



# Army

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## Land Warfare Doctrine 1

### The Fundamentals of Land Power

2014

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## Chief of Army message


The Army continues to hold a special place in the hearts of Australians through sacrifice and long service to this nation. Although times and technologies have changed, the fundamental mission of the Australian Army endures; to win the land battle. The Army must be able to do this in order to defeat our enemies and safeguard the interests of the nation and the lives of our people.

To carry out these operations effectively, the Army must be multi-skilled, flexible, adaptable, well trained and doctrinally prepared. Our skills must be second to none. As a small force we need to be smarter than our potential enemies. Because of the diversity of threats we face, and their ability to evolve rapidly, we need to prepare ourselves to learn quickly 'on-the-job'. Our ability to adapt to changing circumstances more quickly than our enemies is a key factor in continuing operational success. To do this we rely on each soldier being committed to continuous self-development. As well as the efforts of individuals, the adaptability of the Army can be supported by good doctrine.

The Army must view doctrine as a journey rather than a destination. Since the first edition in 1977, published as *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations (Provisional)*, the Australian Army has sought to evolve its capstone warfighting doctrine to take into account changes in international affairs, technology, government policy and changes in the character of Australian society more generally. In this context, *The Fundamentals of Land Power* represents continuity in thought. It is another step in Army's doctrinal journey, and one that builds on the knowledge of our historical experience and analysis of contemporary challenges to ensure the Army remains effective, adaptable and relevant.

The 2014 edition of *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power* provides the Australian Army with the philosophical guidance for achieving the mission of winning the land battle and thriving in the chaos of the 21st century. It draws on the feats of our predecessors, but it is also unambiguously forward-looking. This publication represents the Australian Army's strategic thinking about land power. It provides relevant doctrine for the conduct of land operations – as part of our maritime strategy – in partnership with the Navy and Air Force, other government agencies, friends and allies. The Army's land forces must have a strategic and expeditionary mindset, be tactically agile, protected, networked, trained and educated to manoeuvre in the contemporary environment. Above all else, the Army must possess the superior leadership and skills that are best guarantors of battle success.

Our doctrine is founded on the hard won battle experience of our Army for over a century. This capstone doctrine must be studied and understood by all ranks. Equally, it must be examined and debated beyond the Department of Defence. Through such debate, Army can increase its intellectual capital and better position itself to *promote* and *protect* Australia's interests, *deter* threats to her sovereignty and, if necessary, *defeat* them. I commend this publication to you with the intent that it will generate a broad discussion on the utility of land power.



D.L. Morrison  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Army

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## Introduction

War and warfare continue to plague the human race. War remains the most complex and dangerous strategic challenge faced by nations. In the future, warfare will be waged by information and technology-enabled military forces, in land, sea, air, space and cyber space. This will be notably irregular in style when compared with most interstate strategic practices in modern times. Preparing for such conflict requires the investment of very significant human, materiel and technological resources. Being able to fight and win under such circumstances depends ultimately on having the right force structure and military capabilities.

Australia's geostrategic and environmental situation has shaped the development of the nation's defence capacity. Demography, geography and economic power contribute to and influence doctrine which is unique to the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Army. For the Army, doctrine is the repository of military knowledge, and is a dynamic embodiment of the Army's ethos. To remain relevant as the basis for military thinking, doctrine must evolve to allow for changes in policy and circumstances.

While Army's doctrine must take into account these recent developments, it must also look beyond these to remain a firm foundation upon which Army can educate and train its officers and soldiers, particularly in peacetime. As such, Army's capstone doctrine – *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power* – serves the Australian Army as a statement of its approach to land warfare. It encapsulates the Army's fundamental philosophy for the employment of land power based on the broad lessons of military history and human experience. This document is independent of any specific organisation or structure, any level or type of technology,

or any particular type or intensity of warfare. This publication codifies what the Australian Army regards as its philosophical foundation and aims to provide the fundamental aspects of the nature and conduct of war.

The use of the term 'land power' reflects the dynamism of the strategic environment over the past 15 years. Land power encompasses the employment of an array of land capability – from Army, the Australian Defence Force and across government – to achieve specified objectives. The Army must always view itself not in terms of simply 'winning the land battle', but as a force capable of exerting land power for strategic effect across the modern spectrum of peace, crisis and war. The term land power also raises Army's concept of itself above this tactical 'win the land battle' and accepts that the generation of effects on the land also has strategic impact. It is multidimensional: land power may involve the employment of capabilities from all the operational environments (land, sea, air, space and cyberspace) to achieve results on land.

The Army is not employed in isolation. Commitment of land, sea and air forces in joint operations, as part of Australia's maritime strategy, is the norm. Warfighting demands optimal force integration or 'joint interdependence' to combine the capabilities of all the Services to optimise overall effectiveness while minimising the vulnerabilities of the total force. This is further enhanced by cooperation between the joint team and other government agencies such as police, diplomatic staff, legal representatives, private sector and non-government organisations.

*The Fundamentals of Land Power* provides a base point in the Australian Army's philosophy from which all doctrine, education and training is derived. As General Douglas MacArthur once noted, 'in no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military'. The leaders of the Australian Army bear the ultimate responsibility; this publication provides them with the foundational doctrine in their execution of the Army's education and training. *The Fundamentals of Land Power* also provides strategic decision makers and the Australian community with the Australian Army perspective on warfare and the defence of Australia and its interests.

This edition of *The Fundamentals of Land Power* contains four chapters. Chapter One describes the nature, character and the conduct of war. Chapter Two, which represents one of the most significant changes from previous editions, examines the Australian Army and the development of



distinct elements of Army culture. It builds on this to examine the Australian Army's concept of land power, and its versatility in the execution of national strategy. Chapter Three describes the Army's philosophy, while examining the provenance and historical, intellectual and contemporary influences on that philosophy. Finally, Chapter Four describes how the Australian Army generates the people and teams that constitute the Army's capability and ability to generate land power.

Effective modern military doctrine usually reflects the interaction of three components: the enduring, the practical and the predictive. The tenets are based on the enduring principles of war; the practical component interprets the character of contemporary warfare; and the predictive component looks to the future to identify how military force development might be integrated with emerging technology.

Effective doctrine is therefore constructed from three elements; past experience, operational requirement and technological feasibility. It assists the institution to learn, anticipate and adapt.<sup>1</sup> This document should foster professional discourse and debate on the Army's past, present and future. Such a debate is essential for the Army as it continues to modernise and define its role in serving the nation into the early and middle decades of the twenty-first century.



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## Chapter 1

### War and warfare

War remains a struggle of political and human will, framed by the enduring themes of friction, danger and uncertainty. For over 3,000 years, organised society has used *land power*<sup>2</sup> as a decisive means to seek political dominance because of its unique capacity to achieve sustained and persistent control and influence over the land, and the population that lives on it. However, the conduct of war – warfare – continues to change based on desired political objectives, human interaction, cultural norms, environment, and technology. These changes require intelligent study, as they alter the character of warfare in ways that can affect success. Such study is assisted by understanding the conduct, levels and principles of war, giving a framework to identify what has changed and what is enduring. One characteristic that is critical to modern understanding is the expansion of war theory to include the full spectrum of conflict.

#### Land power

is defined as: *The ability to project force in and from land in peace, crisis and war to achieve strategic and operational objectives.*

The distinction between conflict and war has become one of degrees and perception rather than substance. All war is conflict, yet not all conflict is termed war, with the spectrum extending from ‘no conflict’ situations –

like humanitarian relief – up to and including ‘total war’ between states.<sup>3</sup> This reaffirms that conflict, at any level, is a competition of political and human will that can use violent and non-violent means to influence a

diverse group of actors to achieve the political objective. Therefore, studying the enduring nature of war, the characteristics of warfare, and its conduct, informs a better understanding of the entire spectrum of conflict, no matter how land power is employed.

## The enduring nature of war

In the early 19th century, the great strategic thinker and student of war, Carl Von Clausewitz, revealed an ambition 'to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked upon more than once by those who are interested in the subject.'<sup>4</sup> Clausewitz's book has enduring relevance for two reasons. First, his theory of war is not tied to a particular time, type of belligerent, or technology, and therefore remains as relevant today as it has been throughout the course of human history. Second, Clausewitz's theory remains fundamentally superior to anything else written before or since. Clausewitz's *On War* remains the most unambiguous statement on the nature of war.

There remains an enduring obligation on students of warfare to evaluate the nature of war in an attempt to identify its character relative to a particular time and place. What is essential to any study is the absolute truth that wars resemble one another more than they resemble any other human activity. All are fought, as Clausewitz insisted, with that special element of danger, fear and confusion peculiar to conflict. Opponents seek to impose their will on one another through violence.

Land warfare is intimately affected by the political environment in which it takes place. Clausewitz observed that 'war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.'<sup>5</sup> Politics at all levels (domestic, regional and global) thus profoundly influence the conduct of land warfare. War and conflict are innate elements of the human condition and comprise a constant competition using both violent and non-violent means between multiple, diverse actors struggling for influence and control of societies. Inescapably, war means people fighting people, and fighting means killing.

Land warfare is a permanent feature of human existence. Victory or defeat on land has been generally synonymous with victory or defeat for the state. Great land powers such as Rome, France, Germany and Russia have suffered their most decisive defeats on land. Land combat has also played

a critical role in the wars of maritime powers such as Athens, Carthage, Venice, Britain, Japan and the United States. Land warfare is characterised by several distinctive features.

**Higher social organisation.** State-based warfare (particularly since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia) has led to the creation of professional military land forces that often form the bulwark of strategic capability.

**Importance of geography.** Occupation of decisive terrain is a key element in achieving victory in war. Unlike the sea, air, cyber and space domains where control and influence are possible but permanent occupation is not, physical geography is able to be occupied by soldiers to produce a decisive outcome.

**Variety in topography.** The land domain and its effect on warfare is further defined by its heterogeneous nature. Land includes jungle, desert, mountains, arctic expanses, urban and rural terrain. By contrast, air, sea, space and cyber domains are relatively homogeneous in nature and thus their impact on people is easier to predict.

**Domination by European military concepts.** Land warfare is historically based on the 'continental' school of thought, much of which was derived from Europe following the Age of Enlightenment. Leading thinkers who defined its conduct include Carl Von Clausewitz, Frederick the Great and Antoine Henri Jomini.

Within the spectrum of conflict, actions can take many forms, ranging from enforcing sanctions through to violent clashes between opposing forces. Despite differences in size, wealth and power, parties to conflict and adversaries in war share a common aim: to threaten or use force to impose their will on another in order to achieve a political purpose. Adversaries may be various combinations of armed, networked insurgents or irregular troops through to

### The remarkable trinity

The trinity comprises:

1. primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are regarded as a blind natural force;
2. the play of chance and probability within which creative spirit is free to roam; and
3. war's element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.

conventional forces capable of exploiting a variety of ways to fight and win.

Clausewitz introduced the notion of the remarkable trinity to describe the interaction of chance, passion and the pursuit of rational political objectives. This trinity describes political processes

that exist everywhere, at every level and rest in human perception.

Conflict, as a political process, tends to escape rational control because it generates unpredictable and chaotic behaviour. Warfare and its challenges magnify the interaction between chance, emotion and the pursuit of rational objectives. Friction, danger, uncertainty and chance will always be present in conflict. Conflict is also influenced by human interaction and physical terrain.

Clausewitz describes **friction** as 'the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult'.<sup>6</sup> The factors that generate friction are enemy action, adverse weather, complex terrain, poor coordination, insufficient or inaccurate information and human error. These factors combine to make even the simplest of actions difficult to accomplish. Initiative, sound leadership, operational experience and thorough and realistic training mitigate, but never eliminate friction.

The **danger** associated with violence engenders fear in combatants and dramatically degrades the efficiency and effectiveness of soldiers and units. Realistic training and strong leadership reduce the negative effects of fear by generating high morale, confidence and resilience.

**Uncertainty** pervades the battlefield in all forms. Incomplete, inaccurate and often contradictory information about the enemy, the environment and the friendly situation creates uncertainty, or the 'fog of war'. In the face of this uncertainty, individuals and organisations at all levels must be educated and postured to act intuitively and decisively, informed by adaptive planning processes and tactical procedures in the absence of complete information.

In all situations of conflict, **chance** creates random and unpredictable events that present a commander with opportunities and threats. Successful exploitation of unanticipated opportunities can exacerbate the effect of chaos on the enemy. Dealing with fleeting opportunities requires devolved authority and responsibility, highly developed analytical skills and creative thinking by all soldiers, and a determination to act.

Free and creative **will** is an important characteristic of human interaction. The will to win and the search for advantage leads protagonists to adopt novel methods and technologies. To cope with the unexpected, there is an increasing requirement to retain initiative and freedom of action. These will be based on versatility (the ability to perform a range of tasks), adaptability (the ability to embrace new and unforeseen tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly between tasks). Danger is inherent in conflict and

engenders fear in all protagonists. Overcoming fear requires discipline and moral and physical courage. Fear is one reason humans make mistakes. Human fallibility can lead to unintended and unpredicted consequences and is the principal cause of friction, uncertainty and chance.

All conflict is based on the pursuit of political aims, which may use degrees of armed force to attain objectives. Violence can destroy a regime or so threaten a population's way of life that it chooses to cease resistance. Violence, however, cannot change people's minds nor gain their support for a political proposition – it can only impose costs on them. Success in conflict, therefore, requires that the victor's and the people's political aims are aligned.

In any conflict there are three distinct parties involved: enemy forces, friendly forces and non-combatants. Each of these could comprise numerous groups such as militias, non-state actors, criminals, non-government organisations and security contractors. Enemy forces can be defined as a person, group, or a nation that nurtures hatred for, fosters harmful designs, or engages in antagonistic activities against another adversary or opponent. Regardless of their nationality or motivation, threat forces are creative and determined and employ different combinations of force, method and technology to achieve their goals. Such enemies, by their nature, try to avoid friendly strengths, exploit weaknesses and upset plans. This means that conflict rarely proceeds as initially envisaged, reinforcing the need for flexibility and adaptability.

Military forces often operate as part of a coalition with other friendly forces. Almost invariably they are also required to operate alongside other government and civilian agencies and organisations. All members of a coalition are faced with the problem of reconciling their respective strategic objectives with the practical issues of interoperability. These include doctrinal compatibility, identification of friendly forces, intelligence-sharing, logistic interaction, communication and coordination.

Some non-combatants act only to ensure physical self-preservation or the protection of their interests. Others are willing participants to help either resolve the conflict or alleviate the suffering of others. Collectively, the parties to a conflict and their interactions constitute a complex human environment. Regardless of their differences, human interaction is marked by free and creative will, political aims, and fear and fallibility.

## The evolving character of war

Throughout history, developments in technology, politics, society, strategy and tactics have continuously altered the character and conduct of warfare. Notwithstanding the enduring nature of war, the manner in which war is prosecuted will continue to change. These changes influence Army's philosophical approach to the operating environment. The operating environment is not just the physical environment; it is the character of contemporary and likely future conflict. Changes in the character of warfare may occur slowly over generations or quite rapidly. Additionally, these changes clearly affect the tactical art of employing units and weapons and, to a lesser extent, the operational art of linking military objectives to achieve strategic ones.

A central challenge confronting contemporary warfare is that we do not always understand what is a war and what is not. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its rule in Eastern Europe, that order, and by extension its inherited definitions of war and peace, have been contested. This has resulted in wars becoming 'fuzzy at the edges': they have no clear end and military forces increasingly have to reject the appropriateness of classical definitions of military victory.<sup>7</sup>

As has been the case in the past, technological developments are continuing to drive change in the character of war. An information-led revolution in military affairs is well under way. It has increased the flow of information into, within and outside military operations, adding a layer of complexity for commanders at all levels.

Effective information management and improved communications are permitting military commanders to make and disseminate better decisions, providing the ability to 'reach back' for information and support, such as joint fires. This connectivity has also resulted in the rise of a global electronic media with real-time access to events, or nearly so, and the ability to reach audiences globally means a political and cultural-moral audit of behaviour that will be an enduring feature of future strategic practice.<sup>8</sup>

The strategic ramifications of this revolution in military affairs include the dissemination of relatively high-technology weaponry and support equipment to non-state and weak-state belligerents. The development of cyber power that is becoming ever more necessary for the creation of



wealth and the functioning of armed forces is already resulting in cyber warfare. Maturing space capabilities for navigation, precision timing and imagery, science, commerce, and communications guarantees that space warfare is a potential future focus of military operations.<sup>9</sup>

## The conduct of war

The path to conflict is dynamic and unpredictable. Most instances of diplomatic or economic competition will not develop into conflict. In other cases, diplomatic incidents are used as pretence for war. Furthermore, a conflict may not be fully resolved and relations between the parties – be they two states, or a state government and non-state political group – may continue to be hostile due to the unresolved tension.<sup>10</sup> Conflict may be protracted, with no near-term prospect of resolution. These differences highlight the importance of maintaining credible land forces that can provide scalable options to support the national interest. It also demonstrates that even though no two conflicts are the same, they do have similarities that can be expressed in **scale**, **intensity** and **duration**. These three characteristics provide a useful comparison for commanders and planners:

- a. **Scale.** Scale represents the degree of threat to national interests, the size and nature of national effort – including military forces committed – and the characteristics of the area of operations. The scale of conflict may be managed through the various levels of command.
- b. **Intensity.** Intensity refers to the overall tempo, degree of violence, and technological sophistication employed. The rate of consumption of resources is also a measure of intensity. The intensity will be high when clashes occur frequently or when encounters between combatants are particularly violent. Intensity may vary during the course of a particular conflict, and at the individual level, depending on the particular situation and perspective of the participants at any one time. Intensity should never be the determining factor of conflicts. The concept is generally of most use at the strategic level of command. Consequently, there is no direct relationship between the intensity and the size and nature of the forces involved.

- c. **Duration.** Duration is the length of time spent engaged in a particular conflict, including any periods of escalated or reduced scale and intensity. A Long Duration war may be the 'War on Terror', with its deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, which has been a persistent conflict lasting for many years. By contrast, a Short Duration example is the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War – short duration, but at High Intensity and Scale. This is also an example of a 'war within a conflict', or the protracted conflict consisting of the Six-Day War, War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War. This conflict demonstrates how scale, intensity can change during a conflict duration, as the conflict has transitioned through a succession of state-on-state wars, to an insurgencies involving state and non-state actors, and back to state-on-state war.

## Levels of war

The military contribution to national security is managed through three levels of command: strategic, operational and tactical. These levels reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing the resources allocated to specific military objectives. Interlinking these levels are strategy, operational art and tactics.

But in examining these levels, caution must be applied. Due to the dynamic and interactive nature of war, its practice (unlike command) cannot be divided into discrete levels. The levels of command are closely related such that tactical actions contribute individually and/or collectively to strategic outcomes. While blurring of the levels of command is almost inevitable, the effective practice of mission command remains paramount to ensure tactical opportunities may be readily exploited. Regardless, the practicalities of communications, logistics and mass are likely to demand the employment of an operational level headquarters capable of coordinating joint, interagency and coalition effort.

The strategic level of command is responsible for coordinating the application of national power to achieve an end-state favourable to the national interest. The strategic level focuses on the development and implementation of strategy as the identification of objectives (ends), concepts (ways) and the resources (means) necessary to achieve them. At this level, all the elements of national power are employed in a manner that maximise their overall effectiveness.

National policy and strategy integrates all the elements of national power to employ a whole-of-government approach to national security. The government considers how it will employ national power to secure the nation and/or protect its interests. It determines the national strategic objectives, which tools of national power to employ and what resources, military or otherwise are required. This includes the mobilisation, posture and preparation of whole-of-government tools and the potential impact of their employment. The political dimension or impact, both domestically and internationally, is a key factor in any government's consideration of the use of military power.

**Military strategic level.** The military strategic level of command links the military instrument of national power to a whole-of-government approach to national security. Military strategic commanders provide advice to the government and translate the government's directions into military strategy, plans and orders. At the military strategic level, both deliberate and immediate military planning are conducted to determine force design, posture, and preparedness requirements to meet assigned and potential government tasks.<sup>11</sup> Strategic commanders command and control the broad military approach across multiple services and levels to achieve these tasks.

Military strategy seeks to achieve military strategic objectives assigned by national policy guidance or derived from the national security strategy. Military strategic concepts are developed to achieve these objectives and these form the basis of campaign plans. Importantly, the necessary military forces, the capabilities and resources required must be identified and matched to these concepts. Military strategy is prosecuted through design, sequence and execution of joint campaigns within a whole-of-government and, frequently, coalition context.

**Operational level.** The operational level of command encompasses planning and conducting campaigns incorporating joint forces. A campaign is a series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve one or more strategic objectives. Military actions at the operational level are joint, often coalition, and invariably interagency in nature. The operational level achieves military strategic objectives by orchestrating, sequencing and resourcing tactical actions and efforts. Successful campaigning is founded on the creative application of operational art.

Operational art is the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of operations through the design, organisation and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Primarily cognitive rather than organisational, it features the creation and sequencing of a series of tactical actions to achieve abstract strategic ends. Operational art links strategy and tactics and aims to set the conditions most likely to achieve the strategic objectives.

In a campaign, a line of operation is a philosophical sequence of operations each of which assists in the achievement of particular strategic objectives. In a generic sense, a line of operation describes where military effort is applied to achieve the end-state. This allows land forces to sequence and resource main and secondary efforts. Multiple lines of operation may be utilised to create an operational level framework from which to consider the diverse array of tactical actions required to achieve assigned objectives.

**Tactical level.** At the tactical level, commanders prepare for, plan and conduct tactical actions to achieve tasks on lines of operation within a campaign. Successful tactical action requires the application of joint and combined arms fighting power to defeat the enemy at a particular time and place.<sup>12</sup> The achievement of tactical tasks is therefore critical in accomplishing operational level objectives and, in turn, setting the conditions for the strategic objectives to be met. The tactical level is focussed on tactics, the ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of units in relation to one another and the enemy in order to utilise their full potential.

**Compression of the levels of command.** Conflict, unlike command, cannot be divided into discrete levels. The levels of command are closely related such that tactical actions contribute individually and/or collectively to strategic outcomes. While blurring of the levels of command is almost inevitable, the effective practise of mission command remains paramount to ensure tactical opportunities may be readily exploited. Regardless, the practicalities of communications, logistics and mass are likely to demand the employment of an operational level headquarters capable of coordinating joint, interagency and coalition effort.

## Principles of war

Certain ideas about strategic planning and the conduct of operations can be deduced from the experience of the past. These are expressed as principles. The principles are not laws such as the laws of natural science, where the observance of certain conditions produces a predictable result. Nor are they like the rules of a game, the breach of which entails a definite fixed penalty. The principles of war are simply a series of factors that successful commanders have found necessary to consider in the past. The weight given to a particular principle depends on the circumstances; it is unlikely all can be applied equally and commanders will need to use their professional military judgement in their application.

**Selection and maintenance of the aim.** Military action is never an end in itself; it is always a means to an end. The end must always remain clearly in view. This cardinal principle applies equally to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict. It relates to taking advantage of local opportunities only where they support the commander's intent. The aim must be simple, direct, unambiguous and within the means of the force available. It must be the one best calculated to further the favourable conclusion of the operation, the campaign, or the war. Once the aim has been decided, all effort must continually be directed towards its attainment so long as this is possible, and every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the aim.

**Concentration of force.** Success in conflict depends on achieving a concentration of force at critical locations and times. Concentration of force is the ability to apply decisive military force at the right place, at the right time and in such a way as to achieve a decisive result. In non-contiguous battlespaces, this requires small, disaggregated teams with the ability to converge rapidly, access joint fires, achieve local superiority and decisive advantage, and then redeploy or regroup when the task is complete. Importantly, concentration of non-kinetic capabilities can achieve effects in the moral and intellectual domains just as the concentration of force achieves effects in the physical domain.

**Cooperation.** Cooperation within joint combined arms interagency teams, allies and coalition partners is vital for success. Only in this way can the resources and energies of each be harnessed so as to achieve success. Synchronisation and orchestration are implicit in cooperation. The principle of cooperation is fundamental to combined arms teams.

**Economy of effort.** Economy of effort is the prudent allocation and application of resources to achieve the desired results and needs to be balanced with the other principles of war, notably security and sustainment. For example, the more resources allocated to ensuring security, the fewer are available for offensive action. Economy of effort is required to achieve, maintain or switch the main effort elsewhere. Supporting efforts are designed to contribute to the achievement of the main effort and subsequent mission success.

**Security.** Security is concerned with measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, or surprise. It is of basic concern during any campaign or operation. Security is required to operate effectively with minimal interference from the enemy. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the security of their force. Security can often best be obtained by offensive operations which, by threatening the enemy's security, restrict his freedom of action. Security applies especially to information, and requires that the enemy be deprived of the knowledge of one's own actions, dispositions and intentions.

**Offensive action.** Military forces take offensive action to gain and retain the initiative. In most circumstances, such action is essential to the achievement of victory. When offensive action is required, it must be swift, decisive and should be directed toward the achievement of the end state. Offensive action is not limited to the application of force but encompasses the proactive use of non-kinetic capabilities such as information dominance and influence.

**Surprise.** Surprise can produce results out of all proportion to the effort expended and is closely related to security. The ability of the land force to disperse and rapidly concentrate is critical to achieving surprise. Not all activities can remain concealed, so deception should be employed to conceal the intent of any action.

**Flexibility.** Flexibility is the capacity to adapt plans to take account of unforeseen circumstances to ensure success in the face of friction, unexpected resistance, or setbacks, or to capitalise on unexpected opportunities. It relates to the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations and conditions; the ability to dynamically manage the balance and weight of effort across different lines of operation in space and time; and the ability to rapidly identify then appropriately respond to new threats and opportunities.

**Sustainment.** Sustainment refers to the support arrangements necessary to implement strategies and operational plans. These arrangements include those logistic and personnel efforts necessary for the efficient support of a force committed to operations. This refers to the requirement to logistically support a large number of small, dispersed combat teams without revealing the location of those teams to the enemy. In a contemporary context, sustainment may also be extended to other actors or stakeholders, such as non-combatants.

**Maintenance of morale.** Morale is an essential element of combat power. High morale engenders courage, energy, cohesion, endurance, steadfastness, determination and a bold, offensive spirit. In any given situation, military success may depend as much on morale as on material advantages. Good leadership, thorough training and success on operations will all contribute to high morale. Actions taken directly or indirectly to destroy the enemy's morale are an important means of reducing the enemy's combat effectiveness.

### **Understanding war and warfare**

Understanding what's changed about the character of war and what endures in the nature of war requires significant analysis. Such analysis is essential because the deductions drawn and the trusted principles relied upon will fundamentally shape an army's preparation for the conduct of war. This preparation is underpinned by the knowledge that the Army is an entity that threatens and when necessary applies violence to achieve national objectives.

The Army's understanding of war and warfare also influences its sense of self and purpose that is required to formulate its concept of land power, shape its culture, and determine how it will contribute to strategic tasks. These three matters are the subject of the next chapter.





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## Chapter 2

# The Australian Army

It is important for an institution like the Army to possess a clear sense of self and purpose. This provides a strong foundation to develop and adapt ideas that align with the theoretical, historical, contemporary and societal influences that form the Army's philosophy. The Australian Army is the foundation of the nation's land power. As part of the joint force, it promotes and protects Australia's interests, deters threats to Australia's sovereignty and, if necessary, defeats them. These requirements inform **Army's concept of land power**. They also reinforce **Army's culture**, which has been shaped by the lessons of history and the contemporary environment. Understanding the concept of land power and culture within the Australian Army places in context the key tasks that government has entrusted to Army – **Army strategic tasks**. Only credible Australian land power will be capable of executing these enduring tasks that support the Australian Defence Force's purpose: securing Australia and its national interests.

## The Australian Army's concept of land power

Australia's approach to land power resides within a larger approach to using military and national power. Only land power can provide persistent influence on land to shape intentions, deny threat access to resources, protect populations and build the capacity of indigenous security forces. Although land power is more than the Army, within Australia's maritime strategy it is the Army that provides rapid and scalable land force options to government across the spectrum of operations. Australia's strategic culture over the last century has been to use:

*...expeditionary land power elements ...to achieve national political objectives. In Australia's case, because the Army has been drawn from a relatively small population base, land power has always been related not so much to size and mass but to quality and the employment of limited military forces to achieve disproportionate strategic effects for political ends.*<sup>13</sup>

This highlights how Australia uses land power to reinforce its use of the instruments of National Power:<sup>14</sup> diplomatic, information, military and economic. It also demonstrates the **utility of land power**, and its **human dimensions**.

#### Strategic deterrence

The strategic actions taken to persuade '...an adversary not to take actions that it might otherwise have done'. This includes the positive effect of influence and the negative effect of operational deterrence.

*Colin S. Gray*<sup>15</sup>

#### Utility of land power.

The employment of land forces in peace, crisis and war illustrates the inherent utility of land power. It offers government scalable and responsive options across the conflict spectrum: tensions in times of peace (such as economic rivalries, diplomatic

friction and ideological differences); deterring aggression; peacekeeping; and up to fighting in joint and coalition operations. Army's responsibilities include promoting and shaping the international security environment, and responding to crises that are not strictly defined as war – such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These actions provide weight to Australia's strategic and diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, many nations in the world remain predominately land powers. Their perception of another nation's land power can shape and influence their intents and actions. This forms strategic deterrence, reducing the likelihood of future threats. If a threat or crisis does arise, land power provides flexibility for responses.

#### Strategic response

This is the ability to conduct rapid reaction to crisis or threat developments.

Land power offers operational and strategic flexibility by providing the Government with the means to respond to changing circumstances. Land power

is supported by, and supports, the other elements of national power. Furthermore, credible land power can operate across the entire land domain – including the electromagnetic spectrum – while also being able to influence the air, sea, space and cyber domains. Within this context,

land power, through the actions of the Australian Army, provides persistent control and sustained influence on or from the land in conditions of peace, crisis and conflict. While land power consists of more than the Army, it is the Army alone that represents the portion of Australia's national effort capable of undertaking close combat on the land, as well as a wide range of non-combat tasks on Australian territory and abroad. Because of this, Australia's land power provides **strategic response**. To achieve these strategic effects, land power requires a strong human dimension.

**Human dimension of Australian land power.** Although land power is made up of the national elements of economy, people, national will and force elements, the human dimension of many of these components form the foundation of land power. Armies depend on the abilities of professional, innovative, adaptable individuals who can react quickly to changing conditions. Such soldiers must be high quality people; moulded by training, education and discipline into cohesive teams with high morale (*esprit de corps*) and the will to win. The human dimension adds to land power's utility, especially in missions that require close human interaction. The Australian Army relies on a large reservoir of human talent. As a result of the increasing average age of Australia's population, tapping this reservoir of human talent, particularly the young, physically fit, individuals who form the core of the land force, will become an increasingly difficult task. Army's culture guides the organisation and the individual in achieving the tasks.

## Australian Army culture

The Australian Army was formed on 1 March 1901, when the Commonwealth of Australia assumed control of the former colonial military forces. Since its formation, the Army's culture has evolved as the nature of Australia's engagement with the wider world has developed. Originally dominated by militia and volunteer forces – permanent forces in 1901 comprised only 1500 of the 28 500 members of the Army – its volunteer nature has in large part been a central characteristic of the Australian Army. But this only provides a partial understanding about the culture of the Army and its use of force in the 20th and early 21st centuries.<sup>16</sup>

Strategic culture is the context that surrounds and gives meaning to strategic behaviour and this behaviour is affected by culturally shaped people, organisations, procedures and weapons. Understanding strategic

culture may provide an improved capacity for understanding enduring motivations for institutions, as well as understand the meaning of why that institution might act as it does.

Therefore, in proposing the doctrine of how and why the Army fights, it is important to understand the culture and motivations of the Army. The culture of the Army pervades its members and organisations; the soldiers of the Australian Army carry this culture with them to the battlefield. By understanding the elements of the culture of the Army, and how they interact, we can understand how it influences our warfighting philosophy and how it may even enable comparative advantage for Australian land forces deployed on operations.

**An expeditionary culture.** On its founding in 1901, the Australian Army had forces deployed in South Africa in support of the British during the Boer War. This external focus of the Army has been an enduring theme in how it operates, and with the exception of a brief period in the 1980s and 1990s, the Army's doctrine and organisation has largely been oriented on its deployment beyond Australia's shores to fight in support of Australian interests, rather than Australian territory. Whether it has been contributions to major wars – such as the First and Second World Wars, more regional conflicts such as the Korean, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, or stabilisation and peace keeping in the Asia Pacific and Africa, these commitments have seen the development of a strong, expeditionary culture. This has often gone hand-in-hand with a second element of Army culture – its predisposition to working within alliance and coalition frameworks.

**A coalition culture.** Coalitions and alliances are voluntary groupings of nations that are based upon a commonality of objectives and a respect for each member's independence and self-interests. The Army's first expedition, the Boer War, took place within an Imperial framework in support of British forces. This has been an enduring theme in the employment of the Australian Army. While this has been driven to a large degree by the small size of the Australian Army, it is also a function of the shared values of Australia and many of the nations with which it has partnered with in war. The interactions between the Australian Army and its coalition partners have also influenced the development of the Army.

**A training culture.** The importance of training, both individual and collective, is central to how the Army raises and sustains capability. Even during periods of low budgets and under-investment in modern equipment,

particularly in the post-Vietnam War era, the Army has sustained a focus on ensuring it maintains high standards in training, especially but not exclusively for individual training. This training culture has focussed on achieving excellence in three areas: individual and small team skills, leadership at all levels of command; and combined arms operations.<sup>17</sup> Historically, the Army has demonstrated that high standards of individual and collective training enable tactical organisations to prevail in the face of numerically superior or better equipped enemies, and until recently, the approach to training emphasised being able to achieve this. In the past decade, there has been a subtle shift whereby the Army no longer trains as the smaller Army in the fight, but is focussed on overcoming numerically smaller and less technically sophisticated enemies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the changes in the strategic environment described in the next chapter, this is unlikely to provide the best foundation for the future. As such, the training culture will need to readjust to ensure our Army is prepared to fight outnumbered and win in the future.

**A culture of austerity.** The Australian Army has been, since its inception, an Army that has been accustomed to austerity in resources, and this in turn has shaped its culture, how it organises and how it operates. It may be necessary for the Army to fight at the end of a long, expensive and vulnerable line of communication, backed by a support area with a limited defence industrial capacity. The practical difficulties of providing logistic support for military operations in Australia – and beyond has been a limiting factor on the structure and size of a force committed to operations, but also the combat weight of deployed forces. For most of its history, the Australian Army has deployed light formations, with only limited heavy or medium armour in support. This has shaped two other elements of Army culture: our tactical, small unit culture, and our practical, pragmatic approach.<sup>18</sup>

**Tactical, small unit culture.** The Australian Army has largely been characterised by tactical and small unit approaches for its entire history. While there have been limited instances of operational responsibility – the I Corps in 1918 and the 1st Australian Army in the Pacific Campaign – these were focussed on the orchestration of tactical effects. The small size of the regular Army since its creation in 1947 reinforced the tactical tradition with a self-image based on a motto that the land force mission is to ‘win the land battle’. While battle is indeed the greatest of all military tests, battle by itself is not the totality of what a modern Army might be called upon to perform.<sup>19</sup> Symptomatic of a small Army, it has also been driven

by the Army's coalition culture. As a junior partner, the influence on military strategy has been limited and therefore the Army has largely eschewed this role. Notwithstanding this tactical culture, the Army's tactical approach has almost exclusively been offensive in nature. The focus on patrolling, ambushing and minor infantry tactics on the Western Front, the North African Deserts, the South Pacific, Vietnam and in contemporary conflict has been a central theme in the tactical conduct of the Australian Army's operations. The 1985 edition of Army's capstone doctrine noted, the essence of soldiering is excellence at the execution of the tactical level of warfare.<sup>20</sup> This has dominated the Army's approach to war.

**Practical and pragmatic approach.** Army has traditionally embraced a practical and pragmatic culture that has reinforced its preference to embrace technological advances that enhance its tactical, small unit capabilities. Although in the past this has been achievable through both a technological edge and a practical approach to problems, the future environment will require intellectual investment to create a cognitive edge to achieve pragmatic outcomes that serve Australia's interests.

**Impact of culture.** These seven elements of Army culture do not exist in isolation. They have developed over the past century and interact to influence the Army's view of itself, war fighting and how to influence and win in a war. *Nor are these elements of Army culture unique to the Australian Army.* All Western armies possess them to some degree, but accord each different weight depending on the historical experiences of individual nations. Further, Army culture must not be viewed as monolithic; it is a subset of still developing larger Defence culture.<sup>21</sup> Despite this, there are discernable elements of Army Culture. Knowing who or what the Australian Army is, is essential to developing ways of improving effectiveness within the Army.<sup>22</sup> The interaction of these, Army's historical experiences, as well as geography, the expectations of national culture and Government national security policy, have also shaped the Army's contemporary view of the employment of land power.

## Army strategic tasks

Army's strategic tasks nest within the Defence principal tasks and forms Army's contribution to National Defence. The strategic effects of strategic deterrence and strategic response influence these tasks. These tasks may be conducted in isolation, concurrently or sequentially. The three strategic tasks are: the shaping of Australia's strategic environment; denying and defeating threats to Australia's interests; and protecting and supporting Australian and foreign civil populations.

**Shaping Australia's strategic environment.** Army contributes to the security of allies and other partners by providing training and materiel assistance. By participating in exercises, exchange programs and cooperative research, Army helps to develop and strengthen alliances and prospective coalitions. This also promotes democratic institutions and general stability in the countries with which Army engages. Specific activities include providing training and advice, participating in exercises and exchange programs, and developing interoperability with other forces to promote cordial relations and confidence-building measures between countries; helping to monitor and control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Asia-Pacific region, and more widely as necessary; and contributing to regional surveillance operations.

**Denying and defeating threats to Australia and its interests.**

While strategic shaping and conflict prevention are important, the Army's mission is to fight when prevention fails and to win this fight. This is Army's core business and Australian society expects the Army to achieve its mission – to win the land battle. The conduct of sustained close combat in combined arms teams is the Army's unique contribution to joint or coalition force with a whole-of-government approach to war.

**Protecting and supporting Australian and foreign civil populations.**

Land forces have a pre-eminent role in protecting and supporting civil populations. Army, as part of the Australian Defence Force, supports government objectives and the community at home and abroad. Army's support can extend from civil community support in disasters and emergencies; to assistance to the civil authorities with border protection, counter-terrorism and terror attack response; and up to evacuation of Australian and other nationals from hostile or crisis environments. Protecting and supporting populations may also include unilateral or multilateral missions with the United Nations, or other coalition partners.

These tasks reinforce how each conflict is different in its characteristics. Therefore, each deployment requires a unique, comprehensive and holistic plan to be executed for the specific circumstances of the operation. However, to prepare land forces for a wide range of contingencies – which align with the government's requirements – a generic framework of interdependent and mutually supporting efforts has been developed. For the Australian Army, there are five efforts. These efforts should be viewed as a way of thinking about Army's contribution to land power and not as distinct lines of operation or lines of effort to be applied as a template during military planning.

The five efforts are joint land combat, population protection, information dominance, population support and indigenous capacity building. **Joint land combat** are actions to secure the environment, remove organised resistance and set conditions for the other operations. Combined arms close combat is Army's fundamental contribution and mastery of close combat is the foundation of warfighting. **Population protection** provides protection and security to threatened populations to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order. **Information dominance** informs and shapes the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups, thereby shaping the information and cognitive dimensions of conflict. **Population support** establishes/ restores or temporarily replaces the necessary essential services in affected communities. **Indigenous capacity-building** nurtures the establishment of civilian governance which may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.

In deciding the combination of these efforts, the government will consider the national interests involved, the objectives sought, and the preferred way to affect an aggressor's and population's will. Land power is not the only, and often may not be the lead instrument, for dealing with national security problems. An interagency emphasis should permeate every level of warfare and command.



### **Land power is a versatile contributor to national security**

Land power is a highly versatile element of the nation's power that provides multiple options to its government's statecraft. These options are built on the scalable nature of the Australian Army's possible contributions, the ability to vary the level of violence it applies to suit the objectives sought, and the Army's ability to work closely with other elements of land, air and sea power. This versatility is enabled by the people who comprise the Australian Army. It's their ability to discriminate, innovate and adapt that provides the versatility inherent in land power, and allows the Army to perform a wide range of tasks that contribute to national security.

The Australian Army's preparation for war and combat starts with doctrine because this shapes subsequent decisions about equipment, training and organisational structure. It also infuses all soldiers with a particular mindset that aims to promote cohesion and combat success. The very top level of the Australian Army's thinking is referred to as its approach to warfare. The Army philosophy, and the specific historical, intellectual and contemporary influences that have shaped it in Australia, is the subject of the next chapter.



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## Chapter 3

# Army's approach to warfare

The Army's philosophy integrates our understanding of many influences, such as national character, the nature of conflict, the utility of land forces and the role in national military strategy. Our philosophy ensures that the Army has strategic utility and tactical superiority. It is also the amalgamation of its experiences in war since 1901, and incorporates military theory, historical experience and the contemporary influences on warfare that the Army anticipates may shape future conflict.

This chapter examines three aspects of the Army's approach to warfare: the **historical** and **intellectual** influences on the Army's approach to war, and **contemporary** influences on conduct of military operations. This analysis is followed by a statement of the Army's philosophy of warfare.

## Historical influences

The historical influences upon the Army's philosophy are intertwined in a complex relationship. These influences include factors relevant to all Australian endeavours, such as its geography, society, economy and national objectives. Also important to the Army are its unique operational experiences and organisational dynamics. Together, these influences shape how the Australian Army conceives its role in national security and how it organises and prepares itself to fight. As Chapter 2 shows, these same factors influence the Australian Army's culture as well.

The impact of Australia's geo-political situation as an island continent located far from its major allies has seen the Australian Army used primarily as an instrument to achieve political objectives overseas. This was the case for the First World War and Second World War, except for the operations involved in and around Papua New Guinea and Timor that were operations to defend Australia itself. After the 1940s, the Army continued to be involved in overseas operations, including the major war in Korea and protracted counter-insurgency operations in South-East Asia. This last experience was especially influential for the modern Army because it led Australian tactics, doctrine and methods to focus on small unit operations and individual skills.

After the withdrawal of its allies' forces from Asia in the early 1970s, Australian strategy became focused on defending continental Australia and its maritime approaches. This strategy had a particular significance for Army organisation and capability, which went through numerous changes and an overall contraction until the unexpected deployment to East Timor in 1999. This operation marked the start of another period of high-tempo and protracted operations for the Army, in theatres ranging from Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomon Islands to name only the major ones. During this most recent period, the Army was required to sustain numerous contingents in very different overseas operations, and to operate in combat and peacekeeping situations of different scale, intensity and duration. These operations have displayed the need for a philosophy that encourages an adaptive mindset and the ability for different force elements to combine to achieve missions.

For most of its history, the Australian Army has drawn upon a small, Westernised and technologically advanced society to achieve national objectives in coalition with others. This has usually led the Australian Army to place a high priority upon an ability to work with others and, more recently, to lead operations close to home.

The Australian Army also started with a strong tradition of part-time soldiering, first as militias and later as a force enlisted only for the duration of a particular conflict. The demands of regional operations in the 1950s and 1960s changed this, and led to the growth of a professional army with full-time and part-time components. This organisational shift led the Australian Army to see itself as a force that can use sophisticated command techniques that encourage individual initiative and teamwork.

The Army has, except for two periods, also been an all-volunteer force. This was the case for its early trials during the First World War, which lent a particular credo to the Australian soldier based on notions of egalitarianism, mateship and innovation. Today, it results in an Army that expects of all its members to maintain high standards of personal discipline, a commitment to the profession of arms, and an ability to act according to shared values.

## Intellectual influences

Like the historical influences, the intellectual influences upon the Australian Army come from the analysis of overseas wars and operations, differing strategic demands over time, classical military theory, and the theoretical and doctrinal developments of its principal allies, Britain and the United States. These influences have, particularly since the 1970s, been adapted for Australian conditions by Australian thinkers and practitioners. However, the Australian Army today still looks outward to ensure its doctrine remains relevant and cognisant of major international developments and trends.

The Australian Army followed the doctrine of its British counterpart after its founding in 1901. This was a natural consequence of our colonial history, a strong influence of British military organisation and traditions on Australia's Army, and the significantly more mature doctrinal infrastructure present in Britain. As a result, their theorists and journals led Australian thinking in these early days. That the Army was commanded by officers from the British Army, or who had served with British units (often in India) reinforced this doctrinal alignment.

The demands of the Pacific War and the Japanese threat drove a more indigenous approach to military doctrine. While largely tactical in focus, the transition from defensive operations to offensive operations in the second half of 1943 saw doctrinal innovation, based on Australian experience and operational imperatives, enshrined in the *Army Training Memorandum*. These publications covered developments in tactics and techniques and modern methods of training to prepare Australian forces for jungle fighting and the array of amphibious operations it conducted between 1943 and 1945.

In the post war period, the Army largely neglected indigenous doctrine development and oscillated between British practice and US doctrinal innovations such as the Pentomic organisation. Still, there was an ongoing

need to interpret Army's role in national strategy. This occurred in the *Australian Army Journal* (1948-76), where the key debate focused on the continental versus forward defence strategies for Australia.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Army grappled again with the task of developing an indigenous military doctrine, this time for defending continental Australia. By the mid-1990s, the Army succeeded in developing coherent doctrine for land operations in northern Australia. However events in the post-Cold War era and new government policy forced the Army to move away from its continental focus towards adopting new doctrine to support a maritime concept of strategy.<sup>23</sup>

The development of manoeuvre warfare concepts in the United States Army and Marine Corps during the 1980s and 1990s was mirrored in Australia, with the 1998 edition of this publication being the first to use these concepts as a basis for Army's philosophy. This change was accompanied by an emphasis on operational art, and the proposal of an 'operational level' that links strategy and tactics.

In line with the influences on doctrine in the United States, the Australian Army has also been influenced by a rediscovery of classical strategists who explained the role of land power. Modern day military thinking has been heavily influenced by the works of two generals: Carl von Clausewitz<sup>24</sup> and Antoine-Henri Jomini.<sup>25</sup> Although they opposed each other – in war and theory – their writings form the foundation of modern military art and science, informing the works of other important theorists: Moltke the Elder, Julian Corbett, Basil Liddell-Hart and William Lind.<sup>26</sup> It is Clausewitz, in his work *On War* who first documented the enduring nature of war in the modern age, without specific reference to belligerents or technology. His theory remains relevant for today and into the future, and is driven by the political objectives of the actors involved.

## Contemporary influences

The operating environment for land forces is not limited to the physical environment. **Globalisation, urbanisation, technological change, a non-contiguous battle space, integration and domestic security** all distinguish today's operating environment from previous battlefields and theatres of war.

**Globalisation** has resulted in a close interconnection between global, regional and national economic and security issues. Strategically, it has led to a trend towards convergence of national and collective security amongst nation-states. In a globalised strategic environment, seemingly localised threats can distort the complex workings of the global economy and lead to preventive military intervention by elements of the international community. Some people regard globalisation as Westernisation: a means by which post-industrial states obtain and maintain power over the rest of the globe.

Population growth in the 20th and 21st centuries has contributed to the **urbanisation** of littoral regions worldwide, increasing the numbers of non-combatants in the area of operations and adding significantly to the complexity of military operations. For the first time in history the world has become more urban than rural. Massive migration to cities, both internal and transnational, will precipitate an increase in growth in urban populations and spatial concentrations. These population increases, uncontrolled industrial development and unsustainable resource usage are stressing vital ecosystems. Shortages of clean water, reduced food production and increased pollution have the potential to cause conflict between those who benefit from resource exploitation and those who are forced to live in degraded environments. For the land force, operating in urban terrain will no longer be a discretionary activity as this is likely to be the environment in which most future military operations occur.

Constantly **evolving technology** continues to shape military operations. Improvements in connectivity, automation, weapon range, accuracy and lethality, and the effectiveness of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems provide the means for integrated combined arms teams to operate distributed throughout complex terrain. Global telecommunications networks coupled with omnipresent communications technology will continue to empower non-state and semi-state actors. The effect will be disproportionate to their size and stature and allow the

formation of supra-national organisations within the cyber domain. During military operations, the domains of land, sea, air, cyber, and space are becoming more interconnected.

**A non-contiguous battle space.** The concept of a single battle space has become less relevant; it is more useful to describe a force's 'operating environment' within which there may be one or more mission spaces. Even in combat against a conventional enemy, the consequences of the conflict environment create a series of 'mini-battles' between individuals or small, semi-autonomous teams. The geographical space between these battle spaces is not empty; it contains non-combatants and uncommitted potential combatants, as well as major infrastructure for population support. The reality of the non-contiguous battle space means that activities conducted in what were traditionally perceived as relatively secure areas now take place where contact with the enemy is likely. Forces need to be prepared for unexpected contact and to exploit joint integration to facilitate mutual support.

**Integration.** Success requires a high level of cooperation and integration between the Services, coalition partners, and other government agencies, non-government and international bodies. The level of integration between these different organisations, from the lowest tactical level to the highest strategic level, is developed to a state of interdependence through the increased connectivity available to a networked force. Integration seeks to achieve combined arms outcomes by bringing together combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements from the three Services and other agencies. Combined arms teams are formed in response to a specific combination of task, terrain and threat. If they involve joint forces, they are referred to as joint task forces, and where they draw on other agencies, they form joint interagency task forces. When operations are conducted in a coalition environment, all these levels can involve combined forces.

**Domestic security.** Domestic security operations cannot be separated from the conduct of operations offshore. The increased reach of enemies allows them to attack targets directly in the homeland in order to offset the physical strength of our forces in a tactical battle elsewhere. Domestic security involves not only protection of militarily important targets but also actions to deny the enemy the ability to strike civilian targets.



## Army's philosophy

Army's philosophy has been shaped by historical and contemporary influences. It integrates understanding of the influences of national character, the nature of war, the utility of land power and its role in national military strategy, within a whole-of-government and coalition environment. This philosophy ensures land power's strategic utility, operational adaptability and tactical superiority as an expeditionary capability within the Australian maritime strategy. To achieve this, the Army has embraced manoeuvre theory that uses physical means to achieve psychological ends to meet the political and strategic objective.

### Manoeuvre theory

Army's concept of manoeuvre occurs within and across the physical, information and cognitive dimensions. Manoeuvre is a way of thinking about warfare rather than the application of a particular set of tactics or techniques. Its essence lies in defeating the enemy's will to fight by 'destroying' the enemy's plan rather than destroying his forces. In its most kinetic form, manoeuvre seeks to shatter the enemy's moral and physical cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated across multiple lines of operation to a single purpose, creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. In this context, manoeuvre is used to create an expectation of defeat in the enemy's mind.

Manoeuvre focuses commanders at every level on exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strengths and protecting friendly vulnerabilities. It emphasises the centrality of the human element in warfare including leadership, organisation, cohesion and morale. Manoeuvre draws its power primarily from opportunism — taking calculated risks and the exploitation of chance circumstances and of forced and unforced errors.

But success will also be influenced by actions beyond those focussed on the enemy. The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a decisive element of warfare. Dealing with this requires a combination of integrity in the conduct of military operations; careful, honest and proactive engagement with the media; adherence to the law of armed conflict; and the sparing use of force with the greatest possible discrimination. It also requires the means to explain our actions to both local populations and a wider audience. As land force actions support political objectives, manoeuvre seeks to combine the use or threat of lethal force with precise non-lethal force to manage perceptions.

Physical actions are informed and guided by informational objectives. The orchestration of physical and non-physical actions and the avoidance of dissonant messages are the basis of effective perception management. The pervasiveness of the media, combined with the effects of globalisation and technology, has resulted in the media being a major contributor to public opinion. The contest for each side to be the first to tell their story is becoming more influential in the final outcome of conflict. Influencing public information and winning the perception battle, therefore, underpins military operations and is an essential prerequisite for the successful application of manoeuvre.

Contemporary operations will require land forces to fight for, and not necessarily with, information. As a consequence, situational understanding will flow from physical interaction with the problem rather than from remote analysis. The ability to generate actionable intelligence and update the shared common operating picture across the land force is central to successful operations. Decision superiority depends on generating actionable intelligence and updating the shared common operating picture while protecting friendly information.

Manoeuvre accepts war as a competition between opposing wills, framed in time and understanding, rather than by physical position alone. It relies on the ability to change physical and non-physical circumstances more rapidly than the enemy can adapt. Manoeuvre seeks to understand how the enemy's strengths can be undermined. While it attempts to achieve the economic application of force, it accepts that combined arms close combat is a central and enduring feature of land warfare and is required to create discrete physical destruction on an enemy that generates a greater cognitive effect, thereby reducing an enemy's will to fight. Manoeuvre occurs at all levels of command.

**Strategic manoeuvre.** Strategic manoeuvre is the coordinated application of the instruments of national power, directly or indirectly, in pursuit of national strategic objectives, and seeks to prevent or contain conflict. The employment of the military element of national power requires strategic manoeuvre to ensure that favourable circumstances are achieved. Strategic manoeuvre was particularly effective in the INTERFET operation of 1999 in which Australian and coalition forces were deployed to establish conditions to allow subsequent achievement of national and international political objectives in East Timor.

**Operational manoeuvre.** Operational manoeuvre prepares and postures forces in favourable situations to directly, or indirectly, achieve military strategic objectives within a campaign. It involves the assignment of forces and the design, organisation and conduct of major operations. Operational manoeuvre sets the conditions to allow tactical commanders to achieve mission success. It was used to great effect in the Australian capture of Lae in the Second World War. Operational manoeuvre was used to dislocate the Japanese forces in Papua New Guinea by splitting the forces on the northern coast while disrupting the Japanese command and control system at Lae.

**Tactical manoeuvre.** Tactical manoeuvre aims to win engagements and battles by placing forces in a position of relative advantage to the enemy, thereby contributing to the achievement of campaign objectives. The purpose of tactical manoeuvre is to destroy the enemy's cohesion and so cause his capitulation with the coordinated use of speed, shock action and lethal and non-lethal force. Sometimes tactical manoeuvre may have limited objectives, its purpose to reinforce the potential dislocation or disruption achieved through operational manoeuvre. Under other circumstances, tactical actions may directly achieve military strategic or national strategic objectives.

### **Defeating the enemy's will to fight**

The physical destruction of military capability – killing the enemy – and the support infrastructure on which it depends is not the only path to the destruction of an enemy's will. Effects that obscure the real situation, interfere with rational decision-making or raise stress to intolerable levels can also attack the will to fight by sapping intellectual, moral and physical energies. This is known as manoeuvre.

The primary objective of manoeuvre is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. To this end a commander will apply available means to produce effects that in turn create an expectation of defeat in an enemy's mind. Means will be physical (fire and movement) and non-physical (such as information operations); in both cases the aim will be to exploit surprise and create a sense of shock.

Perception management contributes to defeating the enemy's will by purposefully manipulating human perceptions to obscure the real situation from the enemy, and clarify that situation for the friendly force. In the context of the manoeuvrist approach, perception management is the key to defeating the will to fight. The object is always to affect the way an enemy

perceives his situation with a view to convincing him of the futility of further resistance, to take actions contrary to his interests, or to reassess the cost of action that sustains his will to fight.

### **The application of manoeuvre**

The successful application of manoeuvre is underpinned by the principles of war. In addition, it possesses the following attributes: **focus of all actions on the centre of gravity, combined arms teams, orchestration and mission command**. Further detail of the application of manoeuvre is contained within *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0 Operations*.

**Focus of all actions on the centre of gravity.** The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. At the tactical level, the centre of gravity will often change as the mission progresses and will frequently be determined by the interaction of enemy and friendly intentions.<sup>27</sup> The approaches to defeating the enemy's centre of gravity are described as dislocation, disruption and destruction.

**Combined arms teams.** A combined arms team is a case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements tailored to a specific combination of mission, threat and terrain.<sup>28</sup> Increasingly this will include joint and inter-agency components. Each team aims to cover the vulnerability of one part of the force with the strength of another. It also presents a dilemma for an enemy by triggering actions to protect against one threat that increase vulnerability to another. Flexible, modular combined arms teams are the basis of the versatility, adaptability and agility that enable success in contemporary conflict.

The ability to conduct combined arms operations and successfully execute close combat is imperative to the application of manoeuvre. These are the product of an ethos and a training regime that emphasise the importance of the fighting soldier, a willingness to endure hardship, to apply force appropriately and an ability to function as part of a team in lethal circumstances. Army's ethos, coupled with intellectual, moral and physical exertion, provides the foundation for its soldiers to engage in combined arms close combat.

**Orchestration.** Orchestration is the arrangement of physical and non-physical actions to ensure their unified contribution to the mission. Orchestration requires a high level of cooperation within combined arms teams and is achieved through the disciplined application of accurate and discriminating fire, timely use of information actions, and effective integration with interagency elements. When lethal force is applied, it must occur with speed, surprise, aggression and discrimination. Orchestration necessarily involves the coordination of interagency elements. Effective orchestration enables simultaneity – concurrent action throughout the mission space. Simultaneity, if achieved, will potentially overwhelm the decision-making capacity of the enemy and collapse the adversary decision cycle.

**Mission command.** Mission command is the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved. Through this process, a commander grants his subordinate the freedom and duty to accomplish the mission. Effective mission command encourages initiative with the added benefit of allowing commanders to focus on higher level concerns rather than subordinate mission execution. The effective practise of mission command is essential to deal successfully with the chance, friction and uncertainty of conflict. Mission command allows faster, more relevant decision-making in complex, volatile environments, but also relies more heavily on individual judgement and tactical exertion. It is based on the clear expression of the senior commander's intent and the granting of trust and freedom to subordinates to act creatively within that intent.

Mission command must be endorsed and practised at all levels in order to be effective. This requires implicit trust between and across all elements of the land force, with junior leaders possessing a detailed understanding not only of the immediate tactical commander's intent, but also of the broader operational and strategic situation. The subordinate is then expected to apply individual judgement in achieving the commander's intent, regardless of changing situations. Junior leaders are also expected to seek opportunities to immediately pursue their commander's intent once tasked and resourced. Army must actively create the climate and foster behaviour that produces a mission command culture.

## **A philosophy to guide the Army**

The Australian Army has adopted a manoeuvrist approach to warfare. This philosophy is relevant across all levels of command, and is consistent with Australia's joint warfare concepts. Army's philosophy has the strength of being simple: it seeks to exploit the enemy's cognitive, information and physical weaknesses. Its focus on mission command and combined arms teams in particular and it aims to make the best use of our key advantage: our professional and dedicated people.

This approach to warfare has been developed over the past two decades, and is always being refined. Still, it is firmly grounded in the operational experience, organisational strength, and intellectual heritage that the Army has built over the past century. This philosophy provides a guide to how the Army will make its contribution to Australia's land power. However, the Army will be unable to contribute to Australia's land power without units that are prepared for close combat. How the Army generates its contribution to land power now, and intends to keep its contribution relevant for the future, is the subject of the next chapter.

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## Chapter 4

### Generating land power

As the foundation of Australia's land power, the Army must be able to generate credible and sustainable land effects. Only through persistence is it possible to control and influence the land domain, and its population, in the future operating environment. However, Australia's limited size will always mean its Army is a small force: capable of Brigade and lower manoeuvre, and predominately a meaningful contributor to coalitions. It is through quality and technology that the Army achieves its weight, and thereby provides relevant options to Government.

The Army is a *Medium-Weight force*:<sup>29</sup> a credible tactical force that projects across strategic distances to achieve national objectives. To generate this force, its structural flexibility not only includes organisational changes and structures, but also the fighting power of the Army – or Army's capacity to fight and win. The process of generating and sustaining these forces is 'capability management' and requires the balancing of current force requirements (preparedness) with future force development (modernisation) to produce strategically relevant and combat-ready forces.

The core role of Army remains the ability to engage in combat, as part of a joint force, against other armed forces. However, there is a dichotomy in this development of capability, particularly with force structure. The Army must be able to generate capabilities for 'the most likely but less dangerous' as well as 'the most dangerous and less likely' forms of war and conflict. While the Army is highly likely to be called upon to undertake stability operations, it would be premature to suggest that war among states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system.

## Fighting power

As a concept, fighting power is the way in which Army generates its capacity through the integration of the **physical**, **moral** and **intellectual** components at both the individual and organisational level. The intellectual component provides the knowledge of war, warfare and cognitive capability – the ‘what to think’. The moral component reinforces culture, values and legitimacy – the will to fight. The physical component provides Army’s capabilities and functional effects – the means to fight. When all three components interact, Army’s capacity to operate in the future environment will be strengthened.

### The intellectual component

The intellectual component is the way in which knowledge, creativity and analytical ability are applied to meet military challenges. Past success in battle is no guarantee of future victory, and Army’s way of fighting must be subject to constant scrutiny and examination. The intellectual component of fighting power provides the level of understanding necessary for success in the complex battle space and is supported by an organisational climate that enables creativity and innovation, analytical excellence and continuous learning. Army’s organisational climate is predicated on its versatility, agility and adaptability to enable the innovation essential to success.

**Versatility** is the ability to perform a wide array of tasks and activities.

This begins with the individual who must possess many skills, at high readiness levels and to mission proficiency. The skills of the individual are further amplified by complementary and supporting group skills. This enables generation of a wide range of high quality, operational options.

**Agility** is the ability to shift between tasks rapidly. This requires both physical and mental dexterity and begins with the individual soldier. Personnel must be sufficiently physically and mentally tough to analyse problems rapidly, often under great stress, to produce solutions that are realistic and achievable as well as unexpected and unpredictable. These attributes must also be institutionalised within a command structure.

**Adaptability** is the ability to respond to new needs or changes in context without a loss of functionality. This is essential given the inability to predict and anticipate the full range and nature of operational threats. Adaptability is a product of the human component of an organisation – the capacity and willingness to innovate and change to solve a new complex problem or execute an unexpected mission.



A key element in developing the intellectual component of fighting power is a robust approach to professional military education. This is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders. The responsibility for implementing professional military education in the Army is three-tiered: It resides with the education establishment – the Army and joint schools – as well as with commanders and individuals. All professional schools should focus on developing the talent for military judgment through education. All leaders and commanders have a responsibility to undertake continuing professional education programs for their subordinates, which include developing military judgment and decision making. Every soldier has an individual responsibility to study the profession of arms. A soldier without either interest in, or knowledge of, the history and theory of warfare – the intellectual content of the military profession – is a soldier in appearance only. Self-directed study in the art and science of war, appropriate to one's rank and trade, is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical condition and should receive at least equal time.

As Army learns, its doctrine must constantly evolve as it is the repository of the Army's institutional knowledge.<sup>30</sup> Success in the competitive learning environment of conflict requires rapid consolidation of new knowledge and experience into doctrine, training and education, and institutional governance as appropriate. This requires all soldiers to contribute to and interact with Army's knowledge base.

### **The physical component**

The physical component of fighting power provides the means to fight. Army describes its physical warfighting capabilities by function, represented by four land force elements. These are:

- a. **Combat.** Combat elements are those land force elements designed to engage the enemy with direct fire weapons. Combat elements include armour, infantry, special forces and aviation.
- b. **Combat support.** Combat support elements provide offensive support and operational assistance to combat elements. Combat support elements include offensive support, ground-based air defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, electronic warfare elements, combat engineers and battlefield support aviation.

- c. **Combat service support.** Combat service support elements support the land force through the provision of sustainment, movement, distribution, health services, personnel services and equipment maintenance activities.
- d. **Command support.** Command support elements enable commanders to execute their command responsibilities, exercise control and provide specialist advice. They include headquarters staff, communication and information systems capabilities, public affairs and civil-military cooperation and military policing.

While all land force elements share similar roles, they may deliver the required effects differently. For example aviation, armour and infantry land force elements specialise in aerial, mounted and dismounted combat respectively but collectively share the primary role of combat. Likewise transport, ordnance, maintenance and health share a common combat support role, but perform different aspects of this role. Therefore while each of the land force elements fulfils separate roles and has different responsibilities, each has varying strengths and weaknesses. Consequently the land force elements are interdependent and a combination of arms and enabling elements will be present, to a greater or lesser extent, in any land force contribution. This combined arms approach is fundamental to generating warfighting capability.

### **The moral component**

Army's will to fight is provided primarily by the moral component of fighting power and supplies and sustains the will to fight. The moral component embodies those individual and organisational characteristics that are fundamental to success — **morale, integrity, values, and legitimacy**. Conflict requires soldiers to act in the face of mortal peril which demands mental toughness and determination, measured by physical and moral courage.

**Morale** is the collective and individual confidence in an organisation that encourages individuals to subordinate their own welfare to collective goals. It is closely related to their shared sense of purpose and values (*esprit de corps*) which is supported by spiritual, rational and material foundations. Morale requires trust between the individual and the organisation and between individuals in the organisation. High morale sustains individual and collective will in the face of adversity, and is thus fundamental to the generation of fighting power.

Morale is significantly enhanced by success. The rational foundations of morale reflect the importance of reason. Soldiers should be confident that they have been well prepared for operations. They must be given tasks that are meaningful and provide scope for professional development. Commanders and their staff must acknowledge that their effectiveness is ultimately based on the confidence and respect of their soldiers. Morale is nourished by sound leadership, effective communication and by meeting the emotional and material needs of individual soldiers and their families to the maximum extent practicable.

**Integrity** is essential to soldiering and sustaining the will to fight but assumes moral courage. Together with mental toughness, which enables soldiers to overcome physical fatigue, danger, and peer and other pressures, integrity supports soldiers in making morally right decisions. Successful military operations demand integrity and moral courage at all levels.

The importance of a soldier's moral character cannot be overstated in terms of developing and sustaining fighting power. This moral character is sustained through the individual's system of beliefs and values. A shared sense of purpose provides the framework for the application of Army's **values** of courage, initiative, respect and teamwork.

- a. **Courage.** Every Australian soldier is expected to demonstrate physical and moral courage. To be courageous in the Army is to believe in the mission, Army's goals and one's mates, and involves doing what is right and fair in all circumstances and under the most demanding conditions.
- b. **Initiative.** Every Australian soldier is expected to show initiative whenever required and to be committed to continuous learning and self-development. Initiative is fundamental to professional mastery and essential to the effective practise of mission command.
- c. **Respect** is the glue that binds the other three values together. It is the quality which will both temper and sharpen the hard edge that must be a part of military service in order to survive and prevail in war. Furthermore, the Australian nation must trust the standing army to respect the law of the land and be capable of restraint and prudence in the use of appropriate and sanctioned violence. Respect also extends to those whom Army is entrusted to protect and support when deployed overseas.

- d. **Teamwork.** The Australian Army is a team of teams in which all soldiers are expected to be able to rely on their mates. Without a team a soldier is just another person. Robust, cohesive teams are the personnel building blocks of Army's capability.

**Legitimacy** refers to perceptions of justice, legality and morality as they apply to military operations and related actions. At the highest level, legitimacy finds expression in Australia using force only under defined circumstances and in a strictly controlled manner which reflects Australia's approach to war. More broadly, such legitimacy is expressed in the terms of international conventions covering the resort to, and the use of, military force including a substantial body of law embodying 'just war' doctrine.<sup>31</sup> Legitimacy also flows directly through to the lowest levels when expressed in rules of engagement and orders for opening fire.

## Professional mastery

The profession of arms is unique because of the importance of its task, the moral and ethical dedication required to achieve it, and the lethal nature of its capabilities. Soldiers have many tasks outside combat operations but, ultimately, the core purpose and reason the Army exists is to protect the nation through the application of lethal force. If required, soldiers kill – and may die – to achieve the mission. The moral implications could not be greater and thus they are compelled to dedicate themselves to a constant re-examination of what it means to be a professional soldier.

Professional mastery binds the intellectual and moral components of fighting power and is critical to generating fighting power and thus warfighting capability. The focus of professional mastery is on people: every soldier must adapt given the changing character of war. Professional mastery is the mechanism by which Army can produce soldiers and teams that respond positively to change, especially when confronted with problems, challenges and ambiguous contexts.<sup>32</sup> Professional mastery assists soldiers to exert themselves physically, morally and intellectually to overcome fear, confusion, fatigue and uncertainty. It also guides behaviour through an understanding of the consequences of actions or inactions and is the foundation of military discipline.

The Australian Army is committed to the profession of arms. Its members are experts trained in the ethical application of land combat power. A professional soldier is an expert in the profession of arms. These men and women adhere to the highest ethical standards and are dedicated to the service of the nation.

## Army capability management

Capability management represents a balance between devoting resources to preparing the current force and the development of the future Army. Army's capability is developed to provide the government with a range of options to support the national interest. These options are based on strategic guidance, which is reviewed by the government and Defence on a regular basis. Army must be relevant, credible and cost-effective. To achieve this, it employs a capability management framework that is based on the Army capability sub-outputs model and the key functions of capability.

The outputs of the Army are the **deployed force, the force reserve, the enabling component and the support base**. The deployed force contains the Army elements that are deployed. Strategic guidance determines the size and composition of the deployed force. The force reserve provides an expansion and sustainability base for the deployed force through individual reinforcement, individual replacement, force element rotation and equipment cross-levelling. The **enabling component** includes individual training and base logistic support elements from Army and the wider Defence organisation. It provides the support required to expand and sustain the deployed force and the combat force reserve, as well as the means to generate new capabilities. Army is heavily dependent on the support received from its national and international **support bases**. The national support base includes all government departments, agencies and industry that provide support to the Army, such as infrastructure, materiel and logistics.

## Preparedness

Army is required to maintain a level of preparedness in accordance with the Joint Operations Command Operational Preparedness Requirements. Army translates this requirement in the annual Chief of Army Preparedness Directive. Selected land force capabilities are held at varying levels of preparedness described by the terms 'operational level of capability' and 'minimum level of capability'. A directed level of capability captures the levels of capability required to meet preparedness, ongoing operations and known national task requirements.<sup>33</sup> The levels of operational capability are determined by a combination of the requirements for short and longer notice operations, and the need for critical individual and collective skills.

## Modernisation

An army that resists change and does not follow the path of continuous modernisation will fail in its mission. The Australian Army thus prepares to meet future operational needs balanced against the requirements of current operational commitments. The anticipation of future needs must be cognisant of the time required to introduce capabilities and the length of time for which they are expected to be in service. This requires a continuous modernisation process, which provides the intellectual investment by Army in its future effectiveness.

To meet this challenge, Army has embraced strategy-driven, concept-led, capability-based modernisation. This approach utilises warfighting concepts to investigate and describe future operating environments and to guide the development of military capabilities within the context of endorsed strategic guidance.<sup>34</sup> This optimises Army's capability by planning for the future and also responding rapidly to operational requirements as soon as they are identified. By anticipating Army's needs as far into the future as possible, and seeking to meet those needs as soon as practicable, the process of modernisation can be incremental and continuous.

A strategic approach to modernisation enables Army to meet the challenge of developing optimal capabilities and effectively introducing them into service in a constantly changing environment by setting objectives and ensuring alignment within Army, between Army and the other services, Defence groups, agencies, external organisations, allies and partners that are key stakeholders in Army's modernisation efforts.

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## Conclusion

While political and technological developments change the character of land warfare, its nature, as a violent clash of wills, remains unchanged. In the land environment, Army is the primary source of Australian land power. Historically, conflict has primarily been decided on land and neither air nor naval power alone can achieve victory on land. Consequently, land forces and their capacity to influence people will continue to play a central role in Australian statecraft and its employment of military power. Although times and technologies have changed, the fundamental mission of the Australian Army endures; it is to win the land battle in order to defeat our enemies and safeguard the interests of the nation and the lives of our people. To be successful in this mission the Army must continue to achieve military relevance in an increasingly complex and lethal global environment.

War fighting is employed in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to protect Australia's sovereignty and national interests. The effective employment of these instruments is dependent on a whole-of-government approach. Army's role in warfare is to generate land force elements which fight as combined arms teams within a joint force to generate land power. Army contributes these forces to shape Australia's strategic environment, defeat threat forces and to protect or support civil populations. Army's contribution is unique and central to Australia's warfighting ability.

Army's warfighting philosophy underpins the Australian approach to the use of land power as part of the joint maritime strategy. Evolved in part from the historical principles of war, the philosophy recognises the innately human nature of war and embraces the essential function of

mission command and close combat in the application of manoeuvre by combined arms teams. Army's doctrine must remain a firm foundation upon which Army can educate and train its officers and soldiers, particularly in peacetime. As such, this capstone doctrine – *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power* – serves the Australian Army as a statement of its approach to land warfare. It has described our fundamental philosophy for the employment of land power based on the broad lessons of military history and human experience. It is an enduring and universal document independent of any specific organisation or structure, any level or type of technology, or any particular type or intensity of warfare. It has codified what the Australian Army regards as its philosophical foundation and provides the intellectual foundation for the generation of land power.



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## Endnotes

- 1 This is a construct examined in Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. 2nd Revised ed. New York, USA: The Free Press, 2011.
- 2 **Land Power** is defined as: *The ability to project force in and from land in peace, crisis and war to achieve strategic and operational objectives.*
- 3 **Expansion Point:** Although the idea of limited and total objectives can be seen throughout history, it is Clausewitz that first provided a spectrum for Real War in the modern context. This is then reinforced by the analysis of Hans Delbruck and Julian Corbett in their respective works. Although other authors provide similar discussion, these three use both state and non-state examples to demonstrate the spectrum of war.
- 4 Clausewitz, C., *On War*, edited and translated by Howard, M., and Paret, P., Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 72.
- 5 Clausewitz, C., *On War*, edited and translated by Howard, M., and Paret, P., Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 88.
- 6 Clausewitz, pp. 87–88.

- 7 Strachan, H. *The Changing Character of War*, A Europaeum Lecture, Delivered at the Graduate Institute of International Relations, Geneva on 9th November 2006, p. 2-3.
- 8 Gray, C., 'War—Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity', *Parameters*, Summer (2010) : 11.
- 9 Gray, C., 'War—Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity', *Parameters*, Summer (2010) : 11-12.
- 10 **Example:** The truce/ceasefire in effect between North and South Korea since 27 July 1953 is an example of an unresolved conflict returned, in principle, to pre-conflict conditions.
- 11 'Immediate planning' is driven by the situation and refers to planning for operations that are certain or likely. 'Deliberate planning' is largely scenario-based and assumption-based and refers to planning for possible operations.
- 12 Coalition force elements may also contribute to the application of fighting power at the tactical level. Conversely, Australian land force elements may contribute to tactical level coalition fighting power.
- 13 Evans, M. 'The Essential Service,' *Quadrant* 56, no. 10 (2012) : 14.
- 14 **National Power.** The totality of a nation's influence is not merely the sum of the individual elements of power. National power depends on a nation's ability to mobilise and integrate the elements of national power within a strategy to support the state's objectives.
- 15 Quotation cited from: Gray, C. S. *Maintaining Effective Deterrence*. US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, p 13.
- 16 Mordike, J., *An Army for a Nation*, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1992, p. 66.
- 17 This training culture is examined in detail in the Army's 1977 capstone publication, *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations* and its follow-on edition in 1985. See Australian Army, Manual of Land Warfare, Vol. 1, Pamphlet 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations* (Provisional), 1977, Chap 5, p. 1.
- 18 The culture of austerity was examined in detail in the Army's 1977 capstone publication, *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations*. See Australian Army, Manual of Land Warfare, Vol. 1, Pamphlet 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations* (Provisional), 1977, Chap 4, p. 3.
- 19 Evans, M. 'The Essential Service', *Quadrant*, 56, no. 10 (2012) : 15.
- 20 See Australian Army, Manual of Land Warfare, Vol. 1, Pamphlet 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations*, 1985, Chap 2, p. 7.
- 21 John, A., 'From Institution to Occupation: Australian Army Culture in Transition', *Australian Army Journal*, 10, 2/3 (2013) : 188.
- 22 Australian Army, *Project OPERA Review*, 2000, Submission 1, Annex E, E-1.
- 23 Evans, M., *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972–Present*, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 301, September 1999, p. 1.
- 24 **Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831).** Clausewitz was a Prussian General who served in many campaigns, including the Napoleonic Wars, he is remembered today as a great strategic theorist and military philosopher. His often cited definition, that war is '...a continuation of political intercourse', is the product of his analysis of the phenomenon of war. Clausewitz's theoretical exploration of polarity helped define Centre of Gravity and the ideas of 'Perfect' and 'Total' War. These deductions highlighted that all conflict is part of a spectrum. Furthermore, there were enduring themes that linked conflicts together – friction, fog of war, violence, and unpredictability – and characteristics that made each conflict unique. Understanding this Nature and Character of War made it possible to see that war consisted of three elements – often described as Hate/Passion, Chance, and Reason/Policy – that influenced the actor (state or non-state) towards different intensities and popular support for conflict. This 'Wondrous Trinity' formed Clausewitz's theoretical model to understand war.

- 25 **Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869).** Jomini's studies attempted to provide a practical guide to campaigning. Jomini was Swiss born and before his military career was a businessman and stock-broker. He served in the Swiss, French and Russian Armies during the Napoleonic Wars. His writings, particularly those in *Précis of the Art of War*, established the geometry of conflict. Jomini's work shaped the development of modern operational art through his analysis of Lines of Operations, Areas of Operations and Decisive Points. He also influenced modern day terrain analysis with his discussion of Geographical Points and Strategic Points – or modern day Key and Decisive Terrain. Finally, many of the Principles of War used throughout western militaries are derived from Jomini's thesis on logistics, massing and maintaining the 'objective', or aim.
- 26 Although this is not an exhaustive list, the theorists identified are considered to be the most influential in the development of Manoeuvre Warfare and Manoeuvre Theory, which forms the foundation of the Army's Philosophy.
- 27 The term 'threat' is interchangeable with 'enemy' in this context. The contemporary operating environment presents challenges for the application of this tenet as multiple 'stakeholder' centres of gravity may require attention.
- 28 This may include joint combined arms teams employing elements of the deployable civilian capability.
- 29 **Force Weight** is a product of the **Combat Mass** of the Force and the **Environment** it operates in. **Combat Mass** is then the product of the **Combat Power**, and the **Structural Flexibility**. Structural Flexibility is achieved through the organisation's structure and its **Fighting Power**. For Australia:
  - (1) Army's structure provides Battlegroups for the most likely contingency with limited Army re-grouping, and deployable Task Forces for larger or coalition operations with Army wide enablers.
  - (2) Army is developing commensurate capabilities that enables the Army to move and fight in protection with firepower.
  - (3) Army trains for operations in the near region, and prepares its forces to promote and protect Australia's interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

This indicates that Australia is developing a Medium Weight Army. When Army's historical structures and forces are viewed, it is identified that the 'Medium Weight' capacity has always been the goal of force development.
- 30 Doctrine is the principal means by which the Chief of Army guides the Army. The Army's doctrine is organised in four levels: capstone provides strategic and philosophical guidance; fundamental shapes the mind; functional trains the mind; and tactics, techniques and procedures train the individual.
- 31 The 'just war' concept is the internationally accepted doctrine that maintains that resort to war (known in legal terms as '*jus ad bellum*') can only be justified if seven principles are satisfied. These principles must be applied prior to resorting to war, during the conduct of the war and during the establishment of peace after the war. The notion of *jus post bellum* contends that any war must be terminated in a fashion that will not seriously harm the future peace, and that the peace after war must include a settlement that brings justice to as many as possible. The seven principles of just war are generally agreed as: last resort, competent authority, just cause, right intention, probability of success, proportionality and comparative justice.
- 32 Schmidtchen, D and De Somer, G. See *Professional Mastery: The Human Dimension of Warfighting Capability for the Army-After-Next*, Land Warfare Studies Working Paper, Canberra, 1999, for a detailed discussion of professional mastery in the context of individual and organisational development.
- 33 Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) is the task-specific level of capability required by a force to execute its role in an operation at an acceptable level of risk. The standing Army is the lowest level of capability from which a force element can achieve its OLOC within readiness notice, and it encompasses the maintenance of core skills, safety and professional standards. *ADDP 00.2 Preparedness and Mobilisation*.
- 34 The model for this process is the Defence Capability Systems Life Cycle. The phases of the cycle are: needs, requirements, acquisition, in-service and disposal.