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# **The Fifth-Generation Australian Army— Leadership and Ethics in 2040**

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**Australian Army Occasional Paper No. 10**



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ISSN (Online) 2653-0406

ISSN (Print) 2653-0414

All enquiries regarding this publication should be forwarded to the Director of the Australian Army Research Centre.

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## Introduction

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) ethos is derived from that of our broader society. And in turn, Australians define something at the core of national identity through the ADF. Australians are proud of the ADF and the ADF's history. They need and want the ADF to represent the best of Australian values. And Australians will be direct in telling the ADF if we have let them down.<sup>1</sup>

*The year is 2040 and Australia is again at war. Corporal or Lieutenant Smith, an every-person-leader known as Smith, is deployed on their first operation. Serving since 2035, Smith, as a Joint Professional Soldier, has trained, educated, tested, practised, rehearsed, learned, failed and tested again. Tomorrow, Smith leads their first combat patrol. As the commander, they are anxious, apprehensive and not quite satisfied with their preparations. Continuously assessing risk, Smith knows that in war, against an enemy violently competing to achieve advantage over our forces, information is incomplete, inaccurate, and contradictory.*<sup>2</sup>

*Despite Smith's pre-patrol anxiety and personal humility, they draw confidence from their own and their team's planning, rehearsals, battle procedure and risk assessment. These actions are globally enabled through the Australian Joint Multi-Domain Force's intimate capabilities, combined with over-the-horizon and remote assets. Enhancing Smith's confidence, their training, education and experience includes frequent collaboration, cooperation, interoperability and integration with joint, interagency, regional, coalition and multi-sector partners. Multi-sector partners include organisations demonstrating leadership, ethics and innovation in communities, technology, commerce, finance, industry, training, education and research.*<sup>3</sup>

*Through training, education and experience Smith understands that 'Soldiers are not in the Army. Soldiers are the Army'.<sup>4</sup> Smith's service is culturally framed through leadership, accountability, humility, ethics, professional curiosity, and values.<sup>5</sup> Their people and their teams are ready for an operating environment experiencing accelerated change. Smith's five years of service and preparation in the Australian Army includes experience in three environmental dimensions—human, physical and information—integrated into five warfighting domains: maritime, land, air, cyber and space. Smith's and their team's skills are practised, tested and rehearsed through the full spectrum of cooperation, competition and conflict.<sup>6</sup>*

*Smith's understanding of leadership and ethics is developed through discussion, case studies, critical thinking, education and training and, in their workplaces, by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) concept of Double Trust.<sup>7</sup> For Smith, their peers and their teams, Double Trust obligates them to defend Australia's values and interests by force, while continuously upholding those values in their organisational leadership, behaviours, culture and conduct.<sup>8</sup>*

*For Smith, their peers and their teams, leadership is defined as empowering people to share their talents with the world through enabling inclusive teams to ethically achieve their personal, professional and cultural potential. Ethics are defined as 'good habits of behaviour ... cultivated through practice'<sup>9</sup> that 'limit suffering and destruction caused by war', based on the five Defence Values of service, courage, respect, integrity and excellence.<sup>10</sup> For Smith, the 'ethical decision is the military decision', where leadership and ethical behaviours are 'part of the decision making process, tempered by training, experience, and observations'.<sup>11</sup>*

*Unifying leadership and ethics with humility, Smith strives to serve and command 'as the best-behaved person in their organisation' and through that behaviour Smith aims to become 'the difference in their organisation' between success and failure.<sup>12</sup>*

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## Transition to the Fifth-Generation Australian Army

Smith, the every-person-leader, is a member of the fifth-generation Australian Army. In the early 2020s, the so-called fourth-generation Australian Army gradually transitioned to the fifth-generation force through a series of changes in Australia's strategic posture. These changes were first articulated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update:

*Our region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War, and trends including military modernisation, technological disruption and the risk of state-on-state conflict are further complicating our nation's strategic circumstances.<sup>13</sup>*

*The Indo-Pacific is at the centre of greater strategic competition, making the region more contested and apprehensive. These trends are continuing and will potentially sharpen as a result of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.<sup>14</sup>*

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update set three strategic objectives for Australia's defence and security: shape Australia's strategic environment; deter actions against Australia's interests; and respond with credible military force, when required.<sup>15</sup> For Smith's fifth-generation Australian Army, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update foretold the road to war in 2040. For Smith and their teams, this foretelling includes:

- **Deployments in Australia's immediate region**, defined as the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South-East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the south-west Pacific.
- **Ethical self-reliance** for individuals, teams and organisations, with continuous collaboration, cooperation, interoperability and integration with coalitions, stakeholders and partners.

- **Enhanced, available, flexible and discriminating lethality** across and between three environmental dimensions—human, physical and information—integrated into five warfighting domains: maritime, land, air, cyber and space.
- **Ability to deploy forces globally** where the Australian Government chooses to do so, including in the context of US-led coalitions.
- **Enhanced capacity to support civil authorities** in response to natural disasters and crises.<sup>16</sup>

In addition, emanating from a series of leadership and ethical failures in Australia and globally in the first two decades of the 21st century, Smith's fifth-generation Army service is shaped by the **2025 Australian National Leadership and Ethics Introspection**. Created, designed and implemented by Australian national, state and community leaders, the Leadership and Ethics Introspection was necessitated by significant post COVID-19 disruptions in the Australian economy, community and international environment.

The 2025 Leadership and Ethics Introspection examined lessons from leadership and ethics failures caused by normalisation of deviance and degraded organisational integrity<sup>17</sup> in politics, banks, financial services and insurance, churches, schools, scouting, charities, gymnastics, hospitals, pharmaceuticals, technology, auditors, telecommunications and defence. Placing people at the centre of the Australian response, among other national actions, Australian state departments of education rapidly created high school leadership and ethics programs. These programs sought to inculcate in young Australians appropriate leadership and ethical 'norms of behaviour'<sup>18</sup> combined with enhanced 'cultural competence'.<sup>19</sup>

As a result, Smith studied leadership and ethics in Year 11 and Year 12 in preparation for joining the ADF. Following Smith's entry into the Australian Army, it was apparent that their Year 11 and 12 studies accelerated their understanding of the ADF's foundational leadership and ethics programs. As a member of the ADF, Smith's training, education and daily interactions with leaders, peers, teams, partners and communities continuously emphasises individual and team responsibilities for leadership and ethical actions.

*Tomorrow Smith, now 23, will have their command, leadership, ethics and Double Trust tested. Australia and the world will witness Smith's and their team's actions on their first combat patrol. This is the moment where the Australian Army's fifth-generation force will be strained, stressed and tested to achieve their assigned mission for our nation.*



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## The Fifth-Generation Australian Army— Leadership and Ethics in 2040

The late Professor Jeffrey Grey first articulated the idea of Australian Army ‘generations’. Grey argued that each generation builds and culminates in conflict, then enters periods of peace before transitioning to the next generation. Each transition implies ‘a certain overlap or blurring of lines’ between generations.<sup>20</sup>

According to Professor Grey, after its formation in 1901, the **first-generation Australian Army** was defined by World War I, culminating in 1918, both on the Western Front and in Palestine/Syria. Facing post-war austerity, this generation struggled through neglect and decline into the 1930s.

The **second-generation Army** rose and matured in World War II, during which Army’s senior leadership contributed in demanding roles at the strategic level for the first time.<sup>21</sup> This Army also declined following the war, but its leadership was able to take the organisation forward ‘to a new generation of development and activity, made possible by the very different strategic circumstances that confronted the nation after 1945 ... and by a shared memory of the consequences of decisions made by an earlier generation of political leadership’.<sup>22</sup>

Between 1946 and 1972, the **third-generation Army** was characterised by the creation of a standing field force in peacetime and the extensive use of that field force on operations in Asia. During this generation, the Army nurtured and developed a professional warfighting ethos.<sup>23</sup> The experience and professionalism of the third-generation’s standing field force strongly influenced the Australian Army, particularly as it transitioned to Army’s fourth generation.<sup>24</sup>

The lengthy transition from the third generation to the fourth generation Army occurred between 1973 and 1999. In these years of relative peace for Australia, concepts and practices for training, equipping, readiness and structure were set by far-sighted senior Army leadership.<sup>25</sup> Emphasising this point, former Chief of Army Lieutenant General Morrison stated:

*There were groups of men and women, who the nation will never know, who wear no campaign ribbons, who joined the Army after Vietnam [in 1972] and left before East Timor [in 1999]; and in the face of steady decline, both financially and support from the Australian population, kept the faith, held standards high, made young officers like me learn the meaning of failure and learn from it, and when we were required to stand up, we managed to do so.*<sup>26</sup>

The **fourth-generation Army** emerged following Australia's intervention in East Timor in late 1999.<sup>27</sup> From 1999 to the early 2020s, the fourth-generation Army, like the third-generation force, deployed almost continuously on operations, this time throughout Australia and the world, to Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq, the Philippines, Solomon Islands and Sudan, on Australia's borders and in our homeland.

In the early 2020s through changing strategic environments, combined with revised Australian strategic thinking, the fourth-generation Australian Army gradually transitioned to the **fifth-generation Army**. The imperative for change was first articulated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, which stated that Army's task was 'not so much to better define the future—forecast more accurately or gain definitional agreement—but rather, at some level, to “undefine the future, to question [Army's purpose]”'.<sup>28</sup> In turn, the changing generational Australian Army became a catalyst for deeper thinking about Army's future, including in leadership and ethics.<sup>29</sup>

In 'undefining' the Australian Army's future, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update was enabled by a series of initiatives and innovations including Defence Values, ADF Leadership, Army in Motion,<sup>30</sup> the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics, the Centre for Australian Army Leadership, the National Institution Statement, Training Transformation,<sup>31</sup> and Combat Behaviours.<sup>32</sup> Importantly, these initiatives and innovations now ensure Smith's service in the Army is culturally framed through leadership, accountability, humility, ethics, professional curiosity, and values.<sup>33</sup>

The 2025 Australian National Leadership and Ethics Introspection also significantly influenced the fifth-generation Army. For Smith and their peers, central to the findings of the Leadership and Ethics Introspection is the concept of ‘normalisation of deviance’.<sup>34</sup> This concept was first developed by Columbia University sociologist Professor Diane Vaughan when reviewing the 1986 Challenger disaster.

Vaughan noted that the ‘root cause of the Challenger disaster was related to the repeated choice of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials to fly the space shuttle despite a dangerous design flaw with the O-rings’.<sup>35</sup> Vaughan found that normalisation of deviance occurs when people within an organisation:

*... become so insensitive to deviant practice that it no longer feels wrong. Insensitivity occurs insidiously and sometimes over years because disaster does not happen until other critical factors line up. Deviation occurs because of barriers to using the correct process or drivers such as time, cost, and peer pressure ... [people] will often adamantly defend their actions as necessary and justified.*<sup>36</sup>

Professor Vaughan’s recommendations to prevent normalisation of deviance include:

- **Past success** employing unsafe, unethical or inappropriate actions must not redefine acceptable performance.
- **Define guiding principles, safety and acceptable risk levels** when operating required systems.
- **Enable all people**, especially those with opposing views, to voice their opinion during discussion.
- **Keep safety programs** independent from the activities they evaluate.
- **Ensure clarity** about standards and how we reward whistleblowers.
- **Create a team-based culture** where if a person breaks the rules, they feel like they are letting their colleagues down.<sup>37</sup>

For Smith and their peers, a **fifth-generation Army** challenge is leading to prevent future normalisation of deviance caused through overbearing or ineffective leadership, failed organisational ethics and misaligned culture. With this challenge, the fifth-generation Army builds 'good habits of behaviour' through inclusive teams enabling people to share their talents with the world, fostering ethical leaders, nurturing diversity and supporting inclusion.<sup>38</sup> Now in 2040, the fifth-generation Army, the Army for Smith and their peers, continues defending Australia and our national interests.

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## The Fifth-Generation Australian Army— How Did We Enable Smith’s Leadership and Ethics?

As consistent, considered and cooperative leaders in the fifth-generation Army, Smith and their peers are nurtured to become better versions of themselves. This nurturing employs the five Defence Values enabling Smith’s ‘good habits of behaviour’. Complementing these actions through Australian Army fifth-generation innovations, Smith and their peers lead and empower their people and their inclusive teams to ethically achieve their personal, professional and cultural potential. Four of these innovations are **Joint Multi-Domain Force**, **education**, **mission command** and an **Australian Army Abrams Charter**.

### Joint Multi-Domain Force

From entering military service, Smith and their peers were educated through Army in Motion on the implementation of the Australian Army’s vision of a future Joint Multi-Domain Force. This fifth-generation Army integrates three environmental dimensions—human, physical and information—into the five warfighting domains of maritime, land, air, cyber and space, based on enduring ideas of **credibility**, **optimisation**, **time**, **mastery**, **development** and **information**:

1. **A credible combat force:** The Australian Army is a self-reliant diverse, trusted and credible combat force, combined and joint by design while partnering by approach to conduct war, enabling actions and influence operations across the full spectrum of cooperation, competition and conflict.<sup>39</sup> Smith and their peers value their unit affiliations, while enabling

brigades as the core of Army's designated mission-ready joint inter-agency task forces. As the lead tactical command capability of the Australian Army, the brigade headquarters:

- **plans, measures and values** 'Time with Ethical Teams', known to Smith as the Australian Army's *competitive edge*. Through enabling predictability in training, the brigade empowers learning, thinking, reflection habits and professional mastery. Time with Ethical Teams recognises the centrality of time with family, work colleagues and community. Brigades mentor purposeful and ethical service alongside positive and sustainable relationships<sup>40</sup>
- **selects, prepares and tests** command and leadership relationships integrated with Joint Multi-Domain Force capabilities. The brigade headquarters enables relationships via three system leadership core capabilities: ability to see the larger system; fostering reflection or thinking about our thinking to enable collective creativity; and shifting the collective focus from reactive problem-solving to co-creating positive visions for the future<sup>41</sup>
- **leads** resourcing, training design and readiness
- **sets** the example and conditions for Army's ethics-based individual, team and organisational empowerment and culture.

A credible combat force is based on cooperative, collaborative and continuous relationships. Smith and their peers know that relationships are a pacing item. Pacing items are 'major systems [and capabilities] ... central to an organisation's ability to perform its designated mission'.<sup>42</sup> These systems and capabilities are subject to continuous monitoring and management at all levels of command. A pacing item is held at the highest level of readiness. Smith knows we must constantly care for and maintain relationships as fundamental systems and capabilities.<sup>43</sup>

Trusted relationships are hard to build and easily broken. Trust in relationships is built over time based on common shared experiences and habitual training.<sup>44</sup> Relationships require mutual trust and shared confidence between leaders, their people, partners and teams. Trusted relationships enhance intra- and inter-organisational communications, save time through robust, honest interactions and enable cooperative efforts.<sup>45</sup>

2. **Optimise the Total Force:** For Smith in 2040, the Australian Army Total Force is defined as full-time forces, a range of part-time forces, volunteer forces (like the US Air Force Civil Air Patrol)<sup>46</sup> and Defence civilians. Army's Total Force continuously employs the revised 10 Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC),<sup>47</sup> to enhance interoperability with joint, interagency, regional, coalition and multi-sector partners and contractors.

One finding from the 2025 Australian National Leadership and Ethics Introspection was that effective leadership and ethics means enabling people and inclusive teams to share their talents with the world in order to ethically achieve their personal, professional and cultural potential. This finding led the ADF to evolve its thinking from the equipment-focused nine FIC in the early 2020s—organisation, command and management, collective training, personnel, major systems, facilities and training areas, supplies, support, and industry—to the people-integrated 10 FIC by the time Smith joined the Army.

These people-integrated 10 FIC guiding the fifth-generation Army are:

- Relationships
- People, education and individual training
- Command, leadership, ethics and critical thinking
- Organisation, command relations and information
- Collective training
- Facilities, simulation, cyber and training areas
- Major systems
- Logistics
- Support
- Innovation and industry.

### 3. Time with Ethical Teams—Australian Army's competitive edge:

Smith entered an Army of ethical, resilient and potent military professionals who habitually train and practise their skills deliberately and safely. It is an Army of competent leaders who empower and optimise ethical human performance through maximising the personal, professional and cultural potential of their people and inclusive teams.<sup>48</sup> For Smith and their peers, in a busy operating environment, practising and maximising Time with Ethical Teams is the Australian Army's competitive edge.

Time with Ethical Teams was a logical progression for the Australian Army. During the height of combat operations in the Middle East, from 2001 to 2015, the Army developed Soldier Recovery Centres. From 2015 to the early 2020s, the purpose of Soldier Recovery Centres was modified and they were adapted as Human Performance Centres. In the fifth-generation Australian Army, the purpose of Human Performance Centres was again modified to meet the needs of Army and they became *Human Performance and Ethics Centres*. Human Performance and Ethics Centres became the platform for the Australian Army's objective of Time with Ethical Teams.

Employing Human Performance and Ethics Centres, Smith and their peers adjusted Army's original concept of Time with Teams to include Time with Ethical Teams, meaning that Army leaders, **plan, measure and value:**

- **purposeful and ethical** service for people and inclusive teams to reach their personal, professional and cultural potential<sup>49</sup>
- **designated** opportunities to learn, reflect and 'think about our thinking'<sup>50</sup>
- **predictability** of training time in garrison and barracks combined with 'practise, rehearsals and trust developed on exercises in building team competence, safety and capability in complex combat environments'<sup>51</sup>
- **centrality** of time with family, work colleagues and community, including voluntary community service
- **The Big Three** noted by Lerner et al. as features of youth development programs:
  - Positive and sustained relationships between junior and senior people
  - Activities that build important life skills, including hydration, a balanced diet, sleep, ethics and values, self-regulation including compensating when goals are blocked, mental and physical exercise, professional relationships, and connections with other people



- Opportunities for junior people to employ their newly acquired life skills, both as participants and as leaders in valued organisational activities.<sup>52</sup>

Time with Ethical Teams is designed, developed, tested, trialled and evaluated through the ADF's newest workforce. This workforce includes people like Smith and their peers serving as the supervisors, specialists, technicians, tradespeople and artisans of the Australian Army Total Force. The ADF's newest workforce leads the daily tactical actions of our organisation, connected with communities, allies, our region and partners.

Smith and their peers, as Army's newest workforce and youngest leaders, understand that 'changes to the character of warfare [occur at rates] faster than many of Army's processes, concepts, capabilities and structures'.<sup>53</sup> They understand that these changes require their continuous efforts as conceptual and practical workforce innovators. Part of this innovation is continuously focusing and refocusing on leadership enabling Time with Ethical Teams.

4. **Master the four combat fundamentals—ethics, tactics, combat and communications (ETC2):** Mastering means our leaders relentlessly training, educating and developing other experts in the Joint Multi-Domain Force's four combat fundamentals. Modifying the 2020s idea of Combat Behaviours,<sup>54</sup> ETC2 requires each member of the Australian Army to master **four combat fundamentals**:

- **Ethical** leadership, decision-making and teamwork
- **Tactical** movement and manoeuvre
- **Combat**
  - *resilience*—physical and mental fitness; self-care and self-defence; relationships and connections<sup>55</sup>
  - *shooting* as individuals and teams
  - *casualty prevention and care* including daily support and care for our colleagues
- **Communicating** in cyber, information-diverse and degraded environments.

5. **Developing leaders—caring, nurturing and mentoring:**

Respectful human interaction is a fifth-generation Army fundamental. Smith and their peers are beneficiaries of respectful human interaction skill enhancements including developing their empathy, interpersonal communications, conflict resolution and ability to influence.<sup>56</sup>

For Smith in 2040, the Defence Values remain service, courage, respect, integrity and excellence. For the Australian Army, the moment Smith and their peers earned the Australian Army's Rising Sun Badge their mutual obligation to serve is manifested in leading ethically, empathetically and purposefully in words, behaviour and action.

Smith and their peers value their roles in caring for, nurturing and mentoring people (including self), teams, families, community and the Australian Army Total Force. This aspect of service in the fifth-generation Army is enhanced through Ethics Mentors, working as an Ethical Red Team and embedded in brigades.

Ethics Mentors are a combination of retired senior and junior community and military leaders who are trained and educated to approach all Joint Multi-Domain Force activities from an ethical perspective. Ethics Mentors, as an Ethical Red Team, practise, rehearse and test alongside Smith and their team through the full spectrum of cooperation, competition and conflict.<sup>57</sup>

As an Ethical Red Team, the Ethical Mentors generate moral and ethical dilemmas during training and education events and when deployed on operations. The Ethical Red Team improves ethical decision-making by ethically training, educating, testing, practising, rehearsing, learning, failing and re-testing leaders like Smith serving in 2040.

6. **Informing the future force—leaving the Australian Army's Rising Sun Badge in a better place:**

Smith and their peers in 2040, through experimentation, meta-cognitive skill development, education, innovation, reflective feedback, partnership and collaboration understand their obligation and responsibility to leave the Army's Rising Sun Badge in a better place when serving and when they complete their service. In the fifth-generation Army, through informing the future force, these obligations and responsibilities involve three attributes:<sup>58</sup>

- Perspective: Not every situation requires the same approach, especially when a person makes an error. Army enhances people's abilities through

enabling post-error review, reflection and learning. Writing also enhances perspectives, through improving our creativity and critical thinking by identifying issues, addressing and simplifying these issues, and developing analysis, perspectives and solutions.<sup>59</sup>

- Humility: Without humility, a person cannot achieve their full potential. US Army General George C Marshall noted that a leader must remain humble and ‘never take the counsel of their ambition’.<sup>60</sup> Humility enables us to see and acknowledge our own limitations while empathising with our people and teams. Humility enhances our professional competence through learning from others and then adjusting and refining our words, actions and behaviours.<sup>61</sup>
- Continuous education: Multidimensional issues call for multidimensional solutions, enabling people to think, decide, and act. Human nature follows patterns. The more we read, the less human actions will surprise us. Smith and their peers are schooled in the General James Mattis, US Marine Corps view of education and reading where:

*the problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience ... the hard way. By reading, you learn through others' experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young people.*<sup>62</sup>

## Education

For Smith and the others serving in 2040, concepts of ‘warrior culture’, ‘warrior heroes’, ‘warrior mentality’ and ‘operators’ from the fourth-generation Army are replaced by the fifth-generation Army’s ethical leadership idea of the *Joint Professional Soldier*.<sup>63</sup>

The Joint Professional Soldier represents a self-reliant, diverse, trusted and credible combat force, combined and joint by design while partnering by approach to conduct war, enabling actions and influence operations across the full spectrum of cooperation, competition and conflict.<sup>64</sup> As a Joint Professional Soldier, Smith’s understanding of leadership and ethics is actively reinforced, through discussion, case studies and critical thinking, by the ADF’s concept of Double Trust, requiring Smith and their peers to defend Australia’s values and interests by force while continuously upholding those values in their organisational leadership, behaviours, culture and conduct.<sup>65</sup>

The Joint Professional Soldier exemplifies ‘good habits of behaviour ... cultivated through practice’ based on the five Defence Values of:<sup>66</sup>

**Service:** The selflessness of character to place the security and interests of our nation and its people ahead of my own.

**Courage:** The strength of character to say and do the right thing, always, especially in the face of adversity.

**Respect:** The humanity of character to value others and treat them with dignity.

**Integrity:** The consistency of character to align my thoughts, words and actions to do what is right.

**Excellence:** The willingness of character to strive each day to be the best I can be, both professionally and personally.

From day one in the Australian Army, enhancing the Army’s Rising Sun Badge mandated that Smith, as a Joint Professional Soldier, to embrace and implement Defence Values to:

- **act** with purpose for Defence and the nation
- **adapt** and innovate
- **collaborate** with teams
- **enable** accountability and trustworthiness
- **reflect**, learn and improve
- **include** and value others.<sup>67</sup>

In educating the Joint Professional Soldier, four ideas are sustained to enable and empower the every-person-leader Smith.

**First, upon graduation** from their initial individual skills and trade training, Smith and their peers are provided accelerated access to their career education. Essentially, Joint Professional Soldiers can learn according to their own pace, capacity and professional curiosity. Once a Joint Professional Soldier completes their rank-relevant mandated education, all additional levels of military training and education are readily accessible.

Through the Australian Army’s Training Transformation, Smith and their peers benefit from the ADF’s significant investment in virtual and augmented reality, known collectively as extended reality, systems and

learning. This investment includes the integration of serious gaming<sup>68</sup> and development of meta-cognitive skills<sup>69</sup> into fifth-generation Army education, based on the four learning pillars of attention, active learning, feedback, and consolidation. Extended reality enabled Smith's 'accelerated learning and training, and timely practise and rehearsal of cognitive and motor skills'.<sup>70</sup> As a result, Smith, as a junior leader in Army, has already completed some advanced training and education from the Joint Multi-Domain Officers Advanced Course and the Joint Command Sergeant Majors Leadership and Innovation Course.

**Second, as Joint Professional Soldiers,** Smith and all those serving in 2040 are supported through interoperability with the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCANZ) Armies Professional Training and Education Program.<sup>71</sup> Extending ABCANZ's mandate beyond 'standards, publications, architectures, databases, and reports', the ANCANZ Professional Training and Education Program enables auditable international certification, recording and recognition of each Joint Professional Soldier's training, learning, education and development.

Operating as a globally connected professional association to 'enable entry into the military profession, maintain standards, and represent the profession in discussions with other bodies', the ABCANZ Professional Training and Education Program generates global accreditation for our Joint Professional Soldier.<sup>72</sup> Empowering, in a global network, self-responsibility for people to maintain their professional standards, the ABCANZ Professional Training and Education Program is crucial for our Joint Professional Soldiers' planning and tracking of their professional training, learning, education and development activities.

The ABCANZ Professional Training and Education Program recognises experience, training, learning, education and development, enabling our Joint Professional Soldiers to continuously improve their skills, capacities and capabilities. The program also recognises when Joint Professional Soldiers lead and contribute to the training, learning, education and development of their people, their colleagues and their professional community.

**Third, from initial individual skills and trade training,** Smith began their classical military education. As a foundation of their military expertise, Smith's five years of service encompasses a rank-relevant education and

practical understanding of military theory. Through understanding the theory and nature of war, Smith understands who they serve, why they serve, and how they must serve. Early in their service, Smith was introduced to:<sup>73</sup>

- **the enduring nature of war** as ‘a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other’<sup>74</sup>
- **forces and factors**—social, political, ideological, moral, economic and technological—that can cause a given war, shape its character, bring about its end, and determine its historical impact
- **war as a series of reciprocal exchanges** between diverging policies—our policy and our enemy’s policy. These reciprocal exchanges ensure that the reason a government embarked on war, to achieve certain political objectives, will change with time. Because circumstances and environments of war are dynamic, incremental and unpredictable, there is a continuous need to review and revise war policy.<sup>75</sup>

A classical military education enabled Smith’s reading of military theorists including Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, Carl von Clausewitz, Baron Jomini, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, Hugh M Trenchard, Billy Mitchell and John Boyd. Now in 2040 Smith’s practical understanding of military theory ensures critical thinking.

*In Smith’s moment of pre-patrol anxiety, they draw upon Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s practical advice to young leaders:*

*... The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.<sup>76</sup>*

*... War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.*

*... War is the realm of chance ... Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.<sup>77</sup>*

Included in Smith’s early and comprehensive classical military education is the concept of ‘Just War’. In particular, Smith and their peers understand that their service, and state-sanctioned permission to apply violence against Australia’s enemies, is a privilege only formalised in the 392 years following the Peace of Westphalia (1648), during which ‘there has been a concerted

effort in international law to develop binding laws of war and military codes of conduct'.<sup>78</sup>

Smith and their peers understand that the requirements of the military profession are unique. For example, the Australian Army is a professional 'entity that threatens and when necessary applies violence to achieve national objectives'.<sup>79</sup> In turn, the Australian nation 'must trust the standing army to respect the law of the land and be capable of restraint and prudence in the use of appropriate and sanctioned violence'.<sup>80</sup> In *jus ad bellum* (justice in going to war) and *jus in bello* (justice in waging war):

*... successful wars have been won not only on the basis of tactical excellence but also on the strategic merit that both civil and military leaders have provided ... including the necessary public legitimisation, determination of end-state goals, provision of logistical support, and preparation for reconstruction.*<sup>81</sup>

Smith also understands the fragility of Just War in world history. They understand that only since the 1860s have laws of war and military codes of conduct 'increasingly taken the form of written rules governing the conduct of war'.<sup>82</sup> These include 'rules of engagement for national military forces, the Geneva Conventions (1864–1949), their Additional Protocols (1977), and various treaties, agreements and declarations limiting the means allowable in war'.<sup>83</sup>

Smith understands their responsibilities under the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) and the Geneva Conventions, which 'regulate conflict and the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians by imposing international standards'.<sup>84</sup> To realise their responsibilities, Smith and their peers have studied, rehearsed and practised three principles established by the conventions generally governing conduct during war:

1. Targets should include only combatants and legitimate military and industrial complexes.
2. Combatants should not use unjust methods or weapons (e.g. torture and genocide).
3. The force used should be proportionate to the end sought.<sup>85</sup>

Importantly, Smith's early, comprehensive and practical Just War training and education complements their fifth-generation Army leadership and ethics training and education to ensure Smith is morally, ethically and culturally ready for combat in 2040.

**Fourth, Smith and their peers are accustomed** to regular analysis of leadership and ethics provided during their training and education. This analysis includes enduring partnerships between the Australian Army and organisations such as the St James Ethics Centre, the King's College London Centre for Military Ethics and the Cranlana Centre for Ethical Leadership. Through these engagements, Smith understands their role as a leader in:

- bringing people together, creating 'space for open and honest conversations', building 'the skills and capacity of people to live and act according to their values', remaining 'committed to injecting a pause into the centre of public life'—including professional life and *including on operations*—and 'allowing people to stop, connect with others and explore the ethical dimension of our everyday lives'<sup>86</sup>
- '[setting] the tone for how society operates and the values we live by' through 'sharpening critical reasoning and ethical thinking' and enabling decision-makers to 'see the bigger picture', *including on operations*, 'on any issue they face'; and '[building] better communities—by strengthening wisdom and ethical courage in our leadership'.<sup>87</sup>

Smith and their peers understand that in concert with leadership and ethics, their profession expects unlimited liability. This means Smith and their peers train and educate to realistically understand the ramifications of unlimited liability, including accepting and understanding:

*... that they are subject to being lawfully ordered into harm's way under conditions that could lead to the loss of their lives ...*

*[Unlimited liability] modifies the notion of service before self, extending its meaning beyond merely enduring inconvenience or great hardship. It is an attitude associated with the military professional's philosophy of service. The concept of unlimited liability is integral to the military ethos and lies at the heart of the military professional's understanding of duty.*<sup>88</sup>



Smith and their peers understand unlimited liability as the basis of the Joint Professional Soldier's application and support of mission, team and self. Without an understanding of unlimited liability, Joint Professional Soldiers' commitment to mission accomplishment is fatally undermined.

## Mission Command

For Smith and those serving in 2040, the fourth-generation Army's 'theory of mission command' was replaced in the fifth-generation Australian Army by the seven principles of mission command and the ADF Leadership doctrine's 'seven interdependent mission command conditions'.<sup>89</sup>

Mission command is a system of thinking, cooperation, collaboration and action ensuring 'timely decisions and optimising resources'.<sup>90</sup> Mission command requires tactically and technically competent people and teams operating in environments of mutual trust and shared understanding. It builds effective teams and nurtures command climates in which leaders train, rehearse and encourage people to take risks and exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within their commander's intent.<sup>91</sup>

Through mission orders, wargames and rehearsals, commanders focus their people and teams on the purpose of an operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. This allows people and teams the greatest possible freedom of action in the context of a particular situation. Finally, when delegating authority, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating resources and planning assessments based on assigned tasks, time and accepted risk.<sup>92</sup>

Successful mission command is enabled by seven principles:

1. **Competence:** performing assigned tasks, to an agreed standard, is achieved via repetitive, realistic and challenging training, combined with lifelong learning through employment, education and professional development.<sup>93</sup>
2. **Mutual trust:** over time—hours, days, weeks, months and years—trust is built, by all of us, on values, ethics, caring for people, consistent leadership, commitment, two-way communication, personal example and common shared experiences.<sup>94</sup>

3. **Shared understanding:** this is enabled through rehearsing, exercising and practising two interdependent variables: collective knowledge and connected actions.
  - *Collective knowledge* encompasses common problem perception and common professional language, including doctrine, operating procedures, operating systems, training and education.
  - *Connected actions* include our contest of ideas, diverse opinions, personal example, dialogue, coaching, mentoring, assessment and collaboration.<sup>95</sup>
4. **Commander's intent:** prepared and delivered personally by each commander, commander's intent provides focus, including for leaders seeking task clarification, and for people and teams on their purpose and on the method employed for mission success.<sup>96</sup> It enables achievement of the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.<sup>97</sup>
5. **Mission orders:** neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction, mission orders succinctly unify efforts, enabling people and teams to plan their own tasks through understanding the situation, commander's mission, purpose, intent and essential tasks while assessing risk.<sup>98</sup>
6. **Disciplined initiative:** this is when people and teams work to follow their orders and adhere to the plan until they realise their orders and the plan are no longer suitable for the situation in which they find themselves. The situation may change through:
  - ethical decision points
  - enemy or friendly action
  - weather
  - terrain, infrastructure or information adjustments
  - equipment or logistics availability, or
  - seizing, retaining, and exploiting an opportunity offering a greater chance of success than the original plan.<sup>99</sup>

7. **Risk acceptance:** in developing courses of action, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against perceived benefits. They apply ethical judgments regarding the importance of an objective, the time available, and any anticipated costs. In applying ethical judgements, commanders assess:
- What is the purpose of the risk?<sup>100</sup>
  - Who holds, or owns, the risk?
  - For how long is the risk held?
  - Is the risk to be treated, tolerated, or transferred; or is the mission terminated?<sup>101</sup>

## **An Australian Army Abrams Charter—Two Ideas**

Smith and all those serving the 2040 are educated on the reform introduced in 1974 by General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the US Army, when he directed the re-establishment of a Ranger Battalion. As the US Army emerged from a decade of fighting in Vietnam, Abrams sought to create a battalion with the following attributes:

- The battalion must be elite, light and the most proficient infantry battalion in the world.
- The battalion must be able to do things with its hands and weapons better than anyone.
- The battalion must contain no ‘hoodlums or brigands’. If the battalion is formed from such persons, it will be disbanded.
- Wherever the battalion goes, it must be apparent that it is the best.<sup>102</sup>

Based on General Abrams’ intent, US Army Forces Command established the 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry in 1974. Importantly, under the Abrams Charter, General Abrams sought to form the ‘world’s best light infantry unit’ and then ‘use that battalion to improve the readiness, esprit, and capability of the rest of the U.S. Army’. In other words, General Abrams intended the Rangers to ‘Lead the Way’ to ‘raise the performance of the entire U.S. Army to Ranger standards’.<sup>103</sup> Abrams achieved this intent as follows:

*The vision that General Abrams had for the Ranger Battalion, as a leader of change for the rest of the Army, was not specifically*

*articulated. This piece of his vision was conveyed indirectly to the commander of the unit. Then Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth C. (K.C.) Leuer was the officer selected as the first Ranger Battalion Commander since World War II ... now retired Major General Leuer said he was '... never specifically told that the Rangers were to be role models for the Army ...' Rather it was in his conversations with senior leaders that he came to understand this implied mission of the Ranger Battalion.*<sup>104</sup>

Further, 'it was understood that the Rangers were to be a role model for the Army and leaders trained in the Ranger battalions should return to the conventional Army to pass on their experience and expertise'.<sup>105</sup>

Smith experienced two aspects of the Australian Army Abrams Charter.

First, Smith regularly served alongside people from the Australian Army's Special Operations Command as peers, mentors and colleagues. Some of Smith's peers served on reciprocal exchange with Special Operations Command, on what is colloquially known as the 'Australian Army Long Look', named after a longstanding reciprocal exchange program with the United Kingdom's Armed Forces.

Second, the Australian Army provides three Army Individual Readiness Badge (AIRB) options, enhancing readiness, esprit and capability by enabling people to ethically reach their personal and professional potential. In Smith's case, this meant extra effort to graduate from the Combined Arms Training Centre conducted Australian Army Ranger Course. In 2040, the three AIRB options for the Australian Army are:

- Silver: identical to the 2021 Army readiness standards (shooting, fitness, health and dental)
- Gold: corps-specific initial employment training graduation standard, individually tested at unit level every four years
- Platinum: eight-week Australian Army Ranger Course (AARC) graduation. This is a lifetime qualification conducted by the Combined Arms Training Centre, covering fundamentals of weapons, navigation and communications, by day and night, in varied environments. AARC graduation requires officers and soldiers to effectively plan, prepare, resource, enable and lead offensive and defensive operations, from section to platoon, in a tactical setting, under cognitive, physical, emotional and ethical stress.

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## Conclusion

*Smith commenced leading their first combat patrol at 0300 today. Within hours, they are in lethal contact with enemy forces. Five years of normalising ethical leadership and professional behaviours through training, educating, testing, practice, rehearsals, learning, failing and testing again are synthesised today on Smith's battlefield. For Smith, the 'ethical decision is the military decision', where leadership and ethical behaviours are 'part of the decision making process, tempered by training, experience, and observations'.<sup>106</sup>*

*The nature of war, as a violent clash of human interests and wills, means that Smith's combat patrol experiences a brutal day—but with that brutality Smith and their team remain composed, compassionate and ethical in all actions. They are under pressure to reach their personal and professional potential through ethical actions. Today, through Double Trust, Smith and their team work hard to both forcefully defend Australia's values and interests and uphold their own 'good habits of behaviour' through the five Defence Values of service, courage, respect, integrity and excellence.<sup>107</sup>*

*For Smith and their team, success is enabled through the 2025 Australian National Leadership and Ethics Introspection, combined with guidance from the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Army reforms—including Army in Motion, Army's Contribution to Defence Strategy, Accelerated Warfare and Good Soldiering. In addition, Smith's success is enhanced by four Australian Army fifth-generation innovations: the Joint Multi-Domain Force, education, mission command, and the Australian Army Abrams Charter.*

*At Smith's request, and at times before Smith asks, joint, inter-agency, regional, coalition and multi-sector support are delivered. Smith and their*

*combat patrol are realising the benefit of weeks, months and years of nurturing relationships through collaboration, interoperability, integration, training and education with key partners.*

*Suddenly Smith sees an opportunity to gain advantage over enemy forces. Rapidly applying their five years of training, learning, education and development, combined with their combat patrol's shared understanding, mutual trust and disciplined initiative, Smith commences a virtual orders brief ...*

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## Endnotes

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- 2 U.S. Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 2018), pp. 1-1-1-18.
- 3 Australian Army, *Forces Command 2020 to 2028: Supporting Army's Contribution to Defence Strategy, Enabling Army in Motion, Mastering Accelerated Warfare and Upholding Good Soldiering* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2019), p. 1.
- 4 Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1999), p. 370:  
After the war in Vietnam, the first unqualified strategic loss in the history of American arms, the Army went into the wilderness. General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, led it out. In his words, 'Soldiers are not in the Army. Soldiers are the Army.'
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- 14 Ibid., p. 3.
- 15 Ibid., p. 25.
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- 17 Lynn S Paine, 'Managing for Organizational Integrity', *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1994, at: <https://hbr.org/1994/03/managing-for-organizational-integrity> (accessed 1 July 2021). Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Stapleton for suggesting this idea (note to author, 9 February 2021).
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For example, LD Purnell's 12 meanings of cultural competence in Larry Purnell, *The Purnell Model for Cultural Competence*, July 2002 [The Purnell Model for Cultural Competence - PubMed \(nih.gov\)](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12500000/) (accessed 07 September 2021):
  1. Developing an awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, and environments without letting them have an undue influence on those from other backgrounds.
  2. Demonstrating knowledge and understanding of people's culture, personal needs, and culturally specific values and traditions.
  3. Continuing to learn cultures of people to enhance relationships enabling leadership, support and mentoring.
  4. Recognising that the primary and secondary characteristics of culture determine the degree to which people adhere to the beliefs, values, and practices of their dominant culture.
  5. Accepting and respecting cultural differences in a manner that facilitates the people's, families' and team's abilities to make decisions to meet their needs and beliefs.
  6. Not assuming that your personal beliefs and values are the same as other people's.
  7. Resisting judgmental attitudes such as 'different is not as good'.
  8. Open to cultural encounters.
  9. Comfortable with cultural encounters.
  10. Adapting leadership and support to be congruent with a person's culture.
  11. Engaging in cultural competence is a conscious process and not necessarily a linear one.
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- 22 Ibid., p. 2.
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Land Command Artillery was raised in 1973, with the Branch evolving through several role, structure and task changes. A consistent thread though, has been the provision of Artillery technical control for Army. This aspect, most notably exercised through the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), has been the core role for the Branch and has directly influenced the technical and tactical development of the Corps. The role of Land Command Artillery grew further with the disestablishment of Corps Directorates in the late Nineties. The Royal Australian Artillery was fortunate within Army to retain a central organisation, external to the School of Artillery that could continue to provide Artillery command, control and advice.  
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- 27 Grey, *A Soldier's Soldier*, p. 2.
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- 32 Australian Army, 2019, *Tactical and Technical Combat Behaviours*, at: <https://cove.army.gov.au/article/combat-behaviours> (accessed 4 November 2021)
- 33 Burr, 'Statement from the Chief of Army'; Brigadier Richard Vagg, note to author.
- 34 Phil Nasskau, 'What Makes a Safe Pilot?' *FlightGlobal*, 20 June 2007, at: <https://www.flightglobal.com/what-makes-a-safe-pilot/74505.article> (accessed 1 July 2021):  
Like Professor Diane Vaughan's findings on normalisation of deviance, Dr. Tony Kern, who served in the U.S. Air Force as a command pilot and flight examiner in the B-1B bomber and as Chairman of the U.S. Air Force Human Factors Steering Group, states: 'If most accidents are caused by human error, the focus should be on flight discipline. Kern defines this as the ability and willpower to employ an aircraft safely, within operational, regulatory, organisational, and common sense guidelines, in the presence of temptation to do otherwise. Everyone has the ability to become a 'rogue pilot'. Poor flight discipline is always the fault of the individual. It can result from one of several factors:
  - Mission expectation—perception that the rules must be broken to get the job done.
  - Ego and power—the belief that the violator has the skill and stature to set their own rules.
  - Unlikely detection—the perception that the violation is unlikely to be detected by anyone in authority.
  - Poor planning—lack of adequate planning time or depth resulting in 'freestyling' during execution.
  - Leadership gap—leaders who personally practise or are known to condone procedural non-compliance.
  - Unique event—an out-of-the ordinary situation such as an airshow or 'special' mission.

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- 40 Ibid., p. 3.
- 41 Peter Senge, Hal Hamilton and John Kania, 'The Dawn of System Leadership', *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, Winter 2015, at: [https://ssir.org/pdf/Winter\\_2015\\_The\\_Dawn\\_of\\_System\\_Leadership.pdf](https://ssir.org/pdf/Winter_2015_The_Dawn_of_System_Leadership.pdf) (accessed 1 July 2021).
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- 44 Email from Brigadier Doug Laidlaw, Commander JTF 646, to author, 14 May 2020.
- 45 Chris Field, 'Community Recovery—Six Ideas to Close Community "Intent-to-Capability"', *Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, Monograph No. 2, February 2018, p. 3.
- 46 An example of a Total Force including volunteer forces is the US Civil Air Patrol (CAP), which is 'a Total Force partner and Auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force'. Established in 1941, the CAP conducts search and rescue, humanitarian relief, disaster response, and homeland protection including cybersecurity. 'Its 60,000 members selflessly devote their time, energy and expertise toward the well-being of their communities nationwide, while also promoting aviation and related fields through aerospace/STEM education and helping to shape future leaders through CAP's cadet program.' (US Air Force Auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol National Headquarters, 'Who We Are', at: <https://www.gocivilairpatrol.com/about/who-we-are> (accessed 1 July 2021)).
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An expansion of the ADF's nine FICs is described in Peter Dortmans, Jennifer DP Moroney, Kate Cameron, Roger Lough, Emma Disley, Laurinda L Rohn, Lucy Strang and Jonathan P Wong, *Designing a Capability Development Framework for Home Affairs* (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), pp. xvii–xviii, at: [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR2900/RR2954/RAND\\_RR2954.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2900/RR2954/RAND_RR2954.pdf) (accessed 1 July 2021):
  1. People: the appropriately sized workforce that has the necessary skills to perform the required role.
  2. Training: the education and skills development programs which enable the workforce to acquire and maintain appropriate skills and competencies.
  3. Facilities: the supply, development and maintenance of infrastructure required to effectively implement specific capabilities.

4. Information and systems: the reference and support material essential for the delivery of capabilities.
  5. Equipment and supplies: the assets, hardware and materiel required to implement capabilities.
  6. Support: the operational and corporate services that underpin the capabilities, such as finance and maintenance support.
  7. Laws, policies, procedures and administration: ensuring that a capability incorporates all levels of required documentation and guidance.
  8. Industry: the capabilities of Australian industry, and the capacity of Australian businesses, to deliver not only operational and other capabilities, but the full spectrum of support functions.
  9. Organisation: the appropriate structures, personnel and balance of competencies to accomplish operational tasks and to ensure appropriate leadership, control and coordination.
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Four combat fundamentals, previously known as the five combat behaviours:
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  2. Combat shooting
  3. Army combatives
  4. Tactical combat casualty care
  5. Combat physical conditioning.
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- 63 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, *Afghanistan Inquiry Report*, pp. 13, 33, 515.
- 64 Australian Army, *Forces Command 2020 to 2028*, p. 2.
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- 68 D Drummond, A Hadchouel and A Tesnière, 'Serious Games for Health: Three Steps Forwards', *Advances in Simulation*, 2, no. 3 (2017), at: <https://advancesinsimulation.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s41077-017-0036-3#citeas> (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 69 Nancy Chick, 'Metacognition', Vanderbilt University Center for Teaching, at: <https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/metacognition/> (accessed 1 July 2021) (bold emphasis added):  
Metacognitive practices **increase students' abilities to transfer or adapt their learning to new contexts and tasks** ... They do this by gaining a level of awareness *above the subject matter*: they also think about the tasks and contexts of different learning situations and themselves as learners in these different contexts. When Pintrich (2002) asserts that 'Students who know about the different kinds of strategies for learning, thinking, and problem solving will be more likely to use them' (p. 222), notice the students must 'know about' these strategies, not just practise them. As Zohar and David (2009) explain, there must be a '*conscious* meta-strategic level of H(igher) O(rder) T(hinking)' (p. 179). Metacognitive practices help students **become aware of their strengths and weaknesses as learners, writers, readers, test-takers, group members, etc.** A key element is recognising the limit of one's knowledge or ability and then figuring out how to expand that knowledge or extend the ability. Those who know their strengths and weaknesses in these areas will be more likely to 'actively monitor their learning strategies and resources and assess their readiness for particular tasks and performances' ...
- 70 Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center Public Affairs, 'Army Researchers Establish Mixed Reality Working Group', U.S. Army, 26 June 2020, at: [https://www.army.mil/article/236779/army\\_researchers\\_establish\\_mixed\\_reality\\_working\\_group](https://www.army.mil/article/236779/army_researchers_establish_mixed_reality_working_group) (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 71 Headquarters Department of the Army, *Interoperability*, Army Regulation 34-1 (Washington DC, April 2020), p. 15, at: [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/pdf/web/ARN19606\\_AR34-1\\_FINAL.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19606_AR34-1_FINAL.pdf) (accessed 1 July 2021); Defense Standardization Program, 'International Standardization', Department of Defense, at <https://www.dsp.dla.mil/Programs/International-Standardization/> (accessed 1 July 2021) (emphasis added): ABCANZ is an international program that promotes interoperability and standardization among the armies of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The focus of the ABCANZ program is on interoperability, defined as: *the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks* ... ABCANZ Products, the prime tangible output of the program, are formal outputs of data or documentation from the Program that are intended to enhance interoperability among the ABCANZ Armies. The types of ABCANZ Products are standards, publications, architectures, databases, and reports.

- 72 'Definition of "professional association"', Collins English Dictionary, at: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/professional-association> (accessed 1 July 2021)
- 73 Major Avnulus R Smiley, *Marine Command and Staff College: The Challenge of Integrating Phase II JPME* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps War College, 2000), pp. 19–20.
- 74 U.S. Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, p. 3.
- 75 Mark Mankowski, 'Debating Doctrine—Reciprocity as an Enduring Feature of War', *Grounded Curiosity*, 24 January 2017, at: [https://groundedcuriosity.com/debating-doctrine-reciprocity-as-an-enduring-feature-of-war/#.YGtlbM\\_itw](https://groundedcuriosity.com/debating-doctrine-reciprocity-as-an-enduring-feature-of-war/#.YGtlbM_itw) (accessed 1 July 2021). Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Mankowski for this idea and reference (note to author, 6 January 2021).
- 76 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans and eds Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75.
- 77 *Ibid.*, p. 101.
- 78 James T Johnson, 'Just War', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/just-war> (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 79 Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), p. 18.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 81 Edward Erwin and James M Dubik, 'Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory', *Naval War College Review*, 71, no. 4 (2018), pp. 1–2, at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7685&context=nwc-review> (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 82 Johnson, 'Just War'.
- 83 *Ibid.*
- 84 *Ibid.*
- 85 *Ibid.*
- 86 St James Ethics Centre, 'Why We're Here', The Ethics Centre, at: <https://ethics.org.au/why-were-here/what-is-ethics/> (accessed 1 July 2021). Emphasis added.
- 87 Cranlana Centre for Ethical Leadership, 'About Cranlana', at: <https://cranlana.org.au/about-us/> (accessed 1 July 2021); St James Ethics Centre, 'Why We're Here'.
- 88 Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada 2009*, Chapter 2, Section 2: 'Fundamental Beliefs and Expectations', at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/duty-with-honour-2009/chapter-2-statement-of-canadian-military-ethos/section-2-fundamental-beliefs-and-expectations.html> (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 89 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, *Afghanistan Inquiry Report*, pp. 31, 489; Australian Defence Force, *ADF Leadership*, pp. 34–41.  
The 'seven interdependent mission command conditions' in *ADF Leadership* are identical to the US Army's seven principles of mission command (Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 (Washington DC, July 2019), p. 1-7). The important exception is that ADF Leadership doctrine emphasises **checking and verifying** people, where (Australian Defence Force, *ADF Leadership*, p. 40):  
Responsibility for the outcome of a mission rests with the leader who issues it. This means you need to check and verify your subordinates' execution of the mission. You as the leader must know, track and understand the situation and context in which your subordinates are operating.  
Done with forethought and care, this can reinforce trust and avoid 'micro-management'. The art of mission command requires you to focus your checks at the **right** time, place, organisation and issue. It is a fundamental error to think of mission command as 'set and forget'; rather it is 'set, follow, check, support and adapt'.

In contrast, US Army mission command doctrine emphasises **competence**, where performing assigned tasks to an agreed standard is achieved via repetitive, realistic and challenging training, combined with lifelong learning through employment, education and professional development (Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, p. 1-7).

- 90 Chris Field, 'Connecting Good Soldiering and Mission Command', *The Cove*, 3 December 2019, at: <https://cove.army.gov.au/article/connecting-good-soldiering-and-mission-command> (accessed 1 July 2021); Magdalena Granåsen, Per Barius, Niklas Hallberg and Anders Josefsson, 'Exploring Mission Command in a Concept for Future Command and Control', in David Alberts (ed.), *23rd International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS): Multi-Doman C2* (International Command and Control Institute, 2018), p. 15, at: <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1299251&dswid=mainwindow> (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 91 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, p. viii.
- 92 Ibid., p. viii.
- 93 Ibid., p. 1-7.
- 94 Ibid., pp. 1-7-1-8.
- 95 Ibid., pp. 1-8-1-9.
- 96 Colonel Mick Reilly, notes to author, 10 January 2021 and 10 February 2021.
- 97 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, pp. 1-9-1-10.
- 98 Ibid., pp. 1-10-1-11.
- 99 Ibid., pp. 1-11-1-12.
- 100 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Mankowski, note to author, 6 January 2021.
- 101 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, pp. 1-13-1-14.
- 102 Francis H Kearney III, *The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), p. 34.
- 103 Asymmetric Warfare Group, 'Abrams Charter in Effect at the AWG', 18 January 2017, at: [https://www.army.mil/article/180709/abrams\\_charter\\_in\\_effect\\_at\\_the\\_awg](https://www.army.mil/article/180709/abrams_charter_in_effect_at_the_awg) (accessed 1 July 2021).
- 104 Kent T Woods, *Rangers Lead the Way: The Vision of General Creighton W. Abrams*, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), p. 8; Kearney, *Impact of Leaders*, p. 12.
- 105 Ken Keen, *75th Ranger Regiment: Strategic Force for the 21st Century*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), p. 5.
- 106 Benson, *Ultimate Justification*, p. 14.
- 107 Hastie, *Honour Before Glory*, p. 12.

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## About the Author

Major General Chris Field was Deputy Commanding General, Operations, US Army Central / Third US Army, 2020–2021. He has commanded at all levels from platoon to the 36,000-person Australian Army Forces Command.

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## Acknowledgements

The author extends thanks to Colonel Kevin Benson (US Army, Retired), Chaplain Stephen Brooks, Major Katie Burrup, Major General Jake Ellwood, Ms Julie Fetch, Colonel Gabrielle Follett, Brigadier Dave Kelly, Brigadier Doug Laidlaw, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Mankowski, Colonel David O'Hagan (Retired), Assistant Commissioner Charysse Pond, Colonel Mick Reilly (Retired), Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Stapleton and Brigadier Richard Vagg for reviewing drafts of this paper. All errors in this paper remain those of the author.

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