Australian Army
Research Centre

Strategic
Assessment
Quarter 3, 2020

Serving our Nation

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Contents

Executive Summary

- There is a widespread lack of confidence in data concerning the impact of COVID-19, warranting 'warlike' government intervention in the economy.

- Economic problems are creating conditions for nation states to act with 'hardening' self-interest. Australia's forecast economic downturn has now transitioned into recession.

- Human security costs from the COVID-19 pandemic will influence state fragility and increasingly create the conditions for conflict in our immediate region and across the Indo-Pacific.

- This AARC Q3 Strategic Assessment acknowledges resilience as an emerging theme relevant to land power's contribution to Australian strategy.

Introduction

Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, the Australian Army Research Centre (AARC) Quarter 3 (Q3) 2020 Strategic Assessment begins by acknowledging Australia is coming to the end of the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. In early September the world moved past 850,000 COVID-19 attributable deaths. Australia's COVID-19 experience accounts for 657 of these deaths as individual, state and territory governments seek to suppress and in some circumstances eliminate the virus within their respective borders, irrespective of the Federal Government's intent to drive economic recovery as a national effort. The Australian economy is now in an official recession as global pandemic-related lockdowns bite economic activity, with an approximate 7% fall in Australia's real GDP in the June quarter.[1] The Australian Government notes this is an exceptional result given the 'World Bank is expecting more economies to experience contractions in per capita GDP than at any other time since 1870'.[2]

Meanwhile, analysts across the world continue to write papers, articles and commentary discussing the impact of the pandemic on the geostrategic balance between nations. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), released at the beginning of this quarter, describes this uncertainty. The Australian Government believes that the nation now finds itself in a period of strategic competition, within a region 'in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War'.[3] This environment is described as paralleling the conditions of the Cold War, the main difference being the geographic epicentre is no longer continental Europe but the Indo-Pacific.[4] Consequently, 'Government has directed Defence to implement a new strategic policy framework signalling Australia's ability— and willingness—to project military power to deter actions against us.'[5]

The purpose of this Strategic Assessment is to analyse the trends influencing decisions pertaining to Army's force design, structure and posture. It focuses upon risks and possible responses to trends and circumstances. The Q2 Strategic Assessment introduced the themes of balancing jurisdiction and capability (as a result of *Operation Bushfire Assist*); an economic crisis (as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic); and an acceleration of strategic competition.[6] These themes are in turn linked to a fourth identified in this Strategic Assessment: *resilience*, a reflection of how the nation responds to shocks. This assessment contends that understanding the drivers of *resilience* is fundamental to understanding Army's role in deterrence, as well as its relationship with other arms of government, when supporting federal and state responses to significant events.

The Environment

National Economics

The June OECD Economic Outlook points toward high indebtedness as a major vulnerability in many emerging-market economies and developing countries.[7] However, how these vulnerabilities manifest into second- and third-order effects remains unclear. The OECD predicts Australia's GDP could fall by 5% in 2020 but reports 'Australia has been relatively spared, so far, from the COVID-19 outbreak.'[8] In July the Australian Government predicted a 3.75% decrease in real GDP, equating to a deficit of $184.5 billion in financial year 2020–21, with unemployment to peak at 9.25% by December 2020.[9] This may be an optimistic forecast.

Australian 'real' GDP is predicted to decline in an amount representative of the Defence budget over the next financial year. Government relief packages and investments have supported a partial economic recovery. However, unemployment has increased substantially to over 9%, and Government reports indicate the ongoing Victorian lockdown will see unemployment breach 10%. It is likely these high levels of unemployment will persist beyond 2020. As predicted in the Q2 Strategic Assessment, this scale of unemployment will have far-reaching effects on the nation. It will be important for Army's workforce to remain adaptable as the nation responds to circumstances many Australians have not experienced.

The estimated drop in Government tax revenue by $100 billion in the next financial year is likely to pressure all public services, including Defence. As a consequence, a spirit of cooperation across the Australian national-security enterprise will be imperative as all arms of Government respond to

emerging security challenges globally. Even Defence, reassured by a funded 2020 Force Structure Plan, is likely to be challenged by the need to balance capability investment, potentially greater levels of collective preparedness, and personnel costs. This balance will need to be achieved while a range of bespoke and time-dependent national economic needs are met as the Government seeks to stimulate the national economy.

Global Economics

Decades of economic growth decreased the incidence of poverty across much of the globe. There is a possibility this trend will end following the events of 2020. In East Asia, GDP is forecast to drop by around 3.5% this year as international trade plummets, with global exports declining by around 26.7%.[10] Agriculture-based economies, many of which exist in Australia's nearby region, have also been affected by a significant drop in demand. The scale of the humanitarian consequences borne as a result of COVID-19 have prompted the United Nations to launch a $2 billion response to support the 'most vulnerable' of society, as developing countries are estimated to lose upwards of $220 billion in income.[11] However, given the standard of development within the near region, some communities may not meet the UN threshold to be sufficiently 'vulnerable' and will therefore be unable to access this support. This may exacerbate internal instability, placing increased pressure upon regional security forces that Army traditionally partners with, prompting increased calls for support. Army is likely to be involved in any humanitarian assistance role.

Global economic conditions are also conspiring with demographic shifts. One such shift is an emerging 'youth bulge' in the Pacific region; this demographic is most likely to be negatively affected by the considerable impact of economic conditions on nations dependent on agriculture. Demographic change includes ongoing youth bulge dynamics across the Middle East and North Africa, and emergent youth bulges in the Pacific.[12] These dynamics have also contributed to an increasing trend of intra-state (or irregular) armed conflict as the gap between societies' 'haves' and 'have-nots' expands. Aggregate challenges of unemployment, youth bulges and inadequate governmental and non-governmental welfare support will present severe governance challenges to nations worldwide.

Social Cohesion and Security

The events of 2020 have had a considerable impact on how Australians view their security. In a recent Lowy Institute Poll, only 50% of Australians said they felt safe—a notable fall over the past 20 years.[13] However, feelings of insecurity did not translate into fears of war. Rather, the top five threats as articulated by participants were 'drought and water shortages, novel coronavirus and other potential epidemics, a severe downturn in the global economy, environmental disasters such as bushfires & floods and finally, climate change'.[14] This perception is not surprising: 'smoke from the Australian 2019-20 summer bushfires caused an estimated 445 deaths and put more than 4,000 people in hospital'.[15] This is a higher fatality figure than the number of Australians killed in the Korean War and almost on par with the number killed during the Vietnam War. With a total of 657 Australian deaths to date due to the pandemic, a perception of a society under siege is not difficult to comprehend.

Defence Strategic Update

The DSU was released on 1 July 2020 and was, in general, received positively. Analysts valued its frank assessment of the changing strategic order and the emphasis given to regional strategic requirements rather than global ones.[16] This policy statement was successfully enunciated to Australia's regional partners, with interest in the potential opportunities in partnering for security highlighted. A range of issues that could be loosely bundled as contributions to 'resilience' were also warmly received; national fuel supplies, funding for ammunition holdings and logistics assurance activities were highlights.[17] There were concerns the DSU was not accompanied with a broader Government investment in other national-security related areas (including diplomatic functions performed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).[18] Other concerns related to the predicted slow pace of capability change in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and questions relating to the ADF's capacity to truly deter were raised).[19]

The DSU recognised successful deterrence requires capability options that mitigate the ADF's own limitations. Australia cannot use 'vertical escalation'—increasing the size and scale of its military forces—to deter effectively in a region including large, more powerful nations.[20] The Army must, therefore, look to capabilities which create new ways of offsetting threats to Australian strategic interests. The Army, as part of the joint force, will likely need to be prepared to operate in the 'grey zone' with sophisticated capabilities that confer Australian strategic advantages. The DSU describes how success in the 'grey zone' requires the ADF to achieve strategic goals without provoking conflict.[21]

The DSU, released at a time of strategic inflection and economic crises, has been described as a particularly significant review and is likely to lead to a range of follow-on action and reforms. However, it cannot be forgotten that it must deliver upon a 'hard-edged' analysis of the strategic outlook. There are significant risks grey-zone actions will give way to more overt forms of conflict in the short term—though competition is not likely to spill over into more military-centric activities in the near future. The environment gives cause for Army to reframe its thinking around being a strategically valuable force. In what way can it decisively influence the environment, potentially even irrevocably, as part of the joint force?

Deterrence and Resilience

Deterrence and resilience should be understood as complementary. Resilience is a precondition for effective deterrence.[22]

The ADF exists to reduce the chance of war, just as much as it does to win war once entered. The presence of an adaptable, capable land-based force within the ADF which can rapidly respond to threats is fundamentally important to Australia. In the words of Richard Betts, 'Deterrence is a strategy for combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war.'[23] The inherently volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous nature of today's globalised geopolitical and economic environment also demands the joint force exist as part of the nation's ability to absorb shock—the proverbial 'black swans' by which we will inevitably be surprised. This ability to react and respond to strategic shocks is as fundamentally important as having the capability to coerce and deter a potential threat from doing harm.

Deterrence

The Army's contribution to joint-force deterrence will be critically important in the future as the Service's future force design integrates capability acquisitions which increase the ADF's reach and lethality.[24] Army will soon complement the other Services with the fielding of Land-Based Maritime Strike Missiles.[25] For the ADF, long-term capability developments in hypersonic missiles and long-loiter munitions further amplify strike capabilities.[26] However, given Australia will need to work with its regional partners to assure an effective deterrence approach, interoperability and collective approaches to force posture and sustainment will likely be required.

Further, strategic competition and new threats are likely to mean Army must adapt to meet contemporary deterrence needs before the delivery of new capabilities. Lethality at range is critical to the Army's modernisation, but must be complemented with other capabilities. A broadened scope of capabilities to effect deterrence was articulated by the Chief of the Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, when he noted:

> *New technologies and hybrid warfare techniques are rendering simple binary approaches to deterrence inadequate. They are creating new realities in which some countries can circumvent the rules-based order through power projection, including by extending their reach beyond traditional geographic notions of territory and sovereignty.*[27]

The Army's contribution to deterrence is not only a matter of capability investment. The responsiveness of the Army to the ADF's (and Australia's) needs will also be critical. A present-day emphasis on adaptability as the bedrock of preparedness will support Army into the future. The Army may need to reform preparedness such that it is a measure not just of what is available at any one point in time but of how quick its responses are and how long the joint land force can be sustained operationally. The Army's force posture will also be an essential component of its responsiveness and resilience in the face of the threats mentioned throughout this report. Prospective adjustments to force posture, as depicted at Figure 1, are therefore important to the fulfilment of Australian strategy.

Major-power strategic competition may be an important focus for Australian Defence planning, but there remain a range of threats that the ADF will have to be responsive to. Although leading conventional military forces are becoming more lethal, they are also less likely to be used for the purposes they were designed for. This speaks to the effects of nuclear-based deterrence, where conflict between major powers has been kept to a minimum to avoid mutually assured destruction. Rather than a source of peace, the nuclear power balance resulted in the 'stability-instability paradox' that saw competition manifest in proxy conflict in the Third World. State-on-state conflict occurs infrequently, but land forces are widely used

to combat insurgencies and eruptions of intra-state violence. Land forces are heavily involved in 'grey zone' conflict outside of combat, though commentators are clearly fixating on cyber and other 'capabilities du jour' which seem to (and often do) deliver strategic outcomes at low cost.

Two hundred years after Napoleon ushered a new generation of warfare into Europe, today mobilisation tools in the form of a smartphone reside in the hands of citizens and diaspora alike, supporting mobilisation in support of a cause—both real and fabricated. This has prompted a revolution in recruiting and radicalisation.[28]

Figure 1: An Army objective force possible posture

I2CEWS Intelligence, Information, Cyber, Electronic Warfare System
AFV FORWARD BASING
FIRES FORMATION
4th MANOEUVRE BRIGADE
LITTORAL MANOEUVRE
SECOND DIVISION
HEALTH FORMATION
AVIATION COMMAND

ARMY OBJECTIVE FORCE "FUTURE READY"

The Army Objective Force is configured for:

- Increased scalability.
- Operational concurrency and cross-domain capacity.
- Refined structures to align landworthiness, airworthiness, force generation and force employment.
- Aligned with population centres to harness the full value of Australia's population and industry.

The mobilising of masses of individuals also holds a coercive potential, as the late Thomas C. Schelling explained: 'To exploit a capacity for hurting and inflicting damage one needs to know what an adversary treasures and what scares him'.[29] In general terms, autocratic regimes treasure unity and are scared by challenges to authority. If mobilisation can be achieved domestically to resist aggression, it might theoretically also be achieved in target regimes. Thus, holding a capability (and a demonstrated willingness to use it) for unconventional warfare[30] may serve a deterrence effect.

The idea of formally weaponising mass mobilisation is captured in the 2019 Swedish concept of *resistance.*[31] Building upon the experience of World War II and competition during the Cold War, resistance has experienced a wellspring of military interest from Eastern European and Scandinavian countries in particular, following Russia's annexation of Crimea.[32] The concept of metaphorically becoming 'an indigestible hedgehog' serves a deterrent effect and was employed in this manner by the Swiss to orchestrate whole-of-nation efforts throughout the Cold War.[33] If a nation is believed to be capable of resisting the shock of an aggressor's violent action, it may adjust the cost-benefit analysis against the pursuit of such aggression; *resilience strengthened into resistance can perform deterrence.*

The globalised availability of information now extends the concept of every soldier is a sensor, to every smartphone-enabled citizen is a sensor, an analyst, and a propagandist. Indeed, this already is a reality. The implications both add support to the generation of information effects and create a phenomenon of mass surveillance.[34] This mass surveillance dynamic has led the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments to propose the concept of 'deterrence by detection', described as follows:

> *Real-time situational awareness is critical to countering the twin challenges of sub-conventional gray zone aggression and a conventional fait accompi gambit promptly and effectively … 'Deterrence by detection,' based upon the idea that our adversaries are less likely to commit opportunistic acts of aggression if they know they are being watched constantly and that their actions can be publicized widely, can generate and maintain real-time situational awareness that can contribute to meeting the fait accompli challenge.*[35]

In the context of an urbanising global population deterred from undertaking conventional warfighting, Army will need to look beyond the 'forces assigned' (those that we control) to 'forces available' (those we can influence).[36] An influence battle pursuing mobilisation toward Australian interest is essential to counter autocratic subversive efforts.[37] Exemplar

means to engage in such an influence battle include the
Active Measures Working Group[38] and the NATO Hybrid Centre for
Excellence,[39] both of which 'spread awareness of the political warfare
'playbooks' of foreign states to enhance the public's ability to identify
and expose malign activities'.[40] Both examples are cheap and illuminate
public awareness of the issue of resilience.

Army and Resilience

The interdependency of social systems is such that the chance and
scale of catastrophic, transformational events is high. Problems affect
more things in more ways more of the time, and when disasters occur
they are more costly. The Army continues to play an important role in
assuring 'national resilience', as it provides support to whole-of-Defence
commitments to Government. However, the Army is also learning through
its important contributions to 'national resilience' as *Operation COVID-19
Assist* continues, and as it prepares for another 'high-risk weather
system'. Resilience, as was described in the Q2 Strategic Assessment, is
a fundamental concept applicable to the Army's preparedness in general.
Though the Army's responsiveness is rightly fortified through the Chief of
Army's strategic guidance, employment of new ideas about 'resilience' is
likely to be advantageous for the Army as it prepares for the environment
depicted in the DSU. The challenge is that for some time Australia and the
world have focused on responsiveness to disasters rather than preventative
measures to 'de-risk'.[41] Recovery after shock should be viewed as renewal,
regeneration and reorganisation, rather than a return to normality.

As the Army responds to the needs of the DSU, developing preparedness
and the ability to respond quickly to the unforeseen, a variety of capability,
organisational, force posture and logistics arrangements will most likely
require review. 'Resilience' requires the entire joint force to continue its work
on 'scaling' and 'mobilisation', as well as reform to workforce approaches,
governance arrangements and business practice. Materiel preparedness is
a central topic to consider within Army's transformation plans. Sources of
efficiency and effectiveness must be found and exploited, such that the
resources made available to the Army are used appropriately in the context
of national requirements. All these factors are likely to require a significant
restructure of the Army's commands and organisations.

There are a range of strategic-level Army activities underway that relate to resilience. It is important that 'adaptability' is not venerated to the point where risks become borne by Army's soldiers; instead the Army's reform needs are likely best enabled by evolving the strategic, preparedness, people and capability systems to be efficient and prepared. For a more resilient Army it will be important that any reform and reorganisation be considered in the context of it operating as a system.

Systemic engagement with the Australian public is essential to the development of resilience. As Hew Strachan notes:

> *Public engagement in defence—of the sort evident in Finland or Estonia for example— creates a level of mass participation, which itself leads to resilience … the effect of ignoring domestic resilience is to undermine deterrence … societal ownership strengthens deterrence. If the public don't understand what they are interested in defending or what they will fight for, then the enemy will assume that the democratic state will pursue every policy option short of war, but not war itself.[42]*

Major power competition currently manifests through a broadening of coercive policy, subversion and proxy wars between democracies and autocracies. Army is just one of a broad range of Government departments that will need to respond to such competition.[43] Army will likely assume responsibilities for concepts of enhanced resilience through humanitarian assistance and/or disaster relief or through capacity building with like-minded partners to become the 'indigestible hedgehogs' that deter aggression. Army's response to the DSU therefore requires an expansion of the Army's approach to the future by better linking *resilience to deterrence.*

Endnotes

1   Frydenberg MP, The Hon. J., *National Accounts June Quarter Statement* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), available at: https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/speeches/national-accounts-june-quarter-statement.

2   Ibid.

3   Department of Defence, *2020 Defence Strategic Update* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), p. 3, available at: https://defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/.

4   Ibid., p. 3.

5   Ibid., p. 3.

6   Australian Army Research Centre, *Strategic Assessment, Quarter 2, 2020* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), available at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/other/strategic-assessment-quarter-2-2020.

7   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Outlook, Vol. 2020, Iss. 1: Preliminary version, No. 107 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2020), p. 34.*

8   Ibid., p. 138.

9   The Treasury, *Economic and Fiscal Update, July 2020: Statement by The Honourable Josh Frydenberg MP and Senator the Honourable Mathias Cormann (Canberra:* Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), available at: https://budget.gov.au/2020-efu/economic-fiscal-update.htm.

10 All global economic data used in this report is from International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020 (Geneva: International Monetary Fund, 2020), available at:* https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020.

11 United Nations Development Programme, 'COVID-19 pandemic: Humanity needs leadership and solidarity to defeat the coronavirus', available at: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/covid-19-pandemic-response.html.

12 Wilson, Catherine, 'Demanding the future: Navigating the Pacific's youth bulge', Lowy Institute, 8 July 2020, available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/demanding-future-navigating-pacific-youth-bulge.

13 Kassam, Natasha, *Lowy Institute Poll 2020: Understanding Australian Attitudes to the World* (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2020), available at: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/about.

14 Ibid., p. 17. This conclusion is reinforced by The Australia Institute, *Polling—Threats and Security, June 2020 (Canberra: The Australia Institute, 2020), available at:* https://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/Polling%20-%20June%202020%20-%20Security%20and%20threats%20%5BWeb%5D.pdf. The Australia Institute noted that regarding perceived threats for people living in Australia, in their top three, 49% had natural disasters, 47% had economic collapse, 44% had climate change and 42% and 40% respectively had chronic disease and infectious disease. Terrorism came in sixth at 23% who included this in their top three, and only 9% did so for the risk of war. More tellingly, only 2% identified war as their top threat, the same number as those who responded that there were no threats (p. 3).

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16 Shoebridge, M., 'Defence strategic update promises real change but more is needed', *The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 July 2020, available at:* https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-strategic-update-promises-real-change-but-more-is-needed/.

17 Ibid.

18 Sharma, D., 'A diplomatic step-up to match our military step-up', *The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 13 July 2020, available at:* https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/diplomatic-step-match-our-military-step.

19 A full analysis of the DSU can be found in Freya Doney, 'Emerging threats and opportunities (Defence Strategic Update)', *Land Power Forum*, Australian Army Research Centre, 20 July 2020, available at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/emerging-threats-and-opportunities-defence-strategic-update.

20 Jackson, Van, 'The risks of Australia's solo deterrence wager', *War on the Rocks*, 20 July 2020, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/the-risks-of-australias-solo-deterrence-wager/. Jackson highlights in this piece a number of deterrence challenges faced by Australia's articulation of the DSU.

21 Department of Defence, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, p. 5. 'In the Indo-Pacific, these activities have ranged from militarisation of the South China Sea to active interference, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion.'

22 Townshend, Ashley, Santoro, David, and Thomas-Noone, Brendan, *Revising Deterrence in an Era of Strategic Competition: Outcomes Report from the Inaugural US-Australia Indo-Pacific Deterrence Dialogue (United States Studies Centre and Pacific Forum, 2019), p. 5, available at:* https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/revisiting-deterrence-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition.

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25 Department of Defence, *2020 Force Structure Plan* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), p. 45, available at: https://defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/.

26 Palazzo, Al, 'Deterrence and firepower: Land 8113 and the Australian Army's future (Part 1, Strategic effect)', *Land Power Forum*, Australian Army Research Centre, 16 July 2020, available at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/deterrence-and-firepower-land-8113-and-australian-armys-future-part-1-strategic-effect.

27 Townshend et al.

28 The mobilisation of the hacktivist group Anonymous, seemingly in support of Western interests against the Islamic State in 2014–15, is an example of such self-mobilisation in practice.

29 Schelling, Thomas, *Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008 (1966)), pp. 3–4.*

30 Unconventional warfare is defined in U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations (Joint Publication 3-05.1, 2007) as 'Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.'*

31 Fiala, Otto (ed.) *Resistance Operating Concept* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence University and Special Operations Command Europe, 2019), available at: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1392106/FULLTEXT01.pdf. Resistance is herein defined as: 'A nation's organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power' (p. 15).

32 Fiala, Otto, and Pettersson, Ulrica, 'ROC(K) solid preparedness: Resistance operations concept in the shadow of Russia', *PRISM*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2020.

33 This example is explored by Charles Knight, 'Swiss military cost-effectiveness in the Cold-War: Insights for land capability', *Land Power Forum*, Australian Army Research Centre, 17 June 2020, available at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/swiss-military-cost-effectiveness-cold-war-insights-land-capability.

34 This phenomenon was demonstrated in Libya in 2011, through citizen journalism via platforms such as Twitter, Google Maps, and Facebook which evolved to become a disaggregate ISR network and nonviolent protest movement. NATO leveraged this environment to support targeting efforts with anecdotal evidence that this environment provided better and faster information than traditional military intelligence channels (John Scott-Railton, *Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libya Revolution* (Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, CIWAG Case Studies, 2013), p. 79).

35 Mahnken, Thomas G., Sharp, Travis, and Kim, Grace B., *Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Great Power Competition* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), pp. i–iii.

36 Maher, Andrew, 'Proxy wars and the demise of conventional warfighting', *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 15 October 2018, available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/proxy-wars-and-the-demise-of-conventional-warfighting/. This conclusion is reinforced by National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress* (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017), available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends-home, which notes that 'The most powerful actors of the future will be states, groups and individuals who can leverage material capabilities, relationships, and information in a more rapid, integrated, and adaptive mode than in generations past … by mobilising large-scale constituencies of support' (p. 28).

37 This recognition is amplified by Katherine Mansted, *Activating People Power to Counter Foreign Interference and Coercion*, National Security College Policy Options Paper No. 13 (ANU National Security College, 2019), p. 1: 'Citizens are increasingly frontline actors in Australia's security challenges: as targets of malign interference and coercion, victims of collateral damage, and agents of national resilience'.

38 This model is explored in detail with a compelling case made for an inter-agency working group assigned to countering disinformation in Fletcher Schoen and Christopher Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference*, Strategic Perspectives 11, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2012).

39 Hybrid CoE: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, at: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/.

40 Mansted, p. 1.

41 Crosweller, M., 'How do we prepare for the future?', Exhibit 30-002.001—RCN.90.099.0001, Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, available at: https://naturaldisaster.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/exhibit/RCN.900.099.0001.pdf.

42 Strachan, Hew, and Harris, Ruth, *The Utility of Military Force and Public Understanding in Today's Britain* (Cambridge, U.K.: RAND Europe, 2020), pp. 24–25.

43 Indeed, this is a Western requirement as argued by Robert Gates, 'The overmilitarization of American foreign policy: The United States must recover the full range of its power', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2020.