killing in warfare. Asserting that "there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow men" (Grossman, 1996, p. 4), Grossman subsequently argues that in most circumstances soldiers in battle will die before they overcome this resistance. While thought provoking, Grossman's argument suffers from two major flaws. First, it is based on a simplistic and highly contested understanding of human behaviour. Second, Grossman's argument is highly reliant on the earlier research of S.L.A. Marshall, which has been thoroughly disproven.

Critiques: In a review essay in *Canadian Military Journal*, historian Robert Engen (2009) discusses both of these flaws in Grossman's work. He observes that Grossman's "ideas seem inconsistent with what scientists and researchers tell us about human behaviour, which is far richer and more complicated than Grossman acknowledges" and that "historians since the 1980s have been consistently demonstrating that Marshall did not have the evidence to back up his claims" (Engen, 2009, p. 121 & 125). Engen's master's thesis goes one step further, analysing several primary sources that undermine Marshall by reaching the opposite conclusion on the basis of more credible evidence, thoroughly undermining the key research upon which Grossman's own arguments are primarily based (Engen, 2008).

Instead read: *War in Civilization* by Azar Gat, which focuses on the role war in human societies, is a meticulously researched and well-argued alternative discussion of human behaviour and violence in particular. Although Gat can be a dry read, his academic depth makes it worth

persevering and his book does not suffer from the analytical flaws that Grossman's does. From a psychological perspective, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* by Ben Shalit provides another alternative. Although it is not a panacea, neither does its analysis rely on the reduction of its subject matter to a single statistic (the number of soldiers who fire their weapons at the enemy) and accordingly it avoids the issue of over-reliance on a single, disproven source that plagues Grossman's own analysis.

Hammes, Thomas X, 2004. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press.

Appears on: Commander Canadian Army's Reading List (2015 edition)

Reason it should be removed: In this book, Thomas X Hammes expands on the concept of "fourth generation warfare", which was first proposed in a journal article co-authored by William S. Lind et al (1989). In the following fifteen years, the concept was refined several times by its proponents, including Hammes. At its core, the theory asserts that warfare has gone through four generations, which are characterised by the primary means they use to wage war. The last of these, according to Hammes, is about seventy years old, yet is still the primary military challenge facing the West in the present era. To paraphrase H.L. Mencken, for every problem there is a solution that is neat, plausible and wrong (cited Knowles, 2004, p. 521:20). This is, in essence, the major problem with the fourth generation warfare concept. The simplified version of history that it is based upon has the potential to lead military practitioners to develop an over-simplified view of both military history and contemporary military threats. For this reason, Hammes' book should be removed from military reading lists.

Critiques: The issue identified in the preceding paragraph is the major theme in several critiques of fourth generation warfare, which tend to discuss the concept in all of its iterations, rather than addressing Hammes' book alone. For example, Michael Evans (2005, p. 243) asserts that the concept is based upon "a superficial and highly selective treatment of military history", and Antulio J Echevarria III (2005, p. 1) states that it is "a bankrupt theory" with "a number of profound and incurable flaws". (For an additional critique, see Owen, 2007, pp. 181-2). While levelled at the theory in general, these critiques are applicable

to Hammes book specifically, Echevarria (2005, p. 2) saying about the book itself that "for his part, Hammes is to be commended for his willingness to ... promote positive change [in general perceptions of modern warfare]. However, the tool that he employs undermines his credibility". Those seeking to better understand either the evolution of warfare, or the nature of contemporary warfare, would be better off reading one of the myriad other sources that address these issues and leaving Hammes—and the rest of the fourth-generation warfare literature—on the shelf.

Hanson, Victor Davis, 1989. *The Western War of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Appears on: Commander Canadian Army's Reading List (2015 edition)

Reason it should be removed: Hanson's monograph sought to take the orthodox view of hoplite combat as limited, violent, and pitched engagements between primarily middle class Greeks over farmland and argue that this served to shape the Western way of warfare to the present day. Hanson's thesis spawned considerable debate over the following decades about the nature of hoplite warfare and has since been criticised for his portrayal of Ancient Greek warfare as well as for a lack of evidence of the supposed emergence and revolution of a Greek middle class. Hanson's argument that a Western way of war developed from this period falls apart because the conditions of the period he describes do not, in fact, exist. Thus, there is little value in *The Western Way of War* to understanding the development of a supposed Western style of warfare.

Critiques: The collection of essays in *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, edited by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano (2013b), provides a comprehensive overview and expansion of the debate about how and why hoplites fought. Critiques of Hanson's arguments note that the Greek phalanx that he describes was in fact far more fluid and mobile than originally thought, and auxiliaries fought in conjunction with hoplites in a variety of combat operations that were more extensive than simple pitched battles. Other critiques in this volume point out that there remains little evidence of the middle class and consequent revolution central to Hanson's thesis on Ancient Greek warfare. (In particular, see: Kagan & Viggiano, 2013a; Foxhall, 2013; Wees, 2013).

Instead Read: *Men of Bronze* allows the reader to understand the nature of the debate about hoplite warfare and the current academic stances. That the reader may gain a more complete understanding of the debate and its various nuances in one volume makes it far more valuable than reading Hanson's work alone. In trying to understand how Western styles of warfare and strategy have developed, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* by Beatrice Heuser provides a thorough exploration of the development of strategy in the West from antiquity to the modern day, including a brief critique of Hanson's claims.

Huntington, Samuel, 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Appears on: Commander Canadian Army's Reading List (2015 edition); U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List (2013 edition)

Reason it should be removed: Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* argued that in the aftermath of the Cold War cultural differences between the major civilisations in the world would be the basis for the next major conflicts, rather than "ideological, political, or economic" distinctions (Huntington, 1996, p. 21).⁴ Huntington's thesis has been criticised for various reasons – lack of evidence that inter-civilisational conflicts are increasing, simplistic conceptions of cultures and civilisations, and for its potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The latter two problems serve as the primary reasons for removal, as the book promotes simplistic understandings of different cultural groups and their relations with each other, serving to reinforce problematic notions of "West versus the rest" or "West versus Islam", while also supporting the narratives of opposing actors such as Russia or Daesh. While examining the role of culture and the interaction of cultures is integral to the success of future conflicts, *The Clash of Civilizations* risks giving military leaders a narrow and simplistic understanding that may do more them harm than good.

Critiques: Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000) challenge Huntington's thesis, noting that traditional explanations for interstate conflict are more suitable, while also observing that interstate conflict between civilisations decreased as the Cold War went on. Building on this, Jonathan Fox (2002) argues that specifically within ethnic conflicts there is no evidence

of an increase in "civilisational ethnic conflicts" in the post-Cold War era. More recently, Neumayer and Plümper (2009, p. 711) find that "there is not significantly more terrorism from the Islamic against other civilisations in general, nor a structural break in the pattern of international terrorism" in the post-Cold War era. Edward Said (2001), writing in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, challenged the labels of "Islam" and "the West" as muddying the waters and oversimplifying the interactions and conflicts of the post-Cold War era. Botocci and Challand (2006) discuss how *The Clash of Civilizations* developed as a political myth and became a self-fulfilling prophecy, feeding into and perpetuating divisive, simplistic, and "neo-Orientalist" perceptions of Islam.

Huntington, Samuel, 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Appears on: US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's Reading List (2012 edition); US Marine Corps Commandant's Professional Reading List (online, updated 20 April 2017)

Reason it should be removed: Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* has become the foundational text informing Western understandings of civil-military relations. Its hypothesis is that the best form of civilian control of the military is "objective control", which is achieved by professionalising the armed forces through the establishment of a well-defined corporate role for their officer corps. It makes this argument alongside an exploration of another, less successful model of civil-military relations – labelled "subjective control" – on the basis of historical examinations of US, Japanese and German case studies and following a lengthy discussion of what constitutes military professionalism. At the time of its publication, this book explored a relatively new area—the nature of civil-military relations. In the sixty years since, extensive further research in this area has challenged both the historical and theoretical foundations of Huntington's analysis, and several other, more convincing theories of civil-military relations have been published, which overcome several of the shortfalls of Huntington's own work.

Critiques: William B. Skelton challenges several aspects of Huntington's book, contending that Huntington's assessment that the liberal tradition is a challenge to military professionalism is incorrect and arguing instead

that for the US military, America's liberal tradition actually contributed to its more rapid professionalisation during the 18th and 19th centuries. He also critiques Huntington's account of US military history, pointing out multiple places where Huntington's historical research was either incomplete or misinterpreted (Skelton, 1996). Edward M. Coffman (1995) chronicles several substantial critiques published over the years, for example citing a review that was published in 1957, almost immediately after the release of Huntington's book, and which concluded that Huntington was "at once persuasive and of dubious validity" (Coffman, 1995, p. 69). Mark D. Mandeles (2009), in yet another review essay, observed that several issues stem from Huntington's frequent tendency to over-generalise. Finally, attempts to apply Huntington's idealised theory of civil-military relations have arguably brought about an artificial dichotomy between strategy and military operations, leading to the situation described by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan (2009) as the "devouring" of the former by the latter.⁵

Instead read: In addition to providing another excellent critique of Huntington, Eliot A. Cohen's *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime* develops an alternative, and much more credible, theory of civil-military relations. It thereby provides a more up-to-date alternative starting point for readers interested in exploring this vitally important area of study.

Shaara, Michael, 1974. *The Killer Angels: The Classic Novel of the Civil War*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.

Appears on: U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List (2013 edition); US Marine Corps Commandant's Professional Reading List (online, updated 20 April 2017); Australian Army Chief of Army's Reading List (2012 edition)

Reason it should be removed: This book is one of the best fictional accounts of the Battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War, providing a deep and entertaining account of the major military decision-makers and actors in this significant battle. The reason to remove it from military reading lists reflects some aspects of American military culture that deserve consideration. *Killer Angels* is a work of fiction and while all storytelling, regardless of form or content, is extremely valuable to societies seeking knowledge construction and empathy of shared

values and culture, fiction can also distort or amplify elements of reality to the benefit of an institution. What an institution recommends as fiction for institutionalised reading reflects the sorts of stories and values the organisation wishes its members to develop, discuss, and improve upon. In the past generation of persistent asymmetric conflict, the American military services have continued on their quest to fight with styles and methods that reflect institutionalisms in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of Africa and across the globe in other desperate locations (Hampson & Lindberg, 2012). Militaries are continuing what Builder (1989, pp. 3-92) warned of, seeking war as well as military strategy cast within particular narratives. The fictional *Killer Angels* compliments the non-fiction of the event, in that modern militaries are seeking what no longer happens in war (Leed, 2015, pp. 133-43).

Critiques: Today's military professionals require a work of military (or even non-military) fiction that evokes the challenges of the current asymmetric and ambiguous conflict environments of non-state actors, rogue regimes and trans-regional networks. Clear victories or culminating battles are unlikely. If militaries seek to provide fictional accounts to inspire as well as imbue values upon the current generation of military professionals, these works of fiction ought to feature greater relevance to the challenges of the modern battlefield. Critics might scoff at this and state that the timeless characteristics of great leaders, honour and bravery from Gettysburg remain as valid today as ever, but that also negates fictional accounts of those same characteristics (as well as others) cast within a story where war does not unfold as it did in the 19th Century. Yet today's well maintained service traditions may not be immediately recognisable within these other works, priming militaries to have a bias to retaining more recognisable works such as *Killer Angels*. As Weick offers, "bureaucracies see what they have seen before and they link these memories in a sequential train of associations... [They] tend to imagine the past and remember the future" (Weick, 2006, p. 448). Featuring *Killer Angels* on military reading lists is akin to attempting to comfort a starving man with a photo of his favourite meal. It is unfulfilling in the current context, yet it reminds the man of how his organisation wants him to imagine his past dining experiences and guide his future selections. This occurs even though the past is incompatible with the starving man's current needs and with other foods that may now be available.

Instead read: Other fictional stories about war, such as *Ender's Game*, *Starship Troopers*, or *The Man in the High Castle*, which are not based on actual battles or wars and therefore lack many of the service-centric concepts and idealised "clean" aspects of 19th century conflict enshrined within *Killer Angels*. For the emergent military themes of drones, artificial intelligence and war, organisations might also consider *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* and *I, Robot*. Regarding unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, *Fight Club* is an example of an eccentric story that has relevance within the context of 21st century complexity and ambiguity.⁶ Although some might consider these sources too whimsical and relativistic for military professional reading they are, as a genre of military science fiction, considering the ambiguity and confusion of future conflicts where things do not go as we expect. They also address how militaries (and individuals) must undergo transformation to remain innovative, relevant and able to attain positions of advantage.

Singer, Peter W. & August Cole, 2016. *Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War*. New York: Mariner Books.

Appears on: US Navy Professional Reading Program (2017 edition); US Marine Corps Commandant's Professional Reading List (online, updated 20 April 2017)

Reason it should be removed: Singer and Cole's novel touts itself as a novel depicting the next world war. In fairness to Singer and Cole (2016, p. v), they are clear from the beginning that the book "is a work of fiction, not prediction". As the previous entry on this "do not read" list noted, fiction can provide valuable insights for institutional development. *Ghost Fleet*, however, fails in this regard. The story depicts American forces fighting back against a Chinese surprise attack on Hawaii. Why the attack happens and how the global political climate reached a point where this could take place is not explained adequately enough to seem plausible for the book's near future setting; an observation reflected across numerous critiques of this book. Geopolitics aside, while the book's exposition of near-future technology is realistically employed and well researched, as one critic pointed out, it fails to offer any new or innovative insights to those within military circles (Frizzell, 2016, p. 160). In fact, in many respects it reinforces the comfortable narrative of superior technology delivering a decisive victory in the culminating

battle, a problem highlighted above in our discussion of Shaara's book *Killer Angels*. If Singer and Cole are not able to give leaders an innovative vision of near-future technology or accurately describe how a conflict with China may begin, there appears to be little reason to include *Ghost Fleet* on a professional reading list.

Critiques: Connie Frizzell's (2016) review in *Naval War College Review* provides a comprehensive breakdown of the novel's weaknesses, including the utility of its portrayal of future-tech. Heuser's (2016) review also draws issue with the world Singer and Cole create with little explanation for why they eschew certain accepted norms in international relations. Lastly, Brent D. Ziarnick (2016) provides a more favourable take on the book's use of technology, while still challenging the political narrative.

Instead Read: Singer's previous works on technological trends in warfare such as *Wired for War* and *Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know* provide in-depth outlooks on these topics without the baggage of *Ghost Fleet*'s storyline. Additionally, Ted Koppel's *Lights Out* specifically examines the threat of a cyber-attack against critical infrastructure in the US.

Conclusion

What ought to be included or not included on future military reading lists will no doubt be emergent and ever-changing depending on the context of the times. Military organisations will go through novel experiences and will develop ways to think within new paradigms, possibly drawing from disciplines and fields that have little or no influence on the content of today's reading lists. Like the reading lists themselves, a military "do not read" list cannot ever be considered final, because what militaries as an organisation do not read today may need to be read at a later date. The ten sources listed above are included in our own "do not read" list because they have either become outdated, are based on faulty or incomplete research, have been thoroughly disproven, or some combination of the above. Accordingly, we do not expect to revise our conclusions about these books any time soon. But, the fact remains that proposing to remove various books from military reading lists has both objective and subjective aspects.

From an objective view, construction of a "do not read" list of books such as what you found in this article is quite appropriate. However, any list once considered in a new context will require further self-reflection and study. The list that we have provided here is valid in the current context due to the justifications we have provided above. But organisations change, and future "do not read" lists will need to be proposed by other critical theorists and professionals thinking about their thinking on military reading lists. For example, were a military organisation to adapt one of the books we recommend to replace another book, if in the future that book too became outdated or its research was disproven, then that book would itself need the same treatment as this article illustrates for its predecessor. The actual books, from an objective perspective, become artefacts that produce effects in military organisations that use their information to create and share knowledge. Thus, this article, as yet another artefact of sorts, is intended to produce an effect by helping to discard old and generate new knowledge. Over time, this artefact, once no longer useful, will require replacement as well.

From a subjective view, books are far more than artefacts of paper and symbols. They represent socially constructed ideas and patterns, and the words and phrases within them are entirely composed of metaphors, values and abstract concepts streamlined into language for groups to consume and consider. Some books become symbolic, representing entire social castes, ideologies, or schools of thought on a variety of professions, topics, and practices. Books can become ritualised, and some books take on a life of their own and become used in manners that their authors had no intention or expectations regarding. It is doubtful, for example, that the 17th century Japanese swordsman Miyamoto Musashi had any idea that his writings on kenjutsu and swordcraft might, almost 400 years later, be added to many reading lists for leaders of industry as well as the military. Author Mary Shelley originally wrote *Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus* anonymously and the initial print run was only 500 copies.

Our concluding point, therefore, is that the value of any book is in the eye of the beholder. Individual military readers should continue to read any book they so desire, although we recommend that they should always do so critically. But militaries as institutions ought to place considerable critical thought into each of the sources they recommend to their members, or in some cases instruct them to read. If the intent of military reading lists

really is to “play a vital role in developing the knowledge that will assist with good judgement, effective leadership and the pursuit of excellence” (Royal Australian Navy, 2006, p. 1), then the evaluation and, where required, discarding of existing knowledge is as vital to achieving this intent as is the assessment and potential inclusion of new knowledge. It is hoped that our discussion here will stimulate debate and, ultimately, go some way towards helping militaries to better achieve a more even balance between knowledge evaluation, induction, retention—and rejection.

Endnotes

- 1 Chillingly, Builder further illuminated that these services have placed institutional goals and self-preservation of their war-waging methodologies even above US national interests. Essentially, if a service could fight a war in a manner that could lose it, but could wage the war in the manner that most fulfilled its institutional self-interests, the service would choose that approach.
- 2 For an excellent summary of the rise of Clausewitz in US Army doctrine and education, and in particular the proliferation of the Paret and Howard edition, see Melton, 2012, pp. 85-86.
- 3 The irony is not lost on this paper's authors that this website (Clausewitz.com, undated) personally attacks Rapoport while simultaneously accusing him of doing the same to Clausewitz. This paper's authors were unable to locate any literary criticism of Rapoport's actual points in his essay, as opposed to ad hominem attacks on Rapoport as an individual.
- 4 Huntington (1996) identified the major civilisations as Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese.
- 5 For a counter-argument to Kelly & Brennan (2009) that is nevertheless still critical of Huntington, see Jackson (2014b).
- 6 This novel has already appeared on at least one military reading list, that being the 2007 edition of the Australian Army Chief of Army's Reading List. Unfortunately, it was removed from the current (2012) edition.

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